Iranian Crisis, First Berlin Crisis, Korean War.

Iranian Crisis (1945–1946)

Unknown operation

During the Second World War, Iran played a special mission in the political and diplomatic actions of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition: it was here in 1943 that the meeting of the "Big Three" - the leaders of the USSR, the USA and England took place. However, few people know that a little later, Iran was to play another role - perhaps the first herald of the beginning of the "cold war" between the Soviet Union and the West. This was recognized, in particular, by the Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who wrote in his memoirs: “It seems to me that historians will confirm that the Cold War actually began in Iran. Although its symptoms were also observed in other parts of the globe, the first signs of this form of war were clearly manifested in Iran.

Like any other, the Iranian crisis had its prehistory. It all started with the entry of allied troops into the territory of Iran in 1941.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, July 8, 1941, I.V. Stalin, in a conversation with British Ambassador to the USSR R. Cripps, raised the question of the situation in the Middle East. He was worried about the excessive concentration of German agents, including saboteurs, on the territory of Iran and the very high probability of this country joining the German axis, which would jeopardize the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The British side, despite the neutrality declared by Iran, treated Moscow's fears with understanding.

Later, another, no less important reason emerged that necessitated the presence of allied troops in Iran. With the outbreak of war in Great Britain, and later in the United States, a decision was made on military supplies to Soviet Union under the lend-lease program. Since August 1941, cargo began to arrive at the northern seaports, which were closer to the fronts of hostilities: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk), etc. Cargo from the USA also received Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Nogaevo (Magadan), Nakhodka . However, German intelligence managed to establish the main routes of the allied sea convoys. German submarines and aircraft based in Norway launched a real hunt for sea caravans. Hundreds of warships, thousands of aircraft and tens of thousands of people were involved in guarding the convoys, but they did not save them from serious losses. Under these conditions, the southern route became more and more attractive - through the ports of Iran and Iraq to Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

On August 17, 1941, a joint Anglo-Soviet note was handed over to the government of Iran. It contained a demand to the Iranian government to ensure the departure of all German specialists from the country. Despite the ultimatum nature of the note, the Iranian government agreed to meet the Anglo-Soviet demands with so many reservations and conditions that its answer was generally considered unacceptable.

Then the Allies decided to move on to military actions. The Soviet government sent a note to Tehran stating that if the ruling circles of Iran did not stop the activities of German agents in the country, the government of the USSR would be forced to send troops to Iran for self-defense. Naturally, the Iranian government, closely connected with the German circles, was not able to stop such activities, especially in the shortest possible time. Practical actions Moscow followed immediately.

On August 25, 1941, the troops of the 44th Army under the command of Major General A.A. Khadeev and the 47th Army under the command of Major General V.V. Novikov entered the territory of Iranian Azerbaijan.

On August 27, the troops of the Central Asian Military District crossed the Soviet-Iranian border along a thousand-kilometer stretch from the Caspian Sea to Zulfagar. This operation was carried out by the 53rd Separate Central Asian Army, which was headed by the commander of the district, Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko. On August 31, an assault force was landed in the Iranian Astarta area as part of the 105th Mountain Rifle Regiment and the artillery battalion of the 77th Mountain Rifle Division. Soviet gunboats entered the ports of Pahlavi, Nowshahr, Bendershah. In total, more than 2.5 thousand paratroopers were transported and landed.

Soviet units entered Iran with battles, clashing with regular units of the Iranian army. The numbers of Soviet losses as a result of these battles are still unknown.

British troops also entered Iranian territory on August 25, moving in two columns: the first - from Basra to Abadan and the oil fields in the Ahvaz region; the second - from Baghdad to the oil fields in the Zaneken area and further north.

On August 29, British advanced units made contact with the Soviet troops in the Senendage area, and two days later another grouping met with the Soviet units a few kilometers south of Qazvin. The operation to bring allied troops into Iran was completed.

According to an earlier agreement, a zone with a radius of 100 km around Tehran remained unoccupied by the allied forces.

On September 19, 1941, in a letter to Stalin, Churchill confirmed his intention to provide all possible support in organizing the southern route for the supply of weapons and goods to the Soviet Union: “I attach great importance to the issue of opening a through route from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian not only by rail, but also along the highway, in the construction of which we hope to attract the Americans with their energy and organizational abilities. On January 29, 1942, the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed, according to which the USSR and Great Britain pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Iran, protect it from German aggression, maintain land, sea and air forces in Iran and withdraw them within a six-month period. period after the end of hostilities.

As the situation at the front changed, especially during the difficult days of 1941-1942, part of the Soviet formations were transferred from Iran to the threatened sectors of the Soviet-German front. The units remaining in Iran were actively involved in the transportation of military cargo delivered to the USSR through Iranian territory.

At the end of 1942, US troops entered the territory of Iran. The command of the American armed forces in the Persian Gulf did not have any agreement on this matter with the Iranian Government, but did not meet with opposition from the cabinet of Kawam es-Saltane, which took a course to encourage the American presence in the country. Thus, he tried to balance the excessive dependence on the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

In that critical period for the USSR, the British repeatedly expressed their readiness to directly participate in the battles on Soviet territory. So, in 1942, the Anglo-American command, having learned about the difficult situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, tried to get Stalin's consent to the entry of British troops and aircraft into the Transcaucasus. Stalin refused, suspecting the British of far-reaching aspirations to gain a foothold in the region after the war. Instead, the Headquarters, on his instructions, transferred to the Transcaucasus from Central Asia and other places, including Iran, all available reserve formations. The situation at the front has stabilized.

In general, the Persian Corridor played a huge role during the war years: 23.8% of all military cargo addressed to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program was transported through it. Almost two-thirds of the total number of all cars delivered during the Second World War went exactly this way. In almost three years, the car assembly plant in the town of Andimeshk alone assembled and sent to the USSR about 78 thousand cars.

Until the autumn of 1942, the vital activity of all transport communications in Iran was provided only by the British. However, with the increase in the volume of traffic, the poor state of Iranian communications affected more and more. The British were no longer able to cope with their restoration. Dissatisfied with this, the Americans in October 1942 took control of the operation of ports, airfields, railways and highways into their own hands. In March 1943, control over the operation of the Trans-Iranian Highway and ports in the Persian Gulf also came under the jurisdiction of the United States. By 1944, the composition of the US Army troops in Iran had increased to 30 thousand people.

Western allies have done a great job of improving Iran's infrastructure. The British administration in the Middle East carried out work on the preparation of the state Trans-Iranian railway in the southern part of Iran to transport goods for the USSR. The American construction firm Folspen has begun construction of a highway from Khorramshahr to the north and a railway line from Ahvaz to that port with a branch to Tanuma. The ports in Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur and Basra were reconstructed; in the port of Khorramshahr, an aircraft and car assembly plant appeared, in the port of Bushehr - a car assembly plant. They assembled Willys, Dodges, Studebakers and other car brands. In the middle of 1943, enterprises also started operating in Shuaiba (Iraq) and the town of Andimeshk, which lies on the Trans-Iranian railway line. Local residents worked at all car assembly enterprises, the administration of the factories consisted of Americans and British, and Soviet military specialists accepted the products.

In Iranian and Iraqi ports, automotive vehicles arrived on cargo ships in the form of assembly kits - in boxes. Collected cars on the beach. At first, the build quality was poor: it was made by hand, and the qualifications of most of the workers left much to be desired. Workers and engineers faced great everyday difficulties. Over time, however, barrack towns were built for the workers, life and food were established; wages have become piecework; fines were set for marriage in the assembly. The quality of work has gradually improved. From the beginning of 1942, approximately 2,000 vehicles per month began to enter the USSR through the Persian Gulf, and from 1943, from 5 to 10,000 vehicles per month. The first column of 50 vehicles left for the Soviet Union on February 23, 1942 from Bushehr via Julfa (Iranian and Soviet).

Driving cars for more than 2 thousand kilometers through mountains and plains, often off-road, proved to be extremely difficult. The convoys usually consisted of 40-50 Studebakers, Fords, Chevrolets and went north on their own. The columns were commanded by Soviet officers and sergeants, the drivers were mostly Iranians and Arabs, often hastily trained to drive cars. The route south of Tehran was guarded mainly by Indian military units. All cars were loaded to the limit: they were carrying spare parts, weapons, food and other goods supplied by the allies under Lend-Lease. Marches were carried out along narrow mountain roads, through steep passes with countless "blind" turns, through a hot desert shrouded in thick dust, which the headlights of automobiles were unable to break through. Armed gangs appeared on the highways, committing sabotage, armed attacks, and robberies.

A particularly difficult and responsible task was the delivery of aviation equipment to the Soviet Union. The planes were either assembled at factories built by the allies in Iran and Iraq and airlifted to Soviet airfields, or sent in disassembled cars and then assembled at Soviet aircraft factories. In order to speed up the transfer of aircraft, a special air base was created in Margil and an intermediate one in Tehran in a short time. In the Azerbaijan SSR, airfields were also prepared to receive combat and transport aircraft, their Maintenance, training pilots for the combat use of American and British fighters and bombers.

Working in heavy climatic conditions required a lot of effort. According to the recollections of the participants in the events, the assembly, for example, of the Boston bombers in Margil, was first carried out by British military specialists. Work began at 3-4 o'clock in the morning and ended at 11 o'clock in the afternoon. At other times, it was physically impossible to work: the machines became so hot under the scorching sun that the workers received burns. Then, Soviet specialists began to be involved in the assembly of aircraft. In just one year, from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944, about 2900 aircraft were assembled and sent to the USSR.

On February 10, 1944, at a meeting with the special envoy of the American President A. Harriman, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR A.I. Mikoyan expressed his satisfaction with the successful arrival of cargo along the southern route through the Persian Gulf. In this regard, on April 15, 1944, by the Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council USSR, a large group of American officers was awarded Soviet orders and medals. In particular, the American General Connolly, who was in charge of all this work, was awarded the Order of Suvorov II degree.

After the Allies opened a second front in France, deliveries to the Soviet Union via the southern route gradually began to wane. The assembly of cars was curtailed, the enterprises were dismantled; Soviet, American and British specialists went home. On October 15, 1944, personnel were withdrawn from the Soviet military camp in Shuaiba; On October 24, the agency in Basra ceased its activities. In November 1944, the last cars were assembled in Andimeshk, and the plant itself was dismantled in January 1945. At the same time, the agency in Bandar Shahpur was also liquidated. From the autumn of 1944 to August 1945, all Lend-Lease deliveries were carried out only through the northern and Far Eastern ports of the USSR.

In accordance with the lend-lease agreement, after the war, the USSR had to return all the surviving serviceable equipment, but could also buy it back. Part of the cars after a major overhaul in 1946–1947 was returned to the former allies in the northern and Far Eastern ports. Relations between Moscow and the Western allies were already damaged, and therefore the acceptance of equipment was carried out in a more than original way. The Western allies brought in several empty barges and a special ship equipped with a press and special "scissors". The American selection committee meticulously accepted the equipment, checked the availability of factory equipment. Then, in full view of the Soviet representatives, the cars were put under pressure, and neat "cubes" of pressed scrap metal were loaded onto barges.

In Iran itself, meanwhile, its own intrigue was unfolding.

Oil background

In addition to military specialists, during the war years, civilian personnel from the USSR also worked in Iran, primarily in the north.

Based on the results of the exploration, Soviet geologists reported to Moscow about the prospects of oil fields in Gogran, Mazandaran and Gilan, which in the northwest were connected with the oil exploration and production lands of Soviet Azerbaijan, and in the northeast with the Turkmen SSR. At the same time, they noted that the industrial development of oil fields would require large investments and - no more, no less - the "alienation" of part of Iranian territory.

Meanwhile, the then allies of the USSR also launched economic activity in Iran. From the end of 1943 - the beginning of 1944, two American oil companies - Standard Vacuum and Sinclair Oil - and the British company Shell, with the support of the US and British embassies and the favorable attitude of the Iranian government, began negotiations in Tehran on granting them oil concessions in southern Iran, in Balochistan. The activity of the allies alarmed Moscow and accelerated work on the preparation of a draft agreement on concluding an oil concession with Iran.

The key figure behind this project was L.P. Beria, at that time deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Having reviewed the package of documents prepared by March 11, 1944, related to the creation of the Soviet-Iranian Oil association and the concession agreement, he was dissatisfied with the "excessively low requests" of the Soviet side and demanded a significant revision of the documents in the direction of increasing Moscow's promising opportunities in Iran. On August 16, 1944, Beria sent I.V. Stalin and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, an analytical report of the Council of People's Commissars, concerning the issues of world oil reserves and production, the oil policy of England and the USA. Beria proposed to "vigorously take up" negotiations with Iran for obtaining a concession in Northern Iran, while emphasizing that "the British, and possibly the Americans, are conducting covert work to counteract the transfer of oil fields in Northern Iran for exploitation by the Soviet Union."

Behind this desire for a concession, there was no urgent need to obtain additional source oil: even in this most difficult period for the country, the USSR was self-sufficient in terms of oil resources. Moscow was driven by a desire to tie Tehran more firmly to Soviet policy, to prevent the creation of a bloc of capitalist countries on its southern borders. Naturally, the Kremlin also understood the importance of oil as the main strategic energy resource of any country. Therefore, the struggle for Iranian oil unfolded in two directions: for gaining access to oil and for preventing other countries from possessing Iran's oil resources. This, by the way, manifested a feature that later became almost the dominant motive of Soviet policy - not to yield to the Western powers in anything, even in the smallest.

In September-October 1944, a government commission of the USSR headed by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs S.I. arrived in Iran. Kavtaradze, whose main task was to conclude an oil concession.

The fate of Kavtaradze himself bore the dramatic imprint of that difficult era. A childhood friend of Stalin, he was arrested in 1937. He was not destroyed only because he was on the list of those sentenced to death penalty Stalin put some kind of squiggle against his last name, which no one could decipher. In order not to get into trouble, they decided to leave the convict alive. At the beginning of the war, S. Kavtaradze, on Stalin's orders, was taken from the camp and taken to Stalin's dacha. “Hello, Sergo,” Stalin greeted him. - Where was it? Where had you been?" “I was sitting,” answered Kavtaradze. Stalin looked at him in surprise and, with his usual "black" humor, said: "I found time to sit - the war is on." After the conversation that followed, S. Kavtaradze was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet mission in Iran was not successful. On December 2, the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, which overwhelmingly did not feel sympathy for the USSR, passed a law prohibiting prime ministers not only from independently granting concessions to foreign states, but even from negotiating them. Iran's ruling circles tended to rely on the United States in their post-war policy, seeing it as a reliable counterbalance to the traditional influence of London and Moscow.

The Americans took advantage of favorable moods in the leadership of Iran. A special role was played by the American financial mission headed by A. Milspo, who was invited by the Iranian government to the post of financial expert, "general administrator of Iranian finances." However, soon Milspo and his mission brought the entire internal and foreign trade, industry, food resources, rationing and distribution of goods, motor vehicles and transportation on the highways of Iran.

American military missions also worked in Iran: Colonel N. Schwarzkopf - in the Iranian gendarmerie and General K. Ridley - in the Iranian army. Ultimately, it was the US Embassy in Iran that acted as the chief adviser to Prime Minister Syed's cabinet on the issue of granting the USSR an oil concession in the north.

However, at that moment, the Soviet leadership was disoriented, believing that the British were behind the Iranian government. On February 19, 1945, a message was received in Moscow from an informant of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who had been in Iran since the existence of the Comintern, that the decision taken by the Majlis was directly caused by the activities of pro-British forces. The ruling circles of Great Britain, in turn, were very concerned about the strengthening of the positions of the USSR in Iran during the war years, which they continued to consider as their own "sphere of influence". They associated their main hopes for a change in the situation with the end of the war and the withdrawal Soviet troops from the northern provinces.

It was here that Moscow saw its chance. Almost the only lever of pressure on the Iranian government on the issue of an oil concession remained at its disposal - delaying the withdrawal of troops.

According to the tripartite treaty on allied relations between the USSR, Great Britain and Iran of January 29, 1942, the withdrawal of Soviet and British troops that did not have occupation status was provided for no later than six months after the end of all hostilities between allied states and the Axis Powers. After the rout Nazi Germany the number of foreign troops on the territory of Iran was as follows: English - approximately 20-25 thousand people; American - 4-4.5 thousand. The number of Soviet troops reached 30 thousand people. On May 19, 1945, the Iranian government turned to England, the USSR and the USA with a proposal for the early withdrawal of their troops from the country, citing the end of the war with Germany.

Concerned about the prospect of consolidating the "penetration" of the USSR in Iran, the British government decided to support the position of Iran and on May 31, through its ambassador in Moscow, A. Kerr, sent a letter to the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where it was proposed to agree on the early withdrawal of allied troops from this country. The Soviet government did not respond to the letter. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs also kept silent about the letter of the American Ambassador A. Harriman dated June 14, announcing the end of the mission of the American command in the Persian Gulf and measures to reduce the US armed forces in Iran.

Only at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945 did the British delegation manage to "draw Stalin's attention" to their plan for a three-stage withdrawal of troops. The Soviet leader at that moment simply could not ignore the Iranian issue. According to English plan, the allied troops were first to be withdrawn from Tehran, then from all of Iran, with the exception of Abadan, where the British troops remained, and the zones in the northeast and northwest of the country, where the Soviet troops remained. This was to be followed by a complete withdrawal of troops from all of Iran.

As a result of an exchange of views between the heads of the three great powers, an agreement was reached only with regard to Tehran. Further decision on the matter was postponed until a meeting of the Council of Allied Foreign Ministers in London in September.

In a memorandum to Molotov dated May 25, 1945, Kavtaradze explained the motives for delaying the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran: “The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran will undoubtedly lead to an increase in reaction in the country and the inevitable defeat of democratic organizations. The reactionary and pro-British elements will make every effort and use every means to eliminate our influence and the results of our work in Iran.”

The situation gradually turned into a sharp confrontation between yesterday's allies.

And the Turkish Crisis of 1946.

According to the decisions Potsdam Conference, at the end of the war, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain had to withdraw troops from Iran, where they were introduced in 1942 so that this country would not reorient itself towards Germany.

On September 13, 1945, the Iranian government asked the three powers to withdraw their troops. American troops were evacuated by January 1, 1946. By March 2, the British left Iran. The Soviet Union refused to name a date for the withdrawal of troops. In Iran, the fermentation of ethnic minorities was then growing - Azerbaijanis (in the northwest, in Iranian Azerbaijan) and Kurds (in the southwest, in Iranian Kurdistan). They sought broad autonomy. The Iranian authorities and Western countries suspected that the USSR wanted to assist the separatists in order to separate Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran and unite it with the Soviet Azerbaijan SSR. On November 18, 1945, an uprising began in Iranian Azerbaijan, organized by the People's Party of Iran (the Tudeh Party, in fact, the Iranian Communist Party). The Tehran government sent troops to put down the rebellion, but were stopped by Soviet forces. In March 1946, the Iranian authorities filed a complaint about this with the UN Security Council.

The borders of the autonomous Azerbaijan and Kurdish (Mahabad) republics created in the north of Iran during the crisis of 1946

The USSR also used the presence of its troops on Iranian territory as a means of pressure on Tehran in order to obtain oil concessions from it in the north of the country.

Public opinion in Great Britain, whose zone of influence had been southern Iran for many years, reacted especially violently to these events. Now that the British troops had left and the Soviets remained, British politicians felt betrayed. In the midst of the Iranian crisis, March 5, 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, speaking at Westminster College in Fulton (Missouri, USA), delivered a famous speech against the USSR. He accused Moscow of creating an "iron curtain" dividing the world into two parts, and called for strengthening the "Anglo-Saxon partnership" between the US and Britain to counter the communist threat. The President of the United States listened to the speech in the hall G. Truman, who did not directly support Churchill's thoughts, but did not express disagreement with them either. The Fulton Speech was taken as a manifesto cold war».

Why did the Iranian crisis arise? How did W. Churchill's Fulton speech and I. Stalin's reaction to it influence the international situation?
3. What was the balance of power in Greece during the civil war? Why did the USSR refrain from actively helping the Greek communists?
4. What claims did the USSR put forward against Turkey? What was the US position during the crisis?
The first obvious consequences of the Soviet foreign policy strategy were the Iranian, Greek and Turkish crises.
According to the Potsdam decisions, after the end of the world war, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain were to withdraw their troops from Iran, where they were introduced in 1942 to prevent Iran's reorientation towards Germany.
Keyword
The crisis- a sharp aggravation of contradictions between states, capable of developing into a full-scale war at any moment. As a rule, crises occur against the backdrop of an acute shortage of time resources for the political and diplomatic settlement of the dispute. In the development of the crisis, several main phases are distinguished: creeping, culmination (the highest point), from which events can develop either to war or to compromise and settlement (the phase of overcoming the crisis).
On September 13, 1945, the Iranian government asked the three powers to withdraw their troops. American troops were evacuated by January 1, 1946. By March 2, the British left Iran. The Soviet Union refused to name a date for the withdrawal of troops. There were reasons for this. In Iran, in the last years of World War II, there was an increase in the national-revolutionary ferment of ethnic minorities - Azerbaijanis in the northwest, in Iranian Azerbaijan, and Kurds in the southwest, in Iranian Kurdistan. These were separatist movements whose leaders sought broad autonomy from the all-Iranian government in Tehran. The leadership of Iran, as well as in Western capitals, suspected that the USSR might assist the separatists in order to separate Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran and unite it with Soviet Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan SSR). On November 18, 1945, an uprising began in Iranian Azerbaijan, organized by the People's Party of Iran (the Tudeh Party, in fact, the Iranian Communist Party). The central government sent troops from Tehran to suppress the rebellion, but they were not allowed into the area covered by it by Soviet forces. In March 1946, the Iranian government filed a complaint with the UN Security Council about the actions of the Soviet military authorities.
The USSR also used the question of the presence of its troops on Iranian territory as a means of putting pressure on Tehran in order to obtain oil concessions from it in northern Iran. Soviet-Iranian negotiations on the withdrawal of troops, linked to the problem of oil concessions, were difficult.
Public opinion in Great Britain, whose zone of influence had been southern Iran for many years, reacted especially violently to the events. Now that the British troops had left and the Soviets remained, British politicians felt betrayed. At the height of the Iranian crisis, on March 5, 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who retired in 1945, delivered his famous diatribe against the USSR while speaking at Westminster College in Fulton (Missouri, USA). W. Churchill accused Moscow of creating an "iron curtain" dividing the world into two parts, and called for strengthening the "Anglo-Saxon partnership" between the US and Britain in the interests of countering the communist threat. During the speech of the British politician, US President Harry Truman was in the hall, who did not develop the ideas stated by W. Churchill, but did not express disagreement with them either. In the world, the "Fulton speech" was perceived as a manifesto of the "cold war", the beginning of which, figuratively speaking, was proclaimed by the retired British prime minister.
Winston Churchill's speech received international resonance largely because I. V. Stalin directly responded to it. On March 14, 1946, in a special interview, he spoke sharply about this speech, stating that in essence it meant a call to war. The press picked up Stalin's careless statements and the problem of "war" between the USSR and the West became the motive for newspaper comments. As a result, in the political atmosphere in different countries the world began to be intimidated by fears. The confrontation between the USSR and the West began to escalate.
Keyword
Escalation- growth, escalation of tension, aggravation of the situation or
conflict.
The Iranian crisis was resolved during the Soviet-Iranian dialogue by April 1946. As a compromise, agreements were reached on the creation of a Soviet-Iranian oil society on favorable terms for the USSR and on expanding the representation of delegates from Iranian Azerbaijan in the Iranian Mejlis. By May 9, 1946, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Iran, and in June the consequences of the uprising in Iranian Azerbaijan were eliminated. In September of the same year, separatist pockets in Iranian Kurdistan (Fars province) were suppressed.
At the end of the crisis, Washington remained convinced that Moscow was forced to make concessions by the principled position of the United States and Britain on Iran. JV Stalin concluded that a British-American alliance was being formed against the USSR.
2, After the country was occupied by German troops in June 1941, King George II fled the country with his family. A partisan movement arose in the occupied territory, in which the communists played an important role - the People's Liberation Army of the Greek People (ELAS). By 1945, its forces had liberated about two-thirds of the country from German troops. Meanwhile, in October 1944, with the support of the Western allies, parts of the armed forces of the royal government arrived in Greece, which clashed with communist detachments. The conflict lasted until February 1945. Although the Soviet Union had influence on the Greek communists and could provide assistance to them through the territory of Yugoslavia, controlled by the forces of J. B. Tito, I. V. Stalin did not want to aggravate relations with Great Britain, whose sphere of influence included Gretzsch , according to the tacit agreements of the "Big Three" during the war years. The Greek communists were advised to yield. On February 12, 1945, in the town of Varkiza, near Athens, agreements were signed between the leaders of the left-wing detachments and the royal government, according to which power was transferred to the latter. Part of the Greek communists did not agree with this decision.
In the summer of 1946, the crisis escalated due to attempts by the authorities to increase military pressure on the left. started in Greece Civil War, which lasted until 1949. Responsibility for it in the Western capitals was assigned to Moscow, which was only partly true. Although the Greek communists had the opportunity to receive assistance from abroad, the USSR continued to refrain from such support, including because of the desire not to irritate friendly Bulgaria, which itself had territorial claims against Greece and was suspicious of the militancy of the Greek communists. In fact, the main initiator of helping the Greek communists was J. B. Tito.
3. In February 1945, Turkey formally declared war on Germany, but did not conduct military operations against it. Relations between the USSR and Turkey during the World War were riddled with mutual distrust. Moscow expected Ankara's speech on the side of Germany and prepared for it. But Turkey evaded entry into the war and benefited from it. The Soviet Union had no formal grounds to enter into a conflict with Turkey, especially since between the two countries there had been a periodically extended Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality since 1925. It was last extended for 10 years in 1935 in such a way that it was to expire on September 7, 1945. On March 19, 1945, 6 months before its expiration, the USSR, as provided for in the text treaty, notified the Turkish government of its intention not to renew it. In Ankara, this was regarded as a warning about the toughening of the USSR's attitude towards Turkey.
At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union tried to achieve the right to ensure the security of the straits along with Turkey. But these demands of the USSR were not supported. In view of its decision to terminate the Soviet-Turkish treaty, the Soviet Union tried to obtain from Ankara an advantageous security regime in the strait zone at the bilateral level. On August 7, 1946, a note was sent to the Turkish government with a proposal to enter into negotiations on changing the navigation regime in the Black Sea straits and allowing the USSR to create a Soviet military base in the straits zone. The content of the note was immediately brought to the attention of the Turkish side by the US Secretary of State James Francis Byrnes, who at that moment was in Paris.
According to American sources, the Soviet note was taken seriously in Washington, as the American leadership did not cease to reproach itself for the "softness" shown in relation to the actions of the USSR during the Iranian crisis, and sought to behave more firmly this time. In the United States, the question of possible measures of military counteraction to the USSR was discussed if, following the note, it would take military actions against Turkey. In the spring-autumn of 1946, based on reports from American and British intelligence about the concentration of Soviet troops in Romania, Bulgaria and the territory of the Soviet Transcaucasia (according to various sources, up to 600,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Romania, and up to 235,000 in Bulgaria) , in the United States and Great Britain were inclined to believe the possibility of a Soviet armed uprising against Turkey.
However, soon American representatives from Turkey and Moscow began to report to Washington that there were no signs of the Soviet side's intention to take steps against Ankara. The crisis did not follow. The Turkish government, upon receiving the note, according to Western sources, also considered it less harsh than it had expected. Moscow did not intend to go into conflict. Perhaps, given the painful reaction of the United States and Britain to the note on the straits, the Soviet government did not insist on accepting its demands. In October, American and British intelligence recorded a decrease in Soviet activity near the borders of Turkey. However, officially the USSR did not renounce its claims to Ankara until May 30, 1953.
The US leadership has learned from the Turkish situation the belief in the need for bases in the Eastern Mediterranean and the provision of military and economic assistance to Turkey to modernize its military potential. Washington paid more attention to oil supplies from the Middle East, the security of which depended on the situation in the Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey, separating this region from the USSR, acquired special significance for American strategic planning.
Minimum knowledge
1. USSR in 1945-1946 tried to check the degree of readiness of the Western allies to protect the "disputed", in his opinion, countries and territories and, if possible, to attach them to his zone of influence. In Iran, the USSR supported the anti-government movements of Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan. Churchill's speech in Fulton, in which he called for the unification of the Anglo-Saxon world against the USSR, which had separated itself with the Iron Curtain, provoked a painful reaction from Stalin, which led to an escalation of international tension.
2. Despite the significant opportunities for the Greek communists to spread their power in the country, the USSR did not provide them with significant assistance, based on allied agreements with Britain during the anti-Hitler coalition.
3. The USSR sought to close the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for the passage of warships of non-Black Sea powers. Therefore, he proposed the idea of ​​"joint defense" of the Black Sea straits. Relying on the support of the United States, Turkey rejected this proposal. In the public opinion of Western countries, ideas about the aggressive intentions of the USSR towards Turkey spread.

Another major crisis took place in Iran as a result of a tense conflict between London and the Nationalist government set up on 28 April 1951 by Mohammed Mosaddegh, head of the National Front, who had long campaigned for the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had a concession to exploit the vast Iranian oil resources.

The decision to nationalize the British company, taken by Mosaddegh two days later

Chapter 10 Coexistence-rivalry and decolonization 923

after the formation of the government, became the first serious challenge to the dominance of the oil-producing country of concession campaigns (mostly British, American, Dutch). The nationalization marked the beginning of a grueling legal battle between the parties involved, in which London used all its influence in favor of the Anglo-Iranian Company. However, above all, it became the occasion for a sharp political clash: the Iranian communists tried to intervene in it, and the United States played a large role in it.

In October 1952, with the rupture of diplomatic relations between Iran and Great Britain, the conflict reached its climax. It was the danger of such a conflict that led to an open clash between Mosaddegh and Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had previously unsuccessfully tried to remove the nationalist leader from the government. The internal crisis, exacerbated by the cessation of oil production as a result of nationalization and a boycott by the British, pushed Mossadegh to extremist decisions, which led to the fact that even his closest supporters gradually left him.

In August 1953, Mosaddegh tried to consolidate power, which was already beginning to elude him, with a plebiscite that brought the country under totalitarian rule. After several days of confusion, during which Reza Pahlavi left Iran and took refuge in Italy, the military elite, led by General Fazlollah Zahedi, supported by American intelligence agencies, defeated Mosaddegh's supporters. On August 19, Zahedi formed a new government.

A few days later, the shah returned from exile, received by his subjects as a triumphant. Mosaddegh's period is over. However, his experience left a deep imprint that spread from Iran to other oil-producing countries, giving rise to the problem of how to combine the possession of resources and the ability to exploit and sell them. The problem of raw materials, therefore, again began to play a central role in international relations. Nor was the fact forgotten that the "reconquest" of Iranian positions was made possible by the intervention of the United States, rather than by the behavior of Great Britain. This made it impossible to restore the positions previously held by the Anglo-Iranian Company.

After another year of protracted negotiations, in August 1954 a new consortium of oil companies signed a concession agreement with the Iranian government. Part of this consortium

924 Part 4. Bipolar system: detente...

still was the Anglo-Iranian company, which had 40% of the shares; it also included Royal Dutch Shell, with a 14% stake, five American companies located in total 40% of the shares and "Company Francaise de Petrol", from 6%. The new consortium was to produce, refine and sell oil on behalf of the Iranian National Oil Company, established by Mossaddeq and maintained as a profit-sharing structure of 50/50% between the new consortium and Iran. This division of profits from oil production became the rule, which gradually spread to the entire industry. It was also the first step towards increasing the difficulties in resolving the rights of the owners of the deposits in their relationship with the rights to exploit and distribute profits. Possibility for producing countries to exercise full control over production process, up to its commercialization, was already visible, but technological problems and lack of financial resources did not allow at this stage to take decisive action in connection with this problem.

It was supposed that today the note will be again devoted to precious metals and money, but life has made its own adjustments. I came across extremely interesting information regarding the situation around Iran and Syria. This is an interview given on February 1, 2012 by Colonel General Leonid Ivashov to MEMRI TV. Answering questions put to him, the former high-ranking military man answered with confidence that Russia was ready to use its armed forces. The two nations are seen as “guaranteed partners of Russia. The only question, therefore, is whom [the West and Israel] will try to destroy first as a stable country: Syria or Iran.”

The former Chief of the General Staff made it clear that Russia would do everything necessary to protect its interests, since "an attack on Syria or Iran is an indirect attack on Russia." Therefore, Ivashov believes that "by defending Syria, Russia is protecting its own interests."

Ivashov's statements in this interview seem to indicate that the Russian leadership is fed up with the results of American, European and Israeli actions in the Middle East and North Africa and is ready for quick and tough action against anyone who attacks against Russia's allies in this region.

The situation around Syria, Iran and the Persian Gulf continues to rapidly escalate. The Pakistani authorities have made it clear that in the event of a Western strike against Iran, Pakistan will side with the latter. And Pakistan, among other things, possesses nuclear weapons. Considering the most close ties Iran and Pakistan with China, it is quite clear that the Celestial Empire will not stand aside in the event of an armed conflict. An equally active participant in this conflict and most likely also on the side of Iran will be another nuclear power - India, because both India and China consume about a third of all Iranian oil. Another thing is that it seems unlikely that these powers would take part directly in a military conflict, but they will undoubtedly provide all possible assistance to Iran.

The constantly deteriorating situation in the economy of the United States and Western countries is pushing their leadership to more risky and adventurous actions. And the new war unleashed in the Middle East can be used by them to justify further deterioration in the situation of the peoples of their countries, because when the authorities are unable to solve problems within the country, they badly need an external enemy or enemies on whom they can blame their internal failures.

No matter what the Americans and their allies say, trying to justify their aggression against Iran, no matter what they cite as arguments for unleashing the conflict, and no matter what provocation they organize for this (the story of the explosion of the battleship Maine in Havana, which served as a pretext for the Spanish - the American War of 1898; the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941, or the events of September 11, 2001, which served as a pretext for unleashing a global "war on terror"; this time it will be possible to organize, say, the death of an American aircraft carrier), the main reason for it is the situation with American banknotes. All new bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries that are gradually and persistently ousting the American currency from international trade and replacing it with commodity barter or, in the future, with gold settlements, deal mortal blows to American hegemony. The American economy is no longer able to compete normally with other countries, and the only thing that still keeps it from complete disaster is the US Federal Reserve Note, which acts as the world's reserve currency. The process of destroying American dominance through such bilateral agreements is somewhat reminiscent of the Chinese torture of a thousand cuts. Each of them is not fatal in itself, but together they lead to a painful death.

Iran found itself at the very edge of this struggle for the elimination of American hegemony, the restoration of normal pricing, the world economy and trade, supported by China and many other allies who will not stop being friends with it. Time will tell exactly how events will develop, but something tells me that the military conflict unleashed by the Americans (or the Israelis) will only accelerate the decline of the United States as a great empire.

Only one thing remains clear. Rising tensions will contribute to pushing up the prices of precious metals, and open armed conflict will send them to a qualitatively different, more high level, since, most likely, military operations on the economic and financial fronts may turn out to be much more important than military operations. Not as visible to the media (mis)information, but no less bloody.

Lezhava, Alexander

Member of the editorial board, special correspondent for the newspaper "Modern School of Russia". The author of the book "The collapse of" money "or how to protect your savings in a crisis" (published by the publishing house "Knizhny Mir" in 2009) and "Entertaining Economics".