In early April 1945, British Prime Minister Churchill ordered the Chiefs of Staff to immediately prepare a plan, codenamed "The Unthinkable"
(Eng. Operation Unthinkable), according to Churchill's idea, the armed forces of England, the USA, France, Canada, Poland (2 corps) and Germany (10 German divisions) were to deliver a powerful blow to the positions of the Red Army in Central Europe. The old anti-communist Churchill could not survive the Russian persecution in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. One cannot exaggerate planning operations in general, and planning Operation Unthinkable in particular. Because there are big differences between the planned and the reality. But nevertheless, this fact emphasized the state in which the participants of the anti-Hitler coalition were during the lifetime of their worst enemy- Adolf Hitler. Of course, the reality in the spring of 1945 did not favor the implementation of the "Unthinkable" plan. Firstly, Japan was still very strong, and secondly, the Red Army occupied very advantageous positions in Europe. Thirdly, public opinion, either overseas or in the British Isles, would hardly have approved of such a turn of events. But among politicians there were supporters of this turn of events, for example, General George Patton, who stated that " ... he will reach the Volga and Stalingrad with his troops ...(probably in the footsteps of Paulus). But in general, the military-political leaders of Great Britain and the United States did not approve of Churchill's plan "Unthinkable" (Eng. Operation Unthinkable).
On May 22, 1945, the plan for Operation Unthinkable was presented to Prime Minister Churchill. Was this plan good or bad in terms of strategy, was everything provided for in it? We do not know, but one could say about this that it was extreme cynicism towards his recent ally, even in thoughts. Churchill, having familiarized himself with the Unthinkable plan, realized that he had gone too far. Churchill's treachery would cost the Anglo-Americans a lot of blood, and Prime Minister Churchill understood this well. Nor was he convinced that the British public would approve of his belligerent premier. Yes, and Churchill significantly exaggerated the confidence of the English people in himself.

By mid-April 1945, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (commander Marshal Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) were located 60–70 km from Berlin. On the morning of April 16, the main forces of the 1st Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian, and then the 2nd Belorussian fronts began an operation to capture Berlin. In April 1945, Vienna, Berlin, and then Prague were out of reach of the troops of the Western Allies.

The troops of the Western Allies crossed the Rhine in April and completed the liquidation of the enemy's Ruhr grouping. They liberated Magdeburg and a number of other major German cities. On April 25, a historic meeting of American and Soviet troops took place on the Elbe, near the city of Torgau.

Nazi Germany was in complete political isolation. Its only ally, Japan, against which, according to the decision confirmed at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union was to act, was no longer able to exert any influence on the course of events in Europe. Through the efforts of the US Navy, Japanese troops were driven out of almost all the territories of the Pacific Ocean it had captured, and the Japanese navy was defeated. However, the ground forces of Japan were still a powerful force, the fight against which in China and on the Japanese islands themselves could, according to the calculations of the American command, drag on until 1947 and require heavy sacrifices.

The USSR, ensuring the fulfillment of allied obligations and its own geopolitical interests, launched from the beginning of 1945 material preparations for military operations against the Japanese armies. In April, the first command and staff departments of military formations set off from the Soviet-German front to the Far East, which, after the defeat of Germany, were to enter the war with Japan.
The establishment of Soviet control over the countries of Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War, in particular the creation of a pro-Soviet government in Poland as a counterweight to the government in exile in London, led to the fact that the ruling circles of Great Britain and the United States began to perceive the USSR as a threat.
In April 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the preparation of a war plan against the USSR. The assignment was preceded by conclusions that Churchill presented in his memoirs:
first, Soviet Russia became a deadly threat to the free world;
secondly, to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance;
thirdly, this front in Europe should go as far as possible to the east;
fourthly, the main and true goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin;
fifthly, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague is of the utmost importance;
sixthly, Vienna, essentially the whole of Austria, should be ruled by the Western powers, at least on an equal footing with the Russian Soviets;
seventhly, it is necessary to curb the aggressive claims of Marshal Tito towards Italy ...

Operation plan

The plan of operation was prepared by the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet. The plan gives an assessment of the situation, formulates the goals of the operation, defines the forces involved, the directions of attacks by the troops of the Western allies and their probable results. The appendices to the plan contain information about the deployment of the Red Army troops (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and the Western allies, as well as cartographic material. The time of the Prime Minister's order to develop an operation plan is not indicated, but given the complexity of its preparation, the nature and volume of the documents themselves, there is every reason to assume that the Prime Minister's order was received by the planners in April 1945.
The general political goal of the planned operation was "to impose on the Russians the will of the United States and the British Empire." At the same time, it was noted that “although the “will” of the two countries can be considered as a matter directly related only to Poland, it does not at all follow that the degree of our involvement (in the conflict) will necessarily be limited. A quick (military) success may or may not induce the Russians to submit to our will at least temporarily. If they want total war, they will get it." military campaign was originally supposed to be land-based and deployed in North-Eastern Europe, the best zone for the offensive was considered the territory north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Dresden-Gerlitz line. At the same time, it was assumed that the rest of the front would hold the defense.

July 1, 1945 was considered as the start date of the operation in the plan. The operation was supposed to involve 47 British and American divisions.

The possibility of participation in the operation of 10-12 German divisions armed by the British and Americans was also considered.

Participation in the war of Poland was allowed, in the event of the transfer of hostilities to its territory. In some sources, the plan of operation is considered as a plan for the Third World War.
Reasons for canceling the operation

The planners came to two main conclusions:
starting a war with the Russians, it is necessary to be prepared for a long and costly total war, the numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes it extremely doubtful the possibility of achieving limited and quick (military) success. Therefore, we believe that if a war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve a quick limited success and we will find ourselves embroiled in a long war against superior forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces may increase exorbitantly if American fatigue and indifference increase and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific.

From the conclusion of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, sent to Churchill

It should also be noted that Churchill pointed out in comments on the draft plan presented to him that the plan was a "precautionary measure" for what he hoped was a "purely hypothetical case."

In addition, it should be borne in mind that the United States was extremely interested in the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan.

According to Edinburgh University professor D. Erickson, Churchill's plan helps to explain “why Marshal Zhukov unexpectedly decided in June 1945 to regroup his forces, received orders from Moscow to strengthen the defenses and study in detail the deployment of Western Allied troops. Now the reasons are clear: obviously, Churchill's plan became known to Moscow in advance and the Stalinist General Staff took appropriate countermeasures.

Further plans in case of war with the USSR

In mid-July 1945, Churchill, having suffered a defeat in the elections, resigned. The Labor government led by Clement Attlee came to power in the UK. In 1946, the new British government, headed by C. Attlee, continued to develop plans for a war with the USSR, involving the United States and Canada for this. The negotiations were entrusted to the head of the British military mission in Washington, a participant in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Field Marshal H. Wilson, who discussed British military projects with President G. Truman, General D. Eisenhower, at that time the commander-in-chief of allied forces in Europe and Canadian Prime Minister M. King. In September, General D. Eisenhower met on a yacht off the coast of the United States with British Field Marshal B. Montgomery. The parties ultimately came to the conclusion that if the Red Army launched an offensive in Europe, the Western Allies would not be able to stop it. The plan for Operation Unthinkable, or rather what was left of it, was sent to the archive, subsequent plans for the war against the USSR were already developed at the NATO level

An insidious plan to attack the USSR, which did not take place largely because of the IS-3 tank, which won the Third World War without firing a single shot and Churchill's failure in his political career, and later because of the success of the Soviet atomic bomb and the Tu-4 bomber.

It is generally accepted that the Cold War began on March 5, 1946. It was on this day, at the suggestion of US President Truman, that Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, in which he “substantiated” the thesis about the threat of another general war and “tyranny” from the USSR. At the same time, he frightened the listeners with disasters coming from the East and the inevitable "Iron Curtain" supposedly lowered by the Soviets on Europe.

The speaker borrowed this term from Goebbels' editorial in the Das Reich newspaper (dated February 25, 1945), which largely determines many of the further steps of the "allies" - they learned from the Nazis and studied well.

Operation Unthinkable is the code name for two plans (offensive and defensive) in the event of a military conflict between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the USSR on the other, developed in the spring and summer of 1945. Both plans were developed at the behest of Prime Minister Winston Churchill by the Joint Planning Staff of the British War Cabinet, in the deepest secret even from other headquarters. Documents relating to these plans are currently held at the National Archives of Great Britain.

The immediate goal of the offensive plan was the forceful "crowding out" of Soviet troops from Poland, the defensive one was the organization of the defense of the British Isles in the event of a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The plan of the offensive operation is considered as the plan of the Third World War.

Subsequently, in his memoirs, Churchill formulated his view of the situation in the spring of 1945 as follows: “The destruction of Germany's military power entailed a radical change in relations between communist Russia and Western democracies. They lost their common enemy, the war against which was almost the only link that bound their alliance. From now on, Russian imperialism and communist doctrine did not see and did not set limits to their advancement and striving for final domination. From this, according to Churchill, the following practical implications for Western strategy and policy flowed:

First, Soviet Russia became a deadly threat to the free world;
secondly, to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance;
thirdly, this front in Europe should go as far as possible to the east;
fourthly, the main and true goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin;
fifthly, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague is of the utmost importance;
sixthly, Vienna, essentially all of Austria, must be ruled by the Western powers, at least on an equal footing with the Russian Soviets;
seventh, Marshal Tito's aggressive claims against Italy must be curbed.

Introductory plan

In such a situation, Churchill instructs the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet to present their views on the military campaign against the USSR, code-named "Operation Unthinkable."

The input data (conditions from which the planners should proceed) were given the following:

The action receives the full support of public opinion in Britain and the United States, and the morale of the Anglo-American troops is high.

UK and US have full support from Polish troops and can rely on the use of German labor and the remaining German industrial potential, as well as 100,000 POW corps, again put under arms.

The armies of the other Western powers cannot be relied upon.

The USSR enters into an alliance with Japan.

The plan was ready on May 22. The plan gives an assessment of the situation, formulates the goals of the operation, defines the forces involved, the directions of attacks by the troops of the Western allies and their probable results. The appendices to the plan contain information about the deployment of the Red Army troops (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and the Western allies, as well as cartographic material.

The main general political goal of the operation was supposed to be to impose on the USSR the will of the United States and Britain in relation to Poland. However, the planners stressed, "Although the 'will' of the two countries may be seen as a matter directly related only to Poland, it does not at all follow that the extent of our involvement (in the conflict) will necessarily be limited." It is very possible that the set goal will not be achieved with a limited campaign, even if it is crowned with a quick victory in the operation on German territory, since the USSR will continue active resistance. In the latter case, one should be prepared for a total war: “if they (the Russians) want a total war, then they will get it.”

The land campaign plan called for two main attacks in northeastern Europe in the direction of Poland. Although outnumbered by the Soviet forces, the Allies have hope of success due to the element of surprise and superior command and control of the air force. In this case, the Anglo-Americans will be able to reach the common line Danzig - Breslau. It was further noted that unless the Red Army suffered a decisive defeat west of this line and was withdrawn, total war was inevitable.

According to Edinburgh University professor D. Erickson, Churchill's plan helps to explain “why Marshal Zhukov unexpectedly decided in June 1945 to regroup his forces, having received orders from Moscow to strengthen the defenses and study in detail the deployment of the troops of the Western Allies. Now the reasons are clear: obviously, Churchill's plan became known to Moscow in advance and the Soviet General Staff took appropriate countermeasures. The plan for Operation Unthinkable was indeed transferred to the USSR by the Cambridge Five.

The IS-3 tanks did not have to fight during the Second World War, but their appearance was quite spectacular and cooled the ardor of those who wanted to fight with the USSR. Seeing the number of tanks and the fact that these were not prototypes, but production models, Churchill and Truman clearly tempered their ardor, since there was nothing even close to similar in their armies. Since then, the fear of "Russian tanks" has gone, because with a powerful superiority in attack bombers and existing nuclear bombs, in tanks and infantry, no one could argue with the USSR.

The Victory Parade of the Allied Forces in World War II - took place on September 7, 1945 in Berlin, at the Brandenburg Gate. The parade was commanded by English Major General Eric Nairs. Marshal G.K. Zhukov hosted the parade from the Soviet Union.

The parade was completed by heavy Soviet tanks of a type completely unknown to the allies, armed with large-caliber guns. Moving three in a row, the tanks approached the podium. The column consisted of fifty-two vehicles - a consolidated detachment created on the basis of the 71st Guards Heavy Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards Tank Army.

British Brigadier General Frank Howley, who witnessed the parade, later wrote in his memoirs: “As for armored vehicles, the Allies limited themselves to a demonstration of light tanks and armored vehicles. tanks) gigantic new tanks of the type "Joseph Stalin". Compared to Russian tanks, everything on Unter den Linden seemed to have decreased in size. Holding the line, the tanks drove past, the vents of their powerful guns pierced the sky. "

After the parade, Zhukov sent a report to Stalin, in which, in particular, the following was said: "... Our IS-3 tanks made an indelible impression on foreigners. The tanks passed in even rows and showed themselves well."

Churchill, having suffered a defeat in the elections in the summer of 1945, resigned. The Labor government led by Clement Attlee came to power in the UK. Attlee was much more favorable towards the USSR, but what did this "favorable mood" mean, in 1946 the Attlee government continued to develop plans for a war with the USSR, involving the United States and Canada for this.

On November 3, 1945 (that is, just two months after the surrender of Japan), Report No. 329 from the Joint Intelligence Committee was submitted to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States. The very first paragraph of this document read: "Select approximately 20 targets suitable for strategic atomic bombing of the Soviet Union." In the eyes of American military strategists, the moment was right. The USSR paid for the victory in World War II with more than 27 million lives (disputes about the figure are still ongoing), while the United States lost less than half a million of its citizens in the war. At the same time, the industrial potential of the states was not only not affected by the fighting, but also increased immeasurably, thanks to the huge number of military orders. At the end of World War II, the United States accounted for 2/3 of the world's industrial production and half of all steel production.

Already on December 14, 1945, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue a directive, which, among other things, noted: "The most effective weapon that the states can use to strike at the Soviet Union are the available atomic bombs." The plans that were created at that moment in time assumed to achieve decisive success primarily through the massive use of atomic bombs and bombing of the territory of the USSR, which was supposed to undermine the economic potential of the country and cause a psychological shock to the army and the population. True, it was recognized that psychologically the bombing could, on the contrary, lead to the rallying of the population of the USSR around their government.

Starting from the end of 1945, one military plan for the war with the Soviet Union was invariably replaced by another. Moreover, each of these plans promised the Americans an unconditional victory in the war. There were enough arguments to show optimism about a possible conflict, and the most important was that Washington at that time already had an atomic bomb ready, and Moscow was only creating this terrible weapon. The debut American war plan against the USSR, called the Pinscher, was ready on March 2, 1946. The Middle East was chosen as a likely region for hostilities against the Soviet Union, since it was in this region, according to American military analysts, that the Soviet Union would try to create a barrier to ensure the defense of its most industrially and agriculturally developed regions - Ukraine and the Caucasus. The plan called for a powerful nuclear strike that would lead the United States to victory.

In subsequent years, employees of the American headquarters managed to draw up a huge number of plans, putting their development practically on stream. One by one, the Bushwacker, Crankshaft, Halfmoon, Cogwill, Offtek plans saw the light of day. In 1948, the Americans presented the Chariotir plan, which provided for the dropping of 200 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities. Thus, each new day could turn the cold war into a real planetary conflict. After the formation of the NATO bloc, Washington had more allies, which means that the military potential of the United States also increased. At the same time, the plans of the American military became more cruel and cynical.

On December 19, 1949, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff approved one of the most famous plans for military aggression against the USSR called "Dropshot" (short hit in tennis), recently you can also find translations of the name of this operation "short hit", "instant hit", "the last shoot". The plan called for a heavy bombing strike. It was planned to drop 300 atomic bombs and 250 thousand tons of ordinary ones on the Soviet Union. At the same time, the territory of the defeated and ruined state was to be occupied. In total, the territory of the country was divided into 4 parts: the Western part of the USSR, Ukraine-Caucasus, the Urals - Western Siberia - Turkestan, Eastern Siberia - Transbaikalia - Primorye. All these zones were divided into 22 sub-zones of responsibility, in which the occupying divisions were to be placed. In terms of the thoughtfulness of its actions, the plan surpassed the Barbarossa.

The bombing of the first day was supposed to result in the loss of 85% of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. The plan described in detail the actions against the Soviet ground, air and sea forces, the suppression of the air defense system. The second period followed the first nuclear strike and provided for the continuation of the air offensive with the deployment of 164 NATO divisions, among which were 69 American ones. It was planned to establish control over ocean and sea communications. The third stage of the campaign provided for the offensive of 114 divisions of the NATO bloc in the west, and another 50 divisions were to land from the south (on the northwestern coast of the Black Sea). These formations were supposed to destroy the armed forces of the USSR in Central Europe. These actions, combined with the ongoing massive bombing of peaceful Soviet cities, were supposed to force Moscow and its allies to capitulate. In total, it was planned to use 250 divisions - 6.25 million people - in the war against the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was planned to deploy about 8 million more people in aviation, navy, air defense and reinforcement units. And in total to put into practice the Dropshot plan, it was planned to use the armed forces with a total strength of 20 million people.

At the same time, the members of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff decided during the war games to check how great the chances are to disable 9 strategic regions of the Soviet Union: Moscow, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, the Urals, the Caucasus, objects on the Black Sea coast, Tashkent - Alma-Ata, Baikal, Vladivostok. In theory, everything went smoothly, but analysts came to not the most comforting conclusions. The probability of a successful attack was estimated at 70%, but aviation losses were estimated at 55% of the total number of bombers involved in the strike. The figure was very impressive. In order to more clearly assess this percentage of losses, we can take a case from the history of the Second World War. The heaviest damage in March 1944 was suffered by a group of 97 Allied bombers targeting Nuremberg. At that time, 20 aircraft did not return from the mission, which accounted for 20.6% of all vehicles involved in the strike.

But most of all, the Americans and their allies were frightened by the danger of a retaliatory strike from the USSR. The successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the constructed test site in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. It was kept secret, but on September 3, 1949, an aircraft of the US Special Meteorological Intelligence Service took air samples in the Kamchatka region, and then American specialists discovered in them isotopes that indicated that the USSR had produced nuclear explosion. US President G. Truman publicly announced this on September 23rd.

The greatest panic among the Americans was caused by the beginning of a large-scale retaliatory ground offensive, since it was obviously impossible to resist the tank and infantry units of the USSR. And the increasing day by day air force of the USSR led to legitimate awe. Major General S. Anderson, Chief of Operations of the US Air Force Headquarters, reported to Secretary of State of the Air Force S. Symington that the US Air Force would not be able to carry out all the planned operations against the USSR, and also to provide air defense of the territory of Alaska and the USA.

In the Kremlin at that moment they kept a truly icy calm. One of the arguments in the dispute with the United States was the creation of our own nuclear bomb, which was announced by Deputy Council of Ministers Kliment Voroshilov. However, even this news did not lead to the extinction of work on creating plans for a war with the USSR. In 1952, US President Harry Truman said: "We will wipe out any cities and ports that need to be destroyed to achieve our goals."

After the creation of the atomic bomb, the only means of its delivery was a strategic bomber; since 1943, the B-29 has been in service with the US Air Force. The USSR had only a few bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and in order to resolve the situation in the shortest possible time, a government decree was issued instead of the domestic 64 aircraft to develop the B-4, based on the American B-29 aircraft in the Soviet Union. Already in 1947, the first three Tu-4 strategic bombers were tested by test pilots Rybko, Vasilchenko and Gallai. In January next year two Tu-4s (commanders Ponomarenko and Marunov) went on long-haul flights, covering 5,000 km without landing from Moscow to Turkestan. Tu-4 in the vicinity of Turkestan dropped 2 tons of bombs. Serial production of Tu-4 bombers was launched at Soviet factories, and by the end of 1949, more than 300 aircraft were in the long-range aviation.

The successes of the Soviet aircraft industry allowed Truman's words to remain only harsh rhetoric. Third World War did not start, but only for the reason that the USSR had more and more nuclear weapons, tanks, delivery vehicles in the form of strategic bombers and ballistic missiles have already appeared. In addition, in the Soviet Union, work was in full swing on the creation of an air defense system for cities and important industrial and strategic facilities, bearing the code "Berkut". Within the framework of this project, a fundamentally new weapon at that time was created - anti-aircraft guided missiles. In 1955, the system, which received the designation S-25, entered service with the army. The characteristics of the system were quite suitable for the military, this air defense system could give a serious rebuff to the air threat from a potential enemy.

The American plans for nuclear strikes on the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s were not fantasies or inventions. They were really worked out and analyzed. For a country that lost more than 25 million of its citizens in the last war and worked day and night to restore what was destroyed, living literally in dugouts, this would be a severe blow. The paradox of democracy lies in the fact that Washington did not just develop these monstrous plans of aggression against a former ally in the war, but also publicized them in the 1970s. The Americans themselves declassified their programs. Perhaps in 20-30 years we will again be able to find out the details of the operations planned by the Americans against our country, but now during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, because even now in the 21st century the world is still hardly stable. We are still sitting on a "powder keg", even though it is balanced modern systems nuclear deterrence and a layered air defense system.

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Books

• Operation Unthinkable. World War III Jonathan Walker. The book by the British historian Jonathan Walker tells about the plans of aggression of Great Britain and the United States against the Soviet Union. Calculated and cynical designs against yesterday's ally...
• Operation Unthinkable World War III, D. Walker. The book by the British historian Jonathan Walker tells about the plans of aggression of Great Britain and the United States against the Soviet Union. Calculated and cynical designs against yesterday's ally...

In the spring of 1945, Winston Churchill asked his military leaders to prepare a secret plan.

This was nothing new. The extremely energetic Churchill always came up with some kind of plan - sometimes sensible, sometimes a little crazy. However, this plan did not go to any comparison with the previous ones.

Churchill wanted a plan for a British attack on the Soviet Union.

In early 1945, America focused its attention on completing the defeat of Germany and then Japan. However, Churchill's eyes were envisioned as darkness descending on Europe. What will happen to this continent when the Red Army occupies its heart? Stalin had already abandoned earlier agreements that Poland - and it was because of her that Britain entered the war in 1939 - would be free. Instead, the Polish government was filled with Soviet supporters, while the Polish resistance fighters ended up in NKVD prisons. Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were under Soviet control, while Greece and Turkey seemed to be under threat. After the inevitable surrender of Germany, the huge American armed forces in Europe will be transferred to the Pacific Ocean.

Who, then, can stop the Russians?

So British strategists developed Operation Unthinkable, a fitting name for what could be World War III. What could be an even more improbable task than to try to think of a way for Britain - beaten and exhausted after two world wars - to start a preventive war in order to defeat the Soviet colossus?

While Britain could no longer be considered "Great Britain" in 1945, an order is an order, and military planners were accustomed to suggesting options for the most unlikely situations. So they bravely set to work, and in 1945 came up with such a plan. The attack was to begin on July 1, 1945, so that the operation could be completed before the onset of winter. They believed that Soviet intelligence would notice the preparation of the Allies, and then conducting a surprise operation like the Barbarossa plan would be impossible. Therefore, the allied forces will be forced to fight hard battles from the very beginning.

Operation Unthinkable called for an offensive involving Anglo-American formations, as well as a Free Poland contingent (the Canadians were also informed of this plan). The combined forces were to break through the Soviet defenses in Germany. It was assumed that in this case the Soviets would concentrate their armored units along the Oder-Neisse line, which the Soviets made the new frontier between Germany and Poland. A giant tank battle similar to the Battle of Kursk will take place near the city of Stettin. If the Allied forces are victorious, they can advance to the 400-kilometer line between Danzig and Breslau, where they will stop in order not to expose their flank to an attack from the southern direction of the Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia.

Paradoxically, this plan was very reminiscent of the Nazi operation "Barbarossa", during which it was also supposed to defeat the Soviet forces near Russian border in order to avoid a long campaign in the depths of this vast state. “The planners reasoned that if they could reach the Danzig-Breslau line in the fall of 1945, then this might be enough to force Stalin to retreat,” emphasizes writer Jonathan Walker in his book Churchill’s Third World War : British plan to attack the Soviet empire in 1945 (Churchill's Third world war: British Plans to Attack the Soviet Empire, 1945). — But if the Allies come to this line in the fall (despite the huge advantage of the Soviets in the number of military personnel), and Stalin does not give up control of Eastern Europe - what then? With the forces at their disposal, the Western Command will not be able to hold this line in the winter of 1945-1946, and they will either be forced to retreat or try to move further into Poland and the Soviet Union. Moving forward would undoubtedly lead to "total war".

Context

The Bundeswehr could unleash a third world

Die Welt 03.07.2017

Life under the threat of the third world

Lidovky 10/19/2016

Turkey stopped the third world?

Yeni Safak 08/03/2016 All-out war against Russia - months before the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan - was the result no one wanted.

The Allied forces had approximately 4 million men in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany, and most of them were Americans, who were soon to be sent to the Pacific. The Red Army had at its disposal almost 11 million soldiers and probably 20,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. The Allies undoubtedly counted on precisely those advantages that allowed them to defeat Nazi Germany. They had significant superiority at sea, which meant that they could provide an amphibious landing in the Baltic Sea area. The Allied tactical air force was two to one behind the Soviet tactical air force, but the Allies could rely on more trained pilots and the fact that the Soviets depended on the United States for high-octane aviation fuel. However, the real advantage in the air would come from the 2,500 Allied heavy bombers stationed in Europe, which would most likely include B-29s. The German air force was unable to stop them, and the Red Army had no experience in dealing with them.

However, Allied war planners fell into the same trap that led to the defeat of Napoleon and Hitler. How to force Russia to submit if she does not want to do this? If defeating the Red Army on German soil was not enough, then the only alternative would be to move east towards Poland and Russia. “The planners turned pale when they began to think about the colossal distance that the Allies had to overcome in order to secure victory,” Walker notes.

In the meantime, the Allies had to assume that the war would intensify after the Soviets attacked Norway, Greece, and Turkey (the British planners had a premonition and expected a Soviet alliance with Japan). As for the atomic bomb, the United States only had two in the summer of 1945, and they were already destined for Japan. In 1946, America only had nine bombs. For all their might, they were only able to do a fraction of the damage the Nazis had done to the Soviet Union, and yet the Russians fought on.

© AFP 2016, STF British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US General David Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Omar Bradley

It is not only the arrogance - or arrogance - of the British who planned an attack on Russia that is striking, although nothing like Britain has done since Crimean War. The ideas underlying this plan, generated by unfounded fantasies or outright despair, are striking.

Even as the death camps were being liberated, Britain considered rebuilding a German army to fight the Russians.

“The most controversial issue of the Unthinkable was the use of German military forces inside the allied camp,” Walker notes. - It was assumed that 10 German divisions could be used in offensive operations, but it would take time to re-equip them from the sources of the Allies themselves, and they would not be ready by July 1, but only in the fall, and indeed the question of their possible use was highly controversial." However, Nazi retooling paled in comparison to Operation Unthinkable's main idea, which was that the United States would join Britain and attack the Soviet Union. Roosevelt and initially Truman—until he changed his mind—were convinced that a post-war arrangement could be negotiated with Stalin. They were wrong, but they didn't know it until the spring of 1945. But then the victory over Japan was yet to be won, and for this the help of the Soviets was considered key. In other words, America just finished crusade in Europe against Nazism. And she was not going to immediately start a new campaign against communism.

Military history buffs like to speculate about how a war between the Western Allies and the Soviets would have ended (although it is commonly believed that the Soviets would have been the first to launch the offensive). Enthusiasts like to compare Sherman tanks to T-34 tanks, or P-51 Mustang fighters to Yakovlev fighters. All this is very interesting, but completely meaningless.

The main fact about a war that would drag the world into a third world war is this: Operation Improbable called for such democratic states how the United Kingdom and the United States start a war against the Soviet Union. Its justification would be the need to push back the Soviet empire and deprive it of its gains in Germany and Eastern Europe.

In turn, the populations of Britain and America would have to bear the burden of a prolonged conflict, without the means to force the enemy to capitulate. And instead of the relatively bloodless air and sea warfare that the Anglo-Americans preferred and continue to prefer, they would have been embroiled in a land war with the most powerful land power on the wide and cold plains and swamps of Eastern Europe.

Operation Unthinkable was, in fact, unthinkable.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

Territory of the Western Allies (blue) and the USSR and its allies (red) in September 1945.

The immediate goal of the offensive plan was the forceful "pushing out" of Soviet troops from Poland, the defensive one was to organize the defense of the British Isles in the event of a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe after the withdrawal of American troops from there. In some sources, the plan for an offensive operation is regarded as a plan for the Third World War. Churchill pointed out in comments on a draft plan submitted to him that the plan was "a preliminary sketch of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical possibility."

background

The military-political situation in the spring of 1945

By April 1945, the Red Army completely controlled the territories of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and partially Czechoslovakia. Both Soviet and Anglo-American troops were making a rapid advance deep into the territory of the agonizing Nazi Reich. On April 13, Soviet troops occupied Vienna, the capital of Austria, and on April 16, they launched an operation to capture Berlin. On April 25, a historic meeting of American and Soviet troops took place on the Elbe, near the city of Torgau.

In the Pacific Ocean, Japanese troops were driven out of almost all the territories they captured, and the Japanese navy was defeated. However, the ground forces of Japan still represented a powerful force, the fight against which in China and on the Japanese islands themselves could, according to the calculations of the American command, drag on until 1947 and require heavy casualties. This made the United States vitally interested in the help of the Soviet Union, which at the Yalta Conference made a commitment to oppose Japan after the victory over Germany.

Churchill's assessment of the political situation and tasks of the Western allies

Subsequently, in his memoirs, Churchill formulated his view of the situation in the spring of 1945 as follows: “The destruction of Germany's military power brought with it a fundamental change in relations between communist Russia and Western democracies. They lost their common enemy, the war against which was almost the only link that bound their alliance. From now on, Russian imperialism and communist doctrine did not see and did not set limits to their advancement and striving for final domination. From this, according to Churchill, the following practical implications for Western strategy and policy flowed:

Polish question

Arrested figures of the Polish government at the trial in Moscow, June 1945

The most painful in relations between the Western allies and the USSR was the Polish issue. The Anglo-Americans tried to prevent the establishment of a communist government created by Stalin in Poland, defending the legitimacy of the London-based Government of Poland in Exile, which continued the tradition of pre-war Polish statehood and had wide support and ramified structures in Poland itself (which remained underground both under the Third Reich and and after the end of World War II). In Poland itself, there was an armed struggle between supporters of the communist ("Lublin") government, supported by the Soviet military administration, and supporters of the emigrant "London" government, led by the commandant of the Home Army, General Leopold Okulicki.

Churchill was extremely alarmed by these trends, as well as by the reports that reached him of repressions against opponents of the communist government: he saw this as a sign of Stalin's desire to establish a solid communist dictatorship in Poland.

Already on March 13, Churchill stated in a letter to Roosevelt: “We are faced with the greatest failure and complete disruption of the decisions taken in Yalta<…>we, the British, do not have sufficient forces to move this matter further, since we have exhausted our possibilities. .

Political tensions on the Polish issue escalated in April, when, after the death of Roosevelt, the new US President Truman took an extremely tough stance on this issue.

At the same time, it became known in London that 16 top figures of the London government in Poland, headed by Okulitsky, who were summoned to Moscow in March allegedly for negotiations on the formation of a government, were arrested (they were convicted in June at the so-called trial of sixteen). On May 5, at the San Francisco Conference, the Anglo-American delegation made a sharp statement on the arrest of this "groups of eminent democratic figures" .

In a letter to Stalin dated April 29, Churchill stressed that "the commitments we have made to a sovereign, free, independent Poland, with a government that fully and properly represents all democratic elements among the Poles, are a matter of duty and honor for us". He demands equal representation of London and Lublin Poles, vehemently opposing Stalin's plan for a Yugoslav-style government.

Churchill viewed Poland as the key to Eastern Europe and believed that the Anglo-Americans should under no circumstances allow the establishment of communist domination in it. In a letter to his Foreign Minister, Eden, dated May 4, Churchill suggested that the "Polish impasse" could be resolved by refusing to withdraw American troops in Germany to the line of division of the spheres of occupation agreed at Yalta until the Polish question was settled. He expresses his extreme concern about the proposed withdrawal of American troops (withdrawal "would mean the extension of Russian domination for another 120 miles on a front stretching 300-400 miles" and would be "one of the most regrettable events in history"). “When all this is over and the territory is occupied by the Russians, Poland will be completely absorbed, buried in the depths of the territories occupied by the Russians”- Churchill believes, noting that in this case the entire East of Europe will be under Soviet influence and the question of Soviet control over Turkey and Constantinople will arise (in fact, the USSR at that moment had already begun to put forward territorial claims against Turkey). In Churchill's opinion, before the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, guarantees should be obtained regarding the democratic future of Poland and the temporary nature of the Soviet occupation of Germany. “If these questions are not settled before the withdrawal of the American armies from Europe and before the Western world has curtailed its war machines, it will not be possible to count on a satisfactory solution to the problems and the prospects for preventing a third world war will be very weak” he notes.

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offensive plan

Introductory terms of the plan

In such a situation, Churchill instructs the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet to present their views on a possible military campaign against the USSR, code-named "Operation Unthinkable."

The input data (conditions from which the planners should proceed) were given the following:

Plan

The plan was ready on May 22. The plan gives an assessment of the situation, formulates the goals of the operation, defines the forces involved, the directions of attacks by the troops of the Western allies and their probable results. The appendices to the plan contain information about the deployment of the Red Army troops (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and the Western allies, as well as cartographic material. The time of the Prime Minister's order to develop an operation plan is not indicated, but given the complexity of its preparation, the nature and volume of the documents themselves, there is every reason to assume that the Prime Minister's order was received by the planners in April 1945.

The main general political goal of the operation was supposed to be to impose on the USSR the will of the United States and Britain in relation to Poland. However, the planners stressed “although the ‘will’ of the two countries can be regarded as a matter directly related only to Poland, it does not at all follow that the degree of our involvement (in the conflict) will necessarily be limited”. It is very possible that the set goal will not be achieved with a limited campaign, even if it is crowned with a quick victory in the operation on German territory, since the USSR will continue active resistance. In the latter case, one should be prepared for a total war: "if they (the Russians) want a total war, then they will get it."

The land campaign plan called for two main attacks in northeastern Europe in the direction of Poland. best zone the territory north of the Zwickau - Chemnitz - Dresden - Görlitz line was considered for the offensive. At the same time, it was assumed that the rest of the front would hold the defense. Strikes were supposed: northern, along the axis Stettin - Schneidemuhl - Bydgoszcz; and southern, along the Leipzig - Cottbus - Poznan and Breslau axis. The main tank battles were supposed to take place east of the Oder-Neisse line, and the outcome of the campaign would depend on their outcome. Although outnumbered by the Soviet forces, the Allies have hope of success due to the element of surprise and superior command and control of the air force. In this case, the Anglo-Americans will be able to reach the common line Danzig - Breslau. It was further noted that unless the Red Army suffered a decisive defeat west of this line and was withdrawn, total war was inevitable. This latter option was seen as highly undesirable and risky. It will require the mobilization of all the forces and resources of the Allies. It was noted that it was impossible to talk about the limit of the allies' advance into the depths of Russia, at which further Russian resistance would become impossible. The planners do not imagine the very possibility of an Allied penetration as deep and rapid as the Germans did in 1942, without leading to final success.

Planners note that offensive operations it will be possible to use only 47 Anglo-American divisions, including 14 armored divisions. According to their estimates, they will face a force equivalent to 170 Allied divisions, of which 30 divisions are armored.

The possibility of forming 10-12 German divisions for participation in the operation was also considered, which, however, cannot yet be ready by the time hostilities begin. It was assumed that the majority of the population of Poland and even the army of Berling (that is, the army of the pro-Soviet government) would oppose the USSR.

Conclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The plan was sent by Churchill to Britain's highest headquarters body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On June 8, the conclusion of the latter was drawn up. It was noted that in Europe the Anglo-Americans have 103 divisions against the Soviet forces, equivalent to 264 allied divisions, as well as 8798 aircraft against the Soviet 11742 (however, with a double superiority of the Anglo-Americans in strategic aviation). Anglo-Americans have unconditional superiority only at sea. As a result, the British command came to the following conclusions, disappointing for Churchill:

• starting a war with the Russians, it is necessary to be prepared for a long and costly total war,
• the numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes it highly doubtful that limited and rapid (military) success can be achieved.

Therefore, we believe that if a war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve a quick limited success and we will find ourselves embroiled in a long war against superior forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces may increase exorbitantly if American fatigue and indifference increase and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific.

defensive plan

In a note to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated June 10, Churchill already expresses his fears about the possibility of the capture Soviet troops, thanks to their overwhelming numerical superiority, the entire Western Europe: he notes that in the event of the withdrawal of part of the American troops from Europe, "the Russians will be able to advance to the North Sea and the Atlantic", and suggests "thinking over a clear plan for how we can protect our Island." However, he notes: "By retaining the code name Unthinkable, the command assumes that this is just a preliminary sketch of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical possibility."

The new plan, retaining the old code name Unthinkable, was ready on 11 July. Planners dismissed Churchill's idea of ​​retaining (in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe) footholds on the Continent as having no practical value. The defense of the British Isles was supposed to be carried out, as in 1940, with the help of aviation and navy. True, it was pointed out that the islands would be defenseless if the Russians used missiles, and this could only be answered by the use of strategic aviation (in which the British had an absolute advantage). “Only in the case of the use of missiles and other new weapons that the Russians may have, will there be a serious threat to the security of our country. An invasion or serious blows to our sea communications can only be carried out after a long preparation, which will take several years, ”the conclusions of the plan were formulated in this way.

Moscow's possible awareness of the "Unthinkable" plan

Further plans in case of war with the USSR

Churchill, having been defeated in the elections in the summer of 1945, resigned. A Labor government led by Clement Attlee came to power in Britain. Attlee was much more favorable towards the USSR, however, since the end of 1945, relations between England and the USSR entered a period of acute crisis due to the refusal of the USSR to stop the occupation of Northern Iran (Iranian crisis) and the formal presentation in August 1946 of territorial claims to Turkey. In 1946, the Attlee government continued to develop plans for war with the USSR, involving the United States and Canada for this. The negotiation was entrusted to the head of the British military mission in Washington, a participant in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Field Marshal X. Wilson, who discussed British military projects with President G. Truman, General D. Eisenhower, at that time Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Europe and Canadian Prime Minister M. King. In September, General D. Eisenhower met on a yacht off the US coast with British Field Marshal B. Montgomery. The parties ultimately came to the conclusion that if the Red Army launched an offensive in Europe, the Western Allies would not be able to stop it. Subsequent plans for a war against the USSR were already being developed at the NATO level.

see also

Notes

1. "Operation Unthinkable: "Russia: Threat to Western Civilization,"" British War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, Publi ... Archived November 16, 2010.
2. Gibbons, p. 158
3. The National Archives | The catalog | Full Details | CAB 120/691
4. O. A. Rzheshevsky. Foreword//W.Churchill. Triumph and tragedy. M., OLMA-Press, 2004 ISBN 5-94850-396-8 p.10
5. Operation Unthinkable. Shot in the back by allies. Krasnov P.
6. How World War II turned into World War III. Interview with Valentin Falin. "RF Today". Chernyak A. No. 9, 2005.
7. Operation Unthinkable report - page 26, comments by Winston Churchill
8. A study done by the OKNS in April 1945 used figures of 7.45 casualties/1000 man-days and 1.78 dead/1000 man-days. Based on this, the total US losses in the two planned landings on Japanese islands were estimated at 1.6 million, including 370,000 dead. frank, Downfall, p. 135-7.
9. Churchill W. The Second World War. Abbr. per. from English. Book. third, vol. 5-6. - M., 1991. - S. 574.
10. Declaration on Liberated Europe, Section VI
11. Letter from I. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt dated April 7, 1945
12. W. Churchill.
13. W. Churchill. The Second World War. Chapter 10
14. E. Duraczyński. General Iwanow zaprasza. Warszawa, "Alfa", 1989. p. 83.
15. E. Duraczyński. General Iwanow zaprasza. Warszawa, "Alfa", 1989. pp. 96-103.
16. A. Prazmowska.(2004) Civil war in Poland, 1942-1948 Palgrave ISBN 0-333-98212-6 Page 115
17. G. C. Malcher.(1993) Blank Pages Pyrford Press ISBN 1-897984-00-6 Page 73