Truth and myths about detachments. The myth of barrage detachments during the Great Patriotic War

25.09.2019

One of the most terrible myths of World War II is associated with the existence of detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern war serials you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in the blue caps of the NKVD troops, machine-gunning wounded soldiers leaving the battlefield. By showing this, the authors take on the soul a great sin. None of the researchers managed to find a single fact in the archives to confirm this.

What happened?

Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by military counterintelligence, firstly represented by the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, and from July 17, 1941, by the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

As the main tasks of the special departments for the period of the war, the decision of the State Defense Committee defined "a decisive struggle against espionage and treason in the Red Army units and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line." They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.

To ensure operational activities in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. By July 25, 1941, Beria were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrier service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Each detained commander, Red Army soldier, Red Navy soldier was checked. If he was recognized as having fled from the battlefield, then he was subjected to immediate arrest, and an operational (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be tried by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the duty to carry out the sentences of military tribunals, including before the ranks. In “particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to be taken to immediately restore order at the front,” the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (navy). Servicemen who lagged behind the unit for an objective reason, in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, were sent to the headquarters of the nearest division.

The flow of servicemen who lagged behind their units in a kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was huge. Only from the beginning of the war until October 10, 1941, the operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. The German agents were easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of scouts neutralized in the winter-spring of 1942 had the task of physically liquidating the command of the Western and Kalinin fronts, including the commanders of generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev.

Special departments could hardly cope with such a volume of cases. The situation required the creation of special units that would be directly involved in preventing unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, returning stragglers to their units and subunits, and detaining deserters.

The first initiative of this kind was shown by the military command. After the appeal of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in "unstable" divisions, where there were repeated cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to the rifle divisions of the entire Red Army.

These barrage detachments (numbering up to a battalion) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops, they acted as part of the rifle divisions of the Red Army, were recruited at the expense of their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were detachments formed either by military special departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which, by order of the State Defense Committee, took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow from the west and south along the line Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks from October 15 to October 28, 1941, more than 75,000 servicemen were detained in the Moscow zone.

From the very beginning, the barrage formations, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not oriented by the leadership towards general executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today in the press one has to deal with such accusations; detachments are sometimes called punishers. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand military personnel detained by October 10, 1941, after the check, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among which special departments were listed: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, spreaders of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10,201 people were shot, including 3,321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number - more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the barrage formations were curtailed without permission. Order No. 227 gave her a new impetus.

The detachments of up to 200 people created in accordance with it consisted of fighters and commanders of the Red Army, who did not differ in form or weapons from the rest of the Red Army soldiers. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was not subordinate to the command of the division, behind the battle formations of which it was located, but to the command of the army through the OO NKVD. The detachment was led by a state security officer.

In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments functioned in parts of the active army. First of all, the Stalinist order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - were formed in the Stalingrad direction.

Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, barrage detachments were charged with the duty to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs in which they were engaged turned out to be wider.

“The barrage detachments,” recalled General of the Army P. N. Lashchenko, who was deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army at the time of the publication of order No. , unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

As many participants in the war testify, detachments did not exist everywhere. According to the Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, they were generally absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.

Do not stand up to criticism and the version that the detachments "guarded" penal units. The company commander of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired colonel A.V. Pyltsyn, who fought from 1943 until the very Victory, states: “Our battalion under no circumstances had any detachments, no other deterrent measures. It's just that it's never been needed."

Famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of detachments behind the battle formations of their unit.

In reality, the outposts of the army detachment were located at a distance of 1.5-2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in fines, but checked and detained everyone whose stay outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their combat activities is sometimes highly speculative.

The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed in one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer-autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 servicemen who "escaped from the front line." Of these: arrested - 3980, shot - 1189, sent to penal companies - 2776, to penal battalions - 185, the vast majority of detainees - 131094 people were returned to their units and transit points. The above statistics show that the vast majority of servicemen, who had previously left the front lines for various reasons - more than 91%, got the opportunity to continue fighting without any loss of rights.

As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This applied to deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, self-shooters. It happened - and they shot in front of the ranks. But the decision to enforce this extreme measure was made not by the commander of the detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (not lower) or, in separate, prearranged cases, by the head of the special department of the army.

In exceptional situations, the soldiers of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could take place: endurance could change the fighters and commanders of detachments in a difficult situation. But to assert that such was the daily practice - there are no grounds. Cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation on an individual basis. Punishment, as a rule, is only the initiators of panic and flight.

Here are some typical examples from the history of the battle on the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. When the fighters and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic, the head of the detachment, Junior Lieutenant of State Security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On October 15, in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division, as well as three (115th, 124th and 149th) separate rifle brigades, from the main forces of the 62nd Army. Having succumbed to panic, a number of military personnel, including commanders of various degrees, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. In order to prevent this, the task force led by the senior detective lieutenant of state security Ignatenko, created by a special department of the 62nd Army, put up a barrier. In 15 days, up to 800 privates and officers were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the ranks. The detachments acted similarly later.

Here, as the documents testify, the guard detachments had to repeatedly prop up the trembling, retreating units and units, intervene in the course of the battle themselves in order to make a turn in it. The replenishment arriving at the front was, of course, unfired, and in this situation, the barrage detachments, formed from staunch, fired, commanders and fighters with strong front-line hardening, provided a reliable shoulder for the line units.

So, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through. The detachment not only stopped the soldiers retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was pushed back.

On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division retreated from the line under pressure from the enemy, the 62nd Army detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took up the defense. For several days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, until the approaching units stood up for defense. So it was in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles more and more turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also a result in advance decision command. The commanders tried to use the detachments left without "work" with maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.

Facts of this kind were reported to Moscow in mid-October 1942 by State Security Major V.M. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh Front, by order of the military council of the 6th Army, two barrage detachments were attached to the 174th Rifle Division and put into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of their personnel, the soldiers remaining in the ranks were transferred to replenish the named division, and the detachments had to be disbanded. The commander of the 246th Rifle Division, in whose operational subordination the detachment was, used the blocking detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front as a linear unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it had to be re-formed.

The reasons for the objections from the special departments are understandable. But, it seems, it was no coincidence that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to the military counterintelligence agencies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, had in mind that the barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for the retreating units, but also as the most important reserve for the direct conduct of hostilities.

As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transition to the Red Army of the strategic initiative and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the occupiers from the territory of the USSR, the need for detachments began to decline sharply. Order "Not a step back!" completely lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order acknowledging that "due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared." By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish rifle divisions.

Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented the penetration of deserters, alarmists, German agents into the rear, not only returned to the front lines the soldiers who had lagged behind their units, but also conducted direct fighting with the enemy, contributing to the achievement of victory over Nazi Germany.

On the defense of Stalingrad

A new stage in the history of detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin was issued, which, in particular, ordered:

"2. To the military councils of the armies, and above all to the commanders of the armies:

[...] b) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to shoot alarmists and cowards in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division and thereby help the honest fighters of the divisions fulfill their duty to the Motherland ”(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P. 445).

In pursuance of this order, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant-General V.N. Gordov, on August 1, 1942, issued his order No. 00162 / op, in which he ordered:

"5. The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, and 65th armies should form five barrage detachments within two days, and the commanders of the 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each.

Protective detachments are to be subordinated to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments.

The barrage detachments are to be equipped with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions.

Provide roadblocks with vehicles.

6. Within two days, restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919.

Defensive battalions of divisions to be equipped with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report on execution by August 4, 1942. (TsAMO. F.345. Op.5487. D.5. L.706).

From the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 “On the implementation of Order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Tank Army to it”:

“In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the departments of the 414th joint venture, the 18th SD, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, got cold feet, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by barriers. detachment and the resolution of the Special Division were shot in front of the ranks.

A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-injured his left hand, was convicted of a crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal. [...]

On the basis of order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.

Operational workers of special departments were appointed as heads of detachments.

As of August 7, 1942, the indicated detachments and detachments of detachments and detachments detained 363 people in units and formations in army sectors, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds.

As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to NKVD special camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to the medical commission, 6 people. - Arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the ranks"

(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P. 181-182).

In accordance with NPO order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad Front (the discrepancy between this figure and the order of Lieutenant General Gordov cited above is explained by a change in the composition of the Stalingrad Front, from which a number of armies) and 25 on the Don.

At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line. Of the detainees, 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points. 15,649 people were detained along the Stalingrad Front, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

During the defense of Stalingrad, the barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the occupied lines, the return of a significant number of military personnel to the front line.

So, on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in a panic. The detachment under the command of lieutenant of state security Filatov, having taken drastic measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through deep into the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, at the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully holding back his onslaught. So, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd Army under the leadership of the head of the detachment, lieutenant of state security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the outskirts of important height. For four days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units.

On September 15-16, the detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for two days against superior enemy forces in the area of the Stalingrad railway station. Despite its small size, the detachment not only repelled German attacks, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th Infantry Division came to replace it.

In addition to the army detachments created in accordance with order No. 227, during the Battle of Stalingrad, the restored divisional barrage battalions, as well as small detachments manned by NKVD servicemen at special departments of divisions and armies, operated. At the same time, army barrier detachments and division battalions carried out the barrier service directly behind the combat formations of the units, preventing panic and mass exodus of military personnel from the battlefield, while security platoons of special departments of divisions and companies at special departments of the armies were used to carry out barrier service on the main communications of divisions and armies in order to detain cowards, alarmists, deserters and other criminal elements hiding in the army and front-line rear.

However, in a situation where the very concept of the rear was very conditional, this "division of labor" was often violated. So, on October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate divisions from the main forces of the 62nd Army. rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, repeated attempts were observed to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. Under these conditions, to fight cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior security lieutenant Ignatenko. By combining the remnants of platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd army detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried, under various pretexts, to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and officers, and 15 servicemen, by order of special agencies, were shot in front of the ranks.

In the memorandum of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Don Front dated February 17, 1943 to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR “On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943”, a number of examples of actions are given defensive squads:

“In the fight against cowards, alarmists and the restoration of order in the units that showed instability in battles with the enemy, an exceptionally large role was played by army detachments and detachments of divisions.

So, on October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate parts of the 138 division division, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire of the enemy, faltered and fled back in a panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th joint venture, 204th SD, which were in the second echelon.

By the measures taken by the command and detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the ranks, and the rest were returned to the front line.

On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of 30 Red Army soldiers of the 781st and 124th divisions showed cowardice and began to flee the battlefield in a panic, dragging other servicemen with them.

The army detachment of the 21st Army, which was located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation.

On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293 division division, during an enemy counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306 joint venture, together with platoon commanders, ml. lieutenants Bogatyrev and Egorov, without an order from the command, left the occupied line and, in a panic, throwing their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.

The platoon of submachine gunners of the army detachment, who was on this site, stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward.

On November 20, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th division division, which was at a height, without resisting the enemy, began to randomly retreat from the occupied area without an order from the command.

The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, serving as a barrier directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in a panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy "(Stalingrad epic. .. S.409-410).

End of the road

After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad and the victory on the Kursk Bulge, a turning point occurred in the war. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army. In this situation, the barrage detachments lost their former importance. On August 25, 1944, the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A. Lobachev, sent a memorandum “On the shortcomings in the activities of the front troops’ detachments” to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General Shcherbakov, with the following content:

“According to my instructions, in August, the front’s PU workers checked the activities of six detachments (a total of 8 detachments).

As a result of this work, it was established:

1. Detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, the protection of communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc. Characteristic in this regard is the activity of the 7th detachment of the 54th Army. According to the list, the detachment consists of 124 people. They are used as follows: the 1st automatic platoon guards the 2nd echelon of the army headquarters; The 2nd automatic platoon was attached to the 111th brigade with the task of guarding the communication lines from the corps to the army; the rifle platoon was attached to 7th sk with the same task; the machine-gun platoon is in the reserve of the detachment commander; 9 people work in the departments of the army headquarters, including the platoon commander st. lieutenant GONCHAR is the commandant of the army logistics department; the remaining 37 people are used at the headquarters of the detachment. Thus, the 7th detachment is not at all involved in the barrier service. The same situation in other detachments (5, 6, 153, 21, 50)

In the 5th detachment of the 54th army out of 189 people. staff only 90 people. are guarding the army command post and guarding service, and the remaining 99 people. used on various works: 41 people - in the service of the AHO of the army headquarters as cooks, shoemakers, tailors, storekeepers, clerks, etc.; 12 people - in the departments of the army headquarters as messengers and orderlies; 5 people - at the disposal of the commandant of the headquarters and 41 people. serving the headquarters of the detachment.

In the 6th detachment of 169 people. 90 fighters and sergeants are used to protect the command post and communication lines, and the rest are on chores.

2. In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs were extremely swollen. Instead of the prescribed staff of 15 people. officers, sergeants and privates, the headquarters of the 5th detachment has 41 people; 7th detachment - 37 people, 6th detachment - 30 people, 153rd detachment - 30 people. etc.

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. In the 21st detachment of the 67th army out of 199 people. 75% of the participants in the battles, many of them were awarded. In the 50th detachment, 52 people were awarded for military merit.

4. The lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most detachments military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded. Over the past three months, 30 penalties have been imposed on soldiers and sergeants in the 6th detachment for gross violations of military discipline. Not better in other units ...

5. Political departments and deputy. the chiefs of staff of the armies for the political part have forgotten about the existence of detachments, they do not direct party political work ...

On the revealed shortcomings in the activities of detachments on August 15, he reported to the Military Council of the front. At the same time, he gave instructions to the chiefs of the political departments of the armies on the need for a radical improvement in party political and educational work in detachments; revitalizing the intra-party activities of party organizations, intensifying work with party and Komsomol activists, holding lectures and reports for personnel, improving cultural services for soldiers, sergeants and officers of detachments.

Conclusion: The detachments for the most part do not fulfill the tasks defined by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various chores and assignments, the maintenance of commanders-in-chiefs, supervision of internal order in the rear of the army are in no way included in the functions of detachments of front troops.

I consider it necessary to raise a question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation ”(Military History Journal. 1988. No. 8. P. 79-80).

Two months later, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 of October 29, 1944 "On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments" was issued:

“In connection with the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.

So, the barrage detachments detained deserters and a suspicious element in the rear of the front, and stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves often engaged in battle with the Germans, and when the military situation changed in our favor, they began to perform the functions of commandant companies. In carrying out their direct tasks, the detachment could open fire over the heads of the fleeing units or shoot cowards and alarmists in front of the formation - but certainly on an individual basis. However, none of the researchers has yet been able to find a single fact in the archives that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired to kill at their troops.

Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of front-line soldiers.

For example, in the Military History Journal, an article by the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army P.N. Lashchenko, says the following on this subject:

“Yes, there were guard detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own, at least on our sector of the front. Already now I requested archival documents on this subject, such documents were not found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, they covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, they detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact."

Almost the same words described the activities of the detachments in the newspaper "Vladimirskie Vedomosti" by the holder of the Order of Alexander Nevsky A.G. Efremov:

“Indeed, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some monsters, but ordinary fighters and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, alarmism was suppressed. When the turning point in the course of the war came, I did not see these detachments anymore.

If desired, more than a dozen memories of this kind can be cited, but those cited along with the documents will be enough to understand what the barrage detachments really were.

The guard detachments of the Red Army have become one of the darkest symbols of the Great Patriotic War. Songs in the spirit of "In the 43rd this company was shot by a detachment", films depicting bloody Chekists chasing soldiers into the attack, and similar cultural artifacts will easily be remembered by many fellow citizens. Meanwhile, the real history of detachments is much more dramatic ...

The first detachments were created not by the sinister People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but by army rear services in the summer of 1941 in Belarus. Then broken at the border Soviet troops rolled back to the east from Minsk.
Confused soldiers and officers walked along the roads, often deprived of leadership and lost their weapons. It was in order to collect them and restore control that the first detachments were created. Combat groups were assembled from randomly retreating soldiers and commanders and sent to the front.
The experience of the first detachments was considered successful. In July 1941, such detachments began to be assembled centrally. The defeated army of the Red Army was haunted by the troubles that befell the vanquished at all times: panic, psychological breakdown and disorganization. The detention of deserters, the collection of scattered units is a dirty job, but it certainly had to be done.

Indicative, for example, is a report on the work of the detachment of the 310th Infantry Division in the fall of 1941 near Leningrad:
“The barrage detachment of the 310th Rifle Division during this period detained 740 soldiers and junior commanders who left the battlefield and went to the rear: 14 of them were sent to special departments of the divisions, the rest were returned to their units in an organized manner ... The barrage detachments are replenished with random people. 310 sd. Soldiers detained in the rear of the division by the same detachment were sent to replenish the detachment.
More than 600 thousand people passed through the detachments during 1941, and it is easy to guess that they were not usually shot. Of the soldiers detained by the detachments, more than 96% simply went back to their units. The rest were sent under arrest, put on trial, and about a third of them actually went under execution.
However, one should not think that the dead were sentenced to severe punishments just like that. Desertion flourished, and those who fled from the front line easily turned into robbers. The documents describe, for example, an incident that occurred in the rear of the Leningrad Front already during the blockade.
An armed deserter was captured during an attack on a grocery store. During the arrest, he actively shot back. On the Volkhov front in February 1942, they caught a deserter who left with an entrusted car and rifle. In the forest, he arranged a dugout for himself and hunted by stealing livestock, and during the arrest he killed a man.

The image of an NKVD worker chasing soldiers into an attack with a pistol is vivid, but factually incorrect. This stereotype is not devoid of real grounds: often the core of the detachment was made up of surviving, but left without work, border guards. The border troops belonged specifically to the troops of the NKVD, and so the stereotype about security officers with revolvers was born.
In reality, detachments were most often subordinated not to the NKVD, but to the army command. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had its own detachments that guarded communications, but never reached - neither in numbers nor in importance - the level of the army.
It should be noted that this measure is by no means unique to the Soviet Union. Back in 1915, during the Great Retreat of the Russian army in the First World War, the order of General Brusilov saw the light, which read:
"... Behind you need to have especially reliable people and machine guns, so that, if necessary, to force the weak-hearted to go forward." An order of a similar nature was published in his army by the general of the old army Danilov: "The duty of every soldier loyal to Russia, who notices an attempt to fraternize, immediately shoot at the traitors."

In the summer of 1942, the country came close to a total military disaster. One of the measures to restore order in the rear of the army was the withdrawal of detachments to new level organizations. This is how the famous Order No. 227 appeared, commonly known as "Not a step back."
The detachments, as we see, already existed and were operating, and the notorious order streamlined and widely disseminated the already established practice. Their functions remained the same: catching deserters, returning to the front line those leaving for the rear, and stopping uncontrolled retreats.
Has it ever happened that detachments opened fire on their own? Yes, in documents and memoirs, several cases were recorded when the flight of units from the battlefield was forbidden by fire, and someone really fell under this fire.
Hero of the Soviet Union, General Pyotr Lashchenko, already in the 80s, tried to clarify the issue of firing detachments at his troops. As a result, no such cases were expected to be found, although the meticulous military leader requested documents from the then closed archives.

Much more often, a detachment could be found on the front line.
Despite their formally privileged status, during the campaigns of 1941 and 1942, detachments often had to engage in battle. By itself, the structure of detachments - mobile, well-equipped with automatic weapons and vehicles - provoked the use as a mobile reserve. For example, the commander of the legendary 316th division, Panfilov, used his detachment of 150 people precisely as his own reserve.
In general, in practice, formation commanders often considered the detachment as an extra opportunity to reinforce units on the front line. This was seen as an undesirable but necessary practice in the absence of reserves.
For example, it was the detachment of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad that fought for two days for the station at the critical moment of the first assault on the city on September 15–16. During the fighting north of Stalingrad, two detachments had to be disbanded altogether due to losses that reached 60-70% of the composition.

In the second half of the war, detachments lost their former importance. It was less and less necessary to restore the rear of the defeated units. In addition, the activities of the detachments were duplicated by other formations, such as rear guard units.
In 1944, the activities of detachments lost their meaning. Their tasks were duplicated by other formations - including the troops for the protection of the rear, belonging just to the NKVD, commandant units. In the summer of 1944, the head of the Political Directorate of the 3rd Baltic Front, spreading his arms, reported to the command:
“The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the people's commissar of defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, the protection of communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc.
In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs were extremely swollen. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

The only really useful function of the detachments at this stage was to clear the rear of the remnants of the German encirclement, to capture the former policemen and officials of the occupation administration who were trying to legalize or hide.
Of course, this situation did not suit the high command. Thousands of experienced well-armed fighters would look much more appropriate on the front line. On October 29, 1944, the detachments of the Red Army were disbanded.
But the activity of the German field gendarmerie sharply increased. In the spring of 1945, in Germany, one could see hanged people with signs on their chests: “I hang here because I did not believe the Fuhrer” or “All traitors die like me.”
The most important terrible secret of the barrage detachments was that there was no terrible secret. The detachments are nothing more than the well-known military police, their functions throughout the war were just that.
Ultimately, the soldiers of the barrage detachments are ordinary soldiers of the most terrible war in the world, performing their combat missions. It is pointless to idealize them, but the demonization of these formations, all the more, does not bring any benefit and, in the end, only leads us away from the real idea of the Great Patriotic War.

Since the time of the Khrushchev “thaw”, a myth was born about the NKVD barrage detachments, which shot the retreating units of the Red Army from machine guns. After the collapse of the USSR, these nonsense flourished.

In addition, supporters of this lie also claim that most of the population of the USSR did not want to fight, they were forced to defend the Stalinist regime "under pain of death." By this they insult the memory of our valiant ancestors.

Story creation of defensive detachments

The concept of a detachment is rather vague - "a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special task." It also fits the definition of "special forces".

During the Great Patriotic War, the composition, functions, departmental affiliation of barrage detachments were constantly changing. In early February 1941, the NKVD was divided into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). Military counterintelligence was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR Navy, where the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF of the USSR were created. On July 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the NPO issued a directive on its work in wartime.

According to the directive, mobile control and barrage detachments were organized, they were supposed to detain deserters, suspicious elements at the front line. They received the right to a preliminary investigation, after which the detainees were handed over to the judicial authorities.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united, the organs of the Third management NPOs were transformed into special departments and passed under the control of the NKVD. Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, execute them. Special departments were supposed to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, cowards. By order of the NKVD No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created at special departments of divisions and corps, and companies at special departments of the armies, battalions at the fronts, they were equipped with NKVD troops.

These units became the so-called "protective detachments." They had the right to organize a barrier service to prevent the escape of deserters, carefully check the documents of all military personnel, arrest deserters and conduct an investigation (within 12 hours) and refer the case to a military tribunal. To send the stragglers to their unit, in exceptional cases, for the immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of the special department received the right to execute deserters.

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents, check those who had fled from German captivity.

Fight against bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, a detachment detachment was formed at the third department of the Baltic Fleet - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced by two armored cars. He acted on the territory of Estonia. Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the area of responsibility, a detachment with a group of operatives was sent to fight the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual servicemen, small units on the roads.

The actions of the detachment markedly reduced the activity of the Estonian bandits. The detachment also participated in the "cleansing" of the Virtsu Peninsula, liberated in mid-July 1941 by a counterattack of the 8th Army. On the way, the detachment met a German outpost, defeated it in battle. He carried out an operation to destroy the bandits in the m. Varla and the village. Tystamaa of the Pärnovsky district, destroyed the counter-revolutionary organization in Tallinn. In addition, the detachment participated in reconnaissance activities, throwing three agents behind enemy lines. Two returned, they found out the location of German military facilities, they were attacked by aircraft of the Baltic Fleet.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the fugitives, but also held the defense itself. It was especially difficult on August 27, some units of the 8th Army fled, the detachment stopped them, a counterattack was organized, the enemy was thrown back - this played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn. During the battles for Tallinn, more than 60% of the personnel of the detachment and almost all the commanders were killed! And these are cowardly bastards who shoot their own?

In Kronstadt, the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued to serve. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought the bandits.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation again deteriorated sharply, so the Stavka, at the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, General A. I. Eremenko, allowed the creation of detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable. A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. The number of detachments was one battalion per division, one company per regiment. They were subordinate to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored cars and tanks. Their task was to assist the commanders, maintain discipline and order in the units. They had the right to use weapons to stop the flight and eliminate the initiators of the panic.
That is, their difference from the detachments under the special departments of the NKVD, which were created to deal with deserters and suspicious elements, is that army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized flight of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), they were recruited not from NKVD fighters, but from Red Army soldiers. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not to shoot those who were fleeing.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest are sent back to the front.

In the defense of Moscow, barrage detachments also played a role. In parallel with the defensive divisional battalions, there were detachments of special departments. Similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD, for example, in the Kalinin region.

Battle of Stalingrad

V connections with the breakthrough of the front and the exit of the Wehrmacht to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NPO was issued. According to it, it was prescribed to create 3-5 detachments in the armies (200 fighters each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline. They were subordinate to the War Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, and the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, the barrage battalions were restored in each division.

By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, 193 army detachments were created on October 15, 1942. From August 1 to October 15, 1942, these detachments detained 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 people were arrested, 1189 of them were shot, the rest were sent to the penal unit. Most arrests and detentions were on the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

The barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order, returning a significant number of servicemen to the front. For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division was surrounded (due to the breakthrough of German tanks), units, having lost control retreated in panic. The barrage detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fugitives and returned them to defensive positions. On another sector of the division's front, Filatov's detachment stopped the enemy's breakthrough.

On September 20, the Wehrmacht occupied part of Melikhovskaya, the consolidated brigade began an unauthorized retreat. The barrage detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade returned to its position and, together with the detachment, drove the enemy back.

That is, detachments in critical situations did not panic, but put things in order and fought the enemy themselves. On September 13, the 112th Rifle Division lost its positions under enemy attack. The detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of lieutenant of state security Khlystov repelled enemy attacks for four days and held the line until reinforcements arrived. On September 15-16, the detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days in the area of the Stalingrad railway station. The detachment, despite its small number, repulsed the enemy attacks and itself counterattacked and surrendered the line intact to units of the approaching 10th Infantry Division.

But there was also the use of detachments for other purposes, there were commanders who used them as linear units, because of this, some detachments lost most of their compositions and had to be re-formed.

During the Battle of Stalingrad there were detachments three types: army, created by order No. 227, restored barrage battalions of divisions and small detachments of special departments. As before, the vast majority of the detained fighters returned to their units.

Kursk Bulge

According to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943 Control special departments of the NKVD were again transferred to the NPO and the NKVMF and reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht began its offensive, some of our units faltered. The detachments fulfilled their mission here as well. From July 5 to July 10, detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1870 people, 74 people were arrested, the rest were returned to their units.

In total, the report of the head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, indicates that 4,501 people were detained, of which 3,303 people were sent back to the unit.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, the detachments were disbanded due to a change in the situation at the front. The personnel replenished the rifle divisions. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used in the protection of headquarters, communication lines, roads, for combing the forest, the personnel were often used for rear needs - cooks, storekeepers, clerks, and so on, although the personnel of these detachments were selected from the best soldiers and sergeants awarded medals and orders, with extensive combat experience.

To summarize: the detachments performed the most important function, they detained deserters, suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, agents of the Nazis). In critical situations, they themselves engaged in battle with the enemy. After the situation at the front changed (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to perform the functions of commandant companies. To stop the fugitives, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, to shoot the initiators and wind up in front of the formation. But these cases were not mass, only individual. There is not a single fact that the fighters of the barrage detachments fired at their own to kill. There are no such examples in the memoirs of veterans. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The guard detachments contributed to the overall Victory by honestly fulfilling their duty.

Sources:
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials of the state security agencies of the USSR from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
"Arc of Fire": Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., St. Petersburg, 2002.

In the liberal media, they scream about the terrible and insidious detachments in the Red Army, which shot retreating soldiers from machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created to discredit the Stalinist period in Russian history. In this analytical article you will find figures and facts from state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as memories of the participants in past battles in the Second World War on the topic of the actions of barrage detachments in relation to their own army.

The famous NPO order No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which immediately became known among the soldiers as "Not a Step Back", among other very tough measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, also prescribed the creation of the so-called. defensive squads. In this order, Stalin demanded:

B) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland; ...

And as soon as information about these detachments went into the shadows. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war years or in the post-war years. Even at the time of the "exposure of Stalin's personality cult," they tried to bypass the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply hushed up, or they were deafly blamed on the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.

After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the subject of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people do not have any information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, who especially prefer to receive a fee in dollars from various foreign "democracy support funds", began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that the Red Army soldiers were driven into battle exclusively by commissars and machine guns of the detachments. That hundreds of thousands of ruined lives are on the conscience of the detachments, that, instead of fighting at the front themselves, the detachments mowed down entire divisions with machine-gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.

Moreover, again, without any evidence, documents, and increasingly referring to the "memoirs" of very dubious personalities.

What happened?

Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by military counterintelligence, firstly represented by the 3rd Directorate of the NKO of the USSR, and from July 17, 1941, by the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

From the very beginning, the barrage formations, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not oriented by the leadership towards general executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today in the press one has to deal with such accusations; detachments are sometimes called punishers. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand military personnel detained by October 10, 1941, after checking, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among which special departments were: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, spreaders of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10,201 people were shot, including 3,321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number - more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the barrage formations were curtailed without permission. Order No. 227 gave her a new impetus.

Here is a document from the FSB archives. He is unable to illuminate the whole real picture barrage detachments, but it can lead to certain reflections. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Departments to the leadership of the NKVD. It is not dated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. It can be seen from this that these are only the first results of the actions of the detachments.

In accordance with the order of NPO No. 227, in units operating in the Red Army, as of October 15, 193 barrage detachments were formed.

Of these, in parts of the Stalingrad Front, 16 and the Don Front were formed - 25, and a total of 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD of the armies.

From the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 of this year), barrage detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line.

Of those detained: 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

15,649 people were detained along the Stalingrad Front, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

It should be noted that the barrage detachments, and especially the detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to the special departments of the NKVD armies), during the period of fierce battles with the enemy, played a positive role in restoring order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, the return of a significant number soldiers on the front line.

August 29 this year the headquarters of the 29th division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control in a panic, retreated to the rear. The detachment detachment operating behind the battle formations of the division units (the detachment chief, lieutenant of state security Filatov), having taken drastic measures, stopped the military personnel retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines.
In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

September 14 this year the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th division of the 62nd army, which carried the defense of the city of Stalingrad. The fighters and commanders of the 396th and 472nd divisions of the regiments began to retreat in a panic, leaving the lines. The head of the detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Elman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and after 2 hours the regiments occupied the former lines of their defense.

September 20 this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal to another line. By the actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces, order was restored in the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, at the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, when support was needed to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully held back his onslaught and inflicted losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd army, led by the head of the detachment (state security lieutenant Khlystov), took up defensive positions on the outskirts of an important height. For 4 days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy submachine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units.

September 15-16 this year The detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for 2 days against superior enemy forces in the area of the railway. railway station in Stalingrad. Despite its small size, the detachment not only repelled enemy attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th page of the division came to replace it.

A number of facts were noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of detachments were sent into battle along with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization and the barrier service was not carried out.
September 19 p. The command of the 240th division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove from a group of German machine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 people were killed.

The barrage detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being operationally subordinate to the commander of the 246th division division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army of the 2nd Barrage Detachment on September 4th. 174 divisions were attached to the division and put into battle. As a result, the detachments lost up to 70% of their personnel in battle, the remaining soldiers of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 of this year. was placed on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, on the orders of the army commander Chistyakov 59 and a member of the Military Council Abramov 60, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Military Council of the front on the transfer of 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not carried out.

Signature (Kazakevich)

Army General Hero of the Soviet Union P. N. Lashchenko:
Yes, there were guards. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own, at least on our sector of the front. Already now I requested archival documents on this subject, such documents were not found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, they covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, they detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up during the Soviet era. We were all brought up on the postulates of a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, the selfless devotion of the Soviet people to their homeland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.

These ideological attitudes somehow begin to be eroded when you read in this document that only within the Stalingrad Front by mid-October 1942, detachments detained more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front, and along the entire line of the Soviet-German front more than 140 thousand, i. e. by the number of more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that by no means all those who fled from the front were detained. At best, half.

One can only be surprised that such detachments were not created back in the 41st. After all, before my eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie) in its structure, which, having professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying simulators and crossbows, restoring order in the rear, clearing rear units from redundant soldiers.

Getting acquainted with the figures of the report, one comes to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of detachments was a necessary and much belated measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party entourage, instead of harsh disciplinary measures, fully justified in the conditions of war, led to attempts to use indoctrination and, in fact, to persuade soldiers with the help of an outrageously bloated and extremely inefficient political apparatus, and led us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if instead of reviving the institution of military commissars in the summer of 1941, detachments would have been created, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.

Note that soon after the creation of detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.

Like it or not, but associations arise: there are commissars - there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.

More interesting numbers. Of the 140,755 detained servicemen, only 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people (i.e. soldiers and sergeants) were sent to penal companies, 185 people (i.e. officers) were sent to penal battalions, returned to their units and to transit points 131094 person. A very soft attitude towards those who fled from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand out of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.

Well, if it was necessary, then the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.

In reality, the outposts of the army detachment were located at a distance of 1.5–2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in fines, but checked and detained everyone whose stay outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their combat activities is sometimes highly speculative.

The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed in one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer-autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 servicemen who "escaped from the front line." Of these: arrested - 3980, shot - 1189, sent to penal companies - 2776, to penal battalions - 185, the vast majority of detainees - 131094 people were returned to their units and transit points. The above statistics show that to fight on without any loss of rights received opportunity the vast majority of military personnel who had previously left the front line for various reasons - more than 91%.

Participant of the war Levin Mikhail Borisovich:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary ...

This order “sobered up” many, forced them to come to their senses ...
And as for the detachments, I only once encountered their "activities" at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank faltered and ran, so the detachment opened fire, where it cut across, where it was right on the fleeing ... After that, I never saw a detachment near the advanced detachment. If a critical situation arose in battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of the detachment guards - to stop those who were scurrying in a panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of submachine gunners.

Memory book. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. WWII hero. Project I Remember

Participant of the war A. Dergaev:
Now there is a lot of talk about detachments. We were in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I did not see them. I mean, they must have been somewhere. maybe further behind us. But we didn't meet them. A few years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which these words: “... we dug a trench in full height. The German hits us right in the forehead, and behind the detachment ... ". I was sitting on the balcony and, unable to stand it, I jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed it. During a break, I tell them: “They are bullying you, but you are silent.” He still sings these songs. In general, just as we did not see women at the front, so did the NKVD.

Memory book. - Artillerymen. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. WWII hero

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles more and more turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a pre-determined decision of the command. The commanders tried to use the detachments left without "work" with maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.

Thus, the barrier detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented the penetration of deserters, alarmists, German agents into the rear, not only returned to the forefront of servicemen who lagged behind their units, but also conducted direct combat operations with the enemy, contributing to the achievement of victory over fascist Germany.

The first days of the Great Patriotic War were catastrophic for the Soviet Union: the surprise attack on June 22, 1941 allowed the Nazi army to gain significant advantages. Many frontier posts and formations that took on the force of the first blow of the enemy perished. Wehrmacht troops moved deep into Soviet territory with great speed. Per a short time 3.8 million fighters and commanders of the Red Army were captured. But, despite the most difficult conditions of hostilities, the defenders of the Fatherland from the very first days of the war showed courage and heroism. A vivid example of heroism was the creation, in the first days of the war, in the occupied territory of the first partisan detachment under the command of Korzh Vasily Zakharovich.

Korzh Vasily Zakharovich- commander of the Pinsk partisan unit, member of the Pinsk underground regional party committee, major general. He was born on January 1 (13), 1899 in the village of Khorostov, now the Soligorsk district of the Minsk region, in a peasant family. Belarusian. Member of the CPSU since 1929. He graduated from a rural school. In 1921–1925, V.Z. Korzh fought in the partisan detachment of K.P. Orlovsky, operating in Western Belarus. In 1925 he moved across the border to Soviet Belarus. Since 1925 he was the chairman of collective farms in the districts of the Minsk District. In 1931-1936 he worked in the bodies of the GPU of the NKVD of the BSSR. In 1936–1937, Korzh participated as an adviser in the revolutionary war of the Spanish people through the NKVD, and was the commander of an international partisan detachment. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he formed and led a fighter battalion, which grew into the first partisan detachment in Belarus. The squad consisted of 60 people. The detachment was divided into 3 rifle squads of 20 fighters each. Armed with rifles, they received 90 rounds of ammunition and one grenade. On June 28, 1941, in the area of the village of Posenichi, the first battle was fought by a partisan detachment under the command of V.Z. Korzha. To protect the city from the north side, a group of partisans was placed on the Pinsk Logishin road.

A partisan detachment commanded by Korzh was ambushed by 2 German tanks. It was reconnaissance of the 293rd Wehrmacht Infantry Division. The partisans opened fire and knocked out one tank. As a result of this operation, they managed to capture 2 Nazis. It was the first partisan battle of the first partisan detachment in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 4, 1941, the detachment met 4 kilometers from the city with enemy cavalry squadrons. Korzh quickly "deployed" the firepower of his detachment, and dozens of fascist cavalrymen fell on the battlefield. The front was receding to the east, and the partisans' cases increased every day. They set up ambushes on the roads and destroyed enemy vehicles with infantry, equipment, ammunition, food, and intercepted motorcyclists. The partisans blew up the first armored train on the first mine made by Korzhem from explosives used before the war for roaming stumps. The combat score of the detachment grew.

But there was no connection with the mainland. Then Korzh sent a man behind the front line. The messenger was the well-known Belarusian underground worker Vera Khoruzhaya. And she managed to get to Moscow. In the winter of 1941/42, it was possible to establish contact with the Minsk underground regional party committee, which deployed its headquarters in the Luban region. We jointly organized a sledge raid in the Minsk and Polessye regions. On the way, uninvited foreign guests were “smoked out”, they were given a “taste” of partisan bullets. During the raid, the detachment replenished thoroughly. The guerrilla war broke out. By November 1942, 7 detachments of impressive strength merged together and formed a partisan formation. Korzh took command over him. In addition, 11 underground district party committees, the Pinsk city committee, and about 40 primary organizations began to operate in the region. It was possible to "recruit" to their side even a whole Cossack regiment, formed by the Nazis from prisoners of war! By the winter of 1942/43, the Korzh connection restored Soviet power in a significant part of the Luninets, Zhitkovichi, Starobinsky, Ivanovsky, Drogichinsky, Leninsky, Telekhansky, Gantsevichsky districts. Connected with the mainland. Planes landed at the partisan airfield, brought ammunition, medicines, and radios.

The partisans reliably controlled a huge area railway Brest - Gomel, the Baranovichi - Luninets stretch, and the enemy echelons went downhill according to a solid partisan schedule. The Dnieper-Bug Canal was almost completely paralyzed. In February 1943, the Nazi command made an attempt to put an end to the Korzh partisans. Regular units with artillery, aircraft, and tanks advanced. On February 15, the encirclement closed. The partisan zone has turned into a continuous battlefield. Korzh himself led the column to break through. He personally directed shock troops by breaking through the ring, then by defending the neck of the breakthrough, while the convoys with civilians, the wounded and property overcame the gap, and, finally, by the rearguard group that covered the pursuit. And so that the Nazis did not think that they had won, Korzh attacked a large garrison in the village of Svyataya Volya. The battle lasted 7 hours, in which the partisans were victorious. Until the summer of 1943, the Nazis threw against the formation of Korzh part by part.

And every time the partisans broke through the encirclement. Finally, they finally escaped from the cauldron to the area of Lake Vygonovsky. . By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated September 16, 1943 No. 1000 - one of the ten commanders of the partisan formations of the Byelorussian SSR - V.Z. Korzh was assigned military rank"major general". All summer and autumn of 1943, the "rail war" raged in Belarus, proclaimed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. The connection of Korzh made a significant contribution to this grandiose "event". In 1944, several operations brilliant in design and organization overturned all the calculations of the Nazis for a systematic, well-thought-out withdrawal of their units to the west.

The partisans broke the railway arteries (only on July 20, 21 and 22, 1944, demolitionists blew up 5 thousand rails!), tightly closed the Dnieper-Bug Canal, frustrated the enemy’s attempts to establish crossings across the Sluch River. Hundreds of Aryan warriors, together with the commander of the group, General Miller, surrendered to the partisans of Korzh. A few days later, the war left the Pinsk Territory ... In total, by July 1944, the Pinsk partisan formation under the command of Korzh defeated 60 German garrisons in battle, derailed 478 enemy echelons, blew up 62 railway bridges, destroyed 86 tanks and armored vehicles, 29 guns, out of order 519 kilometers of communication lines. Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council USSR dated August 15, 1944, for the exemplary performance of command assignments in the fight against the Nazi invaders behind enemy lines and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Vasily Zakharovich Korzh was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 4448 ). In 1946 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1946, Major General Korzh V.Z. in reserve. In 1949-1953 he worked as Deputy Minister of Forestry of the Byelorussian SSR. In 1953-1963 he was the chairman of the collective farm "Partizansky Krai" in the Soligorsk district of the Minsk region. In the last years of his life he lived in Minsk. Died May 5, 1967. He was buried at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery in Minsk. He was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, the Red Star, and medals. The monument to the Hero was erected in the village of Khorostov, memorial plaques in the cities of Minsk and Soligorsk. The collective farm "Partisan Territory", streets in the cities of Minsk, Pinsk, Soligorsk, as well as a school in the city of Pinsk are named after him.

Sources and literature.

1. Ioffe E.G. Higher partisan command of Belarus 1941-1944 // Handbook. - Minsk, 2009. - P. 23.

2. Kolpakidi A., Sever A. Spetsnaz GRU. - M .: "YAUZA", ESKMO, 2012. - P. 45.