Since the Christianization of the ancient Russian society was an ideological action undertaken by the grand ducal authorities in order to consecrate the feudal relations that developed in Kievan Rus, then it led, first of all, to the creation of an organization designed to ensure the success of this action. Such an organization was the Russian Orthodox Church, which considers (quite reasonably) the year 988 to be the time of its founding. It was the church that became the instrument with which, first, the princely, and then the tsarist and imperial power, achieved the most important socio-political goals: it strengthened the feudal system, helped the exploiting classes maintain their dominance over the exploited, kept the masses under control, trying to distract them from active forms social protest.

Therefore, pre-revolutionary theologians and church historians baptism of Russia"were seen primarily in helping to solve social problems: the establishment of Orthodoxy as an ideological sanction of the feudal-serf system and the formation of the church as an organization that carried out this sanction. The Christianization of ancient Russian society is epochal in that it created the Russian Orthodox Church and placed it at the service of the Russian autocracy - this is the main idea that ran like a red thread through the sermons, articles and books of church authors of the pre-revolutionary period. As for other consequences of the “baptism of Russia” (in particular, the influence of this process on the development of ancient Russian culture), they were discussed as if by the way and were classified as side effects, and therefore secondary.

This was a point of view that considered and evaluated the "baptism of Russia" from the positions of the exploiting classes of autocratic-feudal Russia, and expressed its pro-monarchist-minded ideologists of the state church, who stood on the same positions. Now it is shared and promoted in every possible way by the reactionary figures of the Russian church emigration, who view the Christianization of ancient Russian society through the prism of monarchism and in an openly anti-Soviet perspective.

Theologians of the Moscow Patriarchate, perceiving the past of their country through the eyes of believing Soviet citizens, could not accept such an interpretation of the essence and consequences of the "baptism of Russia", which is alien to the working class. But the scientific approach to assessing this phenomenon does not suit them either, since it excludes the presence of mystical principles in the historical process and rejects the principle of providentialism. Therefore, they began to avoid considering the social aspects of the Christianization of Russia, and focused on the purely religious consequences of the action of Prince Vladimir and his successors.

The authors of theological articles and church preachers declared the most important and most significant result of the “baptism of Russia” to be the establishment in our country of the “true faith” and the creation of a “truly Christian church.” They did not even mention anything else, as if they did not know such consequences of the Christianization of Russia and Russia as the deification of princely and royal power, the consecration of social inequality, the justification by the authority of God of the exploitation of man by man, etc., that is, everything that is reprehensible with the point of view of the believing working people of our country.

However, such a selective interpretation of the consequences of the "baptism of Russia", highlighting only the purely religious aspects of this process, appeals only to believers, and in our society there are much fewer of them than non-believers. Meanwhile, the theological and ecclesiastical circles of the Moscow Patriarchate would like this phenomenon to be perceived as outstanding not only by religious fellow citizens, but also by fellow atheists. Therefore, on the eve of the millennium of the baptism of the people of Kiev, they shifted their focus to the socio-cultural consequences of this event, actually putting them in the first place and characterizing them as evidence of the progressiveness of the entire process of Christianization of ancient Russian society. In a number of modern theological works, the very adoption of Christianity as the state religion of the Old Russian state began to be considered only as a means of transferring from Byzantium to Russia the achievements of material and spiritual culture that were advanced at that time.

Indicative in this regard is the article by Archimandrite Pallady (Shiman) “The Spiritual Heritage of Saint Prince Vladimir in the Russian Orthodox Church.” Christianity was the channel along which the high Byzantine culture came to the Russian land” (PV, 1982, No. 8, p. 32).

In doing so, the ideologists of the Russian Orthodox Church formally refer to the conclusions of historical science (including the Soviet one), but essentially distort them in order to apologise for Orthodoxy.

Indeed, the "baptism of Russia", understood as the official introduction of Christianity as the state religion of ancient Russian society, had (and this is widely noted by Soviet historical science) certain progressive economic, socio-cultural consequences, and, moreover, considerable ones. Let us point out only a few of them.

In particular, the introduction of a Christian fast, which provides for multi-day bans on the consumption of meat and dairy foods, stimulated the development of gardening, expanding the range of vegetables on the menu not only of monks and clergy, but also of the rest of the population of Ancient Russia.

Under the influence of Christianity, there was a leap in the development of the construction business, since it was necessary to build first wooden and then stone temples, which required experienced craftsmen, as well as proper materials, architectural art, and interior craftsmanship. All this was first adopted from Byzantium, and then developed on its own, Russian soil.

The need to decorate Christian churches, to make church utensils and clothes, to provide the clergy with a variety of liturgical items - all this created additional incentives for the development of crafts in Russia.

With Christianity they came to Russia and the art of frescoes and mosaics, icon painting, church singing without musical accompaniment were further developed here.

The need for a competent clergy and episcopate gave impetus to the development of education, led to the emergence of church schools, and the need for liturgical books stimulated the development of book art, made it necessary to create libraries.

Therefore, not a single Soviet historian, analyzing the consequences of the Christianization of Ancient Russia, did not fail to note the presence of socially progressive aspects in this process, speaking quite definitely on this score. Here are just two of these statements, typical of Soviet scientific literature.

The first of them was taken by us from the article by S. Bakhrushin "On the issue of the baptism of Kievan Rus", placed in the collection of scientific works of major Soviet historians:

“The conversion to Christianity had, objectively speaking, a very great and, undoubtedly, progressive significance for this period of time.”

And the second is contained in a generalizing work on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, written by a group of authors: “Under the conditions of the early Middle Ages, the adoption of Christianity was generally positive for the growth of culture in Russia”2.

What is characteristic of the scientific assessment of the socio-cultural consequences of the Christianization of ancient Russian society, which is only partially reflected in the statements of Soviet historians cited above?

Firstly, the recognition that the introduction of Christianity to Ancient Russia stimulated the socio-cultural development of our ancestors not directly and directly, but indirectly and indirectly, without a predetermined goal and, as it were, unintentionally. This is confirmed by all the above examples of such incentives. Indeed, those who planted Christianity in Kievan Rus as the state religion did not set themselves any of the listed tasks and goals: they did not intend to develop the culture of agriculture, construction and crafts, did not intend to encourage the development of painting and music, did not worry about increasing educational level of the newly baptized. All this arose as a by-product of the process of planting and establishing Christianity in the Old Russian state.

Secondly, stating the short duration of such stimulation: it took place only within the framework of the Russian Middle Ages with its feudal way of public, state and personal life. At a later time, construction, crafts, painting and other types of industrial and artistic activities developed not only without the support of the champions of Christianity, but often in spite of their efforts.

Thirdly, emphasizing the fact that the stimulation of certain types of socio-cultural activity by the process of Christianization was accompanied by simultaneous opposition to others. For example, while encouraging painting (frescoes and icons were needed for religious purposes), the newly established church condemned sculpture (there is no place for sculpture in an Orthodox church). While cultivating the a cappella singing that accompanies Orthodox worship, she condemned instrumental music that had no liturgical use. The folk theater (buffoonery) was persecuted, oral folk art was condemned, monuments of pre-Christian Slavic culture were exterminated as a “pagan heritage”.

Fourthly, the unanimous conclusion that the progressiveness of some consequences of the Christianization of Ancient Russia does not make the others progressive, nor does this whole phenomenon, taken as a whole. In particular, all those aspects of the Christianization of ancient Russian society that reflected the narrow class character of the introduced religious ideology are devoid of progressiveness. We are talking about such results of the "baptism of Russia" as strengthening the position of anti-popular forces, justifying social inequality, helping to intensify the exploitation of the working masses, imposing on the people such a course of action that was to their detriment: humility, humility, consciousness of one's sinfulness, etc.

Meanwhile, modern Orthodox theologians and church preachers characterize the positive socio-cultural consequences of the Christianization of Ancient Russia as the main ones that determine the specifics of the entire process, and their progressiveness as absolute, allegedly retaining its significance up to the present time. There is a clear distortion of historical truth, deforming the real picture of the adoption of Christianity as the official ideology of the Old Russian state and the influence of this process on various aspects of the life of princely Russia and tsarist Russia.

But the ideologists of modern Russian Orthodoxy are little concerned about the very fact of such a distortion. It is important for them to present the "baptism of Russia" as a socially progressive phenomenon - progressive in everything and for all times, and therefore enduring not only for the Russian Orthodox Church, but for our entire society. To this end, the theological thesis is being promoted that the Christianization of the ancient Russian society did not contain anything hostile to the fundamental interests of the masses and was a universal stimulator of only positive socio-cultural transformations in Russia and in Russia.

In order to be convinced of the inconsistency of this thesis, it is necessary to identify and characterize the main consequences of the Christianization of the peoples of our country, initiated by the action of the Kyiv prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich. There are many such consequences, not advertised by modern Orthodox theologians and church preachers. We will focus on the most significant, predicted in advance by the baptists of Kievan Rus and implemented with maximum completeness in the following centuries. This is the consecration of feudal relations by the newly introduced religion, the creation of the Russian Orthodox Church as a feudal institution and the formation of monasteries as the church support of feudalism. 152

Consecration of feudal relations

The terms "feudalism" and "feudal" are practically not found in modern theological literature, covering the past of our country, including the period of Christianization of Ancient Russia. And this has its own reason. Feudalism is a specific socio-economic formation with class antagonism, confrontation between the interests of the oppressors and the oppressed, and other conflicts; and feudal is a term that refers only to it and provides for taking into account the mentioned antagonism and confrontation. In other words, these terms are socially determined and filled with specific content that does not allow misunderstandings.

The use of these terms in characterizing the prerequisites, circumstances and consequences of the “baptism of Russia” suggests an approach to the Christianization of ancient Russian society from the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of socio-economic formations. This requires, in particular, the identification of the historically transient nature of this process, its class essence, makes it necessary to determine the attitude of various classes and estates towards it, and makes it necessary to reveal the relationship between the narrow class and the universal in it.

Such an approach is fundamentally impossible for theologians and church historians, including modern ones, since it contradicts the idea of ​​"God's providence" - the "divine predestination" of historical phenomena, including the Christianization of Ancient Russia. The scientific approach excludes the possibility of idealizing the historical past and does not allow characterizing feudal phenomena as socially neutral and universal. And the "baptism of Russia" just refers to such phenomena. It was a religious and church reform, which was an integral part of the process of feudalization of ancient Russian society and was carried out in order to sanctify this process. Hence its internal inconsistency, which completely excludes the possibility of unambiguous assessments.

Theologians, pursuing church apologetic goals, are trying to give the official introduction of Christianity in Russia as a state ideology the appearance of a socially neutral phenomenon that allegedly had neither historical conditioning nor class limitations and did not carry anything reprehensible from the point of view of the citizens of a socialist society. Therefore, the authors of theological articles and church preachers diligently avoid the term "feudal" when characterizing both the very process of Christianization of ancient Russian society and its most important consequences, both direct and indirect.

What place did the "baptism of Russia" occupy in the formation, strengthening and development of the feudal system in our country, and how should it be assessed from the standpoint of a Soviet person - a citizen of a socialist society?

As noted earlier, the adoption of Christianity by the Kyiv prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich and his subjects was not the starting point for the feudalization of Ancient Russia. Feudal relations began to form in the course of the decomposition of the primitive communal system, and this process began long before the “baptism of Russia”. But for its further development and strengthening, it needed an ideological sanction, which in the period of the Middle Ages could only be religious, and religion itself had to have the features of a class ideology. This is exactly what happened to Christianity, officially introduced in Russia by Prince Vladimir.

The new religion, which arose in the conditions of the crisis of the slave-owning system and took shape in feudal Byzantium, first of all brought with it justification in the name of the Christian god of social inequality that developed in the ancient Russian society of the 9th-10th centuries in the process of degeneration of primitive communal relations. The oppressors found in it a justification for their actions to enslave the former free community members, and she obliged the oppressed (under the threat of the “punishment of the Lord”, colorfully described by Christian apologists) to put up with their servitude, humbly endure exploitation and other hardships of life

All legalizations and legal norms that regulated inter-estate relations in Ancient Russia, taking into account the interests of the ruling classes, were formulated by the ideologists of these classes as requirements that supposedly came from God and therefore were subject to execution as religious prescriptions. By the same principle, later legislative acts were drawn up - up to the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire: everywhere social inequality was considered as a “charitable state”, allegedly established from above and therefore not subject not only to elimination, but also to condemnation.

Such suggestions have been made throughout the ages of Christianity in an exploitative society. But they became especially active at the beginning of this century - shortly before the Great October Socialist Revolution, which eliminated social inequality in our country. Trying to defame the idea of ​​social equality in the eyes of believers, the pre-revolutionary clergy, acting in the spirit of traditions, the beginning of which was laid by the process of Christianization of Ancient Russia, led the cultivation of their flock in two directions at once.

On the one hand, the holiness and godliness of social inequality, the presence of biblical origins and Christian background in it, were justified in every possible way. Here are the most typical examples of such justifications: “Inequality in the distribution of gifts of human happiness depends on the Lord God” (Sermons, 1905, September, p. 525); “The Lord is pleased to arrange in a human community so that some are rich, others are poor” (Emotional Reading, 1906, part I, p. 336); “The uneven distribution of earthly goods among people is evidence of the wisdom of providence” (Guide for rural shepherds, 1906, No. 37 - 38, p. 6); “Inequality is the inevitable fate of the existence of the whole world” (Church Gazette, 1909, No. 42, Additions, p. 1955), etc.

In articles and sermons, social inequality was declared an eternal and irremovable state. “The inequality of people in the use of earthly goods,” wrote, in particular, one of the central theological journals, “will not stop until the end of the world” (Faith and Reason, 1914, No. 1, p. 103).

The clergy sanctimoniously declared that both the oppressed and the oppressors, the poor and the rich, were equally interested in the presence of social inequality. “The uneven distribution of property,” the article “The Significance of Wealth” said, “is the work of God’s wise and all-good providence for people. If everyone were equally provided with the means of life and no one needed anyone, then there would be difficulty in fulfilling the commandment of love for one's neighbor ”(Soulful Reading, 1902, part II, p. 502). “Inequality,” the author of the article “Two Morals” argued, “is necessary and desirable in the interests of humanity itself, in order to bring it to solidarity” (Pravoslavny interlocutor, 1911, vol. 1, p. 580).

Social equality was declared a utopia, which was allegedly impossible to realize in principle. “Equality is unthinkable, meaningless and pernicious” (Kormchiy, 1907, No. 11, p. 125); “Equality can never be” (Svet Pechersky, 1913. No. 1, p. 2); “There is equality only in the cemetery” (Tserkovnost, 1918, No. 345, p. 2) - statements of this kind did not leave the pages of church publications and were calculated to distract the masses from the revolutionary struggle against social inequality, to develop in them a hostile attitude towards socialist social ideals, disbelief in the possibility of building a society of universal social justice.

In the pre-revolutionary years, the Orthodox clergy waged an open struggle against the ideas of socialism, which were declared unacceptable to believing working people. Socialism was slandered, adherents of socialism were denigrated, socialist ideals were declared unrealizable, the socialist revolution was cursed - and all this was done in order to preserve the privileges of the exploiters, in the name of the triumph of social injustice. The believing working people were told: “Christianity is incompatible with socialism” (Tserkovniye Vedomosti, 1910, No. 8, p. 225); “The socialist supremacy of the people is completely inconsistent with the teaching of divine revelation” (Faith and Reason, 1912, No. 5, p. 581).

Consequently, such a legacy of the Christianization of Ancient Russia, as an apology for social inequality, from the very beginning acquired a reactionary socio-political content - it was adopted by anti-people forces and used for purposes hostile to the people. Although modern Orthodox theologians and church preachers are silent about this legacy, we cannot and must not ignore it in our general assessment of the main social consequences of the “baptism of Russia”.

An important means of justifying social inequality was the consecration of private property by Christianity - the economic basis of the inequality of estates and classes in feudal society. Guided by the well-known Christian principle, according to which both wealth and poverty are from the Lord, the clergy focused their attention on justifying and protecting the owners of private property. This was done, in general, primitively - through speculation on the religiosity of the masses.

Starting from the first years of the Christianization of Ancient Russia and ending with the last days of the existence of the bourgeois-landowner system in Russia, the Orthodox clergy, themselves a large private owner, in every possible way justified the concentration of ill-gotten wealth in the hands of oppressors and exploiters. We find such justifications in chronicles, in church teachings, and in the writings of theologians. Their essence is well revealed in the church publications of the pre-revolutionary period, when the protection of private property was considered by the clergy as an integral part of their activities to prevent the coming revolution.

The authors of theological works and church preachers primarily focused their attention on proving the “God-established” nature of private property and its appearance at the very beginning of human history. “Man,” wrote the author of the article “The Negative Attitude of Socialism to Private Property, or Socialist Communism,” “during the very creation, together with the image of God, received the right of ownership from God” (Vera i razum, 1912, No. 3, p. 279).

The believers were instilled with the idea that the right to private property has its basis in "holy scripture" - primarily in the New Testament (actually the Christian part of the Bible). “In vain,” Bishop Alexei argued in the article “Christianity and Communism,” “we would look in the gospel narratives for at least one expression, one word that could be cited against private property ... Private property is recognized and sanctified by the gospel” (Orthodox interlocutor, 1909, No. 9, pp. 1 - 2).

The main champion and defender of private property was declared Jesus Christ, whose authority was constantly referred to by the church press. “Jesus Christ,” the author of the article “Christianity and Socialism” emphasized, “did not reject private property with a single word, did not consider it theft or robbery, and did not call owners, rich people, criminals just because they were rich” (Christian Life , 1906, No. 9, pp. 1 - 2).

All this served as a basis for the Russian Orthodox clergy to uphold the principle of the “sanctity” of private property. “The right of property of everyone, according to the teachings of Christianity,” was said in the article “Against Socialism,” “is sacred to all and inviolable” (Dukhovnaya conversation, 1917, No. 12, p. 535).

In 1906, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church issued a special decree obliging the clergy under its jurisdiction "to preach in churches about the inviolability of private property" (Tserkovny Vestnik, 1906, No. 28, p. 912). And the parish priests, speaking from church ambos, tried to assure their flock that without private property, the normal existence of human society is impossible. “The right to property,” one of these shepherds exclaimed pathetically, “is an eternal concept! It will never lose power. To destroy this right means to go against divine and human laws” (Guide for Rural Shepherds, 1910, No. 31-32, p. 340).

The reality of socialist society, which has eliminated private ownership of the instruments and means of production as the economic basis for the exploitation of man by man, as an objective prerequisite for social inequality, has confounded the church soothsayers. What was consecrated for nine centuries and was considered the ineradicable legacy of the “baptism of Russia”, became for the citizens of a socialist society the property of the distant past. Today, not only atheists, but also believing Soviet people have become convinced that genuine social progress is possible only on the basis of socialist public property, the establishment and development of which runs counter to those centuries-old traditions, the consolidation of which was facilitated by the “baptism of Russia”.

With the planting of Christianity in ancient Russian society, the active work of the Orthodox clergy began to reconcile the masses with social evil in all its diversity, to educate them in the spirit of humility and humility, to promote the principle of universal sinfulness, as well as the idea of ​​heavenly retribution for suffering in earthly life. Modern ecclesiastical authors either hush up this activity or present it as a manifestation of the concern of cult ministers for the moral improvement of ancient Russian society. In fact, the newly formed church fulfilled the social order of the emerging feudal estate, which felt that the people could not be kept in obedience only by economic dependence and political coercion, and therefore resorted to spiritual violence against the working people - to the use of religion as an illusory compensator for their real social inferiority.

Already in The Tale of Bygone Years we find repeated references to sin as the universal cause of all social troubles and personal misfortunes allegedly sent by God as a punishment to people: “When any country falls into sin, God punishes it with death or hunger, or an invasion of the filthy, or a drought, or a caterpillar, or other executions, so that we turn to repentance, in which God tells us to live. So he (God. - N. G.) punishes us with an invasion of filthy ones; after all, this is his scourge ... Through the invasion of the filthy and the torment from them, let us know the lord, whom we have angered ”(pp. 312 - 313, 314, 346, 347).

In the sinfulness of our ancestors, the clergy saw the causes of princely civil strife, in sins they looked for a prerequisite for the centuries-old Mongol-Tatar yoke, and sins were attributed to epidemics and other natural disasters. The Tale of Bygone Years reports that in 1024, during a famine in the Suzdal land, the inhabitants "beat the wealthy people, saying that they were holding supplies." Prince Yaroslav exiled or executed the organizers of this protest of the masses, declaring: “God sends famine or pestilence, or drought, or other execution on any land for sins” (p. 299).

Sin was declared the final cause of the poverty of the masses, the source of the manifold manifestations of social evil. “Both slavery, and inequality, and all the discord among people - all kinds of evil were produced by sin” (Church Gazette, 1908, No. 14, Additions, p. 666); “People are not unhappy because they are unequal and oppressed, but because they are sinful, selfish and do not know the true truth” (Kormchiy, 1909, No. 49, p. 584); “Poverty stems from the general poverty of mankind, which is based on sin” (Guide for rural pastors, 1910, No. 30, p. 298) - these are the most typical arguments of the clergy on this matter.

And the way out of the situation in all these cases was prompted by the ministers of the cult the same: repentance before God and observance of church prescriptions. And the latter were stereotyped: look for the causes of all social and personal troubles not in the surrounding reality, but in yourself. “If our life,” wrote the author of the article “The Evil Living in Us,” is now sad; if around us we see so much grief, all disorder and all disorder; if malice, mutual hatred and fratricide of every kind dominate in the life that surrounds us, then it is clear where the cause of all these phenomena is. It is in us: our sins, our unrighteousness and iniquity have poisoned our lives” (Church Gazette, 1910, No. 9, Additions, p. 387).

Formally, such calls for humility, patience and humility were intended for all classes and estates of princely Russia and tsarist Russia, but in fact they were addressed mainly to the masses, the destitute, the poor. “In vain they reproach her for being served only by the rich,” Metropolitan Vladimir justified the Russian Orthodox Church in his article “To the Rich and the Poor.” - She addresses both sides with a sermon about the indisputable truth that the root of all earthly disasters and all injustice should be sought not in external orders, but in the sinful corruption of the natural human heart with its passion for self-interest and covetousness, whether this heart beats under the rich man's coat or under a worker's blouse" (Church Gazette, 1905. No. 52, Additions, pp. 2278 - 2279).

In the category of "sinful" the Orthodox clergy attributed primarily those actions of the working people that contained a protest against social evil, injustice, exploitation, and oppression. People's uprisings, the struggle against feudal bondage, and the punishment of cruel landowners by peasants were declared especially sinful. Later, the strikes and strikes of the proletarians, the revolutionary battles of the working class, and speeches against the autocracy - in a word, began to be considered a sin. all manifestations of the social activity of the masses, aimed at improving the condition of the working people, at achieving social progress.

The disadvantaged were taught that by patiently enduring the hardships of earthly life, they would gain the right to eternal salvation in the afterlife. “Through many sorrows and misfortunes,” the Tale of Bygone Years taught, “one has to enter the kingdom of heaven” (p. 353). The same teachings were heard by believers from their clergy at a later time: “There is eternal life, so there is nothing to worry about the troubles of this life” (Faith and Reason, 1912, No. 1, p. 2).

Such suggestion became especially persistent and massive during periods of exacerbation of the class struggle in feudal Russia and bourgeois-landowner Russia. Thus, for example, in the pre-revolutionary years, when the strike movement of the workers and the struggle of the peasants against the landowners intensified sharply, the Orthodox clergy urged the working people to endure the hardships of life patiently, urged them to be content with little and not grumble. “The working poor,” sounded from church ambos and from the pages of theological publications, “should remember that their share of patience and deprivation is the lot of all fallen humanity and that only in this way can a person earn an eternal reward - the kingdom of heaven” (Faith and Reason, 1902 , No. 1, p. 102).

While talking among themselves, the hierarchs and clergymen of the Russian Orthodox Church cynically admitted that they see religion as a means of distracting the working people, and above all the proletariat, from the revolutionary struggle. “In order to remove discontent and despair from the heart of the proletarian,” Bishop Alexy instructed the clergy in the article “Christianity and Communism,” “it is necessary to point out to him, behind the gloomy clouds of sorrows and poverty that surround him, the azure sky of eternal pleasures in the cloisters of the heavenly father, which religion reveals. Take away religion from the proletarian, and you will vainly persuade him to be modest and respect the rights of another: he may be silent for the time being, but if the opportunity arises, he will break his chains ”(Pravoslavny interlocutor, 1909, vol. II, p. 689 - 690).

In the idea of ​​universal sinfulness and the principle of heavenly retribution, the class limitations and the reactionary essence of traditional Russian Orthodoxy as the brainchild of the “baptism of Russia”, the anti-people and anti-humanity of this feudal ideology, which defended the interests of forces hostile to the people, manifested itself with the greatest completeness and distinctness. From the statements of pre-revolutionary theologians and church preachers, it is clear that they perfectly understood the social meaning of calls to the masses to hope for heavenly reward. So, for example, Archpriest E. Kapralov directly called the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church “representatives of the class that most hinders the implementation of the socialist system on earth with its preaching of the kingdom in heaven” (Tserkovno-obshchestvennaya thought, 1917, No. 1, p. 7).

Modern ideologists of the Russian Orthodox Church have abandoned the socio-political interpretation of the Christian doctrine of universal sinfulness and heavenly retribution and began to interpret it in a religious and moral sense - as a requirement of moral perfection for the sake of gaining salvation in the afterlife. This interpretation appeared under the influence of the new way of life of believers, which was established in our country due to the fact that the working people did not heed the persuasion of the clergy and eliminated social evil on their own.

Finally, the newly introduced Christianity deified princely power, which was a simple transfer to Kievan Rus of the Byzantine church tradition. “None other than the clergy,” wrote the famous theologian Professor B. V. Titlinov in the article “The Tercentenary of the House of the Romanovs,” “transferred to Russia the Byzantine idea of ​​autocracy, which then formed the basis of our state structure” (Christian Reading, 1913, No. 3, p. 303). According to this tradition, the emperor was considered the anointed of God, the earthly likeness of the Almighty, and therefore unquestioning obedience to him was seen as a political requirement and as a religious obligation.

“You have been appointed by God” - such was, according to the Tale of Bygone Years, the definition of bishops expressed to the Kyiv prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich (p. 286). The chronicler called Vladimir the new Constantine of the great Rome, resorting to the following parallel: “just as he himself was baptized and baptized his people, so this one acted like that” (p. 288).

Metropolitan Hilarion in his "Sermon on Law and Grace" also equates Prince Vladimir of Kyiv with the Byzantine emperor Constantine, declared by the church "equal to the apostles": "like the great Constantine." And about Yaroslav in the "Word" it is said that he was determined by God to be the successor of his father Vladimir: "God created him as a governor."

The idea of ​​divine establishment was subsequently transferred from the grand ducal power to the royal and imperial and began to be considered by Russian Orthodoxy as one of the most important provisions of the Christian doctrine. From century to century, the masses were taught that “autocracy in Russia was instituted not by human desire, but by God’s will, God’s mercy” (Proceedings of the Kyiv Theological Academy, 1913, vol. I, p. X), that “royal power is God-given power” (Tserkovnyi Vestnik, 1917, No. 7-8, p. 144), that it is of “divine origin” (Khristianin, 1913, vol. II, p. 421), “established by God himself” (Soulful interlocutor, 1913, No. 5, p. 180), etc.

The tsar was considered by the theologians of the Russian Orthodox Church as something derived from God. “God,” the well-known apologist for Russian Orthodoxy, Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov), argued in one of his works, “in the image of his heavenly one-man command, established a tsar on earth; in the image of his all-powerful residence - the king of the autocrat; in the image of his kingdom, imperishable, continuing from century to century - the hereditary king ”(Trinity Word, 1916, No. 302, pp. 30 - 31). “We believe,” the article “Autocracy and autocracy” said, “that our divinely crowned tsar is a reflection of divine providence on earth ... The autocratic kingdom on earth is a snapshot of the sovereignty of God” (Kormchiy, 1903, No. 24, p. 279) .

Such a formulation of the question gave the clergy the opportunity to perform police and security functions: to intimidate the believing opponents of the Russian autocracy with the fear of "heavenly punishment" for their anti-monarchist thoughts and actions. “The image of the king of the earth,” repeated the church press during the period of the first Russian revolution, “in our state is taken from the image of the king of heaven, so that whoever opposes the power of the king and the power of the chiefs appointed from him, he opposes God’s establishment” (Faith and Reason, 1905 , No. 2, p. 70). “We, by our disobedience to royal authority, by our disrespect for it,” the preachers inspired their parishioners, “are rebelling against the divine institution, we anger God and violate his holy will” (Sermons, 1908, May, p. 216).

In their loyal zeal, the Russian Orthodox clergy went so far as to proclaim the principle of monarchism as one of the main doctrinal ideas of Christianity. “The term “autocracy” has acquired a religious connotation in our country” (Tserkovny Vestnik, 1907, No. 3, p. 66); “Our Russian autocracy is purely religious in nature” (Voice of the Church, 1912, No. 10, p. 47) - statements of this kind did not leave the pages of the church press in pre-revolutionary Russia. But they were published most often during the years of political reaction that followed the defeat of the first Russian revolution, as well as during the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty in 1913.

At the height of the revolutionary events in Russia, when the tsar's throne was shaken and the clergy began to worry about how to separate Orthodoxy from the autocracy that had grown together with it, individual critical statements appeared in church publications about the excessive dogmatization of the principles of monarchism. For example, the author of the article “The Priest and Politics” admitted in a burst of frankness: “Our liturgical sermon was all the time elevating autocracy to the absolute ... Shepherds and archpastors were the guardians of autocracy almost to the same extent as Orthodoxy” ( Church Bulletin, 1906, No. 2, p. 39).

However, the church as a whole not only did not abandon such an absolutization of Russian autocracy, but also noticeably intensified propaganda among the masses of the ideas of monarchism, focusing on laying religious grounds for it. A whole system of arguments was developed, with the help of which the dogmatic nature of the demand for unconditional support for the Russian autocracy as an ideal form of state power from a Christian point of view was "proved". “The truth of the autocracy of Orthodox tsars, that is, their placement and approval on the thrones of kingdoms from God himself,” wrote the author of the article “Autocracy of Orthodox tsars,” is so sacred that, in the spirit of the teachings and statutes of the church, it is raised in some way to the degree of a dogma of faith , the violation or denial of which is accompanied by the loss of salvation ”(Courageous interlocutor, 1907, No. 10, p. 298). “Autocracy,” the editorial “Orthodoxy and Autocracy” stated, “is the main pathos of Orthodoxy, its soul, the essence of its very mysticism” (Tserkovny Vestnik, 1913, No. 15, p. 7).

The church included the requirements for recognizing the divine establishment of royal and imperial power in the so-called “rite of the triumph of Orthodoxy” - a divine service performed by the church on the first Sunday of Great Lent and including curses (anathema) against the opponents of Christianity. One of the provisions of this “rank” reads: “Those who think, as if Orthodox sovereigns are enthroned not by God’s special favor with them, and when anointed with the gift of the holy spirit for the passage of this rank, they do not pour into them: and so daring against them for rebellion and treason - anathema” (Church and Public Life, 1906, No. 10, p. 352). This meant that opponents of the autocracy were equated with apostates and subjected to the most severe punishment from the point of view of believers - excommunication from the church and, therefore, deprivation of their hope of salvation in the afterlife.

The deification of autocracy in pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodoxy was considered such an important legacy of the “baptism of Russia” that the celebration in 1915 of the 900th anniversary of the death of Prince Vladimir was reduced mainly to an unrestrained apology for monarchism, to a demonstration by the Orthodox clergy of loyal feelings towards the royal power. .

It was only after the fall of the autocracy in Russia that theologians and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church (and by no means all of them) spoke about the lack of dogmatic foundations for monarchism and about the admissibility of democracy from a Christian point of view. The church press even demanded to “openly and directly condemn the doctrine of the allegedly “divine” origin of the tsarist autocracy in Russia, which, on behalf of the church, has been publicly taught for centuries, in sermons from the church pulpit, officially prescribed and by all means approved by the bearers of royal power as divinely revealed. "(Theological Bulletin, 1917, No. 6--7, p. 134).

Thus, the theologians themselves admitted that the centuries-old activity of the Russian Orthodox clergy to propagate the ideas of monarchism among the masses, which began from the time of the “baptism of Russia”, was nothing more than an abuse of religion for purely political purposes. Such abuse was committed in the interests of the ruling classes of princely Russia and tsarist Russia, and, moreover, not only when the interests of these classes objectively coincided with the needs of social development (during the existence of the Old Russian state and during the formation of the centralized Moscow kingdom), but also after these interests acquired a narrow class character, and autocracy became a brake on social progress.

That is why the ideologists of the modern Russian Orthodox Church do not include the deification of princely, royal and imperial power as an asset of the "baptism of Russia", but prefer to pass over this aspect of the problem in silence. And this has its own reason. Since such deification prevented the believing working people of our country from understanding the class essence of tsarism, kept the religious masses from actively fighting against the Russian autocracy, which is unanimously characterized by all Soviet people (including believers) as an anti-people force, the theologians of the Moscow Patriarchate prefer not to touch on this topic. generally. Otherwise, they would have had to speak unflatteringly about their pre-revolutionary predecessors, to call Russian Orthodoxy (and not its individual representatives) an apologist for Russian autocracy, a religious stronghold of tsarism hated by the people. The "Baptism of Russia" is presented to modern readers of theological articles and listeners of church sermons as something that has nothing to do with Russian tsarism as the embodiment of political reaction.

At present, only the reactionary circles of the Russian church emigration, living in the unrealizable hope for the restoration of tsarism in our country, still evaluate the significance of the “baptism of Russia” from the standpoint of monarchism and see the epochal nature of this event primarily in its consecration of the autocracy of princes, tsars and emperors. They use the preparations for the millennium of the baptism of the people of Kiev as an excuse for a new round of propaganda of monarchist ideas among Russian emigrants, as an additional opportunity for idealizing the Russian autocracy in the eyes of the world community, and finally, as a basis for revanchist calls for the restoration of royal power in our country - that is, in a purely political, and, moreover, extremely reactionary, purposes.

Adhering to the monarchical orientation since its inception, the "Russian Church Abroad" has always stood up for the restoration in our country of the autocratic power of the tsars from the house of the Romanovs. During the six decades of the existence of this religious and political grouping, its ideologists have said so much about monarchism that there seems to be nothing more to say. It would seem that the topic is completely exhausted, and there is no need to return to it. But then the Russian émigré press spoke in jubilee tones about the "baptism of Russia." By association, they remembered the past alliance of Orthodoxy with the autocracy, and the leaders of the Russian church emigration flared up with renewed vigor nostalgia for the monarchy as the ideal of state power and for "the tsar-father as the anointed of God."

The emigrant anti-communist clerics tied the idea of ​​monarchism and the principle of anti-Sovietism into one knot. And this has its own internal logic. The anti-Sovietism of the church circles of the Russian emigration is the ideology of complete and unconditional denial of everything that has been established in our country in the process of building a socialist society. But on the platform of mere denial, the fragmented emigrant forces, which are in a state of constant mutual confrontation, cannot be united and political activity cannot be aroused in them. We need a positive socio-political program, we need an alternative social ideal. As such an ideal, the politicking churchmen offer autocracy in its traditional form, as it was in Russia before the February events of 1917, to all anti-communist circles of the Russian church emigration.

That is why the whipping up of anti-communist hysteria, observed in the course of the preparation of anti-Soviet emigrants for the imaginary millennium of the "baptism of Russia", is accompanied by apologists for the "Russian foreign church»a sharp increase in the propaganda of the ideas of monarchism. Having begun a new round of struggle against communism, the Russian Renaissance, through the mouths of its founders, declared the goal of this struggle to be the restoration of a monarchical system in our country, sanctified by Orthodoxy and based on the unconditional support of the Orthodox Church. Such a process of restoration of the finally and irrevocably obsolete state structure is characterized by the ideologists of the emigrant religious and political group as “re-Christianization of Russia” and “restoration of the ideal of holy Russia” (Russian Renaissance, 1978, No. 1, p. 233).

True, the thoughtless and unrestrained idealization of the mythical “holy Russia” has long ceased to meet with universal support among Russian emigrants, among whom the voices of opponents of orientation towards the historically obsolete past are heard more and more loudly, no matter how rosy it is portrayed. Such statements also appear on the pages of the Russian Renaissance. So, a certain S. Levitsky stated in the article “Missionism, not messianism!”: “Any conscientious historian of Russia will say that holy Russia never existed... supreme ideal. But to be guided by the idea of ​​"holy Russia" even in the most distant future is hardly realistic. No one is forbidden to dream, and the dream of "Holy Russia" is sublime and can even, in the order of irradiation, illuminate the souls of Russian believers with its light. As a “normative idea,” this dream is utopian” (Russian Renaissance, 1980, No. 11, pp. 89–90).

There is no doubt that the utopian orientation towards the restoration of "Holy Russia" as an autocracy based on Orthodoxy is obvious to the leaders of the "Russian Church Abroad". But it is also undoubted that, apart from "Holy Russia", they have nothing to offer the Russian emigration as a social ideal and an alternative to the socialist system that was established in the Soviet Union.

The obvious obsession of anti-communist clerics with the idea of ​​restoring the autocracy in Russia shocks many in the Russian emigration. Among the adherents of the "Russian Church Abroad" there are many who do not share the monarchical convictions of their hierarchs and rather sharply argue with monarchists of all stripes. Echoes of this controversy are also found on the pages of the Russian Renaissance, demonstrating the intransigence of the ideologists of the emigrant religious and political group to any manifestation of dissent in their own environment.

In the already mentioned report of V. I. Alekseev “The Ways and Fates of Russia”, sustained in the spirit of militant anti-communism, the following thought was expressed, expressing the author’s personal attitude to the idea of ​​monarchism and the problem of restoring the monarchy in Russia: “The question of the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Russian monarchy is quite clear: it is based on the Byzantine theory of symphony - the harmonious combination and mutual influence of church and state represented by the patriarch and the monarch ... From the defense of the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe symphony, I think one should not conclude that the Orthodox Church can exist only under a monarchy ... Orthodox the church must support the idea of ​​an Orthodox state, which can be monarchical or democratic” (Russian Renaissance, 1978, No. 1, pp. 43, 44).

The last phrase evoked a painful, downright hysterical reaction from the publishers of Russkoe Vozrozhdeniye. In the note "On the first results", placed at the end of the same issue of the quarterly, where the report of V. I. Alekseev was published, the editor-in-chief of the "Russian Renaissance" inflicted a uniform dressing down on the speaker himself and other opponents of the unconditional orientation of the Russian diaspora towards the restoration of the monarchy, without which allegedly Orthodoxy cannot be preserved. He stated that V. I. Alekseev’s statement was “highly debatable” and that “the very alternative of a monarchical or democratic state is erroneous.” It was again emphasized that the "Russian Church Abroad" sees its social ideal in a "sound monarchy" (Russian Renaissance, 1978, No. 1, pp. 236, 237).

The long-term campaign to add the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II and his family to the “face of saints” also served the purely political goals of propagating the ideas of monarchism. At the final stage of this campaign, the émigré anniversary "Commission for the preparation of the celebration of the millennium of the Baptism of Russia" and its press organ took an active part in it. On the pages of the quarterly, several articles were published praising the Russian autocracy, glorifying the "Christian virtues" of the Romanov tsars and mourning the execution of the last "autocrat of all Russia."

The Council of Bishops of the “Russian Orthodox Church”, which met at the end of October 1981, by its decision of November 1, 1981, canonized Tsar Nicholas II with the whole family, including them in the composition of the “new martyrs” who allegedly suffered during the years of the revolution and civil war"for faith". The reactionary circles of the Russian church emigration consider this conciliar action as a stage in preparation for the pseudo-anniversary of the "baptism of Russia", which they would like to celebrate in autocratic Russia. As for the Soviet people, including adherents of modern Russian Orthodoxy, they perceived the idea of ​​the leaders of the emigrant religious and political group with the canonization of the last tsar and others like him as a political provocation of anti-Soviet clerics, unsuccessfully trying to galvanize the corpse of tsarism overthrown by the revolutionary masses.

Formation of the Russian Orthodox Church

The conclusion of theologians (both pre-revolutionary and modern) that the formation of the Russian Orthodox Church should be included among the main and immediate results of the "baptism of Russia" is fully consistent with reality and therefore does not cause disputes on the part of scientists. Yes, only since 988 does the history of Russian Orthodoxy begin as a specific variety of Byzantine Christianity and the Russian Orthodox Church as a confessional unit that occupies a certain place in the system of similar church formations of Greek Catholic religious orientation. It is the millennium of this church that will be celebrated in 1988 by adherents of Russian Orthodoxy both in our country and abroad.

On the other hand, something else can and should be disputed: the theological assertion that the Russian Orthodox Church arose as a socially neutral institution, allegedly propagandizing universal truth, defending the interests of all estates and classes of princely Russia and Tsarist Russia, and acting primarily as a people's intercessor. This statement clearly and sharply contradicts the facts. national history, which have long become the property of science, and many are recognized by church historians. There are too many of these facts, and therefore we will consider only the most characteristic ones.

The Byzantine Church, in the image and likeness of which the church organization of Ancient Russia was created, was an established feudal formation. Its feudal essence was manifested in the content of the propagandized ideology and the nature of its activities, in the economic base, structure and functions, in the class affiliation of the episcopate and the clergy. It was focused on the ideological defense of the feudal system of Byzantium and the religious justification of the social evil that triumphed in it, on strengthening the imperial power, which aroused the sympathy of the princely-boyar elite of the Old Russian state.

The Russian Orthodox Church took shape as a metropolis of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, from which it initially received bishops and priests who transferred to Russia the already developed dogma, the formed cult, the well-established structure, and the approved norms of church life. The metropolitan who headed it until the middle of the 15th century was appointed or approved (with rare exceptions) by the Byzantine primate - Patriarch of Constantinople and was completely dependent on the latter.

Created to consecrate the feudal system that was forming in Russia and strengthen the centralized Old Russian state, the young church organization more or less successfully coped with only the first task, which was already discussed earlier. As for the second, it turned out to be beyond the strength of the newly formed church. And this was explained not only by subjective factors (in particular, the unwillingness of the Byzantine metropolitans to help strengthen the political rival of the Byzantine Empire, which Kievan Rus remained after baptism), but also by objective reasons: the deepening of the process of feudalization of ancient Russian society, which led to the fragmentation of a single, huge society. At that time, the Kievan state was divided into small and numerous princely destinies, which claimed the role of independent political centers.

During the reign of Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Russian church had not yet received organizational formalization. The structure of the central ecclesiastical authority was also not determined, which significantly reduced the unifying possibilities of the new religion. The hierarchs and priests who arrived in Russia from Byzantium at the behest of the Grand Duke and were in the Grand Duke's entourage supported Vladimir's unifying policy. And it was for what. It was this policy that ensured their personal well-being: a tenth of all income received by the treasury of the centralized Old Russian state was allocated for the maintenance of the church. In a word, some kind of Byzantine "symphony" began to take shape here - the unity of the grand ducal and ecclesiastical authorities, with the former dominating over the latter.

The bishops and clergy who were in the ancient Russian cities, subsequently transferred by Prince Vladimir to his numerous sons, were set differently. The episcopal departments created in these cities became the religious and church support of the specific princes, who showed a tendency to separatism, constantly conflicted with each other and in every possible way opposed the centralization aspirations of the grand duke's power.

Only under Yaroslav Vladimirovich did the church organization acquire a completely finished look. The power of the metropolitan over the dioceses that were part of the Old Russian state was strengthened, and at the same time the dependence of the head of the church on the grand duke's power increased - as was envisaged by the Byzantine "symphony". Vladimir's successor even tried to gain independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople: in 1051, Yaroslav promoted his protege, the Russian priest Hilarion, to the metropolitanate. However, this attempt did not receive further support, and the Byzantine primaries continued to send metropolitans (mainly Greeks) to Russia. Nevertheless, the centrifugal tendencies were still significantly weakened. With the help of the metropolitan and the clergy subordinate to him, Yaroslav overcame the separatist efforts of the specific princes, who relied on the support of local bishops.

But this did not last long. Before his death, Yaroslav repeated the mistake of his father - he divided the Old Russian state between his sons, which accelerated the process of fragmentation of Ancient Russia - its disintegration into specific principalities that were in a state of mutual hostility. Being dependent on local princes, the bishops blessed them for civil strife, during which not only enemy villages and cities were looted and burned, but also "foreign" churches, as if they belonged not to the Orthodox denomination, but to some competing with it, were destroyed or taken away as trophies, “foreign” icons, as if they depicted non-Orthodox objects of worship, were treated worse with fellow believers captured than with enemies of the faith.

This was a phenomenon common for the period of feudal fragmentation of Ancient Russia, when there were no objective prerequisites for uniting specific principalities into a single state entity. The specific princes, the separatist feudal lords, who defended their own independence contrary to national interests, did not strive for the unity of Russia. The hierarchs who depended on them did not perceive Russia as a single whole - spiritual "lords" who did not want to share their influence and income with the central church authorities. Therefore, the assertions of modern church authors that in the 12th century the Russian Orthodox Church remained “the only bearer of the idea of ​​the unity of the Russian people, which opposed the centrifugal aspirations and civil strife of the princes” (50th anniversary of the restoration of the patriarchate, p. 39), was “the personification of national unity” ( Russian Orthodox Church, p. 11).

In the same way, the assertions of the ideologists of modern Russian Orthodoxy that in the terrible period of the Mongol-Tatar yoke for Russia, only the church was at the height of its position and selflessly carried out a mission of national significance are unfounded. In particular, on the pages of the publications of the Moscow Patriarchate it is said that the Russian Orthodox Church allegedly suffered from the invaders just as much as the masses of the people: she “together with all the people bore exorbitant hardships and hardships” (ZHMP, 1947, No. 4, p. 23) , and its clergy "for centuries, sacrificially shared with the people its difficult fate in the past" (ZHMP, 1982, No. 1, p. 7).

Meanwhile, numerous sources, the reliability of which is not denied even by church historians, testify: during the period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the Orthodox clergy were in an incommensurably better position than the rest of the estates of Ancient Russia. Once under the rule of the Golden Horde, the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church (especially the hierarchical elite) quickly adapted to the changed conditions: they themselves hastened to go over to the Mongol-Tatar invaders in the service and the masses called for obedience to foreigners.

This is how the most objective pre-revolutionary historians and publicists characterized the behavior of the Russian Orthodox clergy during the Mongol-Tatar yoke. “It was hard for the Russians,” wrote N. Vysotsky in the article “The Political and Social Activities of the Highest Representatives of the Russian Church,” “this is the Mongol yoke. But not all Russians equally bore the burden of this enslavement. Representatives of the church tried to win a privileged position. They achieved from the Tatar khans that their living conditions were not similar to the situation of mere mortals. The people suffered, and they felt, if not well, then at least tolerably... At the time of the Tatar pogrom, they tried to protect themselves personally, not paying attention to the cries and groans of the enslaved people. When the Mongol yoke was finally established, they tried to create a privileged position for themselves and received the former importance of important masters, while retaining the unchanging character of the barsva, expressed in a despotic attitude towards people below them in social status"(Ringer, 1907, No. 8, p. 43, 61 - 62).

A similar assessment of the behavior of the hierarchical circles of the Russian Orthodox Church in the same period was given by such a major theological authority as Professor E. E. Golubinsky. “If we assume,” he wrote in “The History of the Russian Church,” “that the duty of the higher clergy—bishops with cathedrals of abbots—should, under the circumstances, be to inspire princes and all citizens to courageous resistance to enemies in order to defend their land, then the annals they do not give us the right to say that our bishops are at the height of their calling;

they do not tell us that, in the midst of general panic and confusion, this inspiring hierarchical voice should be heard throughout the country” (vol. II, part I, p. 14).

Indeed, in the initial period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, when there were especially many victims due to mass resistance to the invaders from all social strata of ancient Russian society, the Russian Orthodox clergy suffered less than others, since they either hid or surrendered to the mercy of the winner. Here is what church publicists themselves wrote about this. “In the annals,” noted N. Vysotsky, “we find facts of the shameful behavior of some higher clergy. The head of the Russian church, Metropolitan Joseph, who arrived from Greece to Russia in the very year of the Tatar invasion of the Vladimir region (in 1237), fled, leaving his cathedra. The Bishop of Ryazan, unknown by name, also tried to hide in safe places. Bishop Kirill of Rostov acted like the one in Ryazan, "beating" the Tatars at Beloozero. The bishops of Galich and Przemysl, who remained alive after the capture of their cathedral cities by the Tatars, probably did the same” (Zvonar, 1907, No. 8, pp. 42 - 43).

And in the subsequent time, the clergy behaved in such a way that the conquerors had no desire to oppress them: calls were heard from the church ambos of Russian Orthodox churches to the parishioners to meekly accept the power of the Mongol-Tatar feudal lords, to serve them faithfully, showing humility and evangelical humility. Such a clearly expressed treacherous behavior of the church circles of Ancient Russia in relation to the Russian people was dictated by purely selfish considerations and met the interests of the clergy alone. Both church authorities and ordinary clergy realized that it was more profitable for them to serve foreign invaders than to oppose them on the side of the masses, since in the latter case they would have to face considerable difficulties and hardships, which the clergy tried to avoid; this is what led them to cooperate with the interventionists.

The Mongol-Tatar feudal lords appreciated all the benefits of their alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church. Paying a service for a service, they not only did not oppress the Orthodox clergy, but also provided them with all sorts of benefits and indulgences, as was done by the Mongol-Tatar conquerors in relation to the ministers of other cults. Thanks to these benefits, the Orthodox clergy did not experience even a hundredth of the hardships that the Mongol-Tatar yoke brought to the Russian people. “Tatars,” wrote E. E. Golubinsky, “became to the faith and to the Russian clergy in a relationship of the most complete tolerance and the most complete favor ... They fully recognized our existing civil rights for our clergy. Thus, this scourge of God, which fell upon our fatherland, was not at least a scourge for the Church, i.e., it was not a scourge for the latter, at least from the side of her external freedom and external position ”(Vol. II, Part I , p. 17).

In particular, according to Russian chronicles, the monasteries and clergy of Orthodox churches were completely exempted from paying tribute, which was forcibly collected from all other classes of enslaved Russia. So, in the Laurentian Chronicle under the year 1257, the following is written: “The same winter was the number (census to determine the amount of tribute. - N. G.) and the whole land of Ruts was covered, but not that, who serve at the church.” In another list of the same chronicle, it is indicated that when such a census was carried out in the northeastern part of Russia, the Horde scribes “do not care for abbots, blacks, priests, kriloshans, who look at the holy Mother of God and at the lord”1.

The privileges granted to the clergy and the church as a whole were specifically stipulated in the special labels (commendations) that the Golden Horde khans gave to the Russian metropolitans: Mengu-Timur - Kirill, Uzbek - Peter, Dzhanibek - Feognost, Berdybek - Alexy and Tulunbek - Michael. Listing these privileges, the author of the article “The Political and Social Activities of the Highest Representatives of the Russian Church” wrote: “The labels approved the following benefits for the clergy: firstly, the Russian faith was protected from any blasphemy and insults by anyone, theft and damage to the accessories of external worship; secondly, the clergy were exempted from tribute, all duties and all duties; thirdly, all church immovable estates were recognized as inviolable, and church servants, that is, slaves and serfs, were declared free from any kind of public work ”(Zvonar, 1907, No. 8, p. 43).

Exposing the conspiracy of the Russian Orthodox clergy with the Mongol-Tatar invaders, which brought benefits to both sides, G.V. Plekhanov wrote: to appreciate the courtesy of ‘unfaithful and impious tsars’.”2 This is what the pre-revolutionary church press itself wrote about this deal between the Russian Orthodox clergy and foreign invaders. church to the state "- the independent position of our church was strengthened thanks to the patronage of the Tatar khans of the Golden Horde. During this period of time, our church receives special privileges from the khans, thanks to which the clergy prosper and become a large capitalist size" (Strannik, 1912, No. 8, p. 149).

Even in those cases where individual modern theologians recognize the very fact of the patronage of the church by the Mongol-Tatar invaders, they present it as a consequence of the enthusiastic and respectful attitude of foreigners to Orthodoxy. “Is it not significant,” the church historian M. Pavlov exclaimed pathetically in the article “The Sun of Russia,” that the Tatars, having inflicted enormous damage on Russia, its state structure, education, economy, did not destroy Orthodoxy, apparently well aware of the futility of this undertaking. On the contrary, the Tatars even treated the church with some respect” (ZHMP, 1949, No. 1, p. 29).

Such reasoning of the current champions of Orthodoxy is a simple rehash of the statements of pre-revolutionary church historians that the Golden Horde granted privileges to the Orthodox clergy only because they bowed to Orthodoxy and wanted to propitiate foreign gods.

In reality, everything was different. In their actions in relation to the Russian Orthodox clergy, the Mongol-Tatar khans were guided primarily by political considerations. The benefits and handouts received from them were nothing more than a payment to the clergy for a service, a reward for treason against the Russian people. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in all the labels issued to Russian metropolitans, the Golden Horde khans specifically emphasized that privileges were granted to the church and its clergy in payment for the consecration of the khan's power. So, for example, in Mengu-Timur's label (1267) the following is said about the clergy; the envoys of the khan and the collectors of tribute “they won’t lure them with the right heart of God for us and for our tribe to pray and bless us” (Monuments of Russian law. Issue III. M., 1955, p. 467). “They don’t need it,” the label of Taidula issued in 1347 says about the clergy, “they don’t take anything from them, they don’t take anything from them, they pray for us” (ibid., p. 466). In the same way, the reasons for granting benefits to the Russian Orthodox clergy are stated in the labels of Tulunbek to Metropolitan Mikhail (ibid., p. 465) and Berdybek to Alexy (ibid., p. 469).

Consequently, the Golden Horde khans favorably treated the Russian Orthodox clergy not because they “were tolerant of any religion” (Russian Orthodox Church, p. 11), but because they saw in it their ideological support, a reliable ally in enslaving the population Ancient Russia.

There is no truth in the assertions of modern church authors that during the period of the Mongol-Tatar yoke, “the Russian clergy made selfless efforts to alleviate the situation of the people” (Russian Orthodox Church, p. 11). Indeed, efforts were made by the clergy, and, moreover, considerable, only their goal was not to alleviate the plight of the masses, but to protect the selfish interests of the clergy themselves.

Here is just one example of such "selflessness", given in the already mentioned "History of the Russian Church" by Professor-Archpriest A.V. Gorsky. At the beginning of the reign of Dzhanibek (the successor of Khan Uzbek), Metropolitan Theognost went to the Golden Horde and there he “subjected to cruel tortures” (ZHMP, 1976, No. 2, p. 67). But they “tortured” him not because he stood up for the enslaved people or sought to alleviate their forced lot, but for opposing the attempts of the new Golden Horde ruler to deprive the Russian Orthodox clergy of their former benefits and privileges - “because of the tribute that they wanted to impose on both the clergy and which Theognost refused" (ibid.). And the stubbornness of the first hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church gave its results: “nevertheless, he received,” the church historian states, “confirmation of the former rights of the clergy” (ibid.).

Finally, one cannot leave without refutation the statement of the ideologists of modern Russian Orthodoxy that the church “in the difficult times of the Tatar yoke pacified the Horde khans, protecting the Russian people from new raids and devastation” (ZHMP, 1960, No. 3, p. 33). Some idea of ​​the nature of this "appeasement" and its consequences can be given, in particular, by the activities of the Rostov Bishop Tarasy, who, together with the prince, brought the predatory hordes of Duden to Russia, plundering and destroying Vladimir, Suzdal, Moscow and a number of other ancient Russian cities - according to the chronicler "You have made the whole earth empty."

Such was the actual behavior of the bulk of the ministers of the church during the period of the Mongol-Tatar yoke - self-serving, anti-people and anti-patriotic. The metropolitans, episcopate and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church in the overwhelming majority not only collaborated with the Horde, but also took a direct part in the struggle of the princes for the grand throne, supporting one pretender, then another, which only deepened the split of Russia and weakened it in the face of the enslavers.

In the 13th century the center historical development Russian lands moved to the north-east of the country, and the religious and church center was also moved there. The chair of metropolitans formally continued to remain in Kyiv, which was destroyed by the invaders, but first Vladimir (1299), and then Moscow (1325) became their actual location. The Church, having strengthened its economic power and needed the political protection of accumulated wealth, felt the benefits of centralized power. She supported the Moscow prince in taking the throne of the grand duke (1328), which was a progressive phenomenon. The latter, in turn, sought support in the Orthodox Church, starting an active and socially significant activity to turn Moscow into a religious and church center.

There was a mutual interest of both parties in joint actions. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two feudal forces - the grand duke's power and the Orthodox Church - was neither peaceful nor stable. The hierarchs, headed by the metropolitan, cared primarily for church interests, sought benefits and benefits for the clergy, advocated for the independent position of the church and for strengthening its political role in the state. In addition, there were various separatist groups within the church that opposed the progressive centralization policy of the Moscow grand ducal authorities (for example, Novgorod). And the great Moscow princes and secular feudal lords sought to weaken the economic power of the Orthodox Church, limit church land ownership, bring the political claims of the episcopate and clergy into the framework, and overcome separatist sentiments among them.

The behavior of the Orthodox episcopate and clergy during the period of the liberation struggle of the Russian people against the Golden Horde yoke (XIV - XV centuries) was not unambiguous either. Some of the hierarchs and clerics took up patriotic positions and blessed their "flock" for this struggle. This is exactly what Sergius of Radonezh, the abbot of the Trinity Monastery near Moscow, did in particular, who supported the Moscow prince Dimitri (later called Donskoy) in his armed opposition to the invaders. But most of the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, even in the midst of the liberation movement, continued to cooperate with the invaders in their own interests and called on the parishioners of their churches to patiently endure the oppression of the Golden Horde, showing humility and humility.

In order to deprive the hierarchical top of the Russian Orthodox Church of its external support, the grand ducal power went to break with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, taking advantage of the latter's entry into an agreement with the Pope, which led to the conclusion of the Union of Florence. In 1448, the Council of Russian Bishops elected Bishop Ion, the head of the church, who received the title of Metropolitan of Moscow and All Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church became autocephalous - self-headed.

But even after that, the relationship between the grand-ducal and church authorities remained uneven and did not fit into the parameters of the Byzantine "symphony", for the sake of which Prince Vladimir began the process of "baptizing Russia". At times they became very tense - as it was, for example, during the period of the struggle for the subordination of Novgorod to the power of the Moscow Grand Duke (second half of the 15th century). That is why it is in no way possible to agree with the modern champions of Orthodoxy, who assert without any reservations that in the 14th-15th centuries the Russian Orthodox Church “spiritually, materially and morally contributed to the restoration of the political unity of Russia” (50th anniversary of the restoration of the patriarchate, p. 39 ).

Truth is on the side of Soviet scientists in this case, too, who have come to the following generalizing conclusion. The history of the Russian Church in the 14th-15th centuries shows that it by no means took the position of unconditional support for the unification of the Russian lands. The church maneuvered, there was a sharp struggle within it, and various groups, first of all, sought to strengthen their own position. As for the grand ducal power, being forced to reckon with the church, it stubbornly strove for its subjugation. The cooperation of the church with the princely authorities was full of contradictions and conflicts.

These contradictions did not disappear even in the 16th century. On the contrary, they have acquired even greater scope and sharpness. The established centralized Moscow state sought to subordinate the church to its influence and strengthen its own economic position at the expense of church land holdings, which were significant. And the Russian Orthodox Church wanted to preserve these riches as an economic basis for its independence and in every possible way defended its own interests, which by no means always coincided with state ones. These two competing forces were completely in solidarity only in one thing - in the struggle against anti-feudal and anti-church uprisings, which equally threatened both secular feudal lords and church feudal lords. Together they suppressed the anti-feudal urban uprisings of the middle of the 16th century, the unrest of the peasants who smashed the monasteries, the heresies of Theodosius Kosoy and Matvey Bashkin.

In parallel with the creation of a centralized Moscow kingdom, which was declared the “third Rome”, the heir to the former power of Byzantium, and the tsar - the successor of the Roman and Byzantine emperors, the church cult was centralized, the liturgical way of life was unified, the process of creating an all-Russian pantheon of Orthodox saints was completed. All this prepared the prerequisites for the transition of the Russian Orthodox Church to new frontiers of autocephaly. The replacement of the metropolitan form of church authority by the patriarchal one was brewing.

In 1589 church cathedral elected Metropolitan Nova Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, who took the honorable fifth place in the list of heads of Orthodox churches - after the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. Having made the Russian patriarch independent of the Constantinople one, the council at the same time made him dependent on the royal power: according to the conciliar code, the patriarch was approved by the king, which fully corresponded to the Byzantine Orthodox tradition"symphony".

The relationship between the royal and patriarchal authorities in the 17th century remained complex and internally contradictory. But if in the XIV - XVI centuries, when there was a generally progressive process of formation and strengthening of the centralized Muscovite state, the Russian Orthodox Church, although with reservations, nevertheless supported this positive trend in social development, then at a later time nothing remained in its activities. socially progressive. The church leadership took care of securing their rights and privileges, preserving their own wealth intact, obtaining new economic benefits and expanding their influence on government activities and public life. National problems did not bother him, and the church did not deal with them.

The strengthening of the position of the church after the liberation from the Polish intervention and the defeat of the peasant uprisings of the 17th century led to the strengthening of the church leadership's claims not just to a privileged, but to a dominant position in the state. A ritual reform was carried out, designed to unify church life and increase the prestige of the Russian Orthodox Church. This reform brought to life powerful opposition from various social groups and led to the Old Believer schism (falling away from the church of adherents of the old rites, the old faith), whose adherents were cursed, subjected to severe persecution, which did not stop in the following centuries.

In the course of the ritual reform in church circles, the idea of ​​the superiority of patriarchal power over royal power began to be promoted. Adherence to this idea reflected the inclination of the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church to the so-called Caesaropapism - the combination of church and secular power in one person. The most active champion of Caesaropapism was Patriarch Nikon, who headed the Russian Orthodox Church from 1652 to 1658. However, his claims, which contradicted the Byzantine church tradition, were suppressed by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.

Nikon was replaced by another patriarch, who did not show caesaropapist manners.

The incident was over, but not forgotten.

Peter I, fearing not without reason that in the patriarch, with his claim to independence and orientation to the past, he would meet an opponent of his transformations, decided to completely eliminate the patriarchal form of church government and replace it with a collegiate body. According to the tsar's manifesto, in 1721, the Theological Board was placed at the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the same year it was renamed the Holy Governing Synod with the Chief Procurator at the head. The Russian Orthodox Church, not only in essence, but also in form, became part of the state apparatus of the Russian Empire and remained so until the Great October Socialist Revolution. Only the local council of the Russian Orthodox Church, held in Moscow in 1917-1918, restored the patriarchal form of government, but this happened after the establishment of Soviet power.

Modern Orthodox theologians usually characterize the Petrine church reform as a violation of the Byzantine principle of "symphony" and a departure from the traditions laid down by the "baptism of Russia", and the state of the church in the post-Petrine period is called only as a state of "slavery", "oppression". In fact, Peter I brought the "symphony" to its logical conclusion, putting Russian Orthodoxy in the state in which the Orthodox Church in Byzantium was in the heyday of the empire. It is no coincidence that the Eastern Patriarchs did not see anything unorthodox in the Petrine reform and in their letters (1723) recognized the Holy Governing Synod as “their brother in Christ”, declaring that it “has the right to perform and establish the same as the four apostolic holy patriarchal altar." And the Russian Orthodox Church did not experience any “oppression” on the part of the imperial power: between them there were relations between two allies equally interested in each other, as A. N. Radishchev pointed out in his ode “Liberty”.

Modern church authors claim that the reform of Peter I "became a beneficent suffering for the Russian Church", that "in the post-Petrine, imperial period, the spiritual forces of the Russian Church were revealed in their entirety" and that at that time "Russian Orthodoxy was experiencing a period of spiritual upsurge" (Russian Orthodox church, p. 20). It really experienced something, only this upsurge was deeply reactionary in social content and manifested itself exclusively in the activation of the anti-popular activity of the church, in the strengthening of clerical obscurantism. Therefore, there is not a single socially significant and socially progressive action in the asset of Russian Orthodoxy in the Slepetrovka era. All his activities of that time bore the stamp of reactionary, anti-people, retrograde.

The Russian Orthodox Church, which had taken shape as a feudal institution, could not (or rather, did not have time) to reorganize itself in a bourgeois way. Therefore, it absolutized feudal relations and hampered the development of the capitalist system in the country: in particular, it opposed the abolition of serfdom, advocated the preservation of such remnants of feudalism as corporal punishment, the complete lack of rights for women, etc.

Even bourgeois ideologists complained that the Russian Orthodox Church did not condemn a single manifestation of feudal inertia, no matter how flagrant it may be. “The clergy,” wrote Professor-Archpriest E. Akvilonov in the initial period of the first Russian revolution, “did not protest either against Peter’s violence, or against Bironism, or against Arakcheevism, or against the whip, gauntlets and gallows, or against serfdom, or against bribery and foolishness. The clergy carefully eschewed the horrors of people's life and proclaimed everything for many years ”(Stranik, 1905, No. 5, pp. 809 - 810).

Being the flesh of the flesh of feudalism, the Russian Orthodox Church has always stood on narrow-class positions, defending the interests of the exploiters and blocking itself with the forces of political reaction. Despite the repeated secularization of church property (primarily land holdings with peasants assigned to them) by the grand ducal and tsarist authorities and numerous cases of expropriation of these properties by rebellious peasants, the church throughout almost its entire pre-revolutionary history remained the largest private owner, feudal hoarder, cruel exploiter the masses of the people. Therefore, she directly participated in the suppression of anti-feudal peasant uprisings by tsarism, contributed to the autocracy in the cruel reprisal against the Decembrists, actively opposed the formation and development of the labor movement, and was on the side of the reactionary forces during all three revolutions. “The historically established notoriety of the Orthodox clergy as extinguishers of any social movement,” the church press stated self-critically during the years of the first Russian revolution, “has sufficient grounds for compiling such a view of the clergy” (Pravoslavny guide, 1905, No. 7 - 8, p. 144). Such self-criticism of the Orthodox clergy did not last long - until the defeat of the first Russian revolution. “It’s no secret to anyone,” one of the church magazines wrote on his behalf less than two weeks before the October armed uprising, “that we have always been sworn, principled enemies of violent upheavals in the life of the state” (Tserkovnost, 1917, No. 339, p. .6). And when the Great October Socialist Revolution nevertheless happened, the Russian Orthodox Church not only condemned it, but also embarked on the path of open counter-revolution, once again demonstrating its anti-people essence.

Persecution by the church was experienced by progressive figures of science, culture and education, who, at the instigation of the clergy, were subjected to all sorts of obstacles that seriously hampered their scientific and educational activities. Artificial obstacles were created to the cause of enlightenment of the masses of tsarist Russia. It was the ecclesiastical circles of autocratic-feudal Russia who most resolutely opposed universal education. When this issue was considered in the State Council, Bishop Nikon submitted a special "note" in which he "substantiated" the undesirability of introducing the knowledge of the broad masses, stating that it would entail a decrease in religiosity and a decline in morality.

Church leaders motivated their speeches against universal education by concern for the "moral foundations of people's life." In fact, they were worried about something else: they were afraid that the education of the masses would lead to a decline in their religiosity. “It has been noticed,” the priest V. Bazhanov lamented in the article “On the need to educate Christian idealism in the Russian people,” that as “enlightenment and education” develops in our country, the number of people lovingly devoted to the holy faith and church decreases in inverse proportion. If such a phenomenon is recognized as characteristic and typical even for the Russian peasantry, then, consequently, our enlightenment and education, being in irreconcilable contradiction with the principles of religious life, should be considered abnormal, and therefore not useful ”(Guide for rural pastors, 1909, No. 2 , p. 49).

The church circles of tsarist Russia interfered directly in the affairs of the country's higher educational institutions, seeking the expulsion of progressively thinking scientists from the universities. Spiritual censorship stifled living thought, not allowing the publication of those scientific and journalistic works that "contained anything tending to shake the teachings of the Orthodox Church, its traditions and rituals, or in general the truths and dogmas of the Christian faith."

All this exposes Russian Orthodoxy of the pre-revolutionary period as a champion of darkness and ignorance and refutes the assertion of modern theologians that the Church has always been “the educator and enlightener of the people” (ZHMP, 1957, No. 12, p. 36).

During the years of political reaction that followed the defeat of the first Russian revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church launched and led a campaign to discredit socialist ideas among the masses, subjected the adherents of socialism to harassment and persecution. In 1909, the Synod introduced the teaching of "information on the denunciation of socialism" in church educational institutions. The program of the new subject said: "Theological seminaries should give their pupils, future pastors of the church, a spiritual sword to fight socialism." At the same time, the compiler of the program emphasized that both teachers and students of church schools should have paid “most attention” “to the most militant socialism - this is scientific socialism, which is being put into practice by social democracy” (Voice of the Church, 1912, No. 11, p. 175).

The church leadership declared socialism such a dangerous enemy of Orthodoxy, in comparison with which even sectarianism and the Old Believer schism faded into the background. Back in 1908, when discussing the struggle to prevent the influence of social dietary literature on the masses, the missionaries declared: “This kind of literature is much more dangerous than the literature of schismatics, and this new enemy in the face of socialism is a more serious enemy for Orthodoxy than schism” (Missionary collection, 1908, No. 1, p. 60). In the future, the Orthodox clergy became even more entrenched in this idea. Analyzing the reports of the missionaries received by the Synod, A. Bronzov wrote: “These 11 reports once again convince us that the fight against socialism, Jewry, and even, perhaps, unbelief is not always given due importance and that, according to tradition, special attention is devoted to the fight against the “split and sectarianism. The fight against this, and especially against the other, which is becoming more and more intensified, of course, is both necessary and understandable, but recently socialism has raised its head too high all over the world, by the way, in our country too ... And all this is much more dangerous Old Believer schism" (Church Herald, 1916, No. 43 - 45, pp. 776 - 767).

Church attacks on socialism did not have the expected effect. Not only did they not compromise socialist ideals in the eyes of the working people, but, on the contrary, they raised their prestige. But the clergy, by these attacks, undermined their authority among the masses of believers.

In the two centuries that have passed since the reforms of Peter the Great, Russian Orthodoxy has so organically merged with the tsarist autocracy, and the church has become so firmly integrated into the structure of autocratic power, that the hierarchy and the clergy can no longer imagine themselves outside this structure. Therefore, they not only deified the Russian autocracy, which has already been discussed, but also directly supported tsarism, considering such support as a historical merit of the church as a whole. “It must be borne in mind,” wrote one of the most reactionary church publicists of the pre-revolutionary period, “that the Russian clergy, who daily offer prayers for the tsar at their divine services, are tsar-loving. For centuries, it has brought up in itself a deep devotion to the idea of ​​autocracy, as the fundamental basis of the state life of Russia, along with Orthodoxy ”(Missionerskoe obozreniye, 1905, vol. II, p. 803). Speaking on behalf of the “royal-loving” clergy, priest V. Dankevich declared: “We sucked love and devotion to the tsar, so to speak, with mother’s milk” (Sermons, 1906, October, p. 511).

The loyal zeal of the episcopate and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church was also clearly manifested during the discussion in the country of the question of the further fate of the monarchical form of government in Russia. Wishing to prevent the fall of tsarism, the representatives of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie proposed some limitation of the autocracy and thereby retaining the throne. However, the Russian Orthodox Church categorically rejected even such an insignificant concession to the demands of the times. The church press launched a broad campaign in defense of the unlimited autocracy of the Russian tsars. Readers were inspired that the constitutional-democratic system contradicts the Christian ideal of state power. “Any idea of ​​some kind of constitution,” declared Bishop Nikon, “of some kind of agreement between the tsar and the people, is blasphemy, an unforgivable insult not only to the tsar, but also to God” (Voice of the Church, 1912, No. 10, p. 47).

Autocracy was characterized by the clergy as a national shrine - "a treasure that other peoples do not have." “Whoever dares,” it was said on the pages of the official organ of the Russian Orthodox Church about tsarism, “to talk about limiting it, that is our enemy and traitor” (Tserkovnye Vedomosti, 1911, No. 5, Additions, p. 179).

Standing up for unlimited autocracy, the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church showed truly Jesuit resourcefulness. On the one hand, they blackmailed the ruling classes of bourgeois-landowner Russia, declaring that without tsarism they would not be able to cope with popular uprisings. “A single, firm, autocratic power,” stated one of the many sermons on this topic. - can prevent and pacify popular passions. What is needed is the powerful, strong power of a monarch, appointed by God himself and strong by his power, able to restrain and tame the impulses of human passions and establish obedience in the state ”(Kronstadt Pastor, 1914, No. 41 - 42, p. 639). Those in power were warned that the establishment of a constitutional and legal system would lead to the creation of a socialist state in Russia (Voice of the Church, 1912, No. 10, p. 151). And on the other hand, they assured the working people that the restriction of autocracy was beneficial exclusively to the "upper classes." “The idea of ​​democracy, or people’s rule,” declared I. Aivazov in the note “The Power of the Russian Tsar,” “how hypocritically absurd, invented to allow the upper classes to imperceptibly hold the people in their hands, is alien to the soul of the Russian people” (ibid., p. 163 ).

Resolutely condemning those who were weary of the union of Orthodoxy with the autocracy, the clergy declared this union to be equally beneficial for the church and for the state. A different situation seemed obvious nonsense to the church circles of tsarist Russia. “A non-religious state,” wrote professor-theologian P. Svetlov in the article “Is a non-religious state permissible?”, “Especially in Christian countries, there is nonsense that is contrary to conscience and common sense” (Tserkovnye Vedomosti, 1913, No. 13, Additions, p. 598).

After the overthrow of the tsarist government, hated by the people, the hierarchs and clergymen of the Russian Orthodox Church mourned this loss most of all and mourned it loudest of all. “Let's not hide,” Archbishop Evlogii publicly lamented, “that it is hard for many of us to give up the idea of ​​autocracy” (Dukhovnaya conversation, 1917, No. 6, p. 281).

The Russian Orthodox clergy was shocked by the fact that their propaganda of the ideas of monarchism among the masses turned out to be completely ineffectual and the people did not stand up for the deposed tsar. “We could not imagine,” one of the journals stated in an editorial a few months after the fall of the autocracy in Russia, “such a deep indifference of the masses to the fate of the monarchy” (Tserkovnost, 1917, No. 339, p. 7).

All this, taken together, characterizes the Russian Orthodox Church of the pre-revolutionary period as a feudal institution, class alien to the masses of princely Russia and Tsarist Russia, as a spokesman and defender of the interests of the exploiting minority, as a support of political reaction and a stronghold of anti-popular forces.

Nevertheless, the theological and ecclesiastical circles of the Moscow Patriarchate in their numerous publications continue to assert that the Russian Orthodox Church “has always been with its people”, “lived one life with them” (ZhMP, 1975, No. 5, p. 1037) and “on throughout its thousand-year existence ... sacrificially carried out active and diverse service for the good of our beloved Fatherland, for the good of its peoples ”(ZHMP, 1980, No. 5, p. 5), and its hierarchs“ showed high examples of sacrificial service to their people ”( Orthodox church calendar for 1981, p. 2). Statements of this kind, which became noticeably more frequent during the preparation of the Russian Orthodox Church for its own millennium, are clearly designed for people who will take their word for it and will not turn to the history of Russian Orthodoxy, to stir up the past of this denomination.

That is why the appeal to this past is highly relevant now: without it, one cannot refute (as loyalty to historical truth requires) the theological legend about the “nationality” of Russian Orthodoxy as the main result of the “baptism of Russia”.

The emergence of monasteries

When modern theologians and church historians consider the circumstances and consequences of the "baptism of Russia", almost the main attention is paid to the activities of monasteries. Moreover, this activity is covered tendentiously and in a purely apologetic spirit - so as to evoke an enthusiastic attitude towards it not only among believing readers and listeners, but also among non-believers. For this purpose, the following tactic is used: monasteries (especially Old Russian ones) are characterized in theological articles and temple sermons not so much as religious and church centers, but as centers of culture and art, and monastic obedience is characterized primarily as a cultural and educational activity.

Here is a typical example of just such a characterization contained in the special issue of the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy, "50th Anniversary of the Restoration of the Patriarchate." “The role of monasteries in Russia,” writes the author of the Brief Review of the History of the Russian Church, “was enormous. And their main merit to the Russian people - not to mention their purely spiritual role - is that they were the largest centers of education. In the monasteries, in particular, chronicles were kept - wonderful historical works ... Icon painting and the art of book writing flourished in the monasteries, translations into Russian of Greek theological, historical and literary works"(p. 31, 39). From the above fragment it is clear that the religious and church aspects of the activities of monasteries (“purely spiritual role”) are mentioned as if by the way - apparently because there was nothing in it that could substantiate the thesis about the progressiveness of the baptism of Russia. On the other hand, the cultural and educational one has been brought to the fore and classified as the “main merits” of the monasteries of the Old Russian period of Russian history.

Other ecclesiastical authors go even further in hypertrophying the cultural and educational aspects of monastic activity: they only mention it when characterizing the place and role of monasteries in Ancient Russia. “The spiritual activity of the monasteries in Russia,” said Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko) in a speech at the opening of the theological interviews, “was enormous. They were major centers of education. They carried out translations into Old Slavonic from Greek theological, historical and artistic works” (ZHMP, 1978, No. 12, p. 53). Monasteries in Russia, says the sermon of Archpriest I. Sorokin “On the Day of Remembrance of All Saints”, “became cultural centers, hotbeds of spiritual enlightenment of the people, as well as spreaders of literacy” (ZHMP, 1980, No. 7, p. 45). And the description of the monasteries, contained in a similar sermon by Archpriest A. Yegorov, consists of only exclamations: “Monasticism! What a huge impact it had on the cultural and historical development of the Russian people! (ZHMP, 1981, No. 7, p. 46). And further in the same spirit.

This tactic of deliberately shifting emphasis, deliberately used by the ideologists of contemporary Russian Orthodoxy, has produced certain results. Obviously, not without its influence, not only individual Soviet writers and publicists, but also some researchers began to characterize the monasteries of Ancient Russia one-sidedly, with a religious and apologetic accent - as if they were not centers of religious and church influence primarily and primarily, but if and not exclusively, but mainly cultural and educational centers.

Here, for example, is how the Old Russian monasteries are characterized in S. Bakhrushin’s article “On the Question of the Baptism of Kievan Rus”, written in 1937, but republished in 1975: “The Pechersky and Vydubitsky monasteries appear with features of major cultural and scientific (?!) centers in which large stocks of knowledge were accumulated (?!) and there were people who not only owned a pen, but also knew how to work scientifically (?!). People were drawn to these centers seeking to expand their knowledge... Lively scientific (?!) conversations started here.” Since nothing else is said about these monasteries except for the above panegyric, the reader cannot help but have the most perverse (not to say distorted) ideas about the monastic cloisters of Ancient Russia: they will no longer appear as monasteries, but downright research institutions.

That is why, when considering the consequences of the "baptism of Russia", it is advisable to specifically dwell on how the monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church arose, what they did and what influence they had on the church, public and personal life of our distant ancestors.

Monasteries as an integral part of the church structure of Russian Orthodoxy appeared in Ancient Russia only in the 11th century, that is, several decades after the adoption of Christianity by Prince Vladimir of Kyiv and his subjects. And yet, they owe their appearance to the "baptism of Russia", and their activity is an important moment in religious and church life, one of the main stimulators of the process of Christianization of ancient Russian society.

The chronicle connects the beginning of Russian monasticism with the activity of Anthony, a resident of the city of Lyubech, near Chernigov, who became a monk on Mount Athos and appeared in Kyiv in the middle of the 11th century. The Tale of Bygone Years reports him under the year 1051. True, the chronicle says that when Anthony came to Kyiv and began to choose where to settle, he “went to monasteries, and he did not like anywhere” (p. 305). This means that there were some monastic cloisters on the Kievan land even before Anthony. But there is no information about them, and therefore the Pechersky Monastery (later the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra) is considered the first Russian Orthodox monastery, which arose on one of the Kyiv mountains at the initiative of Anthony: he allegedly settled in a cave dug for prayers by the future Metropolitan Hilarion.

However, the Russian Orthodox Church considers Theodosius, who accepted monasticism with the blessing of Anthony, to be the true founder of monasticism. Having become abbot, he introduced in his monastery, which numbered two dozen monks, the charter of the Studian monastery in Constantinople, which strictly regulated the entire life of monastics. Subsequently, this charter was introduced in other large monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church, which were predominantly cenobitic.

Following Kyiv, Novgorod, Vladimir, Smolensk, Galich and other ancient Russian cities acquired their own monasteries. In the pre-Mongolian period, the total number of monasteries and the number of monks in them were insignificant. According to chronicles, in the 11th-13th centuries there were no more than 70 monasteries in Russia, including 17 each in Kyiv and Novgorod.

The number of monasteries noticeably increased during the period of the Mongol-Tatar yoke: by the middle of the 15th century there were more than 180 of them. Over the next century and a half, about 300 new monasteries were opened, and in the 17th century alone - 220. The process of the emergence of more and more monasteries (both male, and women's) continued until the Great October Socialist Revolution. By 1917, there were 1025 of them (478 male and 547 female) with a total number of monks and novices reaching 95 thousand people.

Like their Byzantine prototypes, Russian Orthodox monasteries were multifunctional. They have always been regarded not only as the centers of the most intense religious life, the guardians church traditions, outposts of Orthodoxy in its missionary activities, but also as an economic stronghold of the church, as well as centers for the training of church personnel. The monks formed the backbone of the clergy, occupying key positions in all areas of church life. Only the monastic rank gave access to the episcopal rank. Bound by a vow of complete and unconditional obedience, which they gave during their tonsure, the monks were an obedient tool in the hands of the church leadership.

Before revealing the functions of the monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church, let us briefly consider the circumstances of their emergence. This is necessary because modern church authors most often write about monasteries as pioneers in the development of remote places and uninhabited outskirts, and monastics are characterized as selfless workers, strict ascetics and disinterested prayer books, although they have no grounds for such descriptions and characteristics.

The first monasteries arose not in the wilderness, but either near large cities, or directly in them. There were many such monasteries in Kyiv, Novgorod, Moscow and other urban centers of Ancient Russia. The practice of creating city monasteries was preserved in the following centuries. So the author of the article “On the Causes of the Moral Decline of Monasticism” had reason to assert that “modern monasteries are almost all located in cities” (Church and Public Life, 1906, no. 44, p. 1445),

Even in those cases when monasteries were indeed created in the distant outskirts of Kievan and Moscow Rus (in particular, in the north of the country), they, as a rule, arose where the Russian peasant had already managed to settle, and by no means in a completely uninhabited place. Monastic colonization, Soviet researchers note, “usually followed the path already paved by the peasants”1. Therefore, it is in no way possible to agree with the assertion of modern church historians that, “advancing towards the icy sea-ocean, the monastery cleared a road there for peasant settlements” (ZHMP, 1949, No. 7, p. 16).

The statements of the ideologists of modern Russian Orthodoxy that the population of the outlying areas rejoiced at the appearance of monastic cloisters do not correspond to reality either. In fact, many of the founders of monasteries were expelled and even killed by local residents, rightly fearing that the newly created monastery would take away their lands and enslave them themselves (as it often happened). This fact was universally recognized by pre-revolutionary church historians: Archbishops Philaret (Gumilevsky) and Makariy (Bulgakov), E. E. Golubinsky, and others. .

Being the economic stronghold of Russian Orthodoxy, the monasteries concentrated enormous wealth, acquired not by the labors of the "unburied dead", but by the most cruel exploitation of the masses of the people. During the time of serfdom, they were large feudal farms that owned land and peasants attached to it. For example, the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery owned villages and villages already under the abbess of Theodosius. A lot of land, gold and silver was given to him by Prince Izyaslav Yaroslavich; he received three volosts from Prince Yaropolk Izyaslavich and five villages from his daughter. Other monasteries of Kyiv, Novgorod and other Russian cities also owned many riches. Modern church historians themselves report that by the end of the 16th century, the Trinity-Sergius Lavra had 200 thousand acres of land located in 27 districts of Russia, not counting small estates in other districts (ZHMP, 1946, No. 6, p. 34).

During the period of bourgeois development in Russia, the monasteries became well-established capitalist enterprises, turning over millions. According to the assumptions of pre-revolutionary researchers (the monasteries never reported exact data on their wealth), the monetary capital of the monastery was at least 40 million rubles. “The fact,” was reported in the church press during the first Russian revolution, “that mammon in our time is the object of primary worship in our monasteries ... Our 697 monasteries have about half a million acres of land, and some monasteries separately have land, measured in thousands of acres ... Monasteries build premises specifically for the lease of the laity, who rent these premises for shops, shops, residential apartments and even taverns, not to mention hotels for pilgrims, who also give monasteries large incomes ”(Church-public life, 1906, No. 42, p. 1382).

Some idea of ​​the economic power of Russian Orthodox monasteries and their wealth can be given by the following figures. When two-thirds of the total number of monasteries were closed in 1919, they were seized and transferred to public use: more than 900 thousand hectares of land, 4248 million rubles of monastic capital, 84 factories, 436 dairy farms, 602 cattle yards, 1112 tenement houses, 704 hotels and farmsteads, 311 apiaries, etc.2.

The church justified the acquisitive activity of the monasteries with the needs of charity, stating that "the monasteries of the estate are the wealth of the poor." However, the actual amount of monastic charity was negligible compared to their economic possibilities. “Where do the funds go, so carefully acquired by the monasteries? What is the end goal of the inventiveness of the abbots of the monasteries in terms of acquisition? Charity? Schools? Hospitals? Shelters? - the author of the article "Our monasteries" asked sarcastically and answered himself: - Nothing of the kind! No monastery acquires solely for charitable purposes. It is no secret to anyone that our monasteries do good with pennies and only for decency, while their acquisitions go partly to the benefit of the brethren, directly into their pockets (in non-communal monasteries), and partly to the splendor of churches built for praying laity, on high bell towers. and good-noise bells” (Church-and-public life, 1906, No. 42, p. 1384). Indeed, when in the pre-revolutionary years the Synod raised the issue of establishing mandatory deductions from the income of monasteries for charitable purposes, the hierarchs staged an obstruction, and the issue had to be removed from discussion.

In addition to accumulating wealth for the needs of the church, monasteries served as centers of religious and church life. Monastic liturgical practice became the standard for parish churches. Considered from this point of view, the monasteries were the main zealots of ritualism, the centers of liturgical formalism, the most active champions of purely external piety. “We must boldly recognize monasteries,” declared the author of the article “Monasteries as educational centers,” as the lowest religious and educational level... monastics (with the rarest exceptions) real profane, unfamiliar with the most elementary religious information” (The Church and Public Bulletin, 1914, No. 18, p. 9).

The monasteries directed and coordinated the missionary activities of the clergy. Monk missionaries were the most active champions of the forced Christianization of the non-Slavic peoples of our country and with particular zeal sowed in the souls of adherents of Russian Orthodoxy the poisonous seeds of hatred for the non-Slavic and non-Orthodox.

The monasteries trained clergymen of all ranks. The episcopate was elected from the monastic environment, and the hierarchal rank was received mainly by monks of noble origin. In the 11th-12th centuries, fifteen bishops came out of one Kiev-Pechersk monastery. Bishops from the "simple" numbered a few.

Icons were painted in monasteries, which, along with frescoes and mosaics, constituted that genre of pictorial art that was allowed by the church and encouraged by it in every possible way. Outstanding painters of antiquity reflected in the icon both religious plots and their vision of the surrounding world, captured in paints not only Christian dogmas, but also their own attitude to the pressing problems of our time. Therefore, ancient Russian pictorial art went beyond the narrow framework of church utilitarianism and became an important means of artistic reflection of its era - a phenomenon not only of purely religious life, but also of general cultural life.

Such an expansion of the functions of icon painting occurred not thanks to the efforts and attitudes of the Russian Orthodox Church, but in spite of them. Not to her and not to the monastic rank of icon painters, but to the genius of Russian artists, who rose above the narrowness of church canons with their strict regulation of creativity, we owe the fact that ancient icons retain great artistic value for today's art lovers and bring us, atheists, great aesthetic pleasure.

Before the advent of printing, it was in the monastic cells that books for liturgical purposes were copied, literature of a religious and church content was composed, in particular the “lives of the saints”, glorifying the “pleasers of God” (mainly monastics) and those cloisters where they carried monastic obedience. Most works of this kind were purely apologetic in nature. They are scarce in historical information and artistically weak.

At the same time, the monasteries fulfilled the social order of the princely authorities: they created and re-edited chronicles and legislative documents. Judging by the content of the chronicles and the style of their presentation, they were written by people who only formally “left the world”, as required by the ritual of initiation into monasticism, but in fact were in the thick of political events, full of “worldly” worries and unrest. Describing the ancient Russian chroniclers, Academician D.S. Likhachev wrote: “They were all very lively people, sometimes young, sometimes old, distinguished by great curiosity, actively intervening in political life, whose hand was led by worldly interests and political passions”1.

Along the way (no longer in the order of fulfilling the instructions of church or civil authorities and not in the course of carrying out monastic obedience, but solely on personal initiative, under the influence of civic feelings and patriotic sentiments), works of a non-religious genre were created behind the monastery fence, belonging to authors with a keen historical sense and great literary gifts. Many of these gems of ancient Russian literary creativity were subsequently destroyed by the church because of their insufficiently Orthodox content. It is wrong to transfer the glory of the authors of these literary monuments of high civic sound and great artistic merit, as some modern researchers and publicists do after the theologians, to ancient Russian monasteries as a whole. For the latter, this was the situation when, in the words of A. S. Pushkin, “good was done inadvertently” 2.

Being conductors of religious and church influence on the masses, Russian Orthodox monasteries also claimed the role of zealots of morality, spiritual educators. Modern Orthodox theologians and church preachers depict monastic cloisters as champions of the moral progress of society, and monks are characterized as bearers of the highest morality, allegedly serving as models for the laity.

Statements of this kind have nothing to do with the truth, as the church sources themselves eloquently testify. Of course, there were among the Russian monks of all times impeccable behavior, strict ascetics, highly moral personalities who managed to manifest and preserve positive spiritual qualities even in the unnatural conditions of monastic life. However, the general moral level of Russian Orthodox monasticism (as well as their counterparts in Byzantium or in the West) was very low, and the moral influence of monasteries on society was predominantly negative. To be convinced of this, it is enough to turn to ancient church documents and to the works of pre-revolutionary church historians (modern theologians and preachers hide from their readers and listeners the facts about the true appearance of monastics).

Here, for example, is how monastics are described in the literary monument of the 12th century “The Word of Daniel the Sharpener”: they go around the villages and houses of the glorious world of this world, like affectionate dogs. Where there are weddings and feasts, there are blacks and blacks and lawlessness: it has an angelic image on itself, and a depraved disposition; the saint has a dignity on himself, but is obscene by custom” 1.

Tsar Ivan the Terrible spoke about the monks of his time (XVI century) at the Stoglav Cathedral as parasites, many of whom "were tonsured only for the sake of bodily peace." Citing these words in his “History of the Russian Church”, Archbishop Macarius not only did not dispute them, but also supplemented them with a statement by the well-known Orthodox theologian of the same time, Maxim the Greek, who stated that the monks were engaged only in worldly affairs and spent their lives in “every disorder” (t VII, book II, pp. 94, 103).

And here is how the famous historian A. Shchapov characterized the monastic life of the next century: “Monasteries in the 17th century. were filled with vicious people, and all kinds of vices dominated there to the highest degree ”(Shchapov A. Russian split of the Old Believers. Kazan, 1859, p. 208).

Little has changed in subsequent centuries. The author of the article "Bright Ideals and Gloomy Reality" directly called the monasteries "dens for the most part homeless, unprincipled parasites, feeding on the gullibility of pious worshipers." “Monasteries,” he wrote, “now exist in Russia only to nourish the sinful flesh of the monks gathered in them; and the monks increase in numbers because a well-fed diet without special worries and labors, without shortcomings and deprivations will always attract endless ranks of parasites ”(Tserkovno-obshchestvennaya zhizn, 1906, No. 44, p. 1457).

Among the numerous vices that Orthodox monasticism indulged in, church historians and publicists primarily noted self-interest, money-grubbing, greed - and this is with the monastic "vow of non-acquisition", which provides for the rejection of the possession of any kind of property. According to Archbishop Macarius, Maximus the Greek reproached the monastics for being occupied only with “their estates” (vol. VII, book II, p. 102). In the monasteries, the author of the article “Our Monasticism” pointed out, “the spirit of acquisition, outward brilliance and comfort” reigns (Church and Public Life, 1906, No. 42, p. 1385).

Flourished in Russian Orthodox monasteries and such vices as drunkenness and depravity. This is unanimously declared by those who directly observed the life of monastics and studied the life of monasteries according to ancient church sources. Ivan the Terrible and the Stoglavy Cathedral denounced the monastic brotherhood for drunkenness. At the beginning of the 18th century, Metropolitan Affony of Novgorod, in his letter to the abbot of the Solovetsky Monastery, noted that in the monasteries "the good elders have disappeared, and those who are, they are also celebrating."

According to A. Shchapov, many monks indulged in such “unbridled drunkenness” that they even “did not go to worship” (Shchapov A. Russian split of the Old Believers, p. 208). And the brethren of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, recalled Professor of Moscow University I. M. Snegirev, managed to get drunk even during divine services: “Before the vigil, buckets of beer, honey and kvass were brought into the southern and northern altars to reinforce the kliros, so that “the right clergy sings , and the left one drinks beer in the altar ... "For the vigil in the altar, after the blessing of the bread, red wine was served to the servants in the enchantment, so that they went out to magnify what is called" to praise "".

Finally, it is necessary to characterize the activities of Russian Orthodox monasteries, which modern church authors do not even mention - the use by the church of monastic cloisters as places of detention, where "enemies of the faith and the tsar" were imprisoned for many years. “Exile to monasteries,” wrote A. S. Prugavin, who was engaged in research in this area, “in former times was carried out in Russia on the widest scale and, moreover, for the most diverse crimes” (Prugavin A. S. Monastic prisons in fight against sectarianism, Moscow, 1905, p. 34).

Pre-revolutionary researchers who studied the history of the use of “holy cloisters” as prisons in the past concluded, based on archival data, that episodic confinement in monasteries of persons objectionable to the church and those in power was practiced in ancient times - at the dawn of Russian monasticism. These imprisonments entered the system in Russia from the middle of the 15th century. True, initially there were no special premises of a prison nature in the monasteries and the prisoners were kept under special supervision in monastic cells. However, already from the end of the 16th century, emergency casemates appeared in many Russian Orthodox monasteries - stone bags, earthen prisons, which, as the pre-revolutionary church press testifies, “in their horrifying conditions can only be compared with the medieval prisons of the scholastic West” (Krasny Zvon, 1908, No. 3, p. 174).

One of the earliest places of detention was the prison of the Solovetsky Monastery. “Exile to the Solovetsky Monastery of religious criminals,” noted A. S. Prugavin in the mentioned book, “was widely practiced already in the middle of the 16th century, in the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Then, during the 17th, 18th, and first half of the 19th centuries, the prison of the Solovetsky Monastery was often overcrowded with prisoners” (p. 10).

From the middle of the 18th century, the Suzdal monastery prison began to function. Prisons were also created in other Orthodox monasteries - both male and female. “In the 16th-18th centuries,” A. S. Prugavin stated, “very many of our monasteries played the role of state prisons for the imprisonment of all the most important criminals not only against the church and religion, but also against the state and government, against public morality etc." (p. 34). Even the church press was forced to admit (albeit only after the fall of Russian tsarism) that monasteries in Russia were “places where victims of autocratic despotism hid” (Christianskaya Thought, 1917, No. 7-8, p. 41).

The fate of the prisoners of the monastery prisons was terrible. Many of them were imprisoned without a term and sat in earthen pits and stone bags for 15-20 years or more. There are cases when prisoners remained in the monastery prison for 50-60 years (Zvonar, 1907, No. 12, p. 189).

The conditions of detention of prisoners in monastic prisons were so difficult that not one of them lost his mind in the first months of his imprisonment. And there is no need to talk about those who spent several years or decades in such a prison. “The percentage of mental illness among monastic prisoners,” wrote A. S. Prugavin, “is huge. If psychiatrists were given the opportunity to investigate the spiritual state of persons who had been in monastic prisons for 10, 15, 20 years, then one can be sure that among these unfortunates they would find very few persons who were mentally healthy” (p. 20).

The blood runs cold when you read the description of the conditions in which the prisoners of the monastery prisons were, compiled by A. S. Prugavin and sounding like an accusation of Orthodoxy and autocracy: “Exhausted by various tortures, rearing up, beaten “mercilessly.” with whips and batogs, with their nostrils torn out, with their tongues cut off, they were taken to Solovki or other "distant monasteries" and locked up there in damp, dark, cold cellars, called prison cells. Here they were doomed to eternal loneliness, to eternal silence, need and grief. It seemed that after the exile they were completely forgotten, they were deleted from the list of living people. Indeed, more often than not, only death saved the unfortunate prisoners from further suffering, only the grave calmed their tormented bodies” (p. 27).

It is impossible to establish the number of victims thrown into the dungeons of the monastery prisons, since information about the prisoners was kept in the strictest confidence, and the cases brought against many of them were subsequently destroyed by the administration of the monasteries, which thus sought to cover up the traces of the crimes of the ecclesiastical and secular authorities of the pre-revolutionary Russia. In a number of cases, even the prison authorities did not know who and for what offenses they were guarding in the casemates, since there was no information about some prisoners in the monastery at all - people suffered and died nameless. But even from those fragmentary, far from complete information, which was obtained with great difficulty by pre-revolutionary researchers, it is clear that during the existence of monastic prisons more than one thousand people found their graves in them. Among these people were opponents of the Russian Orthodox Church (for example, active figures of the Old Believer schism, "stubborn sectarians" and other "enemies of the Orthodox faith"), fighters against the Russian autocracy (in particular, organizers and participants in peasant anti-feudal uprisings, Decembrists and other revolutionaries who fought for the happiness of the people).

Such was the real activity of Russian Orthodox monasteries, starting from the first centuries of the Christianization of Ancient Russia and ending with the times of the fall of the Russian autocracy, for which they were an ideological and political support. This activity contributed to the development of feudalism in Russia with all its contradictions, class limitations and historically transient significance. There were in this activity (as well as in the entire feudal system, which it affirmed and strengthened) aspects that were progressive for their time, expressed, in particular, in the unintentional and nevertheless quite significant contribution of the monasteries to the creation and preservation of the past cultural heritage. However, reactionary aspects, clearly anti-people in their social essence, were predominant in it (especially in recent centuries). Long ago they blocked - and, moreover, many times - everything positive that is put to the merit of the ancient Russian monasteries.

That is why the Russian Orthodox Church, in alliance with the Russian autocracy, made the monasteries a stronghold of tsarism in its struggle against the opponents of the autocratic-feudal, bourgeois-landowner system, including the revolutionary proletariat. From the monasteries came the loudest and most persistent appeals to the tsar for the need to suppress the labor movement by force of arms. From there came the initiative to create the Black Hundred monarchist organizations "Union of the Russian People" and "Union of Michael the Archangel", headed by monks-bishops.

Brochures, leaflets, and proclamations were published in millions of copies in the monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church, in which the idea of ​​monarchism was propagated, the exploitative system was defended, the revolution was discredited, and socialist social ideals were distorted in every possible way. A typical example of such pogrom literature was the Troitsky Leaflets, with the release of which the Trinity-Sergius Lavra earned itself the shameful reputation of a hotbed of counter-revolution and a stronghold of political obscurantism.

The monasteries actively helped tsarism in waging imperialist wars: they intensified militaristic propaganda and provided financial support. Addressing the tsar in connection with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Metropolitan Anthony (Vadkovsky) declared on behalf of the clergy and monasticism: “Dispose of us and our property” (Tserkovny Vestnik, 1905, No. 1, p. 4). The monasteries donated 2.5 million rubles to tsarism for the conduct of this war.

Monasticism behaved in the same loyal way during the First World War. “We dare to declare,” it sounded from the pages of church publications, “that if the state and church authorities invite, allow, command, then churches and monasteries will immediately and without regret give copper bells, and gold and silver utensils, and jewels of icons, and jewelry crosses and vestments, as long as it does not tempt the believing feelings, as long as it forces others who are able to give silver and gold for the needs of the war” (Tserkovnost, 1917, No. 377, p. 7).

In order to save the autocracy from military defeat and prevent the possibility of its fall, the monasteries did not spare their treasury and were ready to make material sacrifices. And when the people needed their funds - to save the starving population of the Volga region and other regions of the country that suffered from a terrible drought in the 20s of the current century - the monks behaved differently. They categorically refused to allocate even a small fraction of their wealth to this most humane goal. Monarch-Patriarch Tikhon (Belavin) stated that church canons forbid the use of cult property for non-liturgical purposes, and on this basis refused church assistance to the starving, among whom, by the way, adherents of Russian Orthodoxy predominated.

During the years of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War, the monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church served as a support base for the counter-revolutionary forces, actively cooperated with the interventionists, which was the logical conclusion of their centuries-old anti-people activities. All this so compromised monasticism in the eyes of believing working people that the radical clergy, who proposed to modernize Russian Orthodoxy in relation to the post-October conditions for the existence of the church (the so-called "renovationists"), raised the question of closing all urban and most of the rural monasteries. Monasticism, it was said in one of the projects of church reforms developed by renovationist groups in the early 1920s, “should be the property of individuals who are really disposed towards it. Consequently, all monasteries must either be closed or converted into Christian communes” (Tserkov i Zhizn, 1923, No. 1, p. 28).

Such is the pre-revolutionary history of Russian Orthodox monasticism, brought to life by the "baptism of Russia." It does not provide any grounds for an apology for this church institution and unbridled praise of the past activities of monasteries as allegedly progressive in social and cultural terms - praises that disorient not only believing Soviet people, but also some of the non-believers.

The consequences of the "baptism of Russia", as well as any historical phenomenon, should be assessed not by individual, often secondary or secondary, moreover, arbitrarily selected results, but by the main, defining, organically arising from the entire process of Christianization of ancient Russian society and determined by this process.

With this approach, which is truly scientific and therefore leads to the truth in a direct way, it becomes obvious that the most important results of the Christianization of Ancient Russia are the consecration of feudal relations, the creation of the Russian Orthodox Church and the formation of monasteries. They had a class-limited, historically transient character and were progressive to the extent and for as long as the feudal system was progressive.

When feudalism historically outlived itself and became a brake on social development, feudal institutions also turned into anachronism, including the Russian Orthodox Church, which arose as a result of the "baptism of Russia", with all its institutions, among which monasteries occupied a central place.

Snatching out individual aspects of the activities of the church and its divisions that were progressive in the past and presenting them to the Soviet people as evidence of the absolute progressiveness of the entire process of Christianization of Ancient Russia is a gross distortion of the truth. And it is necessary to refute it, relying on the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the historical process, with all determination, regardless of whether we are dealing with a conscientious error or a conscious falsification. The only difference is that in the first case, it is sufficient to confine oneself to calm and correct explanations, while in the second, a decisive exposure is necessary.

The year 988 went down in history as the time of the baptism of Russia, the conversion of the Slavs, gathered under the hand of the Kyiv prince, into Orthodox faith. Baptism is the only example in world history of the rapid and relatively painless introduction of a new religion on the territory of a vast state.

Christianization did not always proceed smoothly. Since the 10th century, a lot of evidence has been preserved of the forcible introduction of a new faith into the masses.

Prince Vladimir instructed his governors to persuade the Slavic tribes to Orthodoxy, among whom the prince's uncle, Dobrynya, enjoyed special confidence. Yes, yes, the same Dobrynya Nikitich, well known to us from epics and legends. “Baptized Dobrynya with a sword, and Putyatya with fire” - these words very accurately describe the process of forcible Christianization of the population. Demonstrative executions of pagans who denied the new faith, and gave rise to this saying.

But the resistance to baptism has its own rationale: with the arrival of the Church on the Slavic lands, a new tax was imposed on peasant farmsteads and households - the church tithe. One tenth of the profits, from the harvest or livestock offspring, was to be given to the churchmen. Many historians believe that tithing became one of the main "stumbling blocks" in the process of Christianization.

However, the process of introduction of Christianity met resistance far from everywhere. Thanks to the primordial religious tolerance and peacefulness of the Slavs, and also because of the long neighborhood with Christian preachers, whom Byzantium willingly sent to the Slavic lands, in many places mass baptism took place quite peacefully. Of course, if it were not for the active assistance of the central government, not for the forceful pressure of Prince Vladimir, then the Christianization of Russia would probably have dragged on for centuries. The Russian Church since its inception has always relied on the central government, relying on the power of the state, in return assisting its interests.

The consequences of the Christianization of Russia

Many researchers believe that the adoption of Orthodoxy was not only a well-thought-out action on the part of Prince Vladimir, but also a kind of spiritual impulse, a sign of remorse for fratricide and revelry. Be that as it may, it is impossible not to say about the political and social consequences that the Christianization of Kievan Rus as a state brought.

Thanks to the powerful support of Byzantium, which Russia received after baptism, the Slavic state gained considerable weight in the political arena of both Europe and Asia. In addition, the adoption of Christianity made it possible to actively begin to establish relations with those states that professed the same faith. Having received the new status of a "civilized", and not pagan, state, the Slavs began to develop trade relations with European countries. Subsequently, these contacts will bring not only economic, but also political benefits, making Kievan Rus a significant player on the world stage.

Starting the baptism "from above", that is, first christening himself, his family and his immediate circle, Vladimir created the central vertical of power. The Church became the force that united the disparate Slavic tribes and strengthened the princely power. Existing independently of each other, these two institutions - church and state - have always acted together. The church directed its forces to the dispensation of the state and the support of the central government, while the state, in turn, contributed to the prosperity of the church.

It was Christianity that became the central spiritual force that rallied the people. And even during the period of state fragmentation of the XII century, the Church remained unchanged, helping the Slavs to feel like a single nation.

Another important consequence can be called a general softening of morals. The church made a lot of efforts to eradicate pagan customs. The cessation of sacrifices and bloody rites is a direct merit of the new faith. Enlightenment and moral education of the people became the real duty of the Christian clergy.

Spiritual and cultural

After the adoption of Christianity, Ancient Russia received a powerful impetus for the development of literacy and culture, which was taken as a model from Byzantium:

• A new system of chronology was established (the new year began on March 1).
• Church holidays came into life.
• A Roman account appeared, the names of the months (Genvar, Fuvroire, and so on).
• The Greek monks Cyril and Methodius brought 2 Slavic alphabets - and the Glagolitic alphabet, which served to develop Russian writing.

New cultural traditions assumed the education of a certain segment of the population - priests, craftsmen and politicians. In this regard, literacy schools appeared, from which the first generations of the Russian intelligentsia emerged.

Art (icon painting), architecture, literature and others developed widely. Everything was aimed at the spiritual transformation of man, the inculcation of Christian values. The first books were not entertaining, they were treated with all seriousness and care.

Kievan Rus strove to form its cultural unity on the basis of spiritual qualities: "mercy" and "conscience" were higher than "justice" and "law".

International

In the 9th century, many Western countries adopted Christianity (Poland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary and others), so the Christianization of Russia contributed to the expansion of international relations in the West, but at the same time, limiting them with the countries of the East. A single religion helped Ancient Russia to enter the Christian “family” of European countries and become on the same level with them, absorb their culture and science, and enter the circle of trust. Significantly strengthened relations with Byzantium, which at that time was the center of civilization. International trade was established, marriages were made with Europeans, which also served to strengthen international ties.

Moral

A radical change in the worldview of Christian Russia influenced the moral component of its people. So, for a pagan, the main thing is worthily seeing off a dead person in order to gain a better life after death, but for a Christian: the fate after death depends on who the person has been all his life. This principle became decisive in the actions of people, which served as the formation of the Russian mentality, which continues to this day. The cruel pagan was replaced by a Christian, called to live according to conscience and the law of God. Polygamy and sacrifices have been abolished. The people that were part of Russia were diverse (Ugrian-Finns, nomadic Turks and others) and had their own traditions. The establishment of the state religion marked the beginning of the unity and formation of the ancient Russian nation, which paganism failed to achieve.

Political

The church significantly helped in the establishment of patriarchal statehood: it had a family court in its hands and the government provided material support.

The structure of the state was inherited from Byzantium, where there was a principle: the state is like a human body (body and soul), which means that the body of the state needs two branches (secular and spiritual). In this regard, the Russian Orthodox Church became closely associated with politics, and the metropolitan (later, patriarch) was an adviser to the prince. Thanks to the principle of the divine origin of the head of state, the prince was able to unite the scattered lands of Russia and strengthen his status.

Economic

After the baptism of Russia, the economy began to develop. Foreign goods from the allied states entered the domestic market, handicrafts began to develop, and their own coins were minted. The development of trade was served by trust in Russian Christians, while earlier they were called “barbarians” and tried not to build economic relations.

Thus, Christian postulates were introduced into all spheres of the life of the people, which determined the further successful development of Russia.

The influence of Christianity on the culture of Ancient Russia

The emergence of Christianity with its rich traditions could not but have an impact on the culture of the Slavs. The new faith required new rituals - and temples and monasteries were actively built throughout the country. Temple architecture, originally copying the Byzantine style, very quickly fell under the influence of the original Slavic traditions. And the monuments of ancient architecture clearly demonstrate this. Sophia Cathedral in Novgorod can be a good example of such influence.

Christianization opened the doors to literary creativity. Thanks to the works of Cyril and Methodius, the service was conducted in a language understandable to all, respectively, and all church literature was also translated into Old Church Slavonic. Very quickly, monasteries and churches acquired their own libraries, and not all the works in them were translated - in Russia, their own authors of spiritual literature appeared.

With the spread of writing, history also received an impetus to development. Recording events or chronicling has become a voluntary duty of Orthodox monks. That is why written evidence of the formation of Christianity and the development of Russian statehood from the 10th-12th centuries has come down to us.

But Christianity played its main role in the process of the unification of Russia. Orthodoxy became the pivot around which a single nation began to form from disparate Slavic tribes. Spiritual, cultural, social unity, which Christianity provided, became a catalyst for the unification of Russia, the creation of a single state with a single people on its territory.

In the second half of the 10th century, there was a struggle in Russia between the old pagan clans, who, if necessary, turned to the north of the country, and that part of the nobility (mainly southern, Kievan), who had long understood the need for reforms that could bring the then Russia to the most civilized countries Europe.

Trade relations with Byzantium made it easier for Russia to get acquainted with Christianity. Merchants and combatants who went to Constantinople began to accept Christianity there and bring a new religion to Russia. In the reign of Igor in Kyiv there was already a Christian church of St. Elijah. There were many Christians in the squad of Prince Igor himself. The wife of Prince St. Princess Olga was also a Christian. In a word, the Christian faith became well known to the people of Kiev even under the first Varangian princes. True, Svyatoslav was cold to the Greek faith; and under his son Vladimir in Kyiv there were still pagan "idols" (idols) and there were still before them human "requirements", or sacrifices.

Gradually, the prerequisites were created for the official recognition of the new religion and for the mass baptism of the Eastern Slavs. These premises were destined to come true during the reign of St. Prince Vladimir-Red Sun.

In 983, Vladimir makes an attempt to turn paganism into a state religion. A single pantheon for all Russia is being created pagan gods led by Perun. A hierarchy of pagan gods was established, which corresponded to the hierarchy of earthly power: one supreme ruler (Kyiv prince) and then there were already local princes. By his order, idols of the main deities were placed on a hill near the princely palace in Kyiv. Perun stood out with a silver head and a golden mustache. Idols were also installed in Novgorod, and possibly in other cities. However, it was not possible to strengthen paganism with a pantheon. Many preferred to remain loyal to the old gods, rejecting the violence of the central government. The developed powers still perceived pagan Russia as a barbarian country.

In any relationship with Christian states, a pagan country inevitably turned out to be an unequal, flawed partner, with which Vladimir did not agree (conversion to Christianity strengthened his inherent sense of responsibility for the state, for its authority). Apparently, this explains Vladimir's rejection of paganism and the turn to a fundamentally new religion.

Deciding to be baptized, Vladimir asked only the boyars where to be baptized, to which he received the answer: “Where you like it.” Then the prince, having gathered an army, went to Chersonese. Having drained the city wells, he forced the city to surrender. Having occupied it, Vladimir sent ambassadors to Basil and Constantine with a proposal to give their sister, Anna, to him as his wife, threatening otherwise to approach Constantinople. The kings replied that if the prince was baptized, then Anna would be given for him. Vladimir agreed. The kings, having asked the sister to give her consent, sent her along with the priests to the Russian Tsar. The bishop of Chersonesus performed the rite of baptism and gave him the name Vasily.

Vladimir fulfilled his obligations and helped Vasily II retain the throne, but the emperor was in no hurry to marry his sister to a northern barbarian. Vladimir decided to force the fulfillment of the agreement and, having captured the Greek city of Chersonesos in the Crimea, married Anna. Many noble warriors, imitating their prince, converted to Christianity. Upon his return to Kyiv, Vladimir began to baptize the inhabitants of the capital, and then his other subjects.

The people of Kiev, among whom there were many Christians, accepted the conversion to Christianity without obvious resistance. Vladimir considered Christianity as the state religion; refusal to be baptized under such conditions was tantamount to a manifestation of disloyalty, for which the people of Kiev had no serious grounds. The inhabitants of the southern and western cities of Russia reacted just as calmly to baptism, often communicating with non-Christians and living in a multilingual, multi-tribal environment.

Far greater resistance was put up by the inhabitants of the north and east of Russia. Novgorodians rebelled against Bishop Joachim sent to the city (991). To conquer the Novgorodians, a military expedition of the people of Kiev, led by Dobrynya and Putyata, was required. The inhabitants of Murom refused to let Vladimir's son, Prince Gleb, into the city and declared their desire to preserve the religion of their ancestors. Similar conflicts arose in other cities of the Novgorod and Rostov lands. The reason for such a hostile attitude is the adherence of the population to traditional rites, it was in these cities that elements of a religious pagan organization were formed (regular and stable rituals, a separate group of priests-sorcerers, sorcerers).

Another reason for the resistance of Rostovites and Novgorodians was their wary attitude towards the orders coming from Kyiv. christian religion was seen as a threat to the political autonomy of the northern and eastern lands, whose subordination to the will of the prince was based on tradition, and was unlimited. Vladimir, who violated these traditions, although he grew up in Novgorod, but succumbed to alien Greek influences, was considered in the eyes of the townspeople of the North and East who were forcibly converted to Christianity, an apostate who trampled on his original liberties.

In rural areas, resistance to Christianity was not so active. Farmers, hunters, who worshiped the spirits of rivers, forests, fields, fire, most often combined faith in these spirits with elements of Christianity.

The dual faith that existed in the villages for decades and even centuries was only gradually overcome by the efforts of many generations of clergy. And now it is still being overcome. It should be noted that the elements of pagan consciousness have great stability (in the form of various superstitions). So many orders of Vladimir, designed to strengthen the new faith, were imbued with a pagan spirit.

The religious reform, which drastically changed the lives of many people, was prepared by the previous development of the Russian lands and brought to life by political causes. However, the assertion that Vladimir was guided solely by the understanding of the state benefit of Christianity is incorrect. Obviously, without a deep rethinking of his own life, without a sincere conversion to Orthodoxy, Vladimir would not have been able to act so consistently and decisively, prompting and forcing the inhabitants of a huge pagan power to baptize.

One of the problems after the formal (violent) was the education of subjects in the Christian spirit. This task was carried out by foreign priests, mainly immigrants from Bulgaria, whose inhabitants back in the 9th century. adopted Christianity. The Bulgarian Church enjoyed independence from the Patriarch of Constantinople, in particular to elect the head of the church. This circumstance played a big role in the development of the church in Russia. Not trusting the Byzantine emperor, Vladimir decided to subordinate the Russian Church to the Bulgarian, and not to the Greek hierarchs. This order was preserved until 1037 and was convenient because Bulgaria used service books in the Slavic language, close to colloquial Russian.

The baptism of Russia should not be imagined as one simple change of beliefs. Christianity, having become the dominant religion in Russia, expressed itself not only in preaching and worship, but also in a whole series of new institutions and institutions. A hierarchy came from Greece to Russia: a Russian metropolitan began to live in Kyiv, supplied by the Patriarch of Constantinople; in other cities, bishops subordinate to the metropolitan were appointed (at first there were five of them, then their number reached 15). Churches and monasteries were built in Kyiv and in all dioceses; the clergy of churches and the brethren of monasteries were subordinate to their bishop, and through him to the metropolitan. Thus, the power of the metropolitan extended to the whole of Russia and united all the clergy of the country. Together with Christianity, writing came to Russia, and with it book enlightenment. No matter how weak it was at first, it still had a powerful influence on people who knew it. The liturgical and sacred books were brought to Russia in the Slavic language accessible to all, the very one in which they were set forth by their Slavic primary teachers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius and their Bulgarian students. The language of these books was quite understandable to the Russians, and therefore "book teaching" was not difficult. Immediately upon baptism, schools with teachers-priests appeared in Russia, and scribes-lovers of enlightenment appeared, who collected and copied books. The metropolitan and the clergy in general ruled and judged the people subordinate to them in the same way as it was done in the Greek church, on the basis of a special collection of laws of the Nomocanon, which received in Russia in the Bulgarian translation the name Pilot's Book. This collection contained the church rules of the Apostles and ecumenical councils, also the civil laws of Orthodox Byzantine emperors. The Church owned the lands on which the clergy and monasteries ran their households in their own way, guided by Byzantine customs and laws, establishing such legal relations with farmers as were adopted in Greece.

Thus, in Russia, along with the new dogma, new authorities, new enlightenment, new laws and courts, new landowners and new landowning customs appeared. Since Russia adopted the faith from Byzantium, everything new that came along with faith had a Byzantine character and served as a conductor of Byzantine influence on Russia.

In pagan times in Russia there was only one social difference: people were divided into free and not free, or slaves. The free were called men; slaves were called "servants" (singular serf, robe). The position of slaves, very numerous, was difficult: they were considered as draft animals in the household of their master. They could not have their own property, they could not be witnesses in court, they were not responsible for their crimes before the law. The lord was responsible for them, who had the right of life and death over his serf and punished him himself as he wanted. Free people found protection in their clans and communities; the serf could find protection only from his master; when the master set him free or drove him away, the slave became an outcast and was deprived of protection and shelter.

Thus, in a pagan society, princely power did not have the strength and significance that state power has now. The society was divided into independent unions, which alone guarded and protected their members on their own. A person who left his union turned out to be a powerless and defenseless outcast. The family, with the custom of polygamy, the purchase of brides, had a rude pagan character. Slavery was very common. Brute force dominated society and the human personality in itself had no meaning in it.

Under the influence of Christianity, pagan orders in Russia began to noticeably soften.

The Christian Church, founded in Russia by Prince Vladimir, could not come to terms with such an order. Together with Christ's teaching about love and mercy, the church brought to Russia the beginnings of Byzantine culture. Teaching the pagans the faith, she sought to improve their worldly order. Under the influence of Christianity, individuals from the pagan environment changed their views and customs for the better, followed Christ and showed high examples of moral Christian life and even asceticism. Tradition says about Prince Vladimir himself that he softened under the influence of the new faith, became merciful and affectionate. Many pious Christians appeared among the retinue of zemstvo people, who revered the church, loved books, and sometimes escaped worldly temptations to monasteries and desert life. Through its hierarchy and the example of the zealots of the new faith, the church influenced the mores and institutions of Russia. Through her sermon and church practice, she showed how one should live and act in personal and public affairs.

The church tried to raise the importance of princely power. She taught the princes how they should govern: "forbid evil and execute robbers." The clergy pointed out to Prince Vladimir that the prince could not remain indifferent to violence and evil in his land, that he must keep order in it. The clergy based this view on the conviction that princely power, like any earthly power, was created by God and must do God's will. But since "all power is from God" and since the prince "is God's servant," then he must be obeyed and he must be honored. The Church demanded from the subjects of the prince that they "have affection" for the prince, that they do not think evil of him and look at him as God's chosen one. The view of pagan Russia on the princes was very rude, as on retinue kings who take tribute for their military services to the land and who can be driven away if they are not pleasing, and even killed (like the Drevlyans of Igor). The Church in every possible way fought against such a view and supported the authority of the princes, looking at them as born and God-given sovereigns. When the princes themselves dropped their dignity in coarse quarrels and civil strife, the clergy tried to reconcile them and teach them to "honor the elders" and "not cross someone else's limit." Thus, the clergy put into practice the ideas of a proper state order, having before them the example of Byzantium, where royal power was very high.

Having found a number of unions in Russia, tribal and tribal, retinue and city, the church formed a special union - a church society; it included the clergy, then the people whom the church took care of and nourished, and, finally, the people who served the church and depended on it. The Church took care of and nourished those who could not feed themselves: the poor, the sick, the poor. The Church gave shelter and patronage to all outcasts who lost the protection of worldly societies and unions. The church received into its possession villages inhabited by slaves. Both outcasts and slaves came under the protection of the church and became its workers. The church judged all its people equally and dressed them according to its own law (according to the Pilot Book) and according to church customs; all these people came out of subordination to the prince and became subjects of the church. And no matter how weak or insignificant a church person was, the church looked at him in a Christian way - as a free person. For the church consciousness, all were brothers in Christ, and before the Lord there was neither a slave nor a master. Slavery did not exist in the church: slaves donated to the church turned into personally free people; they were only attached to church land, lived on it and worked for the benefit of the church. Thus, the church gave secular society an example of a new, more perfect and humane device, in which all the weak and defenseless could find protection and help.

The Church then influenced the improvement family relations and morality in general in Russian society. On the basis of Greek ecclesiastical law, adopted and confirmed by the first Russian princes in their "church statutes," all offenses and crimes against faith and morality were subject to ecclesiastical, not princely, judgment. Church judges, firstly, judged for sacrilege, heretics, magic, pagan prayers. Church judges, secondly, were in charge of all family matters that arose between husbands and wives, parents and children. The Church tried to eradicate pagan customs and mores in family life: polygamy, kidnapping and buying wives, expulsion of a wife by a husband, cruelty to wives and children, etc. Applying in their courts the Byzantine laws, more developed than the rough legal customs of pagan society, the clergy brought up the best morals in Russia, planted the best orders.

In particular, the clergy rebelled against the crude forms of slavery in Russia. In teachings and sermons, in conversations and conversations, representatives of the clergy actively taught the masters to be merciful to the slaves and to remember that the slave is the same person and Christian as his master himself. In the teachings, it was forbidden not only to kill, but also to torture a slave. In some cases, the church directly demanded from the masters the release of slaves and slaves to freedom. Receiving slaves as a gift, the church gave them the rights of free people and settled them on their lands; following the example of the church, secular landowners sometimes did the same. Although such examples were rare, although the exhortations of pious teachings did not eradicate slavery, the very view of the slave changed and softened, ill-treatment of slaves began to be considered a "sin". It was not yet punishable by law, but was already condemned by the church and became reprehensible.

So widespread was the influence of the church on the civil life of pagan society. It covered all aspects of the social system, and equally subordinated to itself both the political activity of the princes and the private life of every family. This influence was especially active and strong due to one circumstance. While the princely power in Russia was still weak and the princes of Kyiv, when there were many of them, themselves strove for the division of the state, the church was one and the power of the metropolitan extended equally to the whole of the Russian land. The real autocracy in Russia appeared, first of all, in the church, and this communicated internal unity and strength to church influence.

Along with the influence of the church on the civil life of Russia, we see the educational activities of the church. She was versatile. First of all, those practical examples of the new Christian life that were given to the Russian people by individual ascetics and entire communities of ascetics - monasteries - were of enlightening significance. Then writing, both translated Greek and original Russian, had an enlightening influence. Finally, those objects and monuments of art that the church created in Russia with the help of Greek artists had an educational value.

Baptism, carried out under Vladimir, did not become the final stage in the Christianization of the country, but it became an important link in the reorganization of religious life on new foundations. First of all, Christianity was instilled in the social tops of society. In the personal possession of the princes and boyars were expensive liturgical books and literature, expounding the main provisions of the new dogma. A typical handwritten monument of this kind is the “Izbornik of Svyatoslav” in 1073, decorated with a miniature image of the owner and his family. The collection contains the amount of information necessary for the assimilation of the Christian faith. In addition to purely theological provisions, the collection contains a lot of information about their history, geography, astronomy, philosophy, ethics, grammar.

Federal Agency for Education

State educational institution

Higher professional education

"Tverskoy State University»

Department of Theory and History of Culture

abstract

"The Meaning and Consequences of the Baptism of Russia"

Completed by: student of the 13th group of DO Bondarenko V.N.

Checked by: Associate Professor of the Department of Theory and History of Culture Gerasimov N.I.

Tver, 2005

1. Introduction………………………………………………………….……... 3

2. Choice of faith………………………………………………………….….. 4

3. Christianization of Russia…………………………………………………….. 6

4. The meaning and consequences of the baptism of Russia……………………………... 8

5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………. fifteen

6. Bibliography…………………………………………………………. 16

Introduction.

The formation and strengthening of the Old Russian state, the struggle against tribal fragmentation, the development of feudal relations gave rise to the need to adopt a new ideology.

Vladimir's first attempt was the religious reform of 980 - its essence was to create a single pantheon of pagan gods headed by Perun and to give him a harmonious hierarchical system.

The reform was defeated, but it undermined tribal religious beliefs and thus paved the way for the adoption of Christianity.

The official date of the adoption of Christianity in Russia (its Orthodox branch) is considered to be the "Baptism of Russia" in 988.

The significance of the adoption of Christianity is great, it provided an ideological justification for the developed feudal relations. The church immediately entered into a struggle with paganism, which contributed to tribal fragmentation.

The choice of faith.

major event cultural life of this period is the adoption of Christianity by Russia. The nature of the historical choice made in 988 by Prince Vladimir was certainly not accidental. The location of Russia between East and West, the cross influence of various civilizations on it fruitfully influenced the spiritual life and culture of the Russian people. However, it repeatedly created critical moments in its history. Despite the geographical proximity Western Europe, the basis for the exchange of ideas and people for the East Slavic tribes went in a northern and southern direction, following the currents of the rivers of the East European plain. Along this path from the south, from Byzantium, Christianity began to penetrate into Russia long before its official approval, which largely predetermined the choice of Prince Vladimir, as well as before him - Princess Olga, and even earlier - the Kyiv princes Askold and Dir.

The earliest about the penetration of Christianity into the East Slavic lands date back to the first centuries. new era when the first Christian apostles and their disciples preached in Asia Minor, on the Balkan Peninsula, in the Northern Black Sea region and in the Crimea. In the Crimea and on the Taman Peninsula, secret catacomb churches have been preserved from those times. Russia made the first approaches to baptism in the ΙX century. Then the Russians were baptized twice. But the pagan reaction completely absorbed these first attempts of the Russian princes to introduce their people to Christianity. And yet Christianity slowly but surely recruited supporters. Under the influence of Byzantium, Christian churches were built on the Taman Peninsula, in Kerch. Christian preachers converted the Russians living in the Crimea to Christianity. Chersonese became the center of Christianity throughout the Northern Black Sea region. Here, from time immemorial, there was an independent metropolis, that is, a church organization headed by the metropolitan. The sermons and extensive educational activities of the “Slavic apostles” Cyril and Methodius, who were highly revered in Russia even in pagan times, had a powerful influence.

At the time of Igor, there were already quite a few Christians in Kyiv and there was a church of St. Elijah. After Olga's baptism, Christianization went at a faster pace. The connections of the Kyiv court with Western Christians show that at that time Russia did not want to focus on any one of the church sides: good relations were maintained with both the Byzantine and Roman churches. Close economic, political and cultural ties with Byzantium, penetration into Russia as an alternative to the paganism of Christianity in its Byzantine version rather severely determined the choice of a new religion.

No less important was another factor related to the religious psychology of the people, the peculiarities of their artistic and emotional perception of the world. It is noteworthy that the Tale of Bygone Years focuses on this. It contains a long story about the doubts of Vladimir and his boyars when choosing a faith. It tells about the arrival of missionaries from Byzantium, Muslims from Danube Bulgaria, Jews from Khazaria, that the prince was dissatisfied with the sermons of everyone except the Byzantine, about that. How he sent boyars to different countries to choose the best faith, and then decided to settle on Christianity of the Byzantine rite. The Byzantine liturgy made a strong impression on the Russians, who first became acquainted with Christianity. According to Abbot John Ekonomtsev, the figurative and symbolic perception of the world so characteristic of Russians, their maximalism, the desire to achieve the absolute with one impulse of will, found fertile ground.

Formally, Russia became Christian. The funeral pyres, the fires of Perun, went out, but for a long time pagan burial mounds were poured over the villages, they prayed to the fire-Svarozhich, and celebrated the violent holidays of antiquity. Paganism began its long journey of radiance with Christianity.

Christianization of Russia.

In 988, Vladimir converted to Christianity. The circumstances that preceded this event and accompanied it are told with fabulous features, which are quite characteristic of oral traditions recorded quite a long time after the said event. It is only certain that Vladimir was baptized and at the same time married the Greek princess Anna, the sister of the emperors Basil and Constantine. His baptism, most likely, took place in Korsun or in Chersonese, a Greek city on the southwestern coast of Crimea; From there, Vladimir brought to Kyiv the first spiritual and necessary supplies for Christian worship. In the beginning, the people of Kyiv were baptized. In one of summer days by order of Vladimir, pagan idols led by Perun were overturned. The next morning, all the inhabitants of the city came to the river. There they all entered the water, and the priests performed the rite of baptism over them. Immediately, the Grand Duke ordered the construction of churches to begin. And the first of them - the church of St. Basil - he ordered to be placed on a hill where the image of Perun had previously stood. Following this, the conversion to Christianity of other Russian cities and lands began. This process took several years.

The Christianization of Novgorod was entrusted to the uncle of Prince Dobrynya. Pagan Novgorod opposed the arrival of Dobrynya with priests and crosses. Only after fierce clashes, in which the pagans defeated the court of Dobrynya and killed his relatives, did the Novgorod governor manage to break the resistance of the rebels. Many people were severely punished. Christianity was introduced with the same difficulty in Rostov and other lands. In rural, forested areas, paganism retained its position for a long time.

The Christianization of Russia was carried out not only by princely decrees, but also in other ways. Icons and sacred books were brought to Kyiv from Byzantium; their translation into Slavic was organized, and Christian churches were erected everywhere.

One of the features of Byzantine Christianity was that it allowed church services in the lands of newly converted peoples in their native language, in contrast to the Roman church, which allowed worship only in Latin. This brought the new religion closer to the people, making it a part of their spiritual life, way of life and culture.

Vladimir could not but take into account one more feature of the Byzantine church organization. At the head of it was not a church minister, like the pope of Rome, but the head of secular power - the emperor, the patriarch was subordinate to him. This tradition was transferred to Russia.

The metropolitan and bishops were sent from Byzantium to manage church affairs. But as Christianity spread, it became necessary to dramatically increase the number of clergy. A large number of schools were opened, in which mainly priests and other churchmen were trained, necessary for "the fulfillment of rites and for the scientific enlightenment of the flock." Of course, these schools contributed greatly to the common cause of education.

At the head of the Russian Church was a metropolitan appointed by Constantinople. In large cities there were bishops who were in charge of all church affairs of a large district - the diocese. With the isolation of individual principalities, each prince sought to ensure that his capital had its own bishop. The metropolitan and bishops owned lands, villages and cities: they had their own servants, serfs, outcasts, and even their regiments. The princes gave tithes for the upkeep of the church. One of the most important church organizations was the monasteries, whose way of life and ideology were completely transferred from Byzantium.

In fact, Christianization took place over several centuries and was primarily for political reasons.. Kyiv merchants who traded with Byzantium, soldiers who visited Christian countries became Christians. Christianity was accepted by Kyiv princes Askold and Olga.

In the X century. was a strong feudal state high level crafts and trade, spiritual and material culture. Further development required the consolidation of forces within the country, and this was difficult to do in conditions where different cities worship different gods. A unifying idea of ​​a single God was needed. International relations also required the adoption of Christianity, since Russia maintained constant contacts with the Christian countries of Western Europe and Byzantium. To strengthen these contacts, a common ideological platform was needed.

Receiving baptism from Byzantium was also not accidental. Kievan Rus had closer trade and cultural ties with Byzantium than with other countries. The subordination of the church to the state, characteristic of Byzantium, also appealed to princely power. The adoption of Christianity from Byzantium made it possible to worship in their native language. It was also beneficial for Byzantium to make the baptism of Russia, since it received an ally in the struggle to expand its influence.

Year of the Baptism of Russia

The act of baptism in Kyiv and Novgorod, which took place in 988, has not yet exhausted the acceptance of Christianity by the whole people. This process spanning centuries.

The prince and his retinue were baptized in Korsun (Chersonese). Baptism was reinforced by the marriage of the prince with the sister of the Byzantine king Vasily III. Upon the return of Prince Vladimir with his retinue and the newly-born princess to Kyiv, he ordered the overthrow of the old gods and the need for the entire population of Kyiv to gather on a certain day and hour to the banks of the Dnieper, where baptism was performed. The baptism of Novgorod was a more difficult task, since Novgorod constantly showed separatist tendencies and perceived the baptism as an attempt to subordinate it to the will of Kyiv. Therefore, in the annals one can read that “Putyatya baptized the Novgorodians with fire, and Dobrynya with a sword”, i.e. Novgorodians put up fierce resistance to baptism.

The consequences of the baptism of Russia

During the XI century. in different parts of Kievan Rus, pockets of resistance to Christianization arose. They had not so much religious as social and political meaning; were directed against the oppression and spread of power of the Kyiv prince. At the head of popular indignations, as a rule, were Magi.

After the adoption of Christianity, already under Yaroslav the Wise, a metropolis was created in Kyiv, headed by a sent Greek metropolitan. The metropolis was divided into dioceses headed by bishops, mostly Greeks. Before the Tatar-Mongol invasion, the Russian Orthodox Church consisted of 16 dioceses. From 988 to 1447 the church was under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, its primates were appointed in Constantinople. Only two cases of appointment of Russians as primates are known - Hilarion(XI century) and Kliment Smalyatich(XII century). Already under Vladimir, the church began to receive tithes and soon turned into a major feudal lord. There are monasteries performing defensive, educational, charitable functions. During the reign of Yaroslav, monasteries were founded St. George(Christian name Yaroslav) and St. Irina(heavenly patroness of Yaroslav's wife). In the 50s. 11th century the most significant of the ancient Russian monasteries appears - Kievo-Pechersky, founded by Anthony and Theodosius of the Caves, the founders of Russian monasticism. At the beginning of the XII century. this monastery received the status laurel. By the time of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, there were monasteries in almost every city.

Thanks to the material support of the princes, churches are being built. In 1037 the cathedral was founded St. Sofia- the main cathedral church in Kyiv, built on the model of Constantinople. In 1050, the cathedral of the same name was built in Novgorod.

In conditions of feudal fragmentation, the church found itself in a difficult situation. She had to play the role of a mediator in settling disputes and contradictions, the role of conciliator of warring princes. The princes often interfered in the affairs of the church, solving them from the point of view of their own benefit.

Since the end of the 30s. 13th century Russian lands were enslaved. The Church characterized this disaster as a punishment for sins, for the lack of religious zeal, and called for renewal. By the time of the invasion of Russia, the Tatar-Mongols professed primitive polydemonism. They treated the ministers of the Orthodox Church as people associated with demons who could damage them. This danger, in their opinion, could be prevented or neutralized by good treatment of the ministers of Orthodoxy. Even when the Tatar-Mongols accepted in 1313, this attitude did not change.