Before the general offensive of the Red Army, the 4th and 6th Soviet armies are created and the Southern Front is formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. Frunze's offensive plan was to encircle and destroy the Russian Army in Northern Tavria, preventing it from leaving for the Crimea through the isthmuses of Perekop and Chongar. The 6th, 13th and 4th armies, the 1st cavalry army of Budyonny, the 2nd cavalry army of Guy and the Makhno gang took part in the general offensive against the Crimea.
The commander of the 6th Army, Comrade Kork (1887-1937), an Estonian by birth, graduated from the Chuguev Infantry School in 1908, and in 1914 from the Academy of the General Staff and in the Imperial Army had the rank of lieutenant colonel. After the occupation of the Crimea, Comrade Kork was commander of the 15th Infantry Division and later head of the Frunze Academy of the General Staff. In gratitude for his exploits for the glory of the dictatorship of the world proletariat, he was shot by Stalin, after whose death he was rehabilitated.
To attack Perekop, the 51st Blucher Rifle Division, already known to us, is assigned, which for this is reinforced by a strike and fire brigade, a separate cavalry brigade, cavalry regiments of the 15th and Latvian divisions and an armored group.
October 26/November 7. Frunze ordered to take the Perekop rampart. To do this, Blucher, who united the entire shock group on Perekop, divides it: 1) the shock-fire and 152nd rifle brigades to storm the Turkish shaft; 2) he allocates the 153rd rifle and two cavalry brigades to the strike group for an offensive through the Sivashi to the Lithuanian Peninsula and to reach the rear of the Perekop fortifications.
To prepare for the assault on Perekop, 55 guns and 8 escort guns fired. The operation began on November 7 at 22:00.
October 27/November 8. In the morning, the enemy spent three hours from twenty batteries of various calibers in real preparation for the assault on the rampart. Our old trenches were not only not improved, but partly already fell apart, or they have now been smashed by the Reds. The line of trenches went along the very crest of the rampart, and the shelters were on our slope of it, so the enemy shells hit the slope of the rampart facing him or flew over the rampart and burst behind the rampart, which saved us. But the trouble was with the delivery - dozens of horses were torn to shreds. From ten o'clock, as far as the eye could see, twelve chains of red infantry covered the entire field in front of us - the assault began.
The temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, arrived at the site and gave the order not to shoot until the Reds approached to the very ditch. The Perekop fortifications consisted of a huge, massive old Turkish rampart and a deep ditch in front of it, once filled with water from the bay, but now dry, reinforced with barbed wire along both of its slopes and located to the north of the rampart, that is, towards the enemy. With the approach of the Red infantry, their artillery transfers all the force of their fire to our rear. Using this, the strikers fill the trenches along the crest of the rampart and bring ammunition. The Reds, apparently, were confident in the strength of their artillery fire and quickly rolled on us. Their apparent overwhelming superiority in strength and our retreat encouraged them. Perhaps our deathly silence gave them the illusion that we had already been killed, and therefore they “perlied” cheerfully, with warlike cries. I even saw with a simple eye that the first chains were in zipuns, pulled up and, as those who remained on our wire later said, this was some kind of the best division named after Comrade Frunze. The first chain was already at a distance of 300 paces from us, the machine gunners' hands were already itching, but there was no order to fire. The Reds became completely bolder, and some ran up to the moat. Although we were confident in ourselves, nevertheless, the nerves were very tense and the first to break our silence was the head of the division, General Peshnya, who knew the machine gun very well and took up it himself. The effect of the fire of at least 60 machine guns and four battalions, this only in the sector of the 2nd regiment, was amazing: the fallen fell, the rear chains pressed in and thus cheered up the remnants of the forward chains, which in places reached the moat. Our advantage, despite our small numbers, was that the Red artillery could not hit us because of the proximity of their shooters to us, and the enemy machine guns could hit us perfectly, but for some reason they only pulled them, and did not shoot over their heads. Maybe they had no experience in this kind of use of their weapons? We were also fortunate in that, with the approach of the Reds closer to the ditch and the rampart, they clearly realized the full significance for them of such an obstacle, which, as they were convinced, even their numerous artillery could not destroy. A quarter of an hour later, the entire attacking mass mixed up and lay down. It was impossible to think of a worse position for the Reds even on purpose: for us, from the height of the rampart, they presented excellent targets, without the possibility of hiding anywhere, and it was here that they suffered the greatest losses. Our artillery also hit them, but not in the same way as always. It turns out that, in addition to damage from enemy artillery fire, it was partially withdrawn to the right, to the sector of the Drozdov division, where the Reds broke through the estuary. Until evening, this whole mass did not move under our fire, filling the air with the cries of the wounded. I happened to read in the history of the Civil War published in the USSR a description of the attacks on the Crimea, where it was reported that their losses at that time were up to 25 thousand people and that they stormed the Perekop shaft and destroyed our brother with bombs in reinforced concrete shelters, which we did not have there , but we had simple dugouts covered with boards with earth. But despite this, the whole field was covered with dead and wounded in the name of the international of the proletarian revolution of Lenin and Trotsky, but our situation was getting worse.
In the book "Blucher" this offensive is described as follows:
“November 6 of the new style, on the eve of the celebration of the third anniversary of the great proletarian revolution, we were ready to storm. The 15th and 52nd Rifle Divisions were moving up to the battlefield. Together with the 153rd Rifle Brigade and a separate cavalry brigade of the Perekop group, they were planned to strike through the Sivash on the Lithuanian Peninsula, on the flank and rear of the Perekop position. The 152nd rifle and fire strike brigades were preparing for a frontal attack on the Turkish Wall. M. V. Frunze came to the headquarters of the 51st Rifle Division, located in Chaplinka, to personally supervise the operation. Wrangel concentrated the best units on the defense of Perekop. On the night of November 8, when the country was celebrating the third anniversary of October, the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions and the 153rd and a separate brigade of the 51st rifle division in the bitter cold, drowning in the swamps of the Sivash, being shot by artillery and machine-gun fire, dragging on themselves machine guns and guns, went on the attack on the Lithuanian peninsula. Early in the morning of November 8, they reached the White trenches and, breaking through the wire, drove out the troops of General Fostikov with bayonets (it was a detachment of Kuban with two machine guns).
Silence reigned in the artillery positions under the Turkish Wall. Thick fog covered the Turkish Wall. The tension grew. Continuous inquiries from the Lithuanian peninsula: "What's the matter?"
At nine o'clock the fog slowly cleared and all our 65 guns opened rapid fire. From the Turkish Wall, the whites bombarded us with fire. The seven-kilometer space under the rampart and on the rampart turned into a continuous sea of craters. At about 12 o'clock the shock regiments and the 152nd brigades with the 453rd regiment rushed to the assault. Bearing huge losses, they approached the Turkish Wall faster and closer. On the Lithuanian Peninsula, the Whites attack the 13th and 34th divisions (I remind you that the divisions of the Russian Army were three regiments, and the Reds had nine regiments, with one cavalry regiment per division. By this time, these two of our divisions were no more than two battalions ). At about 18:00 we attack the Turkish Wall again. Armored cars are in the forefront. At the very ditch, unexpectedly encountering a wire, the infantry stopped again. A whole day of unparalleled combat had not yet brought victory, but the goal was already close. About 200 white guns and up to 400 machine guns hit our units.
(The number of guns in our sector is ten times exaggerated, and the number of machine guns is four times exaggerated. The Perekop shaft was occupied only by two Kornilov shock regiments, and the third regiment stood facing east, towards the Sivash, to protect against a strike from there).
During the battle on October 26 / November 8, the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment lost 8 people killed and 40 wounded. 35 horses were killed. All wounds were from artillery fire.
October 27/November 9. The Kornilov Shock Division left the Perekop rampart by one o'clock and retreated to the Yushun positions. The night was dark and starless. The battalion of Colonel Troshin was left in the rearguard of the division, which also left the Perekop rampart by one o'clock. This is how it is written in the book “Kornilovsky Shock Regiment”: “In the evening of October 26, Art. Art. Colonel Levitov summoned Colonel Troshin and told him that with the onset of darkness the entire Kornilov Shock Division was ordered to withdraw to the Yushun positions, and his 2nd battalion was assigned to the rearguard. In order not to reveal your retreat in front of the enemy, it is necessary to shoot from rifles until the last moment. The impregnable Perekop shaft began to empty. Machine guns are taken away, companies leave one after another. Colonel Troshin stretched his battalion through the trenches. The ominous silence was occasionally broken by a single shot. Finally, the 2nd Battalion withdrew. Without a single spark of cigarettes, the Kornilovites passed through the Armenian Bazaar and, late at night, were drawn into the first line of the Yushun fortifications.
The combat logs of all three regiments of the Kornilov Shock Division noted that these fortifications were poorly adapted for defense.
Let's see how this assault on the Perekop positions illuminates Blucher's headquarters: “At night, at about 24 hours (October 26/November 8), Frunze orders the attack to be resumed and demands that the rampart be captured at all costs. Again, we throw the exhausted units on the assault, and at about 3 o'clock on October 27 / November 9, impregnable Perekop fell.
In fact, Perekop was abandoned by the Kornilovites without a fight and even before the Reds approached, according to the order of October 26, November, at 24 o'clock.
Interestingly, Blucher wrote in his reports to the commander of the 6th Soviet Army about the reasons for the failure of the assault on the Perekop fortifications: “It was not possible to take the Perekop fortified position by raid. The enemy provided himself, although with a small garrison, but equipped with a colossal materiel. The positions are adapted to the tactical conditions of the terrain. This makes the isthmus almost impregnable.”
In one chicly published history of the USSR, I read the same fabrication about the storming of the Perekop fortifications, where the Reds allegedly smoked out officers with bombs and flamethrowers from concrete fortifications, which in fact did not exist on the Perekop shaft, just as there was no “LEGENDARY STORM OF PEREKOPSKY VALA RED" at 3 o'clock on October 27/November 9.
28 of October. At dawn, the enemy with large forces, supported by strong artillery fire, went over to the offensive on the front of the division. Despite the small number of the regiment and the fatigue of people from long and difficult transitions, accompanied by continuous and overwhelming battles, the regiment with courage held back the onslaught. However, the right-flank 1st regiment was driven out of the first line by the attack of the Reds from the side of the Drozdov Rifle Division, the 3rd regiment was under threat of a strike from the rear. At this time, the temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, took an armored car from the 2nd regiment and ordered by phone the 3rd and 2nd regiments to go over to the counterattack. I, the commander of the 2nd Regiment, dared to point out the danger of a penalty for the weak 3rd Regiment, and then the 2nd Regiment would be pressed against the bay, but at that time I was informed that the 3rd Regiment was already moving beyond the wire to attack.
I then considered the attack unnecessary and risky, but the inappropriate haste of the commander of the 3rd regiment made it necessary to expose his regiment to the bullets of the Reds, and not to throw them back again with the force of his fire. When the 2nd regiment went beyond the wire, the 3rd regiment in a thin chain, led by its regiment commander, Colonel Shcheglov, on horseback, was already moving towards the trenches of the enemy's red machine guns. The futility of the counterattack under the conditions that had been created for us weighed heavily on me. Shells and bullets also rained down on the 2nd Regiment, which calmly and unanimously went on the counterattack. Busy with the fate of my regiment, I did not pay attention to the actions of the 3rd regiment, but when I looked at its sector, I saw a sad picture of its retreat, now without the regiment commander wounded in this sortie. Here I also ordered to retreat under the cover of machine guns to my trenches.
Passing through the barbed wire, I stopped to take another look at the situation in the sector of the 3rd Regiment, but here my command of the valiant 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment came to an end. The bullet hit me in the left groin, piercing through a thick bag of cards, and stopped in the spine of the spine. She knocked me off my horse, paralyzing both legs almost instantly. After 8 years, in Bulgaria, Dr. Berzin performed an operation on me and presented me with a Russian pointed bullet with a bent end as a memory of the Motherland, which inflicted the thirteenth wound on me in the struggle for honor and dignity. national RUSSIA. Simultaneously with me, my assistant Colonel Lysan, Anton Evtikhievich, was also wounded, also in the groin, but right through. Colonel Troshin took command of the regiment, Captain Vozovik became his assistant.
In this battle, among the officers, the following were wounded: General Peshnya, who temporarily commanded the division, and the commander of the Kornilov artillery brigade, General Erogin, took temporary command of the division; the commander of the 1st Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Gordeenko, and the regiment was received by Lieutenant Colonel Shirkovskiy; the commander of the 3rd Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Shcheglov and his assistant Colonel Pooh, and the regiment was received by Colonel Minervin.
Despite the failure, the division still held on to its sector.
In the book: “Markovites in battles and campaigns for RUSSIA”, p. 345, they paint a picture of their approach to the right flank of our division to replace us and incorrectly indicate the distribution of regiments that actually occupied the sectors as follows: on the right flank of the division, up to Lake Salt, stood the 1st regiment, to the left - the 3rd regiment, and on the very left flank stood the 2nd regiment, to the very Perekop Bay.
On October 28, General Wrangel gathered representatives of the Russian and foreign press and informed them of the situation, saying: “The army that fought not only for the honor and freedom of the Motherland, but also for the common cause of world culture and civilization, the army that had just stopped the bloody the hand of the Moscow executioners, abandoned by the whole world, bled to death. A handful of naked, hungry, exhausted heroes continue to defend the last inch of their native land. Their forces are coming to an end, and not today, so tomorrow they can be thrown into the sea. They will hold out to the end, saving those who seek protection behind their bayonets. I have taken all measures to take out in case of misfortune all those who are threatened with bloody reprisals. I have the right to hope that those states for whose common cause my Army fought will show hospitality to the unfortunate exiles.
29th of October at dawn, under strong pressure from the enemy, the Kornilov Shock Division, according to the order, began to retreat to Yushun. From there, due to the complicated situation, the division retreats further south, along the Yushun-Simferopol-Sevastopol road.
* * *
After describing the last battles for Perekop and leaving the Crimea by us according to our data, we should also be interested in the view of our enemy on this, which I take from the Russian Thought newspaper of December 7, 1965, set out in an article by D. Prokopenko.
CAPTURE OF PEREKOP
For the forty-fifth anniversary.
The 6th Soviet Army, which stormed the Perekop-Yushun positions of the Whites in November 1920, was commanded by Kork (1887-1937). An Estonian by birth, he graduated from the Chuguev military school in 1908, and in 1914 from the Academy of the General Staff. In the old Army, he had the rank of lieutenant colonel (I insert: in 1937 he was shot for his service in the Red Army. Now, probably, he has been recorded in the synodic of the red commanders-in-chief: “repressed”, “rehabilitated”). On the capture of Perekop and the Yushun positions, Kork made a report at the Yekaterinoslav garrison military scientific audience on November 1, 1921 (“Stages of the Long Way”, military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1963),
“The troops of the 6th Army approached Perekop on the evening of October 29th. The 1st and 2nd cavalry, the 4th and the 13th armies poured into the 4th army approached the area of the Chongar Peninsula a few days later. The positions of the whites were divided into three groups: the Turkish Wall (the main fortifications), then a number of Yushun positions (their strength is in depth), and to the east - the Sivash positions, along the southern coast of the Sivash (Rotten Sea), these fortifications were weak. The White command did not mean that the northwestern part of the Sivash was dry. The summer and autumn of 1920 were dry, there were almost no winds from the east, and the water therefore went to the southeast. Information about this state of the sea began to arrive at the red headquarters only after October 29.
Side forces. In total, Wrangel had up to 13,500 infantry fighters, up to 6,000 cavalry fighters, about 750 machine guns, 160 guns and 43 armored cars on the Perekop Isthmus (I ask the reader to pay attention to the fact that Perekop at that time was occupied by only two regiments of the Kornilovskaya The shock division, the 3rd regiment was in reserve, with a ledge back to the south, and the front to the Sivash, to protect our rear, and plus, all three regiments suffered huge losses during the retreat from the Dnieper and decreased by 2/3 of their small strength , that is, in total, the division had no more than 1.200 bayonets.The machine guns in three regiments could not be more than STA, and as for our Kornilov artillery brigade, from its composition in three divisions in the last battle for Perekop, some of them were taken to repel attacks there were no cavalry at Perekop, not even our regimental cavalry squadrons.In general, the commander of the 6th Red Army greatly exaggerated our forces at Perekop with the specific goal of increasing our merits of our army, when in fact our fate was then decided by Pilsudski with the support of France by making peace, as during the Battle of Orel, when Pilsudski concluded a truce with Lenin, and the Red Army crushed us with its colossal superiority. Colonel Levitov).
Red forces: 34,833 infantry, 4,352 cavalry, 965 machine guns, 165 guns, 3 tanks, 14 armored cars and 7 aircraft.
If we compare the forces of the parties, Kork reports, then our numerical superiority over Wrangel immediately catches the eye: we outnumbered him more than twice in infantry, while Wrangel had more cavalry, but here we must take into account the presence of the 1st and 2nd and cavalry armies, which could be transferred at any time to the Perekop Isthmus in order to force it and advance to the Crimea. As for the artillery, in total the enemy seemed to have superiority, but his artillery was extremely scattered. If we compare the number of artillery in the strike directions, then the superiority in artillery was on our side.
So, comparing the number of parties, it should be recognized that a huge superiority was on our side.
The high red command believed that the struggle for Perekop would be positional, as in an "imperialist" war. But, having learned that the northwestern part of the Sivash was passable, the commander of the 6th decided to deliver the main blow through the Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula to Armyansk. Preparation for the operation was as follows; 2 brigades of the 51st Infantry Division were to strike at the Turkish Wall, and the other two brigades from the 1st Cavalry would advance around the right flank of the Whites occupying the Perekop Isthmus. The 52nd and 15th divisions were to go behind enemy lines through the Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula. The Latvian division was left in the army reserve.
Hostilities began on the night of November 7-8. Due to fog, the 51st Division began artillery preparation along the Turkish Wall at 10 o'clock in the morning, and at 2 o'clock the attackers began to cut the wire, but were repulsed by concentrated white fire. In the renewed attack at 18 o'clock, the Reds suffered heavy losses and retreated. The White counterattack overturned the Red Brigade (153rd), which bypassed their right flank.
On the night of November 7-8, other red units begin an offensive on the Lithuanian Peninsula and move deeper into it, despite vigorous counterattacks by white infantry with armored vehicles.
So, by 18 o'clock on November 8, the Reds had no success either in front of the Turkish cash, or on the Lithuanian peninsula, since the Whites went over to counterattacks all the time. But the exit of two rifle divisions to the flank and rear of the Whites, who occupied the Turkish Wall, created a critical situation for them. The Red Command gives the order to storm the shaft with two brigades, and the rest of the units - to strike in the direction of Armyansk. The assault on the rampart began at 2 am (152nd rifle and fire brigades), but only the rearguards of the whites remained on it, who had already begun their retreat ... The Turkish rampart was taken without heavy losses (no losses at all).
On the morning of November 9, stubborn battles began everywhere, but the reserves of the Whites (with Barbovich's cavalry) could not delay the advance of the Reds. The 51st division on the evening of November 9 approached the first line of the Yushun positions ... Breakthrough of the Yushun positions on November 10 and 11. Here begins a series of decisive battles on which the fate of the Crimea depends. In his order, General Barbovich says: "There cannot be a single step back, this is unacceptable according to the general situation, we must die, but not retreat." Taking part in the breakthrough: the 51st, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions, and then the Latvian. Cork, in view of the severe frosts and the lack of fresh water in this zone, orders all the Yushun police to pass in one day, regardless of losses. The task was not completed completely, but nevertheless, on November 10, the 51st division broke through three lines, here the white defenders were supported by artillery from ships (as the commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which occupied the leftmost flank of the white positions, to the very Perekop Bay, I testify, that the shooting of our ships in these battles I did not see and did not hear about it. Colonel Levitov),
On the left flank, they were able to capture only the first fortified line. On the morning of November 11, the Latvian and 51st rifle divisions attacked the last line and broke through it. A number of White attacks could not stop the movement, and the Reds occupied railway station Yushun around 9 o'clock in the morning. On the left flank of the Reds, the Whites were preparing a decisive blow to eliminate the offensive. Furious attacks alternated on both sides. At about 11 o'clock, the white units, with the support of the officers (which then no longer existed) of the Kornilov and Drozdov divisions, resumed counterattacks and pressed the reds. Then Cork orders two brigades to hit the rear. The resistance of the whites was broken and they began a gradual retreat ... "- The operation to capture the Perekop-Yushun positions by the evening of November 11 was completed," says Kork, "and at the same time the fate of the Wrangel army was decided." Further movement deep into the Crimea went without fighting.
According to Cork, the losses of the Reds are 45 officers and 605 Red Army soldiers. He explains such small losses by combining maneuver with an attack and the swiftness of the offensive, which did not allow the enemy to put his units in order. The general goal - the destruction of the enemy - was not achieved, since the cavalry did not break through in time Kork this could not be, and the Soviet Marshal Blucher seemed to have a different opinion about the same battles.In the book "Marshal Blucher", p. 199, in the order for the 51st Moscow Division of November 9, 1920 No. , the village of Chaplinka, § 4, about the losses during the capture of Perekop, it says this: "The brigade commanders act decisively, the main obstacles are in our hands. Remember that the energy is in the pursuit REWARD FOR HEAVY LOSSES, suffered in the battles for the impregnable positions of the Turkish Wall. Signed: Division Commander of the 51st Blucher, Commander of the General Staff Dadyak. So, according to the Reds, they stormed the Perekop shaft in THREE hours November 9, knocking us out of concrete fortifications, when we didn’t have any at all, and there was no one to knock out, since the last battalion of Colonel Troshin left the rampart by order at 24:00 on 8 November. I also dare, even in my modest position as commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which then defended the left side of the Perekop rampart, to assure Comrade Kork that the losses just in front of the rampart should be ten times greater. It would not be worth it to especially regret Kork that they did not exterminate us, but they saved the prepared gas cylinders in case General Wrangel did not appreciate the hopelessness of our situation and would not prepare ships for the patriots of RUSSIA who want to leave their homeland. And yet one has to believe that retribution exists: the famous Soviet heroes of these battles Kork and Blucher deservedly received from their leader a bullet in the back of the head for treason to their homeland. Colonel Levitov).
Crimean campaign
Minich, leaving the Don army near Azov, reached Tsaritsynka by April 7 (18), 1736, where he discovered that the troops were not yet ready to march on the Crimea. However, the war, too, had not yet been declared, and the battles near Azov were formally started by powers that were not at war with each other. Even when news of the siege of the Azov fortress reached Constantinople in early April, the Russian envoy Veshnyakov continued to be treated politely and, contrary to custom, they were not thrown into the Seven-Tower Castle. The reason for such "politeness" was the extremely unpleasant situation for the Ottomans on the Persian front. There, Turkey continued to suffer defeats, and the warlike and energetic Kuli Khan officially became the head of Persia, who finally removed both Shah Tahmasp and his infant son Abbas from power, and began to rule under the name of Nadir Shah.
Veshnyakov, seeing weakness Ottoman Empire, continued to encourage Petersburg to act decisively. “I will boldly and truly convey,” he wrote to the capital, “that in Turkey there are neither political leaders nor military leaders .... Everything is in terrible disorder and, at the slightest disaster, will be on the edge of the abyss. Fear of the Turks rests on one legend, for now the Turks are completely different than they were before: how much they were previously inspired by the spirit of glory and ferocity, they are now so cowardly and timid, everyone seems to foresee the end of their illegal power .... The Tatars, knowing everything it is now, as they say here, that the loyalty of the Porte is beginning to waver. As for the Christian subjects, the Turks fear that everyone will revolt as soon as the Russian troops approach the borders. The local Greeks of Constantinople are mostly idlers, having neither faith nor law, their main interest is money, and they hate us more than the Turks themselves, but the Greeks of the region and even more Bulgarians, Volokhi, Moldavians and others care so much about getting rid of their Turkish tyranny and so strongly devoted to Russia that at the first chance of life they will not spare Your Imperial Majesty as a trusted savior. The Turks know all this.”
In early April, Minich sent a small detachment of infantry from Tsarichanka to the Samara River, led by Lieutenant Bolotov, to reconnoiter the area. The cavalry detachment of Colonel Lesevitsky received the same order. The reconnaissance detachments also had to establish "flying mail posts" and constantly report to Tsarichanka about possible enemy movements. Hurrying with the start of the campaign, the field marshal decided to lead the troops to Samara in five columns, sending them as soon as they were ready. The time factor played a big role, it was impossible to let the enemy strengthen his positions and transfer reinforcements to the Crimea.
On April 11 (22), the first column under the command of Major General Spiegel set out from Tsarichanka, it included four infantry and two dragoon regiments. The next day, on April 12 (23), 1736, Osterman sent a letter to the Turkish vizier, which read: the security of the state and subjects, are forced to move their troops against the Turks. War was finally declared.
On April 13, the Devitz column began to move with one infantry and three dragoon regiments. On April 14, a column of Lieutenant General Leontiev set off on a campaign: six regular regiments and 10 thousand people of the Land Militia. On April 17, the column of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg launched an offensive: one infantry, three dragoon regiments, field artillery, Chuguev and Little Russian Cossacks. On April 19, a column of Major General Repnin set out: four infantry and one dragoon regiments. All other regiments of the Dnieper army also had to be drawn to Tsarichanka, they were entrusted with the protection of communications and transports with provisions and other supplies. The regiments stationed on the Don and Donets were ordered to go independently to the Samara River. Four thousand Don Cossacks going on a campaign also went from the Don separately from other troops, with whom they were supposed to meet already at Kamenny Zaton.
On April 14 (25), Spiegel's vanguard went to the Samara River and built two wooden and two pontoon bridges across it. Having crossed the river, two days later, the detachment stopped, and the soldiers began the construction of two strongholds. One of them was erected at the confluence of Samara with the Dnieper, and the other - on Samara itself, on the site of the ancient Bogoroditskaya fortress. For the construction of the first, Ust-Samarsk fortification, an older fortress located here was used. It was surrounded by an extensive earthen fence, under the protection of which the barracks, officers' apartments and the infirmary were located. Two more fortifications on a height to the east of the fortress. This entire defensive system, from the Samara River to the Dnieper, which was open to enemy cavalry, had additional protection in the form of a line of slingshots and a palisade. Colonel Chicherin was appointed commandant of the Ust-Samarsk fortification. The Bogoroditsky fortress was surrounded on all sides by a high earthen rampart, and rows of slingshots were placed on the old rampart proper.
On April 19, Spiegel's column went on, and to replace it, Leontiev's columns and, a day later, the Prince of Hesse-Homburg arrived in Samara. On April 22, Repnin's column approached the river. So the columns succeeded each other and moved forward in a coordinated manner, creating strongholds and warehouses-shops along the way. With the passage through Samara, the Dnieper army entered enemy territory, so Minich stepped up his precautions. Each column had the opportunity to support the neighboring one; slingshots were always set up at the halts or a Wagenburg was built from wagons. However, initially there was no news of the enemy. The main concern of the soldiers was marching and building fortifications. Major General Spiegel reported on April 20: “And as in considerable marches, it is very difficult for people in work and crossings, because during the day they march, but at night they work and have such work that people can hardly walk even in infantry regiments.”
On April 26, 1736, Munnich personally arrived at Spiegel's vanguard, which was three days' journey from Kamenny Zaton. Gradually, other groups were drawn up. By May 4, under the command of the field marshal, 10 dragoon and 15 infantry regiments (more than 28 thousand people), 10 thousand people of the Land Militia, 3 thousand Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, 13 thousand Little Russian Cossacks, hussars, Sloboda and Chuguev Cossacks gathered on the right bank of the Belozerka River . In total, over 58 thousand people. A military council was held in Kamenny Zaton, which was supposed to decide which way to go to the Crimea: directly across the steppe or along the banks of the Dnieper through Kyzy-Kermen. We chose the second option.
On May 4 (15), the vanguard of the Russian army set out from the Belozerka River on a further campaign. General Spiegel was still in command of the vanguard. The next day, the main forces under the command of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg moved forward. Field Marshal Munnich rode with them. In addition, a rearguard under the command of Major General Hein was allocated to protect the rear. A convoy was formed to deliver supplies to the army, and a large detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Frint was assigned to protect it.
On May 7 (18) the Russian avant-garde reached Kyzy-Kermen. A strong stronghold was also erected here. The soldiers built a powerful retrashement, reinforced from the side of the steppe by six redoubts, which stretched for 33 km. Ten more redoubts were built between Belozersky and Kyzy-Kermen strongholds. Each redoubt housed a small garrison of 40-50 people from sick and weakened soldiers and Cossacks who were unable to march. On the way to Kyzy-Kermen, small Tatar detachments began to appear, but they still did not join the battle. For reconnaissance of the area, Spiegel singled out from his forces a cavalry detachment under the command of Colonel Krechetnikov (400 dragoons, 150 hussars, one hundred Cossacks of the Izyum Sloboda Regiment, 500 Little Russian and "all good" Zaporozhye Cossacks). Another detachment, Colonels Witten (1200 people) and Tyutchev (1400 people), were sent to reconnaissance by Leontiev and the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. For communication between the reconnaissance detachments, two separate, small detachments were allocated under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Fermor.
Crimean Tatar archer
Witten's scouts defeated a detachment of Nogai Tatars. The captives reported that twenty miles away, near the Chernaya Dolina tract, there was a 100,000-strong Tatar army led by the khan himself. Notifying the commander, Witten connected all the reconnaissance detachments together and continued to move forward to check the words "tongues". In total, he had 3,800 cavalrymen and Cossacks at his disposal.
On the morning of May 8 (19), Witten's cavalry detachment went to a large Tatar camp. These were the advanced forces of the Crimean army under the command of the heir to the khan's throne, the kalgi-sultan. Seeing the Russians, the Tatar cavalry immediately rushed to the attack. Russian commanders began to quickly build dragoons in a square, and the Zaporozhye and Little Russian Cossacks were ordered to cover their flanks. However, at the first onslaught of the enemy, the Cossacks fled. The Tatars fell upon the unfinished square. The dragoons had a hard time: in a hurry, only one line of soldiers managed to put on the rear front of the square. Moving to help Witten with a detachment of cavalry, Spiegel was stopped by a 15,000-strong Tatar army and he himself almost got surrounded.
Seeing that a big battle was beginning, Minich rushed to Spiegel with a small convoy. He made his way to the column, which stood in a square. Then, having studied the situation, he, accompanied by only eighty dragoons and hundreds of Cossacks, rode back to the main forces. On the way, the convoy Minich was attacked by a Tatar detachment, and narrowly escaped death. The Tatar cavalry pressed on all day, trying to overturn the Russians. In the evening Leontiev's detachment approached and opened artillery fire. The Tatars, having heard the roar of the cannonade, immediately retreated, leaving more than two hundred people killed on the battlefield. Russian losses amounted to about 50 people killed and wounded, General Spiegel and Colonel Weisbach were injured.
The first clash with the Crimean horde showed the effectiveness of the dragoon regiments, their stamina and good training. The whole day they held back the onslaught of the superior forces of the Tatar cavalry. Minich showed personal courage, but showed disbelief in the abilities of his commanders, preferring to do everything himself. The Little Russian Cossacks who fled from the battlefield were put on trial.
The captured Tatars told the commander that the main forces of the Crimean horde were eighty miles from the battlefield. In addition, the Cossacks captured several Turkish messengers and found letters from them, from which they found out that the Turks would not send troops to help the khan. Therefore, the army continued the march. On May 11 (22), the army continued its journey, and, in view of the proximity of the Tatar cavalry, all the detachments lined up in one common square. The sides (faces) of the gigantic rectangle formed regular regiments that stood in four lines. The dragoons walked on foot, giving their horses to the Cossacks, who formed the fifth (inner) rank. Artillery was placed in front and at the corners of the square, and irregular troops in the center. The movement of the square required a clear coordination of actions of all military units, and was very tiring for the soldiers and officers, but this did not bother Munnich.
On May 14 (25), Minich's army approached the Kalanchik River, where they again built a fortification. Here 4,000 men joined the army. detachment of Don Cossacks. The next day, the Russian army was attacked by the Tatars. Kare met the enemy with heavy artillery and rifle fire. Minich ordered to bring carts inside the square and place Cossacks on them, who fired rifles over the heads of the soldiers standing in the ranks. A. Bayov wrote: “Tatars with wild cries and drawn sabers attacked the army from all sides. As soon as they approached, they were met with strong rifle and grape fire. The repulsed attack was repeated several more times within two hours. To put an end to these attacks, Minich moved his army forward, after which the Tatars retreated, leaving a significant number of dead in place. The Russians had no losses." Thus, the Russian army broke the resistance of the enemy. The Tatar cavalry withdrew behind the fortifications of Perekop.
Fortifications of Perekop
On May 17 (28), Minich's army approached Perekop and camped on the shores of the Rotten Sea (Sivash). For the first time since the time of Vasily Golitsyn, Russian regiments came close to the gate Crimean Khanate. The Perekop isthmus, which connects the Crimean peninsula with the mainland, has been of strategic importance for centuries, and therefore was equipped with a powerful system of defensive structures. It consisted of an 8-kilometer shaft about 20 meters high, stretching from the Black Sea to Lake Sivash. There was a wide ditch in front of the rampart. All around the rampart stood seven stone towers armed with artillery. They served as additional defense nodes and were capable of flanking fire along the moat. The only passage beyond the line was protected by stone gates, located three kilometers from Sivash and seven kilometers from the Black Sea coast. These gates were armed with artillery, and immediately behind them stood the fortress of Op-Kap. It looked like an oblong quadrangle with stone walls and loopholes at the outgoing corners of the bastions. The garrison of the fortress consisted of four thousand janissaries and sipahis. In front of the gate there was a small village, covered by another low rampart. 84 guns were placed along the fortified line, concentrated mainly in towers and fortresses. The Turkish garrison was supported by numerous Tatar cavalry.
Approaching Perekop, Minich demanded that the Crimean leadership capitulate and recognize the dominion of the empress. Khan, in response, began to play for time, referring to peace with Russia and assuring that all the raids were made not by the Crimean, but by the Nogai Tatars. Not wanting to delay, the Russian field marshal began to prepare for the attack. Already on the day the army arrived, a redoubt with five cannons and one mortar was erected opposite the Op-Kap fortress, which at dawn on May 18 opened fire on the gates and the fortress itself.
The assault was scheduled for May 20. For its implementation, Minich divided the troops into three large columns (each of five plutong columns) under the command of Generals Leontiev, Shpigel and Izmailov. They were supposed to strike in the gap between the Op-Kap fortress and the Black Sea. At the same time, the Cossacks were to make a distracting attack on the fortress itself. The dragoons dismounted and joined the infantry regiments. In each attacking column, the soldiers of the third pluthong carried with them axes and horn spears. All soldiers were given 30 rounds of ammunition, and the grenadiers, in addition, two hand grenades. Minich also ordered that part of the Fusiliers be supplied with grenades (one grenade per person). Artillery, both regimental and field, was ordered to follow in columns, and the cannons mounted on redoubts were ordered to cover the offensive with their fire. In total, 15 infantry and 11 dragoon regiments with a total number of about 30 thousand people were allocated for the assault.
On May 19, General Shtofeln made a reconnaissance of that section of the fortifications that was to be attacked. In the evening of the same day, Russian troops began to advance to their original positions. On May 20 (June 1), 1736, the assault began. On a signal, the field artillery opened fire. Then the front column fired a volley of rifles and rushed forward. The soldiers descended into the ditch, and then began to climb the rampart. At the same time, slingshots were very useful to them, which the soldiers stuck into the slope and climbed up them. Bayonets also came into play. Soon, the infantrymen not only climbed the crest of the rampart, but also pulled several cannons behind them on ropes. The Tatars, who did not expect the appearance of the Russians at all in this sector of defense, panicked and fled. The steppes did not expect that such a deep and wide ditch could be crossed so quickly and at night. Already half an hour after the start of the assault, the Russian flag fluttered over Perekop.
After that, the Russian troops began to storm the towers, which housed the Turkish garrisons. The tower closest to the Russian army opened artillery fire. Minich ordered a team of sixty infantrymen, led by the captain of the Petersburg Infantry Regiment, Manstein, to attack the tower. After a fierce battle, part of the garrison was killed, part surrendered. After that, the defenders of all other towers hastily capitulated.
“The decisive battle in Northern Tavria is over. The enemy took possession of the entire territory captured from him during the summer. He got a lot of military booty: 5 armored trains, 18 guns, about 100 wagons with shells, 10 million rounds of ammunition, 25 steam locomotives, trains with food and commissariat property, and about two million poods of bread in Melitopol and Genichesk. Our units suffered severe losses in killed, wounded and frostbite. A significant number were left behind as prisoners and stragglers, mainly from among the former Red Army soldiers who were put into operation at different times. There were isolated cases of mass surrenders. So one of the battalions of the Drozdov division surrendered entirely. However, the army remained intact and our units, in turn, captured 15 guns, about 2000 prisoners, a lot of weapons and machine guns.
The army remained intact, but its combat effectiveness was not the same. Could this army, relying on a fortified position, withstand the blows of the enemy. For six months of hard work, fortifications were created that made it extremely difficult for the enemy to enter the Crimea: trenches were dug, wire was woven, heavy guns were installed, and machine-gun nests were built. All technical means of the Sevastopol fortress were used. The completed railway line to Yushun made it possible to fire at the approaches with armored trains. Only dugouts, shelters and dugouts for troops were not completed. The lack of workers and the lack of timber materials hampered the work. The frosts that came unusually early created especially unfavorable conditions, since the line of defense lay in a sparsely populated area and the housing problem for the troops became especially acute.
Even in the first days after the conclusion of peace with the Poles, having decided to accept the battle in Northern Tavria, I took into account the possibility of its unfavorable outcome for us and the fact that the enemy, having won, would break into the Crimea on the shoulders of our troops. No matter how strong the position is, it will inevitably fall if the spirit of the troops defending it is undermined.
I then ordered General Shatilov to check the evacuation plan drawn up by the headquarters, together with the commander of the fleet. The latter was designed to evacuate 60,000 people. I gave orders that calculations be made for 75,000; ordered the urgent delivery of the missing supply of coal and oil from Constantinople.
As soon as the inevitability of our withdrawal to the Crimea became clear, I ordered the urgent preparation of ships in the ports of Kerch, Feodosia and Yalta for 13,000 people and 4,000 horses. The task was explained by the alleged landing in the Odessa region to establish contact with the Russian units operating in Ukraine. In order to more fully hide my assumptions, all measures were taken to believe in the version of the preparation of ships for a future landing operation. So, the headquarters was ordered to spread rumors that the landing was planned for the Kuban. The size of the detachment itself was planned in accordance with the total number of troops, so that it could not arouse any particular doubt in those who were aware of the size of the army. The ships were ordered to load food supplies and combat.
Thus, having a certain amount of free tonnage in the port of Sevastopol, in the event of an accident, I could quickly load 40-50 thousand people in the main ports - Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia and Kerch and, under the cover of retreating troops, save those under their protection women, children, the wounded and the sick, ”this is how Wrangel assessed the situation that had developed by the time the Reds left for Perekop.
As early as September 21, 1920, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, the Southern Front was formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. The new front included the 6th (formed from the Right Bank Group), the 13th and 2nd cavalry armies. At the same time, the 12th and 1st cavalry armies were transferred to the Southwestern Front, and the latter was preparing to be transferred to the Southern Front.
In October 1920, the Reds concluded the Starobelsky agreement with Nestor Makhno. Makhno received "some internal autonomy" and the right to recruit into his army on the territory of Soviet Russia. All parts of the Makhnovist army were operationally subordinate to the Southern Front. Now a number of incompetent authors have reached the point of asserting that it was the Makhnovists who took Perekop and liberated the Crimea. In fact, by the beginning of 1920, Makhno had about four thousand bayonets and a thousand sabers, as well as a thousand non-combatants. They had 12 cannons and 250 machine guns.
Wrangel chose Dzhankoy for his bet. On October 22 (November 4), the baron gave the troops a directive:
“The defense of the Crimea was entrusted to General Kutepov, in whose hands the troops united; from the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive, the 3rd Don Division was located, until it was replaced in this sector by the 34th Infantry Division, which in turn was subject to change on the right sector of the Perekop shaft by the 1st brigade of the 2nd Kuban division on October 24th;
The 1st and 2nd Don divisions were to concentrate in reserve in the area north of Bohemka; the 3rd Don division was to be drawn to the same sector after the change;
the middle section of the Sivash was defended by the Don officer regiment, the Ataman cadet school and dismounted rifle squadrons of the cavalry corps;
the cavalry corps with the Kuban division was ordered to concentrate in reserve in the area south of Chirik;
The Kornilov division by October 26th was supposed to replace the 13th infantry division on the left section of the Perekop rampart; the latter temporarily, until the approach of the Markov division, remained in the reserve of the 1st army corps in the Voinka area; The Drozdov division was to concentrate by October 26th at the Armenian Bazaar;
The Markov division, which retreated along the Arbat Spit to Akmanai, was to be transported by rail to the Yushun region.
Upon completion of the regrouping of all parts of the 1st Army by October 29th, the right combat sector from the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive was to be defended by parts of the 2nd Army Corps of General Vitkovsky; the left section, from the Chuvash Peninsula to the Perekop Bay, was transferred to the 1st Army Corps of General Pisarev.
And on the same night, the baron, just in case, went to Sevastopol. As Slashchev quipped: "Closer to the water."
October 25 (November 7) Wrangel declared the Crimea under a state of siege. In the Notes, the baron paints a rosy picture:
“The measures taken managed to dispel the beginning anxiety. The rear remained calm, believing in the impregnability of the Perekop strongholds. On October 26, a congress of representatives of cities opened in Simferopol, in its resolution welcoming the policy of the government of the South of Russia and expressing readiness to help the government with all its might. On October 30, a congress of representatives of the press was being prepared in Sevastopol. Life went on as usual. Shops traded briskly. Theaters and cinemas were full.
On October 25, the Kornilov Union organized a charity concert and evening. Stifling the agonizing anxiety in my heart, I accepted the invitation. My absence from the evening hosted by the union of the regiment in whose lists I was, could give food for disturbing explanations. I stayed at the party until 11 o’clock, listening and not hearing musical numbers, straining every effort to find a kind word for the wounded officer, courtesy of the lady manager ... "
In mid-October, Wrangel, having examined the Perekop fortifications, smugly declared to the foreign representatives who were with him: "Much has been done, much remains to be done, but the Crimea is already impregnable for the enemy."
Alas, the baron wishful thinking. The construction of fortifications at the Perekop-Sivash position was led by General Ya.D. Yuzefovich. Then he was replaced by General Makeev, who was the head of the work on the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus. Back in July 1920, Makeev, in a report addressed to Wrangel's assistant, General P.N. Shatilova reported that almost all capital works to strengthen Perekop, they are produced mainly on paper, since building materials come in “pharmaceutical doses”. No dugouts, no dugouts where troops could hide in autumn-winter period, on the isthmus was practically non-existent.
The head of the French military mission, General A. Brousseau, who examined the Chongar fortifications from November 6 to 11 (NS), wrote in a report to the French Minister of War: “... the program allowed me to visit the location of the Cossack division in Taganash and three batteries located near the railway bridge through the Sivash. These are the following batteries:
- two 10-inch guns east of the railway;
- two old-style field guns on the very bank of the Sivash;
- guns with a caliber of 152 mm Kanet, a little behind the previous ones.
These batteries seemed to me to be very well equipped, but little appropriate, with the exception of field guns, for the role that the troops were to play in the upcoming battles. The 10-inch battery had concrete shelters and consisted of at least 15 officers among the personnel. Her fire was well prepared and could adequately fit into the whole organization of artillery fire, in which the defense of positions at close range would be carried out by field guns. But these weapons were not enough! The infantry fire support was also poorly organized. On the banks of the Sivash, close to the stone embankment of the railway, there were approximately up to a company of personnel; the nearest military units were located five versts from there, in Taganash. To a remark I made, I was told that the lack of equipped positions forced the troops to be withdrawn to places where they could get shelter from the cold.
It must be admitted that the temperature remained very low in early December, that the soldiers were very poorly dressed, that there was not enough firewood in the area.
The terrain, otherwise, facilitated the defense, despite the poor disposition of troops. From this point of view, Crimea communicates with the continent only through a dam and a railway bridge (the bridge has been blown up). Of course, there are fords across the Sivash, but the coast is a clay mountain with peaks from 10 to 20 meters high, absolutely insurmountable.
In the division that I saw in Taganash, there was no confidence in victory. The commander-in-chief told me that the Cossacks were not suitable for this positional warfare and that it would be better to withdraw them to the rear and reorganize into more serious units. The personnel of the division had as many fighters in the rear as in the front line.
In the meantime, I crossed three lines of defense, equipped in the rear of the Sivash; the first two of them were a negligible network of fortifications, the third line was a little more serious, but they were all located in one line, without flank positions, on the slopes facing the enemy, or on the very crest of the hill, too close to one another (from 500 to 800 m) and did not have any trenches in depth.
Soviet military historians greatly exaggerated the power of the enemy's fortifications. However, I think it's worth giving their opinion as well. Moreover, the question of the possibilities of defense on the isthmus is very important, and not so much for the Civil, but for the Great Patriotic War.
“The main line of defense of the Perekop positions was created on an artificially filled ancient Turkish rampart, which had a width at the base of more than 15 m and a height of 8 m and crossed the isthmus from southwest to northeast. The length of the shaft reached 11 km. Strong shelters, trenches, machine-gun nests, as well as firing positions for light guns for direct fire were equipped on the rampart. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 20-30 m wide and 10 m deep. A wire fence of 5-6 rows of stakes was installed along the entire length in front of the fortified position. All approaches to the barbed wire and the ditch were flanked by machine-gun fire.
The second line of fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus ran northwest of Ishun, 20-25 km southeast and south of the Turkish Wall. At this position, 4-6 lines of trenches were built with wire fences and long-term defensive structures.
Behind the Ishun positions was located long-range artillery of the enemy, capable of keeping the entire depth of defense under fire. The density of artillery at the Perekop positions was 6-7 guns per 1 km of the front. There were about 170 guns in the Ishun positions, which were reinforced by artillery fire from 20 ships from the sea.
The positions of the Lithuanian peninsula were not completely completed by construction. They consisted of trenches and had barbed wire in some areas.
The Chongar fortifications were even more impregnable, since the Chongar Peninsula itself is connected to the Crimea by a narrow dam a few meters wide, and the Sivash railway and Chongar highway bridges were destroyed by the Whites.
On the Taganash Peninsula, the enemy created two fortified lines, and on Tyup-Dzhankoy - six fortified lines. All fortified lines consisted of a system of trenches (in a number of sections connected into continuous trenches), machine-gun nests and dugouts for sheltering manpower. Wire fences were built at all sites. On the Arabat Spit, the enemy prepared six fortified lines that crossed the arrow along the front. The Chongar Isthmus and the Arabat Spit had an insignificant width, which made it difficult for the advancing troops to maneuver and created advantages for the defenders. Chongar positions were reinforced with a large number of artillery, armored trains and other equipment.
Indeed, white armored trains played an important role in the defense of the Crimea. By 1914, only one railway line Salkovo - Dzhankoy, which passed through the Chongar Peninsula and Sivash, led to the Crimea. In 1916, the line Sarabuz - Evpatoria was put into operation. And in 1920, the Whites completed the Dzhankoy - Armyansk branch in order to be able to deliver equipment and troops to Perekop. It is clear that this was not enough. It was necessary to build several rocky railways near the isthmus for the transfer of troops and the actions of armored trains.
How many guns were exactly at the Perekop-Sivash position, there is no data in the historical literature, I could not find them in the archives either. True, I found a file on the removal of heavy white guns from the Perekop positions at the end of 1924. It dealt with three 203mm English howitzers MK VI, eight 152/45mm Canet guns, two 152mm fortress guns of 190 pounds and four 127mm English guns.
I will outline the Reds’ plan for mastering the Crimean Isthmus according to the Soviet official closed publication “History of Russian Artillery”: “Planning the operation to defeat Wrangel in the Crimea, M.V. Frunze laid the foundation for its historical example. Using it, he planned to bypass the Chongar positions of the enemy along the Arabat arrow with the crossing of the Sivash at the mouth of the Salgir River. “This maneuver is to the side,” wrote M.V. Frunze, - in 1737 was done by Field Marshal Lassi. The armies of Lassi, having deceived the Crimean Khan, who was standing with his main forces at Perekop, moved along the Arabat Spit and, crossing the peninsula at the mouth of the Salgir, went to the rear of the Khan’s troops and quickly captured the Crimea.
Preliminary reconnaissance showed that the enemy had a relatively weak defense on the Arabat Spit, and the eastern coast of the peninsula was guarded only by horse patrols.
For the safe movement of troops along the Arabat Spit, it was necessary to ensure the operation from the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov, where a flotilla of small enemy ships operated. This task was assigned to the Azov flotilla, located in Taganrog. However, the Azov flotilla was unable to arrive in the Genichesk area due to the ice that bound the Taganrog Bay in early November. Therefore, Frunze abandoned the original plan of using the Arabat arrow for the main attack and adopted a new decision. New decision by M.V. Frunze concluded that the 6th Army should no later than November 8, by the forces of the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions, the 153rd brigade of the 51st division and a separate cavalry brigade, cross the Sivash in the Vladimirovka, Stroganovka, Cape Kugaran sector and strike at the rear of the enemy occupying the Perekop fortifications . At the same time, the 51st division was to attack the Perekop positions from the front. To develop success in the Perekop direction, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry armies were pulled up. The start of the operation was scheduled for the night of November 7-8.
The troops of the 4th Army were to break through the Chongar fortifications.
Thus, the troops of the Southern Front struck in two directions with a concentration of forces on the right wing of the front, where the main task of the operation was solved ...
In the shock group of the 6th Army, which was intended to force the Sivash and act around the Perekop fortifications, 36 light guns of the 52nd division were concentrated. This gave a triple superiority over the artillery of the Kuban-Astrakhan brigade of General Fostikov, who occupied the Lithuanian Peninsula and had only 12 guns.
For direct artillery support of the first echelon of troops that were supposed to force the Sivash, two escort platoons were allocated from the 1st and 2nd divisions of the 52nd rifle division. These platoons, to assist them in moving through the Sivash, received half a company of riflemen each. The rest of the strike group artillery occupied firing positions in the Vladimirovka and Stroganovka areas with the task of supporting the infantry offensive with battery fire from the northern bank of the Sivash. After capturing the strike group of the 1st line of fortifications of the Lithuanian Peninsula, it was planned to move the 1st and 2nd divisions to the peninsula: the 3rd division was supposed to support the infantry offensive from the previous positions and cover the withdrawal of the strike group in case of forcing failure.
The 51st Rifle Division, which operated against the Perekop positions, was reinforced by the artillery of the 15th Division and had 55 guns, which were combined in the hands of the head of artillery of the 51st division, V.A. Budilovich and summarized in four groups: right, middle, left and anti-battery.
The first group, consisting of twelve light and three heavy guns, under the command of the commander of the 2nd division of the 51st division, had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the 51st division of the Perekop fortifications.
The middle group, consisting of ten light and four heavy guns, also had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the Perekop fortifications, and therefore it was subordinate to the commander of the right artillery group. Therefore, right and middle group in fact, they constituted one group of 29 guns, which had a single task and a common command.
The left group, consisting of twelve light and seven heavy guns, had the task of ensuring the breakthrough of the Perekop positions by the strike and fire brigade of the 51st division.
The anti-battery group consisted of seven guns (42mm - two and 120mm - five) and had the task of fighting artillery and suppressing enemy reserves.
From these very unconvincing quotes, it follows that the Reds had seventy 76mm field guns for the assault. In addition, Frunze had as many as twenty-one "heavy guns". Of the latter, the most powerful were 107mm guns mod. 1910, 120mm French guns mod. 1878 and 152mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910
107mm guns and 152mm howitzers under the tsar-father were considered heavy field artillery and were intended to destroy light field (earth) fortifications. The French cannons were more of a museum value than a combat one.
The Southern Front did not have more powerful guns. In the deep rear of the Reds, several guns of large and special power, inherited from the tsarist TAON (special purpose heavy artillery corps), were stored in warehouses. But by November 1920 they were in a deplorable state. technical condition, there were no trained calculations and means of traction to them. Only by March 24, 1923 did the Reds with difficulty manage to introduce eight 280mm Schneider howitzers and three 305mm howitzers mod. 1915
With the available artillery, Frunze could still win a battle in an open field against the Wrangels or the Poles. But the assault on well-fortified positions was doomed to failure in advance. After 19 years, the Red Army stormed the relatively well-defended Mannerheim Line and suffered huge losses due to the disdainful attitude of mediocre strategists like Tukhachevsky and Pavlunovsky to artillery of special power.
On the Karelian Isthmus, even the powerful 203mm B-4 howitzers could not penetrate the Finnish pillboxes. Four years later, in the summer of 1944, 305mm howitzers did an excellent job with them.
So what happens? "Red Eagles" accomplished an inhuman feat, having mastered the Crimean Isthmus? Yes, indeed, many heroic deeds were committed on both sides. But in general, the Reds fought with an enemy programmed to flee, and most importantly, the “Wrangel Line” turned out to be a “Potemkin village”. Our baron's classmate and drinking buddy, Baron Mannerheim, turned out to be much smarter. But in the "Notes" Wrangel will shamelessly lie, talking about the struggle at Perekop: "The Reds concentrated colossal artillery, which provided powerful support to their units." By this time, the Soviet "Agitprom" began fabricating legends and myths about the storming of Perekop.
So how did the assault on Perekop go?
On the night of November 8, in difficult weather conditions - with strong wind and frost at 11-12 degrees - the shock group of the 6th army (153rd, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions) crossed the seven-kilometer water barrier - Sivash. On the afternoon of November 8, the 51st Division, which attacked the Turkish Wall in the forehead, was driven back with heavy losses.
The next day, the Reds resumed their assault on the Turkish Wall, and at the same time the shock group of the 6th Army captured the Lithuanian Peninsula. The defense of the whites was finally broken through.
In the battles for the Crimea, I wanted to dwell in particular on the actions of the fleet and armored trains. The 3rd detachment of the Black Sea Fleet was introduced into the Kartinitsky Bay. The detachment included: minelayer "Bug", on which the detachment commander captain of the 2nd rank V.V. Vilken, gunboat Alma, messenger ship Ataman Kaledin (former tugboat Gorgipiya) and four floating batteries.
Floating batteries (former barges), armed with five 130-152mm guns, took up positions near the Kara-Kazak to support the troops in the Ishun positions. Already at the first attempt of the Reds to break into the Crimea, the B-4 floating battery, with its quick fire, contributed to repelling their attacks. On the night of November 8, 1920, the red units crossed the Sivash and approached the Ishun positions. On November 9 and 10, the floating batteries and the Alma gunboat, receiving target designations and adjustments by telephone, fired intensely at the advancing enemy. The movement of ships and partly the shooting was hindered by a northeast storm, and the bay was covered with a 12-centimeter layer of ice. Despite the unfavorable conditions, the fire of the ships was real, and units of the Red 6th Army suffered losses from flanking shelling from Karkinitsky Bay.
On the night of November 11, the Yishun positions were left white, but the ships remained in their positions and bombarded the Yishun station in the morning. On the afternoon of November 11, a detachment of ships received an order to go to Evpatoria, but due to dense ice floating batteries could no longer withdraw from their positions.
The next morning, November 12, the detachment entered a dense fog, and by mistake in the calculation at 0940 hours. four miles from the Ak-Meschet, the minelayer Bug ran aground. It was not possible to pull the minzag afloat with the help of tugboats, and on the night of November 13, the team was removed from it, and the ship itself was rendered unusable.
An important role in the struggle for the Crimea was played by armored trains. By October 1920, the Reds at Perekop had 17 armored trains, but only a fraction of them were used. Armored trains plied around the Salkovo station, since the bridge over the Sivash was blown up by the Whites, and the tracks were dismantled. So the armored trains of the Reds did not manage to break into the Crimea.
Nevertheless, the heavy armored trains of the Reds provided significant support to the units advancing on the Chongar Peninsula. The most powerful armored train of the Reds was the armored train No. 84, built in late 1919 - early 1920 in Sormovo. It consisted of two armored platforms with 203mm naval guns, created on the basis of 16-axle and 12-axle platforms. The armored train No. 4 Kommunar was also active, which included 4 armored platforms. On one of them was a 152mm howitzer, and on the others - one 107mm cannon mod. 1910
White armored trains were much more active. The light armored train "St. George the Victorious" (formed on July 27, 1919 in Yekaterinodar) from October 12 to October 26, 1920 was on the Ishunskaya branch (line Dzhankoy - Armyansk). The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on October 26 to the Ishun position under the command of Colonel Podoprigor and fought against the advancing Reds, together with units of the Markov and Drozdov divisions.
At dawn on October 27, the armored train "St. George the Victorious" withdrew to Armyansk, north of Ishun, already occupied by the Reds. There he was among the advancing units of the red cavalry. The cavalrymen, supported by artillery fire and armored cars, attacked the armored train with several lavas and surrounded it. The armored train hit the attackers with artillery and machine-gun fire point-blank. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but did not stop the attacks. The red cavalry tried to blow up the railway track on the retreat path of the armored train, but was destroyed by machine-gun fire from the armored train. At this time, "St. George the Victorious" came under fire from a three-inch Soviet battery. As a result of a shell hit, the locomotive's boiler was damaged and an officer and a mechanic were shell-shocked.
With the engine fading, the armored train slowly moved back, without stopping the battle with the battery and the Red cavalry. On the northern arrows of the siding, the wrecked locomotive died out. Before dark, the armored train, not being able to maneuver, still threw off the attacking enemy with its fire. In the evening, a serviceable steam locomotive approached and took the combat train of the armored train to the Yishun station.
During the battle on October 27 on the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" the main gun was broken, one officer was wounded and one volunteer was killed.
On October 28, the armored train "St. George the Victorious" entered the position with an unarmored locomotive. The Reds advanced in large numbers, occupying two lines of trenches and pursuing the retreating White units. The armored train suddenly crashed into the dense chains of the Reds and shot them with machine-gun and grapeshot fire from a distance of up to 50 steps. The Reds showered bullets on the white armored train and attacked it with unprecedented persistence, but, having suffered huge losses, they began to retreat, and the St. George the Victorious pursued them. This allowed the white infantry to launch a counterattack.
Meanwhile, the armored train that had advanced forward was again attacked by fresh infantry forces. The chain of reds lay down at the railroad tracks. On the armored train, 4 soldiers and a mechanic were wounded and the only serviceable injector on the locomotive was killed, as a result of which the water supply to the boiler stopped. But the armored train nevertheless threw back the chains of the Reds with its fire, inflicting heavy losses on them. After the arrival of the white armored car "Gundorovets", "St. George the Victorious" managed to withdraw with an extinct engine to the station Yishun.
Meanwhile, the White command became aware that the Reds were preparing an invasion of Crimea by their other troops from the northeast, along the main line of the railway, laid along the dam near the Sivash station. The heavy armored train "United Russia" (new, built in the Crimea) was on October 28 at the Sivashsky bridge in the area of the 134th Feodosia Infantry Regiment and fired with Red units.
Light armored train "Officer" arrived on the morning of October 28 at the junction station Dzhankoy. By order of the chief of staff of the 1st corps, he went from there to the Taganash station, about 20 miles from the Dzhankoy station, to participate in the defense of the Sivash positions.
On October 29 at 9 o'clock in the morning, the "Officer" entered the Sivash dam as part of one armored platform with two 3-inch guns, one platform with a 75mm cannon and an unarmored locomotive. Despite the fire of the Red batteries standing in the shelter on the opposite bank, the "Officer" moved towards the bridge. When the armored train was 320 meters from the bridge, a land mine exploded under its second safety platform. The explosion ripped out a piece of rail about 60 cm long. By inertia, one armored platform and a steam locomotive tender passed through the blown up place. The stopped armored train with buckshot and machine-gun fire partly interrupted, partly dispersed the Reds, who were near the blown up bridge. Then the "Officer" opened fire on the positions of the Red artillery, which continued to shell it.
Despite the damaged paths, the "Officer" managed to return to his trenches. There he remained until one in the afternoon, maneuvering under the fire of enemy guns. After that, on the orders of the head of the armored train group, Colonel Lebedev, the "Officer" withdrew to the Taganash station.
At this time, units of the Reds broke through the Chongar Peninsula and attacked from the east, bypassing the Taganash station. The armored train "Officer" fired at their columns advancing from the direction of the village of Abaz-kirk. By the fire of white armored trains (including the heavy armored train "United Russia"), as well as positional and field artillery, the Reds, who attacked with large forces, were stopped by the evening south of the village of Tyup-Dzhankoy. Until dark, the armored train "Officer" remained at the Taganash station.
On the evening of October 29, the "Officer" again went to the Sivash dam, but soon returned and met with the armored train "United Russia". Then both armored trains moved to the dam. "United Russia" walked behind the "Officer" at a distance of just over 200 meters. Before reaching 500 meters to the line of advanced trenches of the Whites, Captain Labovich stopped the armored train "Officer", as he received a warning from the officer of the Feodosiya regiment, who was passing along the railway at that time, that the Reds, apparently, were preparing to undermine the path, as they were heard pickaxe strikes on rails. The "officer" began to slowly move away in order to find the place of the dig.
Suddenly, there was an explosion from behind. The explosion occurred under the safety platforms of the United Russia armored train following behind. Two safety pads flew into the air. "United Russia" was thrown back along the rails for a distance of about half a verst. The rear platform with the 75mm cannon of the armored train “Officer” fell into the hole formed from the explosion, which did not have time to slow down. The officer stopped. Then, in complete darkness, the Reds opened fire from seven machine guns, which were mainly located on the left side of the railway track.
Armored train "United Russia" returned fire. On the armored train "Officer" two guns could not fire: the rear 75mm gun could not fire due to the inclined position of the combat platform, which fell into the pit, and the average three-inch gun did not have enough calculation numbers. Thus, the "Officer" opened fire with only one head three-inch gun and all machine guns.
A few minutes later, the Reds, and these were the fighters of the 264th regiment of the 30th division, went on the attack on the armored trains. With cries of "Hurrah" they began to throw grenades at the armored platform of the "Officer". However, there the team had already fled to the United Russia armored train, which went to the rear to the Taganash station.
On the same day, October 29, from 7 o'clock in the morning, the armored trains "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Saint George the Victorious" who were on the Ishun branch, engaged in battle with the advancing Soviet units and held back the advance of the enemy from Karpova Balka. Around noon, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" was hit. Its armored platforms were so seriously damaged that the armored train could not continue the battle and retreated towards the Dzhankoy junction station.
The armored train "St. George the Victorious" was left alone. However, he managed to hold back the advance of the Red units until the retreating White troops reached the big Simferopol road. Then "St. George the Victorious" withdrew to the Yishun station and from there repelled the attacks of the red cavalry, which tried to start pursuing the white units.
When the armored train "Saint George the Victorious" departed, one of its safety platforms derailed. Late in the evening, about two versts from the Dzhankoy junction station, a collision took place between the armored trains St. George the Victorious and Dmitry Donskoy. The armored platforms were not damaged at the same time, and only the reserve car of the St. George the Victorious armored train and three workshop cars, which were attached to the Dmitry Donskoy armored train, derailed.
Apparently, on the same night, the armored train "Ioann Kalita" passed through the station Dzhankoy to Kerch, with the task of covering the retreat towards Kerch of parts of the Don Corps.
On the morning of October 30, the armored train "St. George the Victorious", having attached to itself one combat platform of the armored train "United Russia", moved along with the reserve from the Dzhankoy station towards Simferopol. Approximately 5 miles south of Dzhankoy, the composition of the armored train reserve was abandoned, as it turned out that its engine did not have time to receive supplies.
The armored train "United Russia" was the last to leave the Taganash station. When United Russia approached the Dzhankoy station, it had to stop and wait for the damaged track to be repaired. United Russia moved on when part of the city of Dzhankoy was already occupied by the Reds. At the siding south of the Dzhankoy station, the armored trains "Saint George the Victorious" and "United Russia" joined and went on as a united train.
Around 2 p.m. on October 30, the armored trains approached the Kurman-Kemelchi station, which is 25 versts south of the Dzhankoy station. At this time, the red cavalry suddenly appeared, which came from the Ishun positions, bypassing the retreating white troops. United white armored trains opened fire on the advancing cavalry, threw it back and made it possible for the white units to retreat further in order.
On further movement to Simferopol, the connected armored trains of the Whites were blocked by an obstacle from stones and sleepers piled on the rails. A four-gun battery of the Reds opened fire on the armored trains, and their cavalry was a thousand paces from the railway track.
The Red cavalry moved to attack the white armored trains, but were driven back with heavy losses. With a further withdrawal, the teams of white armored trains had to clear the path several times from the sleepers and stones that the reds had time to throw in order to cause a crash. By nightfall, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" and the composition of the reserve of the armored train "Officer" arrived at the Simferopol station. Later, the combined armored trains "Saint George the Victorious" and "United Russia" came to Simferopol.
At 11 o'clock on October 31, the armored train "Saint George the Victorious" departed from the Simferopol station last. Upon arrival at the Bakhchisarai station, a steam locomotive was launched on its northern arrows. Then, on the orders of the commander of the 1st Army, General Kutepov, the railway bridge across the Alma River was blown up and the bridge on the highway was burned. At night, an order was received to withdraw to Sevastopol for loading onto ships.
At dawn on October 31, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" and the reserve of the armored train "Officer" approached the Sevastopol station and stopped near the first piers. It was impossible to move further, since the combat platform of the Dmitry Donskoy derailed at the turn and the track needed to be repaired.
In the meantime, information was received that troops were already being loaded onto the Saratov steamer at a nearby pier. The command of the armored train "Grozny" was accepted on this ship, which, before landing, rendered the guns just received from repair unusable and threw the locks into the sea.
Around 9 am on November 1, the armored trains "St. George the Victorious" and "United Russia" reached Sevastopol, in the Kilen Bay area. On the way, the material part of the armored platforms was damaged. At about 10 o'clock, a crash was made so that the armored trains would not go to the red as a whole. The combat trains of the armored trains "Saint George the Victorious" and "United Russia" were launched as quickly as possible towards each other.
The team of the armored train "Saint George the Victorious" with six machine guns boarded the ship "Beshtau". The team of the armored train "United Russia", which arrived on the combat unit, was also loaded onto the steamer "Beshtau". Part of the team, which was part of the reserve, was loaded earlier on the Kherson steamer.
The heavy armored train "John Kalita" arrived in Kerch on November 1, covering the brigade under the command of General Fitskhelaurov, which was marching in the rear guard of the Don Corps. Since it was not allowed to blow up the combat train of the armored train, its materiel was rendered unusable without an explosion. On the night of November 2, the team of the armored train "John Kalita" was loaded onto the floating craft "Mayak number 5".
The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on November 2 in Kerch, where the light armored train "Wolf" was already located. The teams of these two armored trains removed the locks from the guns and spoiled the materiel on the battlefields, after which they boarded the ships.
Here I paid much attention to the actions of armored trains. In my opinion, they are very interesting, but their activity is not typical for the retreating Russian army.
General Slashchev claimed: “On November 11, on the orders of Wrangel, I was at the front to see and report on his condition. The units were in complete retreat, that is, rather, they were not units, but separate small groups; so, for example, in the Perekop direction, 228 people and 28 guns retreated to Simferopol, the rest was already near the ports.
The Reds did not press at all, and the withdrawal in this direction took place in peacetime conditions.
I note that this was written when Yakov Aleksandrovich was already in the service of the Reds and the participants in the battles for the Crimea could easily catch him in a lie.
In exile, a number of officers spoke about the horse columns of the Reds and Whites, which long time they walked along the steppe in parallel at a distance of several kilometers from each other and did not try to attack.
Personally, I am sure that the French and Soviet commands for the second time in the Crimea (the first time - in April 1919) concluded a secret agreement: "... we are leaving, you do not touch us." Naturally, the text of the agreement is still unprofitable to publish neither the USSR (Russia) nor France.
The rebels struck at the rear of the Wrangelites in the Ishuni area. They also cut off the Simferopol-Feodosia highway to the retreating Cossack units. On November 10, the underground revolutionary committee raises an uprising, the rebels capture Simferopol - three days before the arrival of the Red Army. In addition, the fighters of the Crimean Insurgent Army captured the cities of Feodosia and Karasubazar (now Belogorsk). I note that the French destroyer Senegal was firing at the rebels who occupied Feodosia.
Several motor boats came to the aid of the partisans from Novorossiysk to the Crimea. The new landing was commanded by Ivan Papanin, already known to us. In the autumn of 1920, he was taken to the mainland with secret documents seized from the Whites, and now he is back in the Crimean Insurgent Army.
It is curious that 20 years later, in the autumn of 1941, Mokrousov again led the partisan movement in the Crimea, and Makarov, “His Excellency’s adjutant,” became his closest assistant. The German invaders knew about Makarov's past adventures and distributed among the population a leaflet specially dedicated to him with the eloquent title "Chameleon". Papanin in the Crimea in 1941-1944 did not partisan, at that time he served as the "head of the Arctic."
In the course of a brilliant operation, she broke into the defense of the White Guards of Wrangel at Perekop, broke into the Crimea and defeated the enemy. The defeat of Wrangel is traditionally considered the end civil war in Russia.
In the Civil War, which engulfed the territory of the former Russian Empire, it was not enough for military leaders to master all the intricacies of military art. It was no less important, if not more important, to win over the local population, to convince the troops of the loyalty of the political ideals they were defending. That is why in the Red Army, for example, L. D. Trotsky comes to the fore - a man, it would seem, by his origin and education far from military affairs. However, his one speech to the troops could give them more than the wisest orders of the generals. During the war, military leaders are also put forward, whose main merits were the suppression of rebellions, real robber raids. Glorified by many historians, Tukhachevsky fought, for example, with the peasants in the Tambov province, Kotovsky was really the “Bessarabian Robin Hood”, etc. But even among the red commanders there were real experts in military affairs, whose operations are still considered exemplary. Naturally, this talent had to be combined with extensive propaganda work. Such was Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. The capture of Perekop, the defeat of Wrangel's forces in the Crimea are first-class military operations.
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By the spring of 1920, the Red Army had already achieved significant results in the fight against the Whites. On April 4, 1920, the remnants of the White Guards concentrated in the Crimea were led by General Wrangel, who replaced Denikin as commander-in-chief. The Wrangel troops, reorganized into the so-called "Russian Army", were consolidated into four corps, with a total number of over 30 thousand people. These were well-trained, armed and disciplined troops with a significant stratum of officers. They were supported by the warships of the Entente. Wrangel's army, according to Lenin's definition, was better armed than all previously beaten White Guard groups. On the Soviet side, Wrangel was opposed by the 13th Army, which by the beginning of May 1920 had only 12,500 soldiers and was much worse armed.
When planning an offensive, the White Guards sought, first of all, to destroy the 13th Army operating against them in Northern Tavria, replenish their units here at the expense of the local peasantry and deploy fighting in the Donbass, on the Don and Kuban. Wrangel proceeded from the fact that the main forces of the Soviets were concentrated on the Polish front, so he did not expect serious resistance in Northern Tavria.
The offensive of the White Guards began on June 6, 1920 with a landing under the command of General Slashchev near the village. Kirillovka on the coast of the Sea of Azov. On June 9, the Wrangel troops occupied Melitopol. At the same time there was an offensive from the area of Perekop and Chongar. The Red Army units retreated. Wrangel was stopped on the line Kherson - Nikopol - Veliky Tokmak - Berdyansk. To help the 13th Army, the Soviet command abandoned the 2nd Cavalry Army, created on July 16, 1920. The 51st Rifle Division under the command of V. Blucher and other units were redeployed from Siberia.
In August 1920, Wrangel agreed to negotiate with the UNR government, whose troops were fighting in Western Ukraine. (Russians from the central provinces made up only 20% of Wrangel's army. Half were from Ukraine, 30% were Cossacks.) The White Guards also tried to enlist the support of the Makhnovists by sending a delegation to them with a proposal for joint action in the fight against the Red Army. However, Makhno resolutely refused any negotiations and even ordered the execution of the parliamentarian Captain Mikhailov.
Makhno's relations with the Red Army developed differently. At the end of September, an agreement was concluded between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Makhnovists on joint actions against Wrangel. Makhno put forward political demands: after the defeat of Wrangel, autonomy should be granted to the Gulyai-Polye region, allowed to freely propagate anarchist ideas, release anarchists and Makhnovists from Soviet prisons, and help the rebels with ammunition and equipment. The Ukrainian leaders promised to discuss all this with Moscow. As a result of the agreement, a well-trained combat unit was at the disposal of the Southern Front. In addition, troops that had previously been diverted by the fight against the rebels were also sent to fight against Wrangel.
counteroffensive Soviet troops began on the night of August 7th. The 15th, 52nd and Latvian divisions crossed the Dnieper and entrenched themselves in the bridgehead near Kakhovka on the left bank. Thus, the Red Army created a threat to the flank and rear of the Whites in Northern Tavria. On September 21, the Southern Front was created, which was headed by M.V. Frunze, who showed himself excellently in the fight against Kolchak, in Turkestan, etc. The Southern Front included the 6th Army (commander - Kork), 13th ( commander - Uborevich) and the 2nd Cavalry Mironov. At the end of October, the newly created 4th Army (commander Lazarevich) and the 1st Cavalry Budyonny, which arrived from the Polish front, were included in it. The front had 99.5 thousand bayonets, 33.6 thousand sabers, 527 guns. By this time there were 44 thousand Wrangels, they had a great advantage in military equipment. In mid-September, as a result of a new offensive by the White Guard, they managed to capture Aleksandrovsk, Sinelnikovo, Mariupol. However, this offensive was soon stopped, the Whites failed to liquidate the Kakhovka bridgehead of the Reds, as well as to gain a foothold on the Right Bank. By mid-October, the Wrangelites went over to the defensive along the entire front, and on the 29th began offensive Soviet troops from the Kakhovka bridgehead. The losses of the whites were great, but the remnants of their troops broke through Chongar to the Crimea. Parts of the 4th, 13th and 2nd Cavalry armies did not have time to support the Budennovites, who were called upon to prevent this breakthrough. The White Guards broke through the battle formations of the 14th and 4th cavalry divisions and on the night of November 2 retreated behind the isthmus. M. V. Frunze reported to Moscow: “... for all the significance of the defeat inflicted on the enemy, most of his cavalry and a certain part of the infantry represented by the main divisions managed to escape partly through the Chongar Peninsula and partly through the Arabat Spit, where, due to the unforgivable negligence of Budyonny’s cavalry, the bridge across the Genichesk Strait was blown up.
Behind the first-class Perekop and Chongar fortifications, built with the help of French and British engineers, the Wrangelites hoped to spend the winter, and in the spring of 1921 continue the fight. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), believing that another season of war could lead to the collapse of the young regime, gave the military command a directive to take the Crimea at any cost before the onset of winter.
* * *
On the eve of the assault, Wrangel had 25-28 thousand soldiers and, and the number of the Red Army on the Southern Front was already about 100 thousand people. The Perekop and Chongar isthmuses and the southern bank of the Sivash connecting them were a common network of fortified positions erected in advance, reinforced by natural and artificial obstacles. The Turkish rampart on Perekop reached a length of 11 km, a height of 10 m. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 10 m deep. Germans in 1918 and in battles with Denikin in 1919. These fortifications were followed by fortified Ishun positions. Hundreds of machine guns, dozens of guns, tanks blocked the way for the Red troops. Four rows of mined barbed wire lay in front of the rampart. It was necessary to advance in open areas, which were shot through for several kilometers. Breaking through such a defense was unrealistic. No wonder Wrangel, who examined the positions, said that a new Verdun would take place here.
At first, given that the Perekop and Chongar isthmuses were heavily fortified, it was planned to strike the main blow with the forces of the 4th Army from the Salkovo area, while simultaneously bypassing the enemy defenses by an operational group consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 9th Infantry Division through the Arabat arrow. This made it possible to withdraw troops deep into the Crimean peninsula and use the Azov military flotilla. In the future, by bringing into battle the cavalry (mobile) group of the front, it was supposed to develop success in the Chongar direction. This plan took into account a similar maneuver successfully carried out back in 1737 by Russian troops led by Field Marshal Lassi. However, to ensure this maneuver, it was necessary to defeat the White Guard fleet, which was supported by American, British and French warships. Enemy ships had the opportunity to approach the Arabat Spit and conduct flanking fire on Soviet troops. Therefore, two days before the start of the operation, the main blow was transferred to the Perekop direction.
The idea of the Perekop-Chongar operation was to simultaneously attack the main forces of the 6th Army through the Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula, in cooperation with the frontal offensive of the 51st Division on the Turkish Wall, to break through the enemy’s first line of defense in the Perekop direction. An auxiliary strike was planned in the Chongar direction by the forces of the 4th Army. Subsequently, it was supposed to immediately defeat the enemy piece by piece at the Ishun positions, which constituted the second line of enemy defense. Later on, by introducing into the breakthrough the mobile groups of the front (1st and 2nd Cavalry armies, the Makhnovist detachment of Karetnikov) and the 4th army (3rd cavalry corps) to pursue the retreating enemy in the directions to Evpatoria, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Feodosia, not allowing him to be evacuated from the Crimea. The Crimean partisans under the command of Mokrousov were given the task of assisting the troops advancing from the front: striking at the rear, disrupting communications and control, capturing and holding the enemy’s most important communications centers.
From the villages of Stroganovka and Ivanovka to the Lithuanian Peninsula, the width of the Sivash is 8–9 km. For reconnaissance of the fords, local guides were invited - solarium Olenchuk from Stroganovka and shepherd Petrenko from Ivanovka.
The Perekop-Chongar operation began on the day of the third anniversary of the October Revolution - November 7, 1920. The wind drove the water into the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov. The units allocated to the shock group of the 6th Army began to prepare for the night crossing of the bay. At 10 pm on November 7, in a 12-degree frost, the 45th brigade of the 15th Inza division entered Sivash from Stroganovka and disappeared in the fog.
At the same time, a column of the 44th brigade left the village of Ivanovka. To the right, two hours later, the 52nd Rifle Division began forcing. Orientation fires were lit on the shore, but after a kilometer they were hidden by fog. Tools got stuck, people helped the horses. At times I had to walk up to my chest in icy water. When about 6 km were left behind, the wind suddenly changed direction, the water driven to the Sea of Azov returned back. At 2 am on November 8, the forward detachments reached the coast of the Lithuanian Peninsula. The enemy, who did not expect the advance of the Soviet troops through the Sivash, regrouped the troops that night. Soon both brigades of the 15th division entered the battle on the peninsula. When units of the 52nd division began to leave Sivash to the right, panic seized the whites. Unable to withstand the blow, they retreated to the previously prepared Ishun positions. Fostikov's 2nd Kuban Cavalry Brigade, which was defending in the first echelon, almost completely surrendered. The Drozdov division introduced into the counterattack suffered the same fate.
Having learned about the crossing of the strike group of the 6th Army, Wrangel urgently transferred the 34th Infantry Division and his closest reserve, the 15th Infantry Division, to this direction, reinforcing them with armored vehicles. However, they could not contain the offensive impulse of the strike group of the 6th Army, which rushed to the Ishun positions, to the rear of the enemy's Perekop grouping.
The Makhnovist detachments, united in the Crimean group of seven thousand, also played an important role. They also crossed the Sivash at a critical moment and, together with the Red units, broke into the Crimea.
At the same time, on the morning of November 8, the 51st Division was thrown to storm the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus. After a 4-hour artillery preparation, units of the 51st division, with the support of armored vehicles, began the assault on the Turkish Wall. However, the fog placed the field artillery to overwhelm the enemy's batteries. Three times the units went on the attack, but, having suffered heavy losses, lay down in front of the moat. The offensive of the 9th Infantry Division along the Arabat Spit was thwarted by artillery fire from enemy ships. The water in Sivash continued to rise. At midnight on November 8, Frunze called Blucher to the phone and said: “The Sivash is flooded with water. Our parts on the Lithuanian peninsula can be cut off. Seize the rampart by all means." The fourth assault on the Turkish Wall was successful.
The defense of the Whites was finally broken on November 9th. During the assault on the Perekop positions, the Red Army suffered significant losses (in some units they reached 85%). The Wrangelites tried to stop the enemy advance at the Ishun positions, but on the night of November 10-11, the 30th Infantry Division by storm overcame the enemy’s stubborn defenses at Chongar and outflanked the Ishun positions. During the assault on the fortified positions of the enemy, the aviation of the Southern Front covered and supported the advancing troops in the Perekop and Chongar directions.
A group of aircraft under the command of the chief of the air fleet of the 4th Army, A.V. Vasiliev, with bomb attacks forced 8 enemy armored trains concentrated here to move away from the Taganash station and thereby ensured success for their troops.
On the morning of November 11, after a fierce night battle, the 30th Infantry Division, in cooperation with the 6th Cavalry Division, broke through the fortified positions of the Wrangelites and began to advance on Dzhankoy, and the 9th Infantry Division crossed the strait in the Genichesk area. At the same time, an amphibious assault on boats was landed in the Sudak region, which, together with the Crimean partisans, launched military operations behind enemy lines.
On the same day, on the radio, Frunze suggested that Wrangel lay down his arms, but the "black baron" remained silent. Wrangel ordered Barbovich's cavalry and the Donets to overturn the Red units that were leaving the Perekop Isthmus with a blow to the flank. But the cavalry group itself was attacked by large forces of the red cavalry from the north in the Voinka area, where battered units were drawn up, which were soon also defeated by the 2nd Cavalry on the move. Wrangel was finally convinced that the days of his army were numbered. On November 12, he issued an emergency evacuation order.
Pursued by formations of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Armies, Wrangel's troops hastily retreated to the ports of the Crimea. On November 13, the soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Army and the 51st Division took Simferopol, on November 15 Sevastopol and Feodosia were captured, and on the 16th - Kerch, Alushta and Yalta. This day is considered by many historians as the date of the end of the Civil War. Wrangel's army was completely defeated, part of the White Guards managed to board ships and sail to Turkey.
But the fighting with individual anti-Soviet formations continued for a long time. It was the turn of the Makhnovists. The operation to destroy them was being prepared on the very high level. As early as November 20, two commanders of the Crimean group - Karetnikov and Gavrilenko - were summoned to Frunze in Melitopol, arrested and shot. On November 27, the Crimean group in the Evpatoria region was surrounded by Soviet divisions. The Makhnovists made their way through the ring, broke through Perekop and Sivash, reached the mainland, but near Tomashovka they ran into the Reds. After a short battle, out of 3,500 Makhnovist cavalrymen and 1,500 famous Makhnovist carts with machine guns, several hundred horsemen and 25 carts remained. Prior to this, on November 26, units of the Red Army surrounded Gulyaipole, where Makhno himself was with 3 thousand soldiers. The rebels managed to get out of the encirclement, connect with the remnants of the Crimean group and again turn into a formidable force. After a fierce struggle that lasted throughout the first half of 1921, Makhno crossed the Soviet-Romanian border in September with a small group of supporters.
During the fighting against Wrangel (from October 28 to November 16, 1920), the troops of the Southern Front captured 52.1 thousand soldiers and the enemy, captured 276 guns, 7 armored trains, 15 armored vehicles, 10 locomotives and 84 ships of various types. The divisions that distinguished themselves during the assault on the Crimean fortifications were given honorary titles: the 15th - Sivash, 30th Rifle and 6th Cavalry - Chongar, 51st - Perekop. For courage during the Perekop operation, all military personnel of the Southern Front were awarded a monthly salary. Many fighters and commanders were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Frunze's authority rose to unprecedented heights.
Taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the Red Army were sent to fight the White Poles, the White Guards recovered somewhat from their defeats and in the spring of 1920 began preparations for another battle with the Soviet Republic.
This time Crimea became their stronghold. Foreign vessels with weapons and uniforms for the 150,000-strong army of General Wrangel went here along the Black Sea. English, French specialists supervised the construction of fortifications on Perekopthe isthmus, taught the Whites to handle the latest military equipment - tanks and aircraft.
In the midst of the fighting between the Red Army and the White Poles, Wrangel's troops left the Crimea, captured part of the southern Ukrainian regions and tried to break through to the Donbass. Wrangel dreamed of a campaign against Moscow.
"Wrangel must be destroyed, just as Kolchak and Denikin were destroyed." This is the task that the Central Committee of our Party set before the Soviet people. Through Kharkov and Lugansk, through Kyiv and Kremenchug, detachments of communists, military echelons, moved south.
While the Red Army was at war with the White Poles, the Soviet command could not concentrate the necessary forces against Wrangel in order to launch a decisive offensive. During the summer and early autumn, our troops held back the onslaught of the enemy and prepared for a counteroffensive.
In those days, fierce battles unfolded under the then legendary Kakhovka. Here, in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where the mighty river, as it were, hangs over the entrance to the Crimea with its bend, the Red troops crossed to the left bank and created a base there for a further offensive. The fighters of the famous 51st Rifle Division under the command of V.K. Blucher created an impregnable fortified area near Kakhovka.
The Wrangelites did their best to drive our units out of here. White infantry and cavalry, reinforced by a large number of armored cars, rushed forward regardless of losses. Vran gel threw on this sector of the front a rare type of weapon at that time - tanks. But the armored monster did not frighten the Red Army.
The clumsy masses of tanks moved slowly forward, crushing the barbed wire, firing incessantly. There seemed to be no force that could stop them. But then the Soviet artillerymen rolled out a gun and knocked out one tank with direct fire. A group of Red Army men with bundles of grenades rushed to another enemy vehicle: there was a deafening explosion - the tank froze, settled on its side. Twobrave warriors captured other tanks unharmed.
Despite all efforts enemy, the troops of the Red Army forged near Kakhovka large strength Wrangel and kept the city in their hands.
Commander of the Volga Regiment Stepan Sergeevich Vostretsov, a slow man, accustomed to doing everything firmly, in detail, commanded the Volga regiment on the Eastern Front, which smashed the Kolchakites. Thoroughness did not prevent him from being a master of desperately bold moves on the field of military operations. He himself, with a small group of machine gunners, captured the Chelyabinsk railway station and opened the way for the regiment to the city. For this, Vostretsov was awarded the first of his four Orders of the Red Banner. | In the frosty winter of 1919, Vostretsov, with a small detachment followed by a regiment, approached the headquarters train that was standing on the tracks in Omsk. - Get out, come! he shouted, throwing open the salon doors. Then Vostretsov forced the general to pick up the telephone receiver and order the troops in the city to lay down their arms. So the savvy Ural blacksmith got the better of his Excellency, who underestimated the military genius of the people. |
By the end of October 1920, everything was ready to go on the offensive. The commander of the Southern Front, M.V. Frunze, ordered the troops to attack the enemy. On the morning of October 28, the front line began to move. First of all, the regiments of the First Cavalry Army rushed into battle, shortly before that they had arrived from the Western Front after the conclusion of peace with Pan Poland. For several days there were stubborn battles on the outskirts of the Crimea. Southern Ukraine would be liberated from the Whites. However, a significant part of Wrangel's army managed to escape to the Crimea. Our troops were to storm the fortifications covering the way to the peninsula. Look at the map and you will understand the extraordinary difficulty of such a task. You can get to the Crimea only along a narrow isthmus or through the Sivash - the “rotten sea”. The Wrangelites firmly entrenched themselves here. Through the 15-kilometer Isthmus of Perekop, the Turkish Wall stretched, rising steeply to 8 m.
In front of the shaft - a deep ditch 20 wide m.
All around, wherever you look, lines of trenches covered with rows of barbed wire fences. Shelters, deep dugouts, loopholes, communication passages were dug in the thickness of the Turkish Wall. Dozens of enemy cannons and machine guns kept the entire space in front of these fortifications under fire.
"Crimea is impregnable," the White Guard generals declared self-confidently. But for ourwarriors were not impregnable positions. "Perekop must be taken, and he will be taken!" - this thought owned the red fighters and commanders of the Southern Front.
They decided to strike the main blow at Perekop.The 51st division was to attack the Turkish Wall from the front; part of our troops was supposed to ford the Sivash, bypass the Perekop fortifications and hit the enemy from the rear. On the Chongar Isthmus, the Red Army delivered an auxiliary strike.
There were final preparations for the decisive assault.In coastal estuaries, sappers built rafts for crossing machine guns and light artillery. Standing waist-deep in icy water, the Red Army soldiers fortified the fords across the Sivash, laying straw, wattle, boards, and logs on the bottom. It was necessary to quickly pass through the Sivash, while the wind drove the water into the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov.
November 7, 1920, the day of the third anniversary of the Great October Revolution, at 10 pm Night darkness enveloped the earth. From the Crimean coast, cut deep, searchlight beams fumbled. And so our advanced units moved through the Sivash. The guides - residents of coastal villages - indicated the path. This transition was incredibly difficult. People, horses, wagons got stuck in the muddy bottom.
Straining all their strength, the red warriors moved forward, with difficulty pulling guns out of the quagmire. Only after three hours did they feel solid ground under their feet.
Illuminated by enemy searchlights, under a shower of bullets, among the explosions of shells, an assault column went forward - communists and Komsomol members.
In a fierce battle, they threw back the enemy and entrenched themselves on the Crimean coast. The poet N. Tikhonov wrote about this feat:
Sivash is bridged with living bridges!
But dead before they fall
They take a step forward.
On the morning of November 8, thick fog enveloped the Turetsky rampart. After artillery preparation, our regiments moved to storm. Attacks followed one after another, but to no avail. The fighters could not overcome the deadly fire of the whites; having suffered heavy losses, they lay down near the enemy's barbed wire.
By evening, the situation worsened. The wind changed, and the water in the estuary began to rise. Our troops that crossed the Sivash could be completely cut off. At the suggestion of M.V.Frunze residents moved to Sivashchnearby villages. They carried with them logs, boards, bundles of straw and branches to strengthen the flooded fords. New regiments went through the Sivash to pull the enemy forces away from the Turkish Wall.
Chief Div Kikvidze - We’re going to the white farm,” said the driver Vaso Kikvidze, dressed in a brand new uniform with gold shoulder straps. - You are under arrest, Colonel, and are accused of not following the order of the headpiece, - said Kikvidze sharply, the commander of the unit demanded secret correspondence, ciphers, documents. | All this, together with the goofy colonel, he brought to your headquarters. There were legends about military cunning, courage, invulnerability of the red commander. After his death, the 16th rifle division, named after Kikvidze, continued to fight. During the Great Patriotic War, she heroically defended the approaches to Leningrad. |
After midnight, the soldiers again rushed to storm the Turkish Wall. Gritting their teeth, they moved forward, making their way through the barbed wire, climbing the steep slopes of the rampart. The wounded remained in the ranks.
And when the sun, peering out from behind the gloomy November clouds, rose over the surface of the Black Sea, it illuminated the red banner pierced by bullets, victoriously flying over the Turkish Wall. Perekop was taken!
Pressing the White Guards, the Red Army also broke through the following fortified lines of the enemy. The divisions of the First Cavalry Army rapidly rushed into the gap.
The Wrangelites were utterly defeated. The remnants of the White Army were hastily loaded onto foreign ships and fled from the Crimea. In battles with the Wrangel troops, units of the already mentioned 51st Rifle Division especially distinguished themselves, andalso parts of the 15th, 30th, 52nd rifle divisions, fighters and commanders of the 3rd cavalry corps.
In a telegram to V. I. Lenin, M. V. Frunze wrote on November 12, 1920: “I testify to the highest valor shown by the heroic infantry during the assaults on Sivash and Perekop. Units marched along narrow passages under deadly fire at the enemy's wire. Our losses are extremely heavy. Some divisions lost three quarters of their strength. The total loss of killed and wounded during the assaults on the isthmuses is at least 10 thousand people. The armies of the front fulfilled their duty to the Republic. The last nest of the Russian counter-revolution has been destroyed, and the Crimea will once again become Soviet.”
The Soviet country triumphed. “The glorious forces of the revolution defeated Wrangel with selfless courage, heroic exertion of strength. Long live our Red Army, great army labor! - with these words, the newspaper Pravda reported on the victory over the enemy.
Young underground workers of Odessa In 1920? when the Red Army temporarily left Odessa, the White Guard deytsy captured a group of young Polish soldiers. Torture did not break the young patriots. On the night before the execution, they wrote letters to their comrades. These letters were published in the underground newspaper Odessa Kommunist. Here are three of them. “Nine communists convicted on January 4, 1920 by a court-martial ... death penalty send their dying farewell greetings to their comrades. We wish you successful continuation of our common cause. We die in paradise, but we triumph and welcome the victorious offensive of the Red Army. We hope and believe in the final triumph of the ideals of communism! Long live the Communist International! | Convicted: Dora Lyubarskaya, - "Ida Krasnoshchekina, Yasha Roifman (Godless), Lev Spivak (Fedya), Boris Mikhailovich (Turovsky), Dunikovsky (Zigmund), Vasily Petrenko, Misha Piltsman and Fields Barg ... " “Dear comrades! I am leaving this life with a clear conscience, without betraying anyone. Be happy and carry on the matter to the end, which, unfortunately, I did not succeed ... Sigmund. “Glorious comrades, I am dying honestly, as I honestly lived my little life ... I am not sorry that I will die like this, it is a pity that I have done little for the revolution ... Soon, soon all of Ukraine will breathe a sigh and live, creative work will begin . It’s a pity that I can’t take part in it ... Dora Lyubarskaya. |
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