Maps of the Tsushima battle with comments. Reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle

The Tsushima battle in 1905 of the Russian Pacific Flotilla with the Imperial Flotilla suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the naval battle, the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of the Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and scuttled along with the crew members. Some ships announced their surrender, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat for the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was another outcome of events possible?

Military and political situation in the Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a sudden attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military operations. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence on this piece of Russian land.

Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. The small allies of Russia, such as France, Germany and others, supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in every possible way in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, in decisive strategic moments, they still tried to maintain neutrality. Allied assistance was shown only when it was in their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive measures. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron led by Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

Already on the way, the Baltic ships learn that Port Arthur has been taken, and all the ships in the roadstead are flooded. The Pacific Fleet has been destroyed. Takova maritime history Far East of Russia. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To reinforce the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov was sent.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units of the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

• 8 squadron heavy artillery against 4 Japanese;
• 3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;
• 1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Japanese Imperial Navy;
• 8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;
• 5 against 24 auxiliary warships of Japan;
• 9 Russian vs 63 Japanese

The clear combat advantage of the Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian one in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat arrows skillfully mastered the art of hitting an enemy target at long distances, moreover, at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet had no such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of marine equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic task of the naval campaign of Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky was to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z. P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any means, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It is possible that bypassing the Japanese islands from the east would be strategic right decision, and the Tsushima naval battle would not have taken place.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. It was decided to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and the Sea of ​​Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that the Japanese admiral Heitatiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are closed

The commander of the Japanese fleet chose a strategically correct plan for possible military operations. A sentinel chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the outskirts of Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently set up minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were waiting for the approach of Russian ships. abandoned naval reconnaissance, fearing that his squadron would be detected by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed to many to be madness. Veterans with worn-out mechanisms, having clocked hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed, untested ships were sent to this doomed campaign. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. Armadillos with the names of eminent commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death.

They got stuck on the descent during the slipway, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, ran aground, as if giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe signs?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship "Emperor" burned down in the workshop. Alexander III". The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by human casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in the civilian harbor, and later ran aground several times, catching up with the squadron in the Gulf of Finland. The battleship "Glory" in general could not be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command had no premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II went around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and connect with the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for the joint mastery of the Sea of ​​Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, destroyers left their native shores forever. A 220-day trip to the Japanese coast with a length of 18,000 nautical miles has begun.

Unseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command is the problem with fuel. According to the international maritime law of that time, warships of the belligerent side could enter the ports of the neutral side only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the route of the squadron, closed its ports to Russian warships.

The supply of the squadron with coal, provisions and fresh water had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop "Kamchatka" was equipped, staffed by artisan volunteers. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. In general, the implementation of a strategic operation of this magnitude deserves the highest praise.

The heaviest loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, the most severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron, like a ghost, loomed on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world followed her movement. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

• Port Said (Egypt);
• Djibouti (East Africa);
• Aden (Yemen);
• Dakar (Senegal);
• Conakry (Guinea);
• Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were fruitless. The first long stay was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruising detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkerzam also joined there, passing a short way through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this surprised no one. The crews were formed for the most part from recruits and penalized. Two months later - a jump across the Indian Ocean. The infinitely tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore, the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island was Korean divers for pearls. The Tsushima battle will begin very soon, the date of the death of the squadron was approaching.

First shot at the enemy

At 1340 hours, the flagship battleship Knyaz Suvorov, under the command of Captain 1st Rank V.V. volleys. The Tsushima naval battle began. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear even in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain of the 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, we want it. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not surrender. The commander kept his word and died along with the full composition of the battleship.

Tsushima battle, briefly about the main

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Baer, ​​with a strong bow deferent and a huge fire on the rostras, rolled out of formation and fell on the port side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under the water, leaving on the surface only fragments of wood and people floundering in the water.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down one after another.

By 4 p.m., the battleship Knyaz Suvorov was out of action, which was badly damaged by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier, it was possible to remove Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky with headquarters on the destroyer "Buyny". A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. He commanded a squadron battleship and the captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two remarkable artists died, both graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, full namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S.O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship "Prince Suvorov", the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

• "Sisoy the Great" under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.P. Ozerov;
• the battleship Navarin, led by the captain of the 1st rank, Baron B. A. Fitingof;
• the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain of the 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;
• the squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", commanded by Captain 1st Rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last to die from the Russian squadron);
• "Admiral Senyavin" led by the captain of the 1st rank S. I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 carried more and more Russian sailors and their ships into the depths of the sea. Another fatally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the stoker - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this nightmarish Tsushima battle (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the course north-east 23. The main thing is to survive. Many have died with this thought. Russian sailors on the battleships following behind watched the place of death of their comrades. They whispered with lips black from burning: "God rest their souls."

The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" and a little later "Borodino" died with the entire crew. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the invincibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were handed over to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov. Later, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years in prison by the decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buyny", who saved Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, was the captain of the 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, commander of the Ermak icebreaker. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he proved himself to be one of the best commanders of the Russian fleet, N. N. Kolomiytsev commanded various ships. During the First World War he became a vice admiral. In 1918 he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications, biographical information about N. N. Kolomiytsev ends with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, a new hydrographic vessel was named after him. Only recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought on the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship "Nikolai Kolomiytsev" was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

History reference

From the lists of the military fleets of that time, two ships of the participant in the Tsushima battle have survived to this day. It's good famous cruiser"Aurora" and the Japanese battleship "Mikasa", the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored Aurora at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including E.R. Egoriev, were killed, another 83 people were injured. Unable to go forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in the Battle of Tsushima gives the Aurora cruiser more reason to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversary of Tsushima, meetings of veterans, participants in the Russo-Japanese War, were held on it. The Japanese treat this monument of history with great reverence.

The memory of the dead sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three came to Vladivostok. Messenger ship Almaz, destroyers Grozny and Bravy. Most of the ships and 5,000 sailors found eternal rest at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Evenlet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on the Waters, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with the people's money and widow's contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.

Battle

On May 23, 1905, Rozhdestvensky's squadron made the last loading of coal. Stocks were again taken in excess of the norm, as a result of which the battleships were overloaded, sinking deep into the sea. On May 25, all excess transports were sent to Shanghai. The squadron was put on full alert. Rozhdestvensky did not organize reconnaissance so as not to discover the squadron.

However, the Japanese already guessed which way the Russian ships would go. Japanese Admiral Togo has been waiting for Russian ships since January 1905. The Japanese command assumed that the Russians would try to break through to Vladivostok or capture some harbor in the Formosa region (modern Taiwan) and from there conduct operations against the Japanese Empire. At a meeting in Tokyo, it was decided to proceed from defense, concentrate forces in the Korea Strait and act according to the situation. In anticipation of the Russian fleet, the Japanese overhauled the ships, replacing all defective guns with new ones. Previous battles have made the Japanese fleet a single fighting unit. Therefore, by the time the Russian squadron appeared, the Japanese fleet was in the best condition, a single unit with great combat experience, which was inspired by previous successes.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into 3 squadrons (each with several detachments). The 1st squadron was commanded by Admiral Togo, who held the flag on the battleship Mikaso. In the 1st combat detachment(armored core of the fleet) there were 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class, 2 armored cruisers of the 1st class and a mine cruiser. The 1st squadron also included: 3rd combat detachment (4 armored cruisers 2nd and 3rd classes), 1st Destroyer Detachment (5 destroyers), 2nd Destroyer Detachment (4 units), 3rd Destroyer Detachment (4 ships), 14th Destroyer Detachment (4 destroyers). The 2nd squadron was under the flag of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura. It consisted of: the 2nd combat detachment (6 armored cruisers of the 1st class and advice note), the 4th combat detachment (4 armored cruisers), the 4th and 5th detachments of destroyers (4 ships each), 9th th and 19th destroyer detachments. 3rd squadron under the flag of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. The 3rd squadron included: 5th combat detachment (obsolete battleship, 3 cruisers of the 2nd class, advice note), 6th combat detachment (4 armored cruisers of the 3rd class), 7th combat detachment (obsolete battleship , cruiser of the 3rd class, 4 gunboats), 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 20th detachments of destroyers (4 units each), 16th detachment of destroyers (2 destroyers), detachment of special purpose ships (it included auxiliary cruisers).

The Japanese fleet comes out to meet the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The balance of power was in favor of the Japanese. For linear armored ships there was an approximate equality: 12:12. For large-caliber guns of 300 mm (254-305 mm), the advantage was on the side of the Russian squadron - 41:17; on other guns, the Japanese had an advantage: 200 mm - 6:30, 150 mm - 52:80. The Japanese had a great advantage in such important indicators as the number of shots per minute, the weight in kg of metal and explosives. For guns of 300-, 250- and 200 mm caliber, the Russian squadron fired 14 rounds per minute, the Japanese - 60; the weight of the metal was 3680 for Russian guns, for the Japanese - 9500 kg; the weight of the explosive for the Russians, for the Japanese - 1330 kg. Russian ships were also inferior in the segment of 150 and 120 mm guns. By the number of shots per minute: Russian ships - 120, Japanese - 300; metal weight in kg for Russian guns - 4500, for the Japanese - 12350; explosives for the Russians - 108, for the Japanese - 1670. The Russian squadron was also inferior in terms of armor area: 40% versus 60% and in speed: 12-14 knots versus 12-18 knots.

Thus, the Russian squadron was inferior in rate of fire by 2-3 times; in terms of the amount of metal ejected per minute, Japanese ships exceeded Russian ones by 2 1/2 times; the stock of explosives in the Japanese shells was 5-6 times greater than in the Russians. Russian thick-walled armor-piercing shells with an extremely low bursting charge pierced Japanese armor and did not explode. Japanese shells, on the other hand, produced severe destruction and fires, literally destroying all non-metal parts of the ship (there was an excess of wood on Russian ships).

In addition, the Japanese fleet had a noticeable advantage in light cruiser forces. In a direct cruising battle, Russian ships were threatened with complete defeat. They were inferior in the number of ships and guns, and were also bound by the protection of transports. The Japanese had a huge superiority in destroyer forces: 9 Russian 350-ton destroyers against 21 destroyers and 44 destroyers of the Japanese fleet.

After the appearance of Russian ships in the Strait of Malacca, the Japanese command received accurate information about the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In mid-May, the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment went to sea, which indicated that the Russian squadron was approaching. The Japanese fleet prepared to meet the enemy. The 1st and 2nd squadrons (the armored core of the fleet of 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class and 8 armored cruisers of the 1st class, almost equal in power to the battleships) are located on the western coast of the Korea Strait, in Mozampo; 3rd squadron - off the island of Tsushima. Auxiliary cruisers from merchant steamers made up a 100-mile guard chain, spread 120 miles south of the main body. Behind the guard chain were light cruisers and patrol ships of the main forces. All forces were connected by radiotelegraph and guarded the entrance to the Korea Bay.

Japanese Admiral Togo Heihachiro

Squadron battleship Mikasa, July 1904

Squadron battleship "Mikasa", repair of the stern turret. Reid Elliot, August 12-16, 1904

Squadron battleship Shikishima, July 6, 1906

Asahi squadron battleship

On the morning of May 25, Rozhdestvensky's squadron headed for the Tsushima Strait. The ships went in two columns with transports in the middle. On the night of May 27, the Russian squadron passed the Japanese guard chain. The ships sailed without lights and were not seen by the Japanese. But the 2 hospital ships following the squadron were illuminated. At 2 o'clock. 25 min. they were noticed by a Japanese cruiser, itself remaining undetected. At dawn, first one, and then several enemy cruisers came to the Russian squadron, which followed at a distance and at times disappeared in the morning fog. At about 10 o'clock Rozhdestvensky's squadron reorganized into one wake column. Behind them moved transports and auxiliary vessels under the cover of 3 cruisers.

At 11 o'clock. 10 min. Japanese cruisers appeared from behind the fog, some Russian ships opened fire on them. Rozhdestvensky ordered to stop firing. At noon, the squadron headed north-east 23 ° - to Vladivostok. Then the Russian admiral tried to rebuild the right column of the squadron into the front line, but, seeing the enemy again, he abandoned this idea. As a result, the battleships ended up in two columns.

Togo, having received a message in the morning about the appearance of the Russian fleet, immediately moved from Mozampo to the eastern side of the Korea Strait (Okinoshima Island). From intelligence reports, the Japanese admiral knew perfectly well the location of the Russian squadron. When the distance between the fleets was reduced to 30 miles around noon, Togo moved towards the Russians with the main armored forces (12 squadron battleships and armored cruisers) plus 4 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. The main forces of the Japanese fleet were to attack the head of the Russian column, and Togo sent the cruising forces around the Russian rear to capture the transports.

At 13 o'clock. 30 minutes. the right column of Russian battleships increased its speed to 11 knots and began to dodge to the left in order to go to the head of the left column and form a common column. The cruisers and transports were instructed to withdraw to the right. At that moment Togo's ships appeared from the northeast. The Japanese ships, having a course of 15 knots, went across the Russian squadron and, being ahead and somewhat to the left of our ships, began to sequentially (one after the other at one point) turn in the opposite direction - the so-called “Togo loop”. With this maneuver, Togo took a position ahead of the Russian squadron.

The turning point was very risky for the Japanese. Rozhdestvensky got a good chance to turn the tide in his favor. Having accelerated the course of the 1st detachment to the maximum, approaching the usual distance of 15 cables for Russian gunners and concentrating fire on the turning point of the Togo squadron, the Russian squadron battleships could shoot the enemy. According to a number of military researchers, such a maneuver could cause serious damage to the armored core of the Japanese fleet and allow the 2nd Pacific squadron, if not win this battle, then at least complete the task of breaking through the main forces to Vladivostok. In addition, the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type could try to "squeeze" the Japanese ships to the column of older Russian battleships, slow but with powerful guns. However, Rozhdestvensky either did not notice this, or did not dare to take such a step, not believing in the abilities of his squadron. And he had very little time to make such a decision.

At the time of the turn of the Japanese squadron at 13 o'clock. 49 min. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of about 8 km (45 cables). At the same time, only the head battleships could effectively hit the enemy, for the rest the distance was too great, and the ships ahead interfered. The Japanese immediately responded by concentrating fire on the two flagships - "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyab". The Russian commander turned the squadron to the right to take a position parallel to the course of the Japanese fleet, but the enemy, using greater speed, continued to cover the head of the Russian squadron, blocking the path to Vladivostok.

After about 10 minutes, the Japanese gunners took aim and their powerful high-explosive shells began to cause great destruction on Russian ships, causing severe fires. In addition, the fire and heavy smoke made it difficult for the Russians to shoot and disrupt the control of the ships. "Oslyabya" were badly damaged and about 14 hours. 30 minutes. having buried its nose to the very hawse, it rolled out of action to the right, after about 10 minutes the battleship capsized and sank. Commander Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Ber was wounded at the beginning of the battle and refused to leave the ship, more than 500 people died with him. Destroyers and a tug lifted 376 people out of the water. Around the same time, the Suvorov received heavy damage. Shell fragments hit the wheelhouse, killing and injuring almost everyone who was there. Rozhdestvensky was wounded. Having lost control, the battleship rolled to the right, and then dangled between squadrons, trying to regain control. During the further battle, the battleship was fired upon more than once, attacked with torpedoes. At the beginning of 18 o'clock. the destroyer "Buyny" removed from the ship part of the headquarters, led by the seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky. Soon, Japanese cruisers and destroyers finished off the crippled flagship. The entire crew was killed. When the battleship Suvorov died, Admiral Nebogatov took command, holding the flag on the squadron battleship Emperor Nicholas I.

I. A. Vladimirov. The heroic death of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the battle of Tsushima

I. V. Slavinsky. The last hour of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the battle of Tsushima

The squadron was headed by the next battleship - "Emperor Alexander III". But soon he received severe damage and moved to the center of the squadron, giving way to Borodino as the leader. They finished off the battleship "Alexander" at 18:50. concentrated fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. None of the crew (857 people) survived.

The Russian squadron continued to move in relative order, trying to escape from the Japanese pincers. But, the Japanese ships, without serious damage, still blocked the way. Around 15 o'clock. Japanese cruisers went to the rear of the Russian squadron, captured two hospital ships, started a battle with the cruisers, knocking the cruisers and transports into one heap.

After 15 o'clock. the sea was suddenly covered with fog. Under his protection, the Russian ships turned to the southeast and parted ways with the enemy. The battle was interrupted, and the Russian squadron again lay down on a course of north-east 23 °, towards Vladivostok. However, the enemy cruisers discovered the Russian squadron and the battle continued. An hour later, when fog reappeared, the Russian squadron turned south and drove off the Japanese cruisers. At 17 o'clock, in obedience to the instructions of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, "Borodino" again led the column to the northeast, to Vladivostok. Then the main forces of Togo approached again, after a short firefight, the fog separated the main forces. Around 18 o'clock. Togo again caught up with the main Russian forces, concentrating fire on Borodino and Orel. "Borodino" was severely damaged, burned. At the beginning of 19 o'clock. "Borodino" received the last critical damage, was all on fire. The battleship capsized and sank with the entire crew. Only one sailor survived (Semyon Yushin). A little earlier, Alexander III died.

At sunset, the Japanese commander withdrew the ships from the battle. By the morning of May 28, all detachments were to gather north of Evenlet Island (in the northern part of the Korea Strait). The destroyer detachments were given the task of continuing the battle, encircling the Russian squadron and completing the rout with night attacks.

Thus, on May 27, 1905, the Russian squadron suffered a heavy defeat. The 2nd Pacific squadron lost 4 of the best squadron battleships out of 5. The newest battleship Oryol, which remained afloat, was badly damaged. Other ships of the squadron also received heavy damage. Many Japanese ships received several holes, but retained their combat capability.

The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not wage a decisive and furious battle. If the captains fought resolutely, maneuvered, tried to get close to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all commanders, the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through towards Vladivostok, not trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships.

Squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov"

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" on a campaign to the Far East as part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in front of the Korea Strait, May 1905

Ships of the 2nd squadron during one of the stops. From left to right: squadron battleships "Navarin", "Emperor Alexander III" and "Borodino"

Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

The end of the pogrom

At night, numerous Japanese destroyers surrounded the Russian fleet from the north, east and south. Nebogatov overtook the squadron on his flagship, stood in his head and moved to Vladivostok. Cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving transports, having not received a task, headed in different directions. The 4 battleships remaining under Nebogatov ("Nikolai", "Eagle", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin") were surrounded by superior enemy forces in the morning and capitulated. The crews were ready to accept the last battle and die with honor, but they complied with the admiral's order.

Only the Izumrud cruiser, which had fallen into the encirclement ring, the only cruiser remaining in the squadron after the battle and guarding the remnants of the 2nd Pacific squadron from destroyer attacks at night, did not obey the order to surrender to the Japanese. "Emerald" at full speed broke through the encirclement and went to Vladivostok. The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Ferzen, who showed himself excellently during this tragic battle and breaking through the encirclement, made a number of serious mistakes on the way to Vladivostok. Apparently, the psychological stress of the battle had an effect. When entering the Gulf of Vladimir, the ship landed on stones and was blown up by the crew, fearing the appearance of the enemy. Although at high tide it was possible to lift the ship aground.

The battleship "Navarin" was not severely damaged in the daytime battle, the losses were small. But at night he gave himself away by the light of searchlights, and the attack of the Japanese destroyers led to the death of the ship. Of the 681 crew members, only three managed to escape. The battleship Sisoy the Great received heavy damage during the daytime battle. At night, she was attacked by destroyers and received mortal damage. In the morning, the battleship reached Tsushima Island, where it collided with Japanese cruisers and a destroyer. The commander of the ship M.V. Ozerov, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, agreed to surrender. The Japanese evacuated the crew, and the ship sank. The armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was seriously damaged during the day, was torpedoed at night and scuttled in the morning so as not to surrender to the enemy. The battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was seriously damaged in the daytime battle. The ship's speed dropped, and it lagged behind the main forces. On May 28, the ship refused to capitulate and accepted an unequal battle with the Japanese armored cruisers Iwate and Yakumo. Having received heavy damage, the ship was flooded by the crew. The heavily damaged cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" was flooded by the crew in a hopeless position. Of all the ships of the 1st rank, the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" was the closest to Vladivostok. The cruiser was overtaken by the Japanese. "Donskoy" accepted the battle with the superior forces of the Japanese. The cruiser died without lowering her flag.

V. S. Ermyshev Battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

"Dmitry Donskoy"

Only the rank II cruiser Almaz, the destroyers Bravy and Grozny were able to leave for Vladivostok. In addition, the Anadyr transport went to Madagascar, and then to the Baltic. Three cruisers (Zhemchug, Oleg and Aurora) went to Manila in the Philippines and were interned there. The destroyer "Bedovy", on board of which was the wounded Rozhdestvensky, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and surrendered.

Captured Russian sailors aboard the Japanese battleship Asahi

The main causes of the disaster

From the very beginning, the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was of an adventurous nature. Ships had to be sent to the Pacific even before the war. The meaning of the campaign was finally lost after the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron. From Madagascar, the squadron had to be returned back. However, due to political ambitions, the desire to somehow raise the prestige of Russia, the fleet was sent to death.

The campaign itself from Libava to Tsushima was an unprecedented feat of Russian sailors in overcoming enormous difficulties, but the battle of Tsushima showed the rottenness of the Romanov empire. The battle showed the backwardness of shipbuilding and armament of the Russian fleet in comparison with the advanced powers (the Japanese fleet was created by the efforts of the leading world powers, especially England). Russian naval power in the Far East was crushed. Tsushima became a decisive prerequisite for concluding peace with Japan, although in military-strategic terms the outcome of the war was decided on land.

Tsushima became a kind of terrible landmark event for the Russian Empire, showing the need for fundamental changes in the country, the disastrous war for Russia in its current state. Unfortunately, he was not understood, and the Russian Empire perished like the 2nd Pacific Squadron - bloody and terrifying.

One of the main reasons for the death of the squadron was the lack of initiative, indecision of the Russian command (the scourge of the Russian army and navy during Russian-Japanese War). Rozhestvensky did not dare to raise the issue of sending the squadron back after the fall of Port Arthur. The admiral led the squadron without hope of success and remained passive, giving the initiative to the enemy. There was no specific battle plan. Long-range reconnaissance was not organized, and the opportunity to defeat the Japanese cruisers, which had been separated from the main forces for a significant time, was not used. At the beginning of the battle, they did not use the chance to deliver a strong blow to the main enemy forces. The squadron did not finish its combat formation and fought on unfavorable conditions, only the lead ships could conduct normal fire. The unsuccessful formation of the squadron allowed the Japanese to focus fire on the best battleships of the Russian squadron and quickly disable them, after which the outcome of the battle was decided. During the battle, when the lead battleships failed, the squadron actually fought without command. Nebogatov took command only in the evening and in the morning handed over the ships to the Japanese.

Among the technical reasons, one can single out the "fatigue" of the ships after a long trip, when they were separated from the normal repair base for a long time. The ships were overloaded with coal and other cargoes, which reduced their seaworthiness. Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ships in the total number of guns, armor area, speed, rate of fire, weight and explosive power of the squadron shot. There was a strong lag in cruising and destroyer forces. The ship composition of the squadron was diverse in terms of armament, protection and maneuverability, which affected its combat capability. The new battleships, as the battle showed, had weak armor and low stability.

The Russian squadron, unlike the Japanese fleet, was not a single combat organism. The personnel, both commanding and private, were distinguished by diversity. There were only enough personnel commanders to fill the main responsible positions. The shortage of command staff was compensated for by the early release of the naval corps, the call-up of "old men" from the reserve (who had no experience of walking on armored ships) and the transfer from the merchant fleet (ensigns). As a result, a strong gap has formed between young people who do not have the necessary experience and sufficient knowledge, "old people" who need to update their knowledge and "civilians" who do not have normal military training. There were also not enough sailors for military service, so about a third of the crews consisted of reserves and recruits. There were many "penalties", which the commanders "exiled" on a long voyage, which did not improve discipline on the ships. The situation was no better with non-commissioned officers. Most of the personnel were assigned to the new ships only in the summer of 1904, and could not study the ships well. Due to the fact that they had to urgently finish, repair and prepare ships, the squadron did not go together in the summer of 1904, did not study. Only in August a 10-day voyage was made. During the campaign, due to a number of reasons, the crews could not learn how to maneuver ships and shoot well.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific squadron was poorly prepared, in fact, did not receive combat training. It is clear that the Russian sailors and commanders entered the battle courageously, fought bravely, but their heroism could not rectify the situation.

V. S. Ermyshev. Battleship "Oslyabya"

A.Tron The death of the squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

Aleksey Novikov, a sailor on the Orel (future Soviet marine painter), described the situation well. He was arrested in 1903 for revolutionary propaganda and, as "unreliable", was transferred to the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Novikov wrote: “Many sailors were called up from the reserve. These elderly people, clearly weaned from the naval service, lived with memories of their homeland, were sick of separation from home, from children, from their wife. The war fell on them unexpectedly, like a terrible disaster, and they, preparing for an unprecedented campaign, did their work with a gloomy look of strangled men. The team included many new recruits. Beaten and miserable, they looked at everything with a frozen horror in their eyes. They were frightened by the sea, on which they first came, and even more - by the unknown future. Even among regular sailors who graduated from various special schools, there was no usual fun. Only free kicks, in contrast to the others, kept more or less cheerfully. The coastal authorities, in order to get rid of them as a harmful element, came up with the easiest way for this: write them off on ships going to war. Thus, to the horror of the senior officer, we got up to seven percent of them.

Another good image explaining the death of the squadron was given by Novikov (under the pseudonym "sailor A. Zaterty"). Here is what he saw: “We were extremely amazed that this ship did not suffer at all from our artillery. He looked as if he was now taken out of repair. Even the paint on the guns did not burn. Our sailors, having examined the Asahi, were ready to swear that on May 14 we fought not with the Japanese, but ... what good, with the British. Inside the armadillo, we were amazed at the cleanliness, neatness, practicality and expediency of the device. On our new battleships of the Borodino type, a whole half of the ship was assigned for some thirty officers; she was cluttered with cabins, and during the battle they only increased the fires; and in the other half of the ship we had not only up to 900 sailors, but also artillery and lifts. And with our enemy on the ship, everything was used mainly for guns. Then we were struck sharply by the absence of that discord between officers and sailors, which you meet at every step with us; there, on the contrary, some kind of solidarity, kindred spirit and common interests were felt between them. It was only here for the first time that we really learned who we were dealing with in battle and what the Japanese were."

The battle between the Russian and Japanese squadrons in the Sea of ​​Japan was the largest naval battle of the era of the armored fleet. In many ways, it was she who decided the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.

The Russo-Japanese War was on. From its first days, the Japanese fleet seized the strategic initiative at sea, now the Russian command urgently needed to strengthen its Pacific Fleet. In October 1904, the 2nd Pacific Squadron under the command of Admiral Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky sailed from Libau to the Far East. It included ships of the Baltic Fleet and battleships being completed. The squadron circled Africa and reached Madagascar, where in February 1905 it was replenished with ships sent after it. On May 9, near Singapore, the ships of the 3rd Pacific squadron of Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov, which left Libava on February 3, joined the squadron.

ON THE APPROACH TO TSUSHIMA

The battle took place between the islands of Tsushima and Okinoshima in the Tsushima Strait, which was part of the Korea Strait between Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula. Nearby, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo Heihachiro, deployed his main forces, pushing the cruisers south of the strait, waiting for the approach of the Russian squadron. For his part, Rozhdestvensky decided, first of all, to get to Vladivostok, the shortest route to which went precisely through the Korea Strait. On the night of May 27, Russian ships entered the Korea Strait. Here at 04:28 they were sighted from a Japanese auxiliary cruiser. The one who now had full information about the composition and disposition of the Russian squadron, immediately began the deployment of his main forces, intending to surprise attack and destroy the enemy in the morning. Rozhdestvensky, who refused to conduct reconnaissance (for fear of discovering his whereabouts), acted at random, and the old Japanese cruiser that followed the squadron was seen from Russian ships only at 06:45.

START OF THE BATTLE

At 13:49, the flagship of the Russian squadron, the squadron battleship Knyaz Suvorov, opened fire on the Japanese flagship Mikasa from a distance of 38 cables (6949 m). The Japanese returned fire at 13:52, and in the very first minutes all three Russian flagships — the battleships Prince Suvorov, Oslyabya and Emperor Nicholas I — received damage, the first two caught fire. More modern Japanese ships surpassed the Russians in a number of ways: their speed was higher - 18-20 knots versus 15-18; artillery had a high rate of fire - the Japanese could fire 360 ​​rounds per minute against 134 for the Russians; the explosiveness of the shells was 10-15 times higher; armored ships accounted for 61% of the area (against 40% for Russian ships).

At 14:10, the Togo detachment concentrated its fire on the "Prince Suvorov", and the detachment of Kamimura Hikonoze - on the "Oslyab". The rest of the Russian battleships joined the battle, "Mikasa" received 25 hits. Among the Japanese ships, the Asama armored cruiser, which was forced to fail, was most severely damaged. The situation on the Russian flagship was critical: a pipe was shot down, a fire started on the deck, the aft tower was disabled, all the halyards were killed and burned, and now Rozhdestvensky could not give orders and direct the actions of the Russian squadron. However, the Oslyabya suffered most severely: having received several holes in the unarmored bow, it took on a lot of water; superstructures were ablaze on the deck. At 14:32, the Oslyabya, which was listing to the port side, went out of order, after about 15-20 minutes it collapsed and sank. At the same 14:32 "Prince Suvorov" lost control; Admiral Rozhestvensky was seriously wounded on the bridge. Until 18:05 no one commanded the Russian squadron.

TSUSIMSKAYA TRAGEDY

The outcome of the Tsushima battle was decided in the first 43 minutes of the battle, but hostilities lasted until the evening, and at night and the next day, Japanese ships completed the rout of the Russian fleet.

The Russian ships left without leadership were led by the battleship "Emperor Alexander III", which returned the squadron to the north-east course. During the battle, the Japanese cruiser Asama was put out of action, but the Emperor Alexander III was also forced to retire, after which the battleship Borodino led the squadron. The battleship Sisoy Veliky, which received a number of damages, began to lag behind. Around 14:50 Borodino turned north and then southeast, after which the Japanese lost the enemy due to fog.

SEA BATTLE

At about 15:15, the Russian ships again headed for Vladivostok, and at 15:40 the opponents again converged and the battle resumed, a number of ships were badly damaged. Around 16:00 Borodino turned east, and at 16:17 the enemy again lost visual contact. At 16:41, the 2nd Russian armored detachment opened fire on Japanese cruisers, and 10 minutes later, Kamimura's ships approached the sound of shots, this battle lasted until 17:30. Meanwhile, the practically uncontrollable "Prince Suvorov", from which the destroyer "Buyny" removed the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky, was surrounded and shot by Japanese destroyers. At 19:30, she rolled over and sank with 935 crew members on board. By 17:40, the Russian ships reorganized into several wake columns, and at 18:05, Rozhdestvensky’s order to transfer command of the squadron to Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov was finally transmitted from the destroyer Buiny, which had caught up with the fleet. At that time, the battleship Emperor Alexander III, which had already begun to roll to starboard, came under fire from Japanese cruisers, which capsized and sank at 18:50. At 18:30, the Borodino, evading enemy fire, turned to the northwest, but it failed to escape: at 19:00 the ship was already engulfed in fire, and after the explosion of the side tower cellar at 09:12, it capsized and sank. Now the Russian column was to be led by the battleship Emperor Nicholas I. At 19:02 Admiral Togo gave the order to cease fire. In total, 4 Russian battleships were killed during the battle, the rest of the ships were also badly damaged in battle; the Japanese did not lose a single ship, but some of them were badly damaged. During the battle, Russian cruisers formed a separate column, having lost an auxiliary cruiser and transport during a skirmish.

NIGHT BATTLE

On the night of May 28, Japanese destroyers came into action, who searched for damaged Russian ships and finished them off with torpedoes. During the night battles, the Russian squadron lost the battleship Navarin and the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and the Japanese lost three destroyers.

In the ensuing darkness, part of the Russian ships lost contact with each other, three cruisers went to the Philippines, others tried to break through to Vladivostok - in fact, the Russian squadron as a single force ceased to exist.

The strongest detachment operated under the command of Admiral Nebogatov: the squadron battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Orel", the coastal defense battleships "General-Admiral Apraksin" and "Admiral Senyavin" and the cruiser "Izumrud".

NEBOGATOV'S CAPITULATION

At 05:20, Nebogatov's detachment was surrounded by Japanese ships. After 09:30, Nebogatov tried to attack, moving closer, but the Japanese, taking advantage of their superior speed, turned aside, waiting for the main forces of the fleet to approach. By 10:00, the Russian detachment was completely blocked, and at 10:34 Nebogatov, without having entered the battle, raised the XGE signal - “I surrender”. Not everyone agreed with this: the Emerald managed to escape, then ran aground and was blown up by the team, and the Eagle team tried to flood the ship by opening the kingstones, but the Japanese managed to prevent them. After 15:00, the destroyer Bedovy, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky and the fleet headquarters were located, surrendered to the Japanese destroyer without firing a single shot. Only the Almaz cruiser and the destroyers Grozny and Bravy were able to break into Vladivostok.

Retired Captain 1st Rank P.D. BYKOV

Preparation and campaign of the 2nd Pacific squadron

The first months of the Russo-Japanese War clearly showed that the tsarist government was unprepared for war.

The underestimation of the enemy's forces and his military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained preponderance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take steps to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in terms of the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his submissions and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was revised with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, which received the name of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that ended in construction, as well as part of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was supposed to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

Due to the fact that, in terms of its composition, the 2nd Pacific squadron was not strong enough to solve independent tasks, sending her pursued mainly the goal of strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships, Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.

Ship composition of the squadron

The main core of the squadron sent to the theater of operations consisted of four new battleships: “Alexander III”, “Prince Suvorov”, “Borodino” and “Eagle”, of which only the first was tested in 1903, the construction of the rest was completed after the start of the war , and they have not yet passed all the required tests. In particular, on the battleship "Eagle" they did not have time to test large-caliber artillery. These new modern battleships, which developed a speed of 18 knots, were heavily overloaded before entering the Far East, as they had to take on board increased stocks of ammunition and food. In addition, during the completion of the battleships, various auxiliary devices were installed on them that were not provided for by the original project. As a result, the draft was 0.9 m higher than designed, which increased the displacement of the battleships by 2000 tons. The consequence of this was a large decrease in their stability, as well as the survivability of ships. Of the rest of the battleships, only the Oslyabya belonged to the modern, already sailing ships. But it was a weak armored ship, which also had 256 mm guns instead of 305 mm.

The battleships Sisoy the Great and Navarin were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305-mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203-mm guns, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had a wide variety of weapons, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the rest of the ships were of an outdated design.

An even greater variety in terms of their tactical and technical elements was represented by the cruisers that were part of the squadron. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, modern were "Oleg", "Aurora", "Pearl" and "Emerald". The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, Svetlana and Dmitry Donskoy were old ships, and Almaz was an armed yacht.

Of the cruisers, two - "Pearl" and "Emerald" were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. "Oleg" and "Aurora" had a deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. Svetlana had a speed of 20 knots, and Almaz - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, Dmitry Donskoy, had only 16 knots. The weakness and insufficiency of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to give the squadron as fast scouts five armed high-speed steamers - Ural, Kuban, Terek, Rion and Dnepr, which joined at different times: to the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very small. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Brave”, “Peppy”, “Fast”, “Trouble”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Flawless”, “Loud” and “Terrible”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and developed a speed of no more than 26 knots.

Despite the fact that the decision to send the squadron was made in April, it took a very long time to form and equip it.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, the work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

Most of the squadron personnel arrived on the ships in the summer of 1904, and only the commanders and some of the specialists were appointed earlier and were on them during construction. Therefore, neither the officers nor the crew had enough time to study their ships well. In addition, on the ships of the squadron there were many young officers who were prematurely released from the naval cadet corps on the occasion of the war, as well as those called up from the reserve and transferred from the merchant fleet, the so-called “ensigns of the reserve”. The former did not have sufficient knowledge and experience, the latter needed to update their knowledge; the third, although they had experience and knowledge of maritime affairs, did not have any military training. Such a staffing of the ships of the squadron with officers was caused by the fact that there were only enough personnel to fill the most responsible positions on the ships.

Preparation and organization of the squadron

Before leaving the Baltic Sea, the squadron in full force never sailed, and only separate detachments of ships made several joint campaigns. Therefore, practice in joint navigation and maneuvering was insufficient. During the short stay in Reval, the ships of the squadron were able to carry out a very limited number of firings, especially since the amount of practical ammunition received for this was less than expected. Torpedo firing from destroyers was also insufficient. The material part of the torpedoes was not prepared, therefore, during the first firing, many torpedoes sank.

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the coast of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationship and influence of the detachment commanders on their subordinates and the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the staff of the squadron commander had to deal with the resolution of various minor issues that could be resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander himself did not have proper organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag-captain was only an executor of the orders of the commander. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, the squadron, when entering the theater of operations, did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of transition

Ensuring the passage of the squadron from the Baltic Sea to the theater of operations, provided that throughout its entire journey (about 18,000 miles) Russia did not have a single base of its own, was a very complex and difficult task.

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repair and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhdestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

In view of the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the squadron commander decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on about. Madagascar. For greater safety of the passage, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments on the subject of a squadron calling at any specific ports, since this would have made his route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some particular issues, such as the duration of the stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron parking, and the possibility of communication with the squadron on the way, etc. Some private questions, such as, for example, the protection of ships during their passage through the Suez Canal, were also resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, diplomatic preparations for the transition were not made.

Because of this, the passage of the squadron was extremely complicated due to the protests of foreign states when the squadron entered a particular port, the reduction of the parking time, the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.

A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, because the time of the squadron's arrival in the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be carried out abroad, it was decided to involve foreign firms in this.

Thus, the possibility of moving the squadron to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their performance of contracts. As expected, such an organization of supply could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on about. Madagascar.

The issues of supplying the squadron with coal were so concerned with the squadron commander that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships received reinforced food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be carried out on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign firms. For the repair of ships on the way, the squadron was given a specially equipped steamship-workshop "Kamchatka". This ship and several other transports with cargo for various purposes constituted the squadron's floating base.

The news that the Russian government sent such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire path of the squadron's movement, up to a direct attack on the squadron and sabotage performances.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it sought ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where various surprises could await the squadron. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to foreign political agents. security department the police department, which willingly took over the organization of the protection of the squadron's route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee either an uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, or the provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, securing the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the organization for the protection of the squadron created on the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident when the squadron crossed the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hull Incident”.

Departure of the squadron and the Hull incident

The completion of new ships, supply issues, etc. - all this delayed the departure of the squadron. On August 29, the squadron arrived at Revel and, having stood there for about a month, moved to Libau to receive materials and replenish coal reserves; On October 2, the squadron left for the Far East. However, on October 2, not all ships left. Two cruisers, part of the destroyers and transports were not yet ready and had to catch up with the squadron on the way.

The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here, Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about the sighted suspicious ships and about the allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were to be anchored sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. In the first two detachments were destroyers, in the next two - cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last detachment of new armadillos was anchored. Such a division of the squadron: Admiral Rozhestvensky considered it the most expedient from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of a collision at night, in the event of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not assigned the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would give the main forces, which, moreover, marching without guards, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not in any way meet the requirements for organizing the passage of a squadron in wartime.

The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22 o'clock. Around 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment approached the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the transport workshop “Kamchatka” reported on the radio that it was attacked by destroyers.

During the passage of the Dogger-bapka ahead of the battleship detachment, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which went to the intersection of the detachment's course and approached it. The squadron decided that the battleships were threatened with an attack, and opened fire. But when the searchlights were turned on, it turned out that the fishing boats were shot. The fire was stopped. However, in the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left beam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were seen, on which fire was also opened. But after the first shots it turned out that these were Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. Two people were wounded on the Aurora and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel, on October 13 it arrived in Vigo (Spain). Here the squadron was delayed until the resolution of the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called "Hull Incident".

There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which worsened Russia's position in the Far East.

After the Hull Incident, the British government threatened to break off diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that had arisen, agreeing to compensate for the losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

The transition of the squadron to about. Madagascar

On October 19, a detachment of new battleships left Vigo and on October 21 arrived in Tangier (North Africa), where by that time the entire squadron had concentrated. Having loaded coal, provisions and taking water, the squadron, according to a previously developed plan, was divided into two detachments. The battleships Sisoy the Great, Navarin, together with the cruisers Svetlana, Zhemchug, Almaz and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, went through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to Madagascar, where they were supposed to rejoin the squadron.

The navigation of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way proceeded without any special complications. By December 15, all ships arrived at their destination.

The rest of the ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with the transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. "Korea", "Malaya" and "Meteor" led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky - went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stop along the way, and coal was loaded on the high seas. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long crossings. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. So, for example, new battleships received a double amount of coal - instead of a thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To receive such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in residential decks, cockpits, anti-mine artillery batteries and other places, which utterly hampered the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in the intense heat on the ocean swell and excitement was a great difficulty and took a lot of time. On average, armadillos took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and, thus, the parking time was spent on loading and emergency repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, remained without rest. In addition, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were littered with coal, it was impossible to carry out any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment came to Madagascar. Here, Admiral Rozhdestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both detachments of the squadron joined in Nosi-be Bay (the western coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stop. Here the squadron stood from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron, and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the raid.

3. Complications in the further supply of the squadron with fuel.

The situation at the time of the arrival of the squadron to Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron's campaign

The defeat of the Russian Manchurian army and the 1st Pacific squadron, which ended with the surrender of Port Arthur, caused serious concern in the ruling spheres of Russia. Getting involved in this adventure, the government hoped for an easy and quick victory. However, these calculations did not materialize. The defeats at Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur - that's what the war brought to Russia instead of the desired victory.

The arrival of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron, the 2nd Pacific squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of further movement of the squadron, since after the loss of Port Arthur by Russia, the squadron was forced to go. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhdestvensky believed that in connection with the changed strategic situation, the squadron's immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing part of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had finally failed. In this regard, Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait in Madagascar for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers "Oleg" and "Izumrud" and destroyers "Gromky" and "Grozny", was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name of the 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after the departure of Rozhdestvensky. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old squadron battleship Nikolai I, the coastal defense battleships General-Admiral Apraksin, Admiral Senyavin, Admiral Ushakov, and the old armored cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. "Nicholas I" was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305-mm guns. The coastal defense battleships were armed with 256-mm guns, although long-range, but not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. This squadron did not have a single modern ship.

Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

When Rozhestvensky received news of the fall of Port Arthur and learned about the government's point of view on the further goals and objectives of the 2nd squadron, he decided to go to the East alone, without waiting for the 3rd Pacific squadron, which he looked at only as a burden. Believing that the Japanese fleet would not have time to repair all the damage received during the blockade of Port Arthur and in battles so soon, Rozhdestvensky hoped that he could still break through to Vladivostok, and decided to leave as soon as possible. The government allowed him to do this, but unexpected complications with the supply of coal delayed the departure of the squadron by almost two months.

The unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inactivity due to the lack of coal and shells for practical firing - all this had an extremely negative effect on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had already declined markedly by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting the commanding staff and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.

The lack of a supply of shells made it impossible to make up for the most important shortcoming—to teach the squadron how to shoot. The Irtysh transport, on which additional ammunition for training firing was loaded, was delayed when the squadron left Libava. It had an accident and was left to be repaired. At the same time, the ammunition from it was unloaded, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by railway. But Rozhdestvensky was not informed about this. At the end of the repair, the Irtysh went to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of the much-needed ammunition for firing practice on the way. During the stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The joint maneuvering of the squadron showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and parking on about. Madagascar did not rise at all and she remained still unprepared for the task.

On March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was able to move on and weighed anchor.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhestvensky did not report his further route in order to achieve the secrecy of the transition. And at that time, the 3rd Pacific squadron, which left Libau in February, was on its way to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East with the same goal, did not know where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. On the way, coal was received six times on the high seas. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, anchored in Kamran Bay, where the ships were supposed to make repairs, load coal and receive materials for further navigation. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, the 3rd Pacific Squadron joined it.

The camps in Kamran Bay, and then in Van Phong Bay, were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, on the other, an attack by the Japanese could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg, in which, referring to poor health, he asked to be replaced upon arrival in Vladivostok by another commander.

Transition from Indochina to Korea Strait

After joining the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov, the 2nd Pacific squadron moved on on May 1. The immediate task of the squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, considered a breakthrough to Vladivostok, based on which the squadron was to develop operations against the Japanese fleet.

In the Sea of ​​Japan, the squadron could pass through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperouse. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to take the shortest route through the Korea Strait, the widest and deepest of all. However, this path lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great navigational difficulties, and besides, the strait could be mined (this was allowed by the depths). The passage through the La Perouse Strait in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky because of the fogs prevailing here, because of navigational difficulties and the lack of coal for this longer transition.

The decision to go through the Korea Strait created the most favorable conditions for the Japanese fleet to fight, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting with the Japanese, but still the latter would be in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would be able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The way through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific squadron in the most disadvantageous position.

Having decided to go through the Korea Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the Japanese fleet forces to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet to themselves. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dnepr were sent to the Yellow Sea, which separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports when the squadron approached the Saddle Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest commercial port, connected by telegraph cables with all major port cities, including Japanese ones.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freeing itself from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.

After the separation of auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: battleships marched in the right column - the 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhdestvensky's flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - "Oslyabya" (Felkerzam's flag), "Sisoy the Great", "Navarin" and the armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"; in the left - the 3rd armored detachment - "Nikolai I" (Nebogatov's flag), coastal defense battleships "Apraksin", "Senyavin", "Ushakov", the cruiser "Oleg" (Enqvist's flag), "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy" , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, which consisted of the cruisers "Svetlana" (branded pennant of Captain 1st Rank Shein), "Almaz" and "Ural", walked ahead in the formation of a wedge - at a distance of 3-4 cab. from the squadron. The cruisers "Zhemchug" and "Emerald" kept on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left at the squadron went in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the head Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, the tugboats Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The course of the squadron was determined by the course of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward in formation; on hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate the signs of the Red Cross.

In this order, the squadron approached the Korea Strait. The squadron was moving in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming ships, only one was detained, the rest did not even look around. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full coverage. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhdestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korea Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet in it. In addition, he believed that the advancement of scouts would only help the enemy to detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that with the superiority of the Japanese in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by intelligence to perform any maneuver.

Rejection of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky's reference to the desire to keep the squadron's movement secret does not hold water at all, since the squadron could easily be detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which actually happened.

Leaving six transports with the squadron had no good justification, since they did not have any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their protection. In addition, the presence of the slow-moving transport "Irtysh" reduced the squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific squadron, Admiral Rozhestvensky did not take any measures to secrecy of movement, did not organize reconnaissance behind the enemy, and did not accelerate the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13-14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships that were part of the squadron, its marching order was very difficult. The squadron marched in the ranks of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to carry fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; the headlights were extinguished. All the lights were open on the hospital ships that sailed at the tail of the squadron, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, about whose close location she knew from intercepted radiograms.

On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested at the places provided for by the combat schedule.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhdestvensky was on the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov". The junior flagships, Rear Admirals Nebogatov and Enkvist, were on the battleship Nikolai I, and the second on the cruiser Oleg. Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that became part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were 4 new battleships of the Borodino type. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and a strong overload of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their fighting qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water, and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship “Oslyabya” was very different from them - a seaworthy, but weak in armor and artillery ship (“Oslyabya” was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers, and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the peculiarities of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were much stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

A comparison of these figures shows that the Japanese ships were better armored and had greater speed. Artillery on Japanese ships was twice as fast as Russian, which allowed the Japanese to throw a much larger number of shells in one minute.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosives, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, in terms of high-explosive action, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimosa) in Japanese shells was approximately twice as strong as the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that the Japanese ships were significantly superior in artillery preparation to the Russians, and also that the Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than that of the Japanese (60 versus 39 percent) .

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. Against 9 Russians, the Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number different kind obsolete and auxiliary ships.

When the 2nd Squadron entered the Korea Strait, the Japanese fleet was at its base at Mozampo. The commander of the fleet, Admiral Togo, was on the battleship Mikasa. The flag of the head of the 2nd squadron, Vice Admiral Kamimura, was on the armored cruiser Izumo. The observation line was deployed between about. Quelpart and the Goto group of islands.

Around 2 o'clock. 25 min. the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, the left flank ship of the sentinel chain, discovered the lights of the hospital ship Eagle, and then identified the entire squadron. At 4 o'clock. 25 min. a radiogram was given about the appearance of the Russian squadron. The Japanese fleet immediately began to prepare for deployment. The reconnaissance cruisers began to converge on the place where the Russian squadron was discovered. By dawn they had taken their places around her. At 5 o'clock. all warships went to the places designated according to the deployment near about. Okinoshima.

The Russian squadron on the intensive work of the Japanese telegraph stations concluded that it had been discovered, however, Admiral Rozhdestvensky made no attempt to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

At dawn, Japanese cruisers were discovered, heading parallel to the Russian squadron. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. Considering ; that the distance to the Japanese cruisers was too great to conduct successful firing, he decided not to send his cruisers out of fear that they might meet in the fog with superior Japanese forces.

Daytime battle May 14

On the morning of May 14, the weather was hazy, visibility 5-7 miles, wind 3-1. At 7 o'clock. Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment to take their places behind and cover the transports. Thus, not only did he not interfere with the reconnaissance of the Japanese, but he himself voluntarily abandoned it and went forward, not knowing where the enemy was. At 9 o'clock. armored detachments were reorganized into one wake column, having 4 new battleships in front. The transports and the cruisers covering them were on the right behind. Japanese scouts kept in full view of the squadron all the time. At 12 o'clock. the squadron lay down on a course of 23 °. Then Admiral Rozhdestvensky made an attempt to deploy the squadron to the front line.

Without doubting that the Japanese cruisers observing the squadron were reporting to Togo all the data on its movement, on the basis of which the Japanese commander was also preparing for the corresponding deployment before the battle, Rozhdestvensky decided, using the finding fog strips, to bring down the enemy’s calculations. To do this, he thought to change the formation at the moment when he found the fog and the Japanese cruisers lost sight of him. But as soon as the rebuilding was started, the fog cleared, and it was not possible to fulfill the plan. Rozhdestvensky did not finish the rebuilding that had begun, and raised a canceling signal. The squadron ended up in two wake columns: on the right - four new battleships, on the left - all the rest.

Since the movement of the Russian squadron still took place in front of Japanese intelligence officers, Admiral Togo had all the data on the composition of the Russian squadron, its course and rebuilding. After weighing everything, he decided to strike at the left column, which consisted of weaker ships. Admiral Togo's plan was to attack the head of the Russian column with armored ships, and for this purpose, taking advantage of the advantage in speed, he went to the intersection of her course. At the same time, light cruisers were to attack the transports and the cruisers covering them.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into two detachments: the 1st detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Togo and the 2nd detachment (6 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Kamimura.

At 13 o'clock. 30 minutes. from the Russian squadron, to the right of the nose, the Japanese fleet was discovered, going to cross the course. Admiral Rozhdestvensky immediately began to line up his ships in one wake column. This rebuilding was not yet completed when the Japanese, having moved to the port side of the Russian squadron, began to make a successive turn to the left in order to enter the intersection of its course. This turn put the Japanese ships in a precarious position. Turning sequentially for 24 points, they described the loop in almost one place, without being able to shoot themselves.

At the time of the turn, the distance between the lead ships of the Russian squadron and the flagship of Togo, the Mikasa, was no more than 38 cables. At this moment, at 13:00. 49 minutes, the flagship battleship of the Russian squadron "Suvorov" opened fire. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron had the opportunity at the very beginning of the battle to strike the enemy at his lead ships. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky failed to take advantage of the unfavorable position of the Japanese during the turn. Remaining in the same wake column, he deprived his new high-speed battleships of the opportunity to get close to the enemy at a favorable distance for them. In addition, in the middle of the Russian squadron, some ships prevented each other from firing, and the end ones fell behind. Therefore, the fire of Russian ships did not cause much damage to the Japanese.

Three minutes later, the Japanese ships returned fire. The distance by this moment has decreased to 35 cables. Four lead Japanese ships concentrated their fire on the Suvorov, six on the Oslyaba, and two on the Nikolai I. Having an advantage in the course, the Japanese began to overtake the Russian squadron, going into her head.

Japanese artillery carried out great destruction on Russian ships; especially suffered two flagship. At 14 o'clock. 25 min. the battleship "Oslyabya", having a large list, failed and after 25 minutes rolled over and sank. At 14 o'clock. 30 minutes. due to damage to the rudder, the battleship Suvorov failed to the right. Its masts and yards were knocked down, all the halyards were burned, so that it was impossible to raise any signals. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The battleship Alexander III became the lead battleship, which, not knowing why the Suvorov had failed, first followed it, but then turned to the left, intending to pass to the north under the stern of the Japanese battleships, which were to the right of the Russians.

It was the decisive moment of the battle. After the failure of the flagship battleship, the Russian squadron, which did not have a battle plan and now, in addition, was deprived of leadership, was doomed to defeat. Valiantly fighting the Japanese, she tried one way or another to break through to Vladivostok.

Noticing the turn of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned “all of a sudden” on the back course in order to again go to the head of the Russian squadron. At the moment of the turn, they were covered by their armored cruisers, which increased their fire on the Russian ships, remaining on the same course, and then turned after the battleships. Due to the fact that the darkness thickened and visibility decreased, the battle stopped temporarily. All attempts by the Russian squadron to break through to the north failed. The Japanese each time went to the intersection of the course, hitting mainly the lead ships.

At 16 o'clock. 20 minutes. the fog thickened again to such an extent that the fighting ceased. The Russian squadron, now having the lead Borodino, turned south. The Japanese temporarily lost the Russians. In search of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned north, and the armored cruisers went south. The Russian battleships, heading south, approached their transports and cruisers, which were fighting off the Japanese cruisers. With their fire, they drove off the Japanese cruisers, and one of them was so badly damaged that he had to leave for the nearest port. Japanese armored cruisers approaching the battlefield opened fire on the Russians. Borodino, followed by the entire squadron, gradually turned north.

At 18 o'clock. 06 min. Japanese battleships approached and, going in an almost parallel course, concentrated 32 cab. fire on "Borodino" and "Alexander III". The Russian ships veered to the left. At this time, the destroyer "Buyny" was approaching the squadron, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was, who was filmed along with his headquarters at about 17:00. from Suvorov. On the destroyer, a signal was raised to transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov. Although this signal was rehearsed by some ships, it was not seen on the Nicholas I, and therefore around 19:00. the destroyer “Imperfect” approached him, from which the order of Rozhdestvensky to lead the squadron to Vladivostok was transmitted by voice.

Meanwhile, the squadron continued to move north. Around 19 o'clock she lost two more battleships: at 18 o'clock. 50 min. rolled over and died "Alexander III", at 19 o'clock. 10 min. died in the same way "Borodino". At 19 o'clock. 10 min. Japanese destroyers attacked the wrecked Suvorov and sank it.

The moment of the death of these ships coincided with the end of the day's battle. The sun went down, twilight came, and Admiral Togo led his armored ships to the north, to about. Even let, lying on the way from Tsushima to Vladivostok, hoping that the Russian ships will go this way. For night attacks against Russian ships, he sent destroyers.

During the daytime battle, Russian cruisers, following the order of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, kept close to the transports, guarding them, and did not conduct reconnaissance. Therefore, the Russian squadron did not know at all where the Japanese fleet had departed.

In the advancing darkness, Japanese destroyers approaching from the north, east and south were visible from the Russian squadron, and only in the southwest it was clear.

Admiral Nebogatov, who at that time took command of the squadron, went to the head of the squadron and turned to the south-west in order to evade the attack. The cruisers also turned and went ahead of the armored squadron, the formation of which was broken, and the ships only approximately held their places.

This ended the day's fight. On this day, the Russian squadron lost three new battleships and one old one. Many ships were heavily damaged.

Of the Japanese ships, the Kasagi cruiser, which was out of order, received the most severe damage. Of the other ships, the flagship battleship of Admiral Togo “Mikasa” was most severely damaged, which was hit by more than thirty shells. The interior of the front conning tower, the front and rear bridges were damaged on it, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, several casemates were broken, and the decks were pierced. More than ten Russian shells hit the Sikishima. The Nissin received several hits on the turrets of guns, and three large guns were broken and part of the bridge was demolished. There were 95 sailors and officers killed and wounded on this ship, Vice Admiral Misu, who was holding the flag on the Nissin, was wounded.

The battleships Fiji, the armored cruisers Asama, Yakumo, Iwate, and Kassuga were also damaged. This battle day abounded with many examples of endurance and courage of Russian sailors, who showed knowledge of their business and fulfilled their duty to the end. So, the artillery conductor Kalashnikov from the "Sisoya the Great" caused a big fire on the Japanese cruiser "Iwate" with a successful hit of the projectile. The artillery quartermaster from the same ship, Dolinin, and the sailor of the 1st article Molokov, when the cellar with ammunition was flooded on the ship, took turns diving into the water and getting shells. The helmsman of the cruiser "Oleg" Belousov and signalmen Chernov and Iskrich timely noticed a torpedo fired by a Japanese destroyer. The cruiser managed to turn away,. and the torpedo passed by. The Aurora, which was moving in the wake, also “was warned by the signalmen from the Oleg and managed to evade the torpedoes. One of the officers of the cruiser "Aurora" wrote about the behavior of the sailors in battle: "Our teams held themselves in battle beyond praise. Each sailor showed remarkable composure, resourcefulness and fearlessness. Golden people and hearts! They cared not so much about themselves as about their commanders, warning about every enemy shot, covering the officers at the moment of rupture. Covered with wounds and blood, the sailors did not leave their places, preferring to die at the guns. Didn't even go to dressings! You send, and they - “It will be in time, after, now there is no time!” Only thanks to the dedication of the team, we forced the Japanese cruisers to withdraw, sinking two ships from them, and putting four out of action, with a large roll. What an officer from the Aurora wrote about the sailors was typical not only for this cruiser, but for all ships of the Russian squadron.

Fight on the night of May 14-15

With the onset of darkness, the Japanese launched a series of attacks, using all their destroyer forces for this - about 40 large and small destroyers. The attack began at about 9 pm and continued until 11 pm, when the Japanese destroyers lost sight of the Russian squadron. Four Russian ships were hit and one of them was lost. Repelling attacks and evading Japanese destroyers, Russian ships lost each other and subsequently acted independently.

Only the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov was united, along with which the only surviving new battleship Eagle and the cruiser Izumrud were sailing. Departing to the southwest, Admiral Nebogatov turned north at about 9 p.m. to go to Vladivostok. Taking into account the experience of Port Arthur, Admiral Nebogatov did not open searchlights at night and evaded the attacks of destroyers; none of the ships were damaged. However, on the morning of May 15, at about 10 o'clock, the detachment was surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet. Without showing any resistance, Nebogatov surrendered the ships (4 battleships). And only the cruiser "Emerald", having disassembled the signal of surrender, gave the most full speed and, breaking through the ring of Japanese ships, headed for Vladivostok. On the way there, he went into Vladimir Bay, where he ran into stones and, on the orders of his commander, was blown up. The team came to Vladivostok by land.

The cruiser detachment led by the cruiser "Oleg", evading the Japanese destroyers, went south. Part of the cruisers fell behind and, having lost their flagship, turned north to go to Vladivostok.

Only the cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Pearls" were United. They went south all night and in the morning they were south of the Korea Strait. The commander of the cruisers, Rear Admiral Enquist, intending to break through to Vladivostok on his own, first decided to go to a neutral port in order to make some corrections. Believing that Shanghai was too close to Japan, Enquist went to the Philippine Islands, where he arrived on May 21. Here in the port of Manila the cruisers were interned.

The rest of the Russian ships went in single order. The ships of the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, repelling the attacks of the destroyers, unmasked themselves by turning on the searchlights, and as a result received torpedo hits.

The cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was the first to be torpedoed at about 21:00, then the battleships Sisoy Veliky, Navarin, and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. However, only one battleship Navarin was killed by a torpedo at night, the rest stayed on the water until morning and then were destroyed by their teams.

On May 15, at about 4 p.m., the destroyer Bedovy, to which the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff were transferred, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and, without making any attempt to fight or leave, surrendered. Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron, along with his entire staff, was captured.

The destroyer "Grozny", following together with the "Bedov", seeing that the latter had raised the signal to surrender, gave full speed and went to Vladivostok, pursued by a stronger Japanese destroyer. Entering into battle with him, "Terrible" caused him such severe damage that the Japanese destroyer was forced to stop the pursuit. Without a compass, with serious damage, "Grozny" nevertheless came to Vladivostok.

At about the same time that Grozny was fighting, the battleship Admiral Ushakov valiantly perished. This old ship due to the damage received in the daytime battle, he lagged behind and walked alone to the north. At 17 o'clock. 30 minutes. two armored cruisers of the Japanese approached him and offered to surrender. The commander of the battleship Captain 1st Rank Miklukha-Maclay opened fire in response to the Japanese proposal. At 18 o'clock. 10 minutes, when the entire combat reserve was used up, on the orders of the commander, the battleship was destroyed by its crew.

Somewhat later, at about 19:00, the cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, approaching about. Even years, was overtaken by six Japanese light cruisers. Despite such a disparity in forces, the commander of the Dmitry Donskoy, Captain 1st Rank Lebedev, entered the battle, firing on both sides. With the onset of darkness, the cruiser, having a number of serious damages, took refuge under the shore of about. Even years. Japanese ships lost it and went to sea. Although this heroic ship fought off an enemy superior in strength, the damage received by it in this battle was so significant that Dmitry Donskoy could not go further and was flooded at great depths, and the crew was brought ashore.

In addition to the destroyer Grozny, the cruiser of the 2nd rank Almaz and the destroyer Bravy arrived in Vladivostok. The latter, separated from the squadron, evaded to the shores of Japan and thus avoided meeting with Japanese ships. It was all that was left of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Results of the battle

In the Battle of Tsushima, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, the rottenness of the autocracy and the disastrous nature of its policy were fully revealed. Tsushima went down in history as an ominous monument to tsarism. At the same time, Tsushima serves as a symbol of the courage and greatness of Russian sailors. They, despite enormous difficulties, conducted the first 220-day voyage in the history of the fleets of an entire squadron from the Baltic through the North Sea, the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, covering 18,000 miles.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of the ships of the squadron were obsolete, the shells were bad, and the mediocre tsarist admirals were essentially unable to control the battle, the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy. They fought heroically and selflessly against the Japanese.

In this battle, the failure of the high command of the squadron was fully revealed.

1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, who ignored all the experience of fighting at Port Arthur, did not prepare his ships for the battle, which he himself considered inevitable.

2) There was no battle plan. Therefore, the only desire of the squadron was to go one way or another to Vladivostok.

3) There was no reconnaissance, so the appearance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet overtook the Russian squadron, which had not completed its combat formation.

4) The leadership of the battle and the transfer of command were not organized.

5) The Russian squadron entered the battle in a disadvantageous position, only the lead ships could fire.

6) The connection in one wake column of new and old ships was impractical, as it made it impossible to use the most powerful ships to the full.

7) Maneuvering in one wake column, which was the only thing the squadron was capable of, allowed the Japanese to cover the head.

8) Incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron helped the Japanese destroyers to successfully attack the Russians.

9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having made a seven-month transition.

With regard to the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:

1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modern technically equipped and faster and better trained. This provided more flexible maneuvering.

2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.

However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in combat.

1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized, the Japanese cruisers did not follow the main Russian forces, being carried away by the battle with the transports. Because of this, the Russian battleships broke away from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.

2) The deployment of Japanese destroyers was incomplete. The maneuver of Admiral Nebogatov knocked down their calculations, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.

The results of the attacks show the insufficient training of the destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three of them hit the same ship.

conclusions

1) The Battle of Tsushima was decided by artillery weapons, the growth of which during the war was expressed in: a) the transition to new methods of firing, which made it possible to conduct concentrated fire from several ships at one target; b) in the use of new high-explosive projectiles of considerable force, which produced enormous destruction in the unarmored parts of the ship and caused large fires.
2) In the battle of Tsushima, an attempt was made to use torpedoes in daylight combat. Although it did not have serious results, it led in the future to the development of this issue. The destructive effect of torpedoes was insufficient. Only one ship was killed by torpedoes.
3) The Battle of Tsushima confirmed the previously revealed need for the success of the attack by aiming destroyers at the enemy. At the same time, the need was confirmed. refusal to use searchlights when repelling an attack by destroyers.
4) The Battle of Tsushima showed the need to strengthen the freeboard armor in order to provide the ships with the necessary combat stability.

The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had a tremendous impact on the further course of the entire war. All hopes for her, a favorable outcome, finally collapsed.

The government of Nicholas II hastened to conclude peace, which was signed in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905.

Valery Shilyaev. Triptych Tsushima. Left side. 2005
Illustration from the artist's website http://www.shilaev.ru/

Tsushima naval battle (May 14-15, 1905). Fight at about. Tsushima warships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, consisting of 30 warships with the Japanese fleet (120 ships). The main goal of the Russian fleet (commanders of the squadrons, Admirals Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov) was a breakthrough to Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet (commander - Admiral Togo) had the task of completely defeating the Russian fleet. The high concentration of forces of the Japanese fleet, its better equipment and maneuverability led to military success. Despite the courage and heroism of the Russian officers and sailors, who had previously traveled 33 thousand kilometers from Kronstadt to Tsushima and entered the battle on the move, the losses for them were catastrophic: 19 ships were sunk, 3 cruisers broke into neutral ports and were interned, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok. Of the 14 thousand people of the squadron personnel, more than 5 thousand died.

Chronicle of the battle

1905.05.27 (May 14 O.S.) Japanese Sea. The Russian 2nd Pacific squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky (11 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 1 auxiliary cruiser) met with the Japanese fleet adm. H. Togo (4 battleships, 24 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 42 destroyers, 24 auxiliary cruisers) in the Tsushima Strait.

7 .fourteen. A Japanese cruiser was spotted from the Russian squadron.

9 .40. Found a detachment of Japanese cruisers.

13 .15. The Russian squadron met with the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

13 .49. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of 38 cables (over 7 km).

13 .52. The Japanese fleet responded with concentrated fire on the battleships Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya.

14 .00 The Japanese cruiser Asama was damaged and withdrawn from the battle by the Russians.

14 .25. Having received heavy damage and lost control, the battleship "Oslyabya" went out of order.

14 .thirty. The battleship Knyaz Suvorov was put out of action and lost control.

14 .40. Russian battleship "Oslyabya" turned over and sank.

15 .40. The squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" received heavy damage.

16 .twenty. On the battleship Suvorov, only a 75-mm gun in the aft casemate survived from the artillery, which continues to fire at the enemy. The ship is a solid fire from bow to stern.

17 .twenty. The Russian auxiliary cruiser Ural was sunk.

17 .thirty. The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the battleship "Suvorov" the surviving staff officers and the wounded in the head Adm. Z. Rozhdestvensky.

18 .fifty. The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was sunk.

2 .15 the battleship Navarin was sunk, the Russians sank 3 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12.

5 .00 To the south of Tsushima Island, their crew scuttled the Russian destroyer "Brilliant".

5 .23. Japanese cruiser sunk Russian destroyer "Imperfect".

8 .00 To the north of Tsushima Island, the battleship "Admiral Nakhimov" was sunk.

10 .05. A Japanese torpedo sank the battleship Shisoy Veliky.

10 .38. Admiral Nebogatov's detachment of ships (battleships "Emperor Nikolai I", "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin"), surrounded by the Japanese squadron, capitulated. Only the cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.

11 .00 After a battle with 2 Japanese auxiliary cruisers and 1 destroyer, the cruiser "Svetlana" was scuttled by the crew.

11 .thirty. The destroyer "Buyny" was sunk.

11 .fifty. The destroyer "Fast" was sunk. 12 .43. Off the coast of Korea, met by 3 Japanese destroyers, the destroyer Gromkiy was flooded by her crew.

14 .00 The team scuttled the battleship "Vladimir Monomakh"

17 .05. The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice-Adm. Z. Rozhestvensky, surrendered to Japanese captivity on the destroyer "Trouble."

18 .10. The Japanese cruisers "Yakumo" and "Iwate" sank the Russian battleship "Admiral Ushakov" (commander cap. 1r. Miklukho-Maclay). In the Battle of Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905, the Russians lost 10 thousand people, the losses of Japan - 3 destroyers and 1 thousand people. Of the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron, only a few ships managed to escape. The cruisers "Aurora", "Oleg" and "Zhemchug" broke into the city of Manila (Philippines; USA), the destroyer "Bodry", the transports "Svir" and "Korea" in Shanghai ( China) where they were interned, the transport "Anadyr" went to the island of Madagascar (fr). Only the cruisers "Almaz", "Izumrud" and the destroyers "Brave" and "Grozny" broke into Vladivostok.

Analysis of the course of the battle

The final stage of the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By this time, the Russian squadron included eight squadron battleships (of which three were old), three coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, eight cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers and nine destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, consisting of 12 armored ships, were divided into three detachments of four ships each. The cruisers were consolidated into two detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov. The Japanese fleet, commanded by Admiral Togo, consisted of four squadron battleships, six coastal defense battleships, eight armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into eight combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The first detachment was commanded by Admiral Togo, the second - by Admiral Kamimura.

The Russian squadron in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers) was not inferior to the Japanese, but in qualitative terms, the superiority was on the side of the enemy. The main forces of the Japanese fleet had significantly more guns of large and medium caliber; Japanese artillery was almost three times faster than Russian artillery, and Japanese shells had five times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese fleet had higher tactical and technical data than Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this we must add that the Japanese had multiple superiority in cruisers and especially in destroyers.

The great advantage of the Japanese fleet was that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, having no such, after a long and difficult transition, had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had a lot of experience in carrying out live firing at long distances, gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in the conduct of concentrated fire with several ships at a single target at long distances. The Russian gunners, on the other hand, did not have the rules of firing at long distances tested by experience and did not have the practice of conducting such firing. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

By the time the Russian squadron arrived in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese fleet as part of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers - at about. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto - Kvelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, which was supposed to timely detect the Russian squadron when approaching the Korea Strait and ensure the deployment of their main forces on the way of its movement. Thus, the initial position of the Japanese fleet before the battle was so favorable that it excluded any possibility of the passage of the Russian squadron through the Korea Strait without a fight. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korea Strait. Considering that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to conduct it depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active operations, leaving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing was repeated as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and formed up in a night marching order. Ahead, cruisers were deployed along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron, two hospital ships followed at a distance of one mile. While moving through the Rozhdestvensky Strait, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, he refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese to detect the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its way. The first at 2 hours 25 minutes noticed the Russian squadron by fire and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, which was on patrol between the islands of Goto-Kvelpart. Soon, due to the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempt to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

Having received a report about the discovery of the Russians, Admiral Togo left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet in the path of the Russian squadron. The tactical plan of the commander of the Japanese fleet was to cover the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and with concentrated fire on the flagships to disable them and thereby deprive the squadron of control, and then develop the success of the daytime battle with night attacks of destroyers and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

With the onset of the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron, first in the formation of a wake, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following in the ranks of two wake columns along the Korea Strait, the Russian squadron at 1330 hours on the right of the bow discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were going to cross its course.

Admiral Togo, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cab. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese were trying to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, having gone to the port side, began a sequential turn of 16 points in order to cover the head of the Russian squadron. This turn, made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships in an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn on the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation in almost one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. However, this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire turned out to be ineffective, because, due to improper control, it was not focused on those Japanese ships that carried out a U-turn on the spot. As they turned, the enemy ships opened fire, concentrating it on the flagships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired on by four to six Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve positive results.

The superiority of the Japanese in artillery and the weakness of the reservation of Russian ships had an immediate effect. At 14:23, the battleship Oslyabya, having received serious damage, went out of action and soon sank. At about 2:30 p.m., the battleship Suvorov broke down. Having been seriously damaged and completely engulfed in flames, for another five hours it repelled the continuous attacks of enemy cruisers and destroyers, but at 1930 hours it also sank.

After the failure of the battleships "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov", the order of battle of the Russian squadron was broken, and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going into the head of the Russian squadron, increased their fire. At the head of the Russian squadron was the battleship "Alexander III", and after its death - "Borodino".

In an effort to break through to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron was on a general course of 23 degrees. The Japanese, having a great advantage in speed, covered the head of the Russian squadron and concentrated fire on almost all of their battleships on the leading ship. Russian sailors and officers, finding themselves in a difficult situation, did not leave their combat posts and, with their characteristic courage and stamina, repulsed enemy attacks to the last.

At 1505 hours fog began, and visibility decreased so much that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. At about 3:40 p.m., the Japanese again discovered the Russian ships heading to the northeast, and resumed the battle with them. At about 4 p.m., the Russian squadron, evading envelopment, turned south. Soon the fight stopped again due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and was eventually forced to use his main forces to search for it.

Well organized reconnaissance before the battle. During the battle, Togo neglected her, as a result of which he twice lost sight of the Russian squadron. In the daytime phase of the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese destroyers, keeping close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (four ships per group) from different directions. Torpedoes were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cab. Of the 30 torpedoes, only five hit the target, and three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 1751 hours, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, having discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. The Japanese commander this time abandoned the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the daytime battle, which lasted until 19 hours 12 minutes, the Japanese sank two more Russian battleships - "Alexander III" and "Borodino". With the onset of darkness, Admiral Togo stopped the artillery battle and headed with the main forces to about. Ollyndo (Dazhelet), and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

Around 20:00, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small detachments, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45 simultaneously from three directions and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance of 1 to 3 cabs, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors destroyed two Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

By the morning of May 15, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized force. As a result of frequent evasions from attacks by Japanese destroyers, Russian ships dispersed throughout the Korea Strait. Only individual ships tried to break through to Vladivostok on their own. Encountering superior Japanese forces on their way, they boldly entered into a decisive battle with them and fought it to the last shell. The crews of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" under the command of Captain 1st Rank Miklukho-Maclay and the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev fought heroically against the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags in front of the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted completely differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian fleet lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. Four armored ships and a destroyer, together with Rozhdestvensky (due to the wound, he was unconscious) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the Almaz cruiser and two destroyers broke through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in forces and the unpreparedness of the Russian fleet for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian squadron lies with Rozhestvensky, who, as a commander, made a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, abandoned reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active operations and did not organize command and control in battle.

The Japanese fleet, having sufficient time and operating under favorable conditions, was well prepared for a meeting with the Russian squadron. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they discovered the Russian squadron in a timely manner and concentrated their main forces on its route. However, Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he could not cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron. Togo exposed his ships to her attack, and only the inept actions of Rozhdestvensky saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this wrong maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result of which he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used the cruisers in the battle, resorting to the search for the Russian squadron by the main forces.

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Medium-caliber artillery, due to the increase in combat distance, did not justify itself. It became necessary to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to build on the success achieved in artillery combat. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of ​​the ship's side and strengthening the horizontal armor. The battle order of the fleet - a single-keel column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, as it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces at a distance of up to 100 miles.

Used materials from the book: "One Hundred Great Battles", M. "Veche", 2002

Literature

1. Bykov P.D. Battle near about. Tsushima // Russian naval art. Sat. Art. / Rev. ed. R.N. Mordvinov. - M., 1951. S. 348-367.

2. History of naval art / Ed. ed. ON THE. Petersburg. - M., 1953. - T.Z. - S. 66-67.

3. History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. / Ed. I.I. Rostunov. - M., 1977. S. 324-348.

4. Kilichenkov A. Togo's mistake and Admiral Rozhdestvensky's last chance. [On the tactics of the naval battle at Tsushima, 1905]. // Marine collection. - 1990. -№ 3.-S. 80-84.

5. Marine atlas. Descriptions for cards. - M., 1959. - T.Z, part 1. - S. 698-704.

6. Marine Atlas / Ed. ed. G.I. Levchenko. - M., 1958. - T.Z, part 1. - L. 34.

7. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the Russo-Japanese war. -T.I-9. -SPb., 1910.

8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Marine Gen. Headquarters. - KN.1-4, 6, 7. - St. Petersburg-Pg., 1912-1917.

Read further:

War in the context of world politics.

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905(chronological table).

Defense of Port Arthur(detailed chronicle of the battle and its analysis).