SA assault squads. Combat squad of Nazism

Who fought according to the rules? ..
They wore it like that because it was inconvenient with a screw in their hands. Grenades, pistols, a shovel are more useful. We entrenched ourselves, took up defense - you can also pop with screws ...
Yesterday the long-awaited package arrived from Fatherland, I finally assembled a stormtrooper.
All original, morning star only replica.

German assault troops of the First World War.

In the early years of the 20th century, no serious military theorist could have foreseen the significant role that small elite formations would play in the armed conflicts of this century. At that time, it was believed that the individual abilities and special training of privates and officers were of little importance, and the fate of future wars would be decided large armies created on the basis of universal military service. Soldiers were considered only as constituent elements of the military machine. Their quantity was more important than quality.
The reassessment took place only during the First World War. Until 1914, even the worst pessimists did not imagine how huge losses in killed and wounded would be suffered by the gigantic armies formed by forced recruitment. The battlefields became sites of mass slaughter - one day of positional action cost the armed forces of the Entente and the Central States almost 10,000 casualties. It was then, during the bloody battles, that favorable conditions appeared for organizing the first modern special forces units.
Already in 1915, when the positional warfare reached a dead point, with no advantages for one of the parties, they began to form special assault groups, whose task was to overcome the enemy's field fortifications. It is not difficult to understand why they were organized at this particular time. The western front was in fact a continuous giant siege line with an extensive system of trenches. On the entire western front, battalion commanders, and sometimes companies, independently developed, mastered and used various methods of positional warfare in the trenches, which made it possible to carry out combat missions with extremely low losses in their units. The first to specialize in overcoming enemy fortifications were assault groups formed from residents of the British dominions: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Their example was picked up by others, and by 1918 there were already purely English special forces units. It was with the light hand of the Australians that the soldiers of the assault groups began to be called "stuntmen".
In 1916, the growth in the strength and effectiveness of heavy artillery fire forced the troops of all the belligerent countries to reduce the width of their fortified lanes and dig deeper into the ground. There was no longer a continuous line of trenches built on the Western Front. Fortified firing points interacting with each other appeared, located at a distance of several tens of meters from each other. This opened up new opportunities for small infantry assault groups. They could now penetrate deep into enemy positions, skillfully sneaking between individual firing points, especially at night or during fog. No official term has been coined for such actions. The Australians called them "free penetration". The French and Italians rather quickly abandoned the creation of temporary assault groups, their soldiers became part of special units (in Italian "arditi"). The Germans also organized similar formations with a homogeneous structure and a clearly defined scope. At the end of 1915, the battalion under the command of Willy Rohr was completely re-equipped: hand grenades, grenade launchers, light machine guns, mortars and flamethrowers appeared. The soldiers were given experimental uniforms - helmets in the form of inverted coal buckets, instead of boots with tops - boots with windings, as well as light armored half vests that protected the body from shrapnel fragments. The battalion, known as the assault unit "Pop", was the first modern unit of its type. He distinguished himself already in the battle of Verdun in 1916. When the German artillery fire forced the French to shorten the front line, "Pop" penetrated deep into the French fortifications, avoiding clashes with the main enemy forces. This maneuver was no different from "free penetration", as the Australians called it. The French began to use the word "infiltration". For a year, all the armies on the western front sounded the alarm when they heard the term.
1916 General Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General of the German Armed Forces, made a short but important visit to the Western Front. There he got the opportunity to see the assault unit "Pop" in action. The general was so delighted with what he saw that a few months later (at the beginning of 1917) he issued an order to create new formations of this type and to introduce the tactics they used into the training program for the rest of the German army formations. This decision soon gave the expected results. In September 1917, assault divisions, supported by heavy artillery fire, defeated the Russians near Riga. In October the Italians were defeated for the same reasons at Caporetto, and in November the Germans forced the British to retreat in the Cambrai area. A series of victories caused dizziness from success and, as a result, fatal mistakes in the organization. During 1917-1918. the most experienced officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers were transferred from their units to assault divisions, which eventually included a quarter of the personnel of the German army on the Western Front. The newly created assault divisions did not and could not have such high combat qualities as the former "shgurmgruppen", whose ten thousand strong was the elite of the Kaiser's army.
March 21, 1918 Germany launched a "victorious offensive" against the 5th British Army. The concentrated fire of 11,000 guns suddenly covered the allied forces and just as suddenly stopped. Then the remaining undestroyed positions were attacked by German assault units moving in a westerly direction. Over the next four months, Ludendorff resumed such attacks several more times. However, each time this was accompanied by disproportionate German losses. The line of defense of the British arched, but did not burst. By the end of July 1918, Germany had withdrawn assault divisions from the front; the offensive lost its scope, and it was decided to stop it. When the counterattacks of the British forces began in August, in the forefront of which were the Australian and Canadian units, it turned out that the German army had lost its former morale.
Ludendorff was the first military commander in the 20th century to pay a high price for misapplication in the battles of special forces units. Mesmerized by their success in relatively small operations, he concentrated the best soldiers from other formations in assault divisions. Thus, he deprived the army of its core, and when the assault formations were defeated on the British lines of defense, it was no longer possible to avoid the defeat of the rest of the German ground forces.
Assault formations were the last hope of Germany in the First World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that after a bitter and humiliating defeat, they have become a symbol that inspires a new generation of the military. In the 1920s, Germany was flooded with books of memoirs of veterans of assault units. A classic example is the memoirs of Ernst Jünger "Storm of Steel". Their literary merit is comparable to Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. The book became a bestseller in England in 1929, where it was published under the title: "Steel Assault. From the Diary of an Officer of the German Assault Unit on the Western Front."

Adapted from the book: Don Miller "Commandos: Formation, training, outstanding operations of special forces."

World War I, Kaiser's Special Forces - Stosstruppen

At the beginning of the 20th century, no serious military theorist could have foreseen the significant role that small elite formations would play in the armed conflicts of this century. At that time, it was believed that the individual abilities and special training of privates and officers were of little importance, and the fate of future wars would be decided by large armies created on the basis of universal military service. Soldiers were considered only as constituent elements of the military machine. Their quantity was more important than quality.
The reassessment took place only during the First World War ...

November 20, 1917 at 06:20 am, thousands of allied guns opened heavy fire on the German trenches located on the outskirts of the city of Cambrai. Under the cover of artillery, 376 tanks crossed the no-man's-land and broke through the German defense line. After three years of trench warfare, the British, using the latest technical means, were still able to break through the Western Front. Finally, the allies were able to reach the "green fields on the other side."
For the first time in the entire war, church bells rang in England - there was a victory celebration. However, just ten days later the Germans counterattacked. Very quickly, the German troops reached their starting lines, and in some places they even captured the positions of the allies. No, the Germans still had no tanks at their disposal. Instead of tanks, the Germans used people: detachments of elite infantry - assault groups (Stosstruppen) - were at the forefront of the attack. Attack aircraft operated in small detachments, abundantly equipped with automatic weapons, mortars, grenade launchers and hand grenades. The pace of the advance of the attack aircraft was astonishing - by noon on November 30, the Germans had advanced almost 10 km.

The assault groups made extensive use of the latest infantry tactics. Under Cambrai and throughout 1918, attack aircraft operated as part of squads equipped with a wide variety of weapons.
German attack aircraft outwardly differed markedly from ordinary infantrymen. Many stormtroopers wore the 1916 steel Stahlhelm helmet, while most infantrymen continued to wear the Pickelhaube with the cone removed. The attack aircraft were armed with hand grenades, each with at least ten pieces (as many as they could carry). Grenades were carried in bags hung over the shoulder. Another distinctive feature of the stormtroopers was that they wore boots of the 1866 model with windings instead of boots. Stormtroopers sewed large leather patches on their knees and elbows, otherwise the uniform would quickly fail with constant crawling. Soldiers armed with hand grenades marched in the first echelon of the offensive. They carried rifles on their backs and did not have a waist belt with cartridge bags. The attack aircraft carried spare clips for the rifle in a cloth bandolier thrown over the neck. The bandolier could carry up to 70 rounds. The assault detachments were the first army units in the world to be armed with submachine guns. Such a submachine gun was the MP18, designed by Hugo Schmeisser. Non-commissioned officers from machine-gun and mortar crews were armed, in addition to a carbine, with a P08 Luger or Mauser pistol. These pistols, thanks to a holster that could be used as a butt, could conduct aimed fire at a distance of more than 100 meters.
Pistols were a more convenient self-defense weapon than a bulky rifle. There was a Luger modification with a 32-round drum-type magazine (similar to the MP18 magazine). The most popular was the Stielhandgranate 15 mallet grenade, which became the main weapon of the assault battalions.
Well-equipped shock troops have earned fame for their bravery on the battlefield. In the preparation of attack aircraft, the personal initiative of the soldiers was especially encouraged. Non-commissioned officers in assault groups were not seen as assistant officers, but as independent commanders at the platoon level.

By the time the spring offensive of 1918 began, German infantry tactics had changed beyond recognition. The minimum tactical unit of the German infantry was a squad, which in turn was subdivided into a machine gun group consisting of two MG08 / 15 crew soldiers and two ammunition carriers, and a rifle group consisting of eight to ten shooters led by a corporal. Other armies switched to such a structure only in the middle of the 2nd World War, at the cost of a lot of blood making sure that this is the only way to achieve maximum density of fire and maneuverability in an infantry platoon.

This offensive was the last German offensive, it was to decide the fate of Germany. Therefore, the attack aircraft were ordered to advance, regardless of the losses. Attack aircraft steadily moved forward towards the designated targets. If the position could not be taken on the move, attack aircraft bypassed it and continued to move. Such a swift offensive turned into heavy losses, since the attack aircraft very quickly lost the support of artillery, and the heavy infantry weapons also lagged behind.
From March to June 1918, the assault battalions launched decisive attacks many times, many of which choked. The attack aircraft managed to achieve many tactical successes, but these successes had only local significance. After all, tactical superiority could not compensate for the political and strategic blindness of the German High Command. By trying to sustain the unrealistic pace of the offensive and focusing on tactics rather than strategy, the High Command doomed Germany to defeat. And this defeat was not the fault of the assault groups.
Assault formations were Germany's last hope in the First World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that after a bitter and humiliating defeat, they have become a symbol that inspires a new generation of the military. In the 1920s, Germany was flooded with books of memoirs of veterans of assault units. A classic example is the memoirs of Ernst Jünger "Storm of Steel".

Ernst Junger wrote: "The unwavering Prussian fighting spirit remained in our infantry. Even after forty-four months of the war, the soldiers fought with the same enthusiasm as in August 1914. It is not surprising that it took the efforts of the armies of almost the whole world to stop this indomitable stream ".

The allies could not fully unravel the tactics of the assault groups. The results of the actions of the stormtroopers were obvious, but even the official English historiography could not offer a better explanation for them than to suggest that the Germans simply borrowed the ideas set out in the French pamphlet. This refers to a pamphlet written by the captain of the French army André Lafargue and entitled "Attack in trench warfare." The pamphlet was published by a civil publishing house in 1916, several copies of it fell into the hands of the Germans.

Austro-Hungarian assault formations during the First World War

Christian Ortner (translated from English by Adamenko D.V.)

When the Austro-Hungarian army entered the first world war, she used tactics practiced in the maneuvers of the pre-war period. The tactics were based on the experience of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. and was aimed at conducting an offensive war. All manuals on tactics indicated that an attack is always the best way out of any situation. This concerned mainly the infantry, which had to be able to act independently, even without the support of artillery or cavalry.

The great campaigns of the summer-autumn of 1914 in the northeast and southeast were conducted in this manner. For each regiment or battalion, this type of war meant a constant onslaught on enemy positions. After finding out the position of the enemy - an immediate attack, even without prior preparation. This tactic was called "recontre". At the beginning, the Austro-Hungarian command did not understand that the Russian and Serbian positions were previously reinforced with outposts. During the outbreak of hostilities, these outposts were quickly overturned and forced to retreat. The Austrians took this as a victory. But when their troops reached the main enemy positions, where they were met by a good defense with strong artillery support, they were already disorganized and in disarray. Naturally, the support of their own artillery was immediately required, but it had only just begun to advance.
During this period, it became a hard fact for each individual infantry soldier that, as required by the regulations, he constantly attacked impregnable positions and, thus, had every chance of dying, but had no opportunity to move forward or backward. The number of victims grew rapidly. During the winter of 1914–1915, the situation changed. Although later than on the western front, the opposing sides began to literally "bite" into the ground, organizing defensive obstacles in front of the trenches and artillery positions behind them. Initially, it was just one line of trenches, which was the goal of any offensive. Where the enemy managed to capture even a small area, he had to leave entire sectors of defense to him in order to prevent the collapse of the entire front. To avoid this problem, the Austro-Hungarian high command (Armeeoberkommando - KLA), based mainly on German experience on the western front, began to deepen the line of defense. Approximately 100 meters behind the first line of trenches, they began to dig a second, and behind it, at about the same distance, a third. All three lines were connected by messages. This field engineering structure was called "first position" (1. Stellung). Even deeper, 2-3 kilometers, a “second position” was arranged, which also consisted of three lines of trenches. Artillery deployed behind the second position. The third position, which, as a rule, remained unfinished, was supposed to be already at a distance of 4–6 km. The transition to positional warfare naturally led to a change in tactics. Now the attack had a chance of success only with artillery preparation, which could destroy the barriers and the enemy's first line of defense, which would allow their own infantry to make contact with the enemy and capture his position. But in order to achieve decisive results, it was necessary to take the second line of defense and, most importantly, the positions of enemy artillery. If this could not be achieved, the enemy could cut off the advancing infantry with the fire of his own artillery and destroy it. That's how it almost always worked. As a result, the attackers were driven back with heavy losses. The next way out of the stalemate was to build up artillery power in order to be able to destroy both the first and second lines of enemy defense. The attack had to be carefully planned and prepared. During long periods of "lull", the fighting on the front was limited to skirmishes, sorties of outposts and the struggle for control of the "no man's land". V Russian army since 1886 there were "hunting teams" that performed the function of regimental intelligence. Raids by specially trained "militants", whose success was often due to rumors, lowered the morale of the Austro-Hungarian army. The soldiers feared that they would not be able to defend themselves against surprise attacks and ambushes. The natural reaction was to simply copy these special units in their own army and create their own "hunting teams" (Jagdkommandos). The first such detachments appeared without any consent from the KLA. In some sectors of the front, the number and strength of such detachments grew rapidly. In the literature, the actions of such teams are painted very romantically, but in fact it was a difficult and dangerous job.
On the western front, trench warfare began as early as 1914. Both sides were forced to admit that the old tactics in the new conditions of war had become useless. The commanders of the German army began to develop a new tactic based on the use of "storm troops" (Stoßtrupps). The fighters of such detachments were armed with lightweight rifles, hand grenades and wire cutters for making passages in barbed wire. The task of the detachment was to be the first to cross the "no man's land", enter the first line of enemy trenches and clear it in hand-to-hand combat. Later, their task was reduced to making passes for their own advancing infantry in enemy barriers. All this meant that the "stormtroopers" had to be trained not only as an infantryman, but also as a military engineer. In March 1915, the first such unit was created. It consisted of two engineering companies and a section of 37 mm guns. By the name of the commander, it received the name "Sturmabteilung Calsow". However, the first experience with this specialized unit was unsuccessful because the higher command simply did not know how to apply it. Thus, it was turned into a regular infantry unit. The situation changed only in June 1915, when Hauptmann Pop (Hauptmann E. Rohr) took over the unit. He reorganized the unit and it now consisted of two engineer companies, a section of 37 mm guns, a machine gun platoon of 6 machine guns, a mortar team with 4 small mortars and a flamethrower team. In 1916, new rules were approved. According to them, only 50% of the personnel were to be on the front line, and the rest were to conduct special courses for training infantrymen in new tactics. The courses were located in Beuville. Rohr's squad grew rapidly. Two new companies appeared and thus the detachment became the "Rohr assault battalion". In all German armies (as military formations), assault battalions appeared from officers and soldiers who had completed Rohr courses - 17 of them appeared during the First World War.
The Austro-Hungarian high command was also imbued with the urgent need to train their own infantry. Each army had to organize special courses in which experienced soldiers could teach newcomers the peculiarities of trench warfare tactics. When it turned out that the Germans had already established such training, the KLA asked permission from the German High Command to send a group of officers to courses in Beville. Thus, 15 Austro-Hungarian officers completed two courses at Beville in September-October 1916. The first experience was a success and KLA asked me to continue my studies. In response, the Germans held in November-December 1916 and January 1917. special courses only for representatives of the Austro-Hungarian army - 120 officers and 300 non-commissioned officers. Copying the German system, these officials organized courses in army formations. These army courses until the spring of 1917 at least had to prepare two assault platoons (Sturmpatrouillen) as part of each infantry company. Platoons were reduced to army battalions. Their composition differed from the German ones due to different army resources in the armies - usually they were 4 infantry companies, a machine gun company, engineering, mortar and flamethrower teams. The low intensity of hostilities on the northeastern front made it possible to painlessly remove a large number of soldiers from the first line of defense and send them to courses. At the same time, the previously existing Jagdkommandos were simply renamed and included in the new battalions. A different situation developed on the Italian front, especially in light of the defeats at Isonzo (Isonzo). Regimental commanders often refused to withdraw the best soldiers from the front and send them to the rear only for retraining.
The first combat use of the Austro-Hungarian attack aircraft took place during the tenth battle of the Isonzo River. The experience was successful. When the assault companies were divided into separate teams advancing at the head of the infantry units, success was always achieved. At the same time, if the assault units operated in large groups, they suffered heavy losses and were defeated, especially if there was no preliminary reconnaissance. Therefore, the KLA has developed general rules for the use of assault battalions in the future. The composition of the units was also finally established. In contrast to the early period and the German system, from June 1917, the Austro-Hungarian assault battalions had to exist at the divisional level. Each infantry division was to have a divisional assault battalion, consisting of many assault companies, just as a division is divided into regiments. Each cavalry division was to create a so-called assault semi-regiment. Separate brigades - assault half-battalions. The numbering of the assault battalions, semi-regiments and semi-battalions coincided with the numbering of the formations they were part of. But the numbering of the assault companies is with the numbering of the regiments in which they were created.
Many problems were associated with the supply of weapons and equipment. In addition to the assault companies, the battalion was to include a machine gun company, an infantry artillery section, a mortar and flamethrower platoon, and a telephone communications detachment. Due to the lack of resources, these necessary combat elements had to be borrowed from the front-line units, and upon completion of the training course or after the mission was completed, they were immediately returned back. Undoubtedly, until October 1917, most assault battalions did not have their own fire support units. The main factor in solving this problem was the twelfth battle of the Isonzo, in which the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary broke through the Italian defenses. Many trophies were handed over to attack aircraft. Among them were a large number of machine guns and the first submachine guns, which were immediately put into action.
During the aforementioned twelfth battle, the Austro-Hungarian assault battalions fully proved their effectiveness in trench warfare. Their elite character was similar to the pre-war role of the cavalry. Assault units have become a symbol of the offensive spirit and successful attacks. But, at the same time, this led to a reassessment of their role on the battlefield. Until June 1918, the Austro-Hungarian army had at its disposal a fairly large number of assault units. Each front-line company included an assault platoon, ready for reconnaissance or special operations at enemy outposts. Secondly, there were regimental assault companies that were part of divisional battalions. And thirdly, the well-equipped teaching staff of the army attack aircraft courses.

But since 1918, the conditions for conducting trench warfare have changed again. Instead of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd positions, combat zones were created. The 1st and 2nd positions were combined into a "main combat zone", approximately four kilometers deep. It was protected from the front by a line of outposts. Bunkers, camouflaged machine-gun emplacements, barrages in depth, and hidden infantry artillery and mortar positions fortified the space between the former 1st and 2nd positions. This meant that during the attack, the infantry had to take not only the lines of trenches, but the entire combat zone as a whole. Despite the large number of assault units available, they were still not enough to take the entire zone. This was one of the reasons for the failure of the offensive on the Piave River in June 1918. After this battle, all assault platoons and subunits were withdrawn from the front and sent to training camps. Until the end of the war, they were assigned only the tasks of reconnaissance and small local combat operations. After the end of the First World War, the idea of ​​using small, specially trained and equipped assault squads was abandoned. It was decided that the main role in subsequent conflicts would be assigned to the individual training of each soldier for hand-to-hand combat and trench warfare, which made it meaningless to maintain any specialized units. At the end of 1918, together with the Austro-Hungarian army, the assault battalions ceased to exist. But their combat experience and skills served as the basis for the training and organization of the infantry and armies of Europe during the Second World War.

Kaiser stormtroopers - assault units of the German imperial army in the First World War 1914-1918.

Introduction

Assault units of the German Imperial Army from their very appearance, according to the conditions of recruitment, the quality of weapons and the specifics of their use, immediately won the place of elite units. The relatively early appearance of these units was caused, first of all, by the rapid offensive (end of 1914) of the positional war on the Western Front, the oversaturation of the latter with troops and means of defense, the search for new forms and methods of breaking through, overcoming the positional crisis. In most of the innovations in the German army in the second half of the world war, the idea of ​​​​increasing the combat capability of units with possible savings in human resources is also traced. The Germans saw the solution to this problem, on the one hand, in strengthening the troops technical means, and on the other hand, in the creation of special units, including assault ones. The task of the attack aircraft was to be the first to cross the "no man's land", enter the first line of enemy trenches and clear it in hand-to-hand combat, make passages for their own advancing infantry in enemy barriers, and much more. It is not for nothing that a British military document during the war, speaking about the purpose of assault detachments, noted: “These detachments serve to carry out purely offensive tasks of a particularly difficult nature. They are allowed into business only where it is difficult to expect success from a conventional infantry attack. All this meant that attack aircraft had to be trained not only as an infantryman, but also as a military engineer. In the course of hostilities, the assault units turned into a striking force, equipped with a wide variety of weapons, staffed by professionals and capable of solving the widest range of combat missions. We will make a reservation right away that by assault units we will understand not only (although primarily) special assault companies and battalions, but also other units and subunits, although they did not have the term “assault” in their names, but according to their purpose and functions performed (before of all - ensuring or implementing a breakthrough of the enemy front, that is, overcoming a positional impasse) close to them. Among them are flamethrower units (and, above all, the 3rd Guards Engineer Battalion, later a regiment, but in addition to individual flamethrower units, there were flamethrower units that were part of the assault battalions), separate jaeger battalions (attached to one corps and solving special tasks, some of them were reorganized into assault) and mountain battalions.

The origin of the assault units, structure, armament, acquisition and training.

From the reconnaissance teams that were even before the war at the headquarters of the regiments, in some regiments, with the outbreak of hostilities, special assault teams were formed, which had the main task of preparing the offensive of their regiments by destroying wire obstacles and other similar obstacles. Average population such teams - 12 people. The main weapons are grenades and rifles. The immediate predecessor of the assault units was the group of "trenches cleaners", created in the infantry units. They were supposed to operate in a positional war and carry out a "cleansing" of the captured front line of the enemy, while the main forces of the attacking infantry moved forward. They were equipped and armed according to their specific tasks: first of all, grenades, carbines and portable shields. The first assault unit was officially formed on the basis of the order of the Supreme High Command of the German Land Forces dated March 2, 1915. This order instructed the command of the 8th Army Corps to form a unit to test new weapons and tactics designed to break through the frozen Western Front. The event was carried out as part of measures to find a way out of the positional impasse. Some were equipped with sappers - representatives of the only branch of the Kaiser's army, who had experience in handling hand grenades and was familiar with the principles of siege warfare. Considering the fact that main problem machine guns were presented for the attacking infantry, the Germans found, in their opinion, a worthy means of dealing with them - the 37-mm Krupp assault gun, light enough to be used at the forefront in infantry combat formations. To test the new weapon, the first assault battalion (originally 2 companies) was formed, led by Major Kaslov (a former officer of the 18th engineer battalion), equipped with a platoon of 37-mm guns. The battalion also included a machine gun company of 6 machine guns, a mortar team with 4 mortars and a flamethrower team. In addition to the new gun, the battalion received other new items - a helmet and body armor. After three months of preparation, the battalion was sent to the front. At the front, it was divided into units, which were distributed among the various infantry battalions of the first line. Combat experience showed that the Krupp cannon was too clumsy and vulnerable. In several battles, the battalion lost up to 30% of its personnel, primarily due to the lack of proper tactics.
In August 1915, Captain Pop (who had previously served in the Guards Rifle Battalion) became the battalion commander. The new energetic commander introduced a special tactic for capturing enemy trenches, the place of the 37-mm assault gun was taken by captured Russian three-inch guns with shortened barrels. The soldiers also changed their uniforms and equipment somewhat in accordance with the new tactics. Rohr personally invented many of the devices used by stormtroopers during operations. In the autumn of 1915, the battalion successfully proved itself in operations in the Vosges region, and in early February 1916 it was transferred to Verdun. On April 1, the battalion really became a battalion in terms of numbers, and in May the German command ordered that all armies operating on the Western Front be sent two officers and four non-commissioned officers per battalion to Rohr to learn new methods of warfare. The first assault battalion also becomes a school for new methods of war.

On October 23, 1916, General E. Ludendorff ordered all German armies fighting on the Western Front to form an assault battalion each. Some battalions were formed on the basis of sapper units, some - infantry and chasseurs. By the beginning of December 1916, there were 16 army assault battalions: 1-4, 5, 7-12, 16, 6, 15 Bavarian. Many of these units were consolidated assault units, previously created as an improvisation and operating as part of divisions. In 1916, assault companies were formed, which operated as part of divisions on an ongoing basis. These companies consisted of an officer and 120 lower ranks, subdivided into three platoons. These platoons were assigned one by one to each regiment of the division. By November 1916, more than 30 German divisions had assault units. In addition, several corps, landwehr divisions and even naval divisions, on their own initiative, formed assault groups in their composition. This parallel process of formation had its roots in the pre-war doctrine of the German army: the commanders of the German corps had the right to organize the training of recruits for discretion but, of course, within the framework of existing norms and regulations. And while the General Staff was planning a strategy for the future campaign, all issues relating to personnel were under the jurisdiction of the corps commanders. This tradition of tactical independence bore considerable fruit after the start of the war. Even the regimental commanders of the German army had a lot of freedom and could experiment on the spot. That is why, by the summer of 1915, assault groups were being formed along the entire Western Front. And already from the middle of 1915, as part of many German infantry regiments, their own shock detachments appeared, numbering from a squad to a company and bearing a variety of names. Thus, the assault battalion of Rora was only the most famous of them and the first assault part of the permanent composition. The simultaneous appearance of assault groups in different divisions clearly showed, among other things, the effectiveness of the German military system, which encouraged individual initiative.

As a result, there were the following types of assault units and subunits:

A) army and corps assault battalions

B) divisional assault companies. For the first time they proved themselves in the battles near Verdun. Some companies consisted of 4 platoons. In such a company, there could be 4 officers, 20 non-commissioned officers and up to 225 fighters with 2 machine guns, 2-3 light mortars and 3 flamethrowers. The company reported directly to the head of the division and was attached to the corresponding infantry units.

C) assault platoons in infantry companies. Thus, a platoon had to be formed for actions in battle that required decisive effort or with prolonged resistance by the enemy. This temporary unit (at the beginning - 10 best fighters of the company, then - 15-25 people) in the first case was at the disposal of the company commander, and in the second an assault detachment was formed from specialists (grenadiers, selected shooters, etc.). Soldiers from the assault squads were called "grenadiers". The High Command did not at all plan to turn assault groups into regular units of formations and units. Moreover, not all assault units and subunits were permanent. So, the order for the 7th German Army read: “All assault units are temporary formations. The personnel included in them should be considered only temporarily: seconded from their unit. The attack aircraft were given a specific task - to break through the front line. Therefore, the assault detachments were seen exclusively as parts of wartime, the completion of the detachments was exclusively at the expense of the soldiers of the army in the field. The assault troops did not yet have a history, they did not even have the instrument color of the military branch.

The first assault groups, which arose in 1915/16, were infantry companies reinforced with heavy weapons. Only after the formation of assault battalions at the army level began, unified staffing tables were developed. The assault battalion of the 1916 model consisted of: Headquarters: 10 officers and 32 lower ranks (sometimes there were more soldiers); 4 assault companies: 4 officers and 120 lower ranks in each; 1-2 machine gun companies: initially 4 officers, 85 soldiers and 6 machine guns each, in 1917 the machine gun company increased to 135 soldiers and 12 machine guns; 1 flamethrower platoon: 4-8 portable flamethrowers;
1 trench artillery batteries: 4-6 76.2 mm or 37 mm infantry guns and 80 men; 1 mortar company: 2 officers, about 100 soldiers and eight 76-mm mortars.

Thus, the assault battalion consisted of about 1400 soldiers and officers. The number of infantry companies in a battalion could range from one to five (as in Rohr's battalion). The number of companies also fluctuated widely: Rohr had 200 soldiers in the company, and 263 in the 3rd Jaeger assault battalion. In terms of the number of heavy weapons, the assault battalion surpassed any infantry regiment. Although not only the number, but also the quantity and quality of weapons varied from the statutory ones within a fairly wide range. So, in 1917. The 2nd battalion, with 4 companies, had a machine gun company (6 machine guns model 1908), a consolidated company of trench mortars and grenade launchers (4 heavy and 4 light mortars, 8 grenade launchers, 2 bomb launchers), a company of flamethrowers (4 heavy and 4 light ) and an assault battery (4-57 mm guns), while the 9th battalion with 2 companies was equipped with 24 grenade launchers, 9 Bergman machine guns mod. 1915 and a company of mortars. In 1918 The battalion included: 2-3 infantry, 1 machine gun, 1 mortar companies, a battery of infantry guns, a flamethrower platoon.

In April 1917, the Kaiser's army had 17 assault battalions, in August 1917 the 18th appeared. Eleven battalions (1-7, 14-17) fought on the Western, six on the Eastern Front (8-13). For the summer of 1917, the grouping of assault battalions looked like this:
Western Front (armies and equivalents)
assault battalion
Russian and Russian-Romanian fronts (armies and their equivalents)
assault battalion

1st Army
1st
Southern Germanic
8th

3rd Army
2nd, 3rd
9th Army
9th

4th Army
4th
8th Army
10th

5th Army
5th
Army Group Bernhardi
11th

6th Army
6th (Bavarian)
Army Group Woyrsch
12th

7th Army
7th
Other associations
13th

Army Group C
14th, 17th

Army Group A
15th (Bavarian)

Army Group B
16th (Württemberg)

In addition, two more Jaeger battalions were turned into assault and were located - the 2nd Chasseur with the 2nd Army of the Western Front, and the 1st Chasseur with the 10th Army of the Eastern Front.

In May-October 1918, three battalions (9th, 17th and 12th) were disbanded.

In 1918, assault battalions and companies were distributed to the armies as follows:
Battalion (company)
Army

1st (company)
1st

4th (company)
4th

5th Rora
5th

6th Bavarian
6th

8th
17th

10th
Eastern front

11th
19th

12th (company)
7th

13th
Eastern front

14th
Army Group "C"

15th Bavarian
Army Group "A"

16th
Army Group "B"

17th (company)
4th

18th (company)
18th

Assault battalions were often subdivided into battle groups equal in size to one company. Such groups were transferred to the front to support the defending infantry. For example, on March 21, 1918, the 3rd Jaeger Assault Battalion was divided into four battle groups: one group (infantry company, flamethrower platoon and two infantry guns) was attached to the 79th reserve division, the other group (infantry company, flamethrower platoon, two infantry guns, two mortars and a machine-gun company) was assigned to the 50th reserve division, the third group (similar in composition to the second) was assigned to the 18th division, and the fourth group (an infantry company and four mortars) was left in reserve of the 2nd Army.

It is necessary to consider the armament of the assault units. In 1914, German infantry regiments were equipped with the Mauser Model 1898 rifle. The non-removable rifle magazine held five unitary cartridges. The store was reloaded using a clip. The device of the rifle made it possible to push the cartridges into the magazine by simply pressing the pads of the thumb. A similar feature of the Mauser rifle favorably distinguished it from, for example, the English Lee-Enfield rifle. On the other hand, the Mauser rifle was more demanding on the quality of ammunition and cleanliness. In addition, the German rifle magazine held half as many rounds of ammunition as the English magazine. With a mass of 4 kg and a length of 1250 mm, the Mauser 98 rifle was an excellent weapon in the conditions of the 1914 maneuver campaign of the year, but it was completely unsuitable for trench warfare. In other branches of the German army: cavalry, artillery, sapper units, separate machine-gun companies and motorized transport units, shorter carbines were used instead of rifles, the only infantry units armed with carbines were chasseurs and rifle battalions. The standard carbine of the Kaiser army had a total length of 1090 mm with a barrel length of 590 mm (while the length of the rifle barrel was 600 mm). He then became the main weapon of attack aircraft.
Assault troops began to use carbines from 1915: due to the shorter length, the carbine was more convenient to use in trenches, and the somewhat limited range did not really matter in close combat. Negative qualities of the carbine: the trigger is difficult and expensive to manufacture and heavy weight. Positive qualities: good ballistics, the most perfect sector sight, good front sight and solid stock. The assault detachments were the first army units in the world to be armed with submachine guns. Such a submachine gun was the MP18 of the Bergman system. MP18 used 9-mm cartridges and worked on the principle of blowback. A 32-round box magazine is inserted on the left side of the receiver. Barrel length 200 mm, total length of the carbine pistol 820 mm. The weight of the weapon is 4050 g. It was possible to fire 32 cartridges from a submachine gun with continuous fire in 3.5 seconds. During 1918, more than 30,000 MP18 submachine guns were sent to the German army, but most of them arrived in units after the big March offensive. General E. Ludendorff very much counted on using the MP18 to increase the firepower of the German infantry during the Allied assault on the Hindenburg line. All officers, non-commissioned officers and 10 privates in each assault company were armed with a submachine gun (for comparison, in an infantry company - only 6 fighters). The Bergman submachine gun turned out to be an insufficiently trouble-free weapon, its automatics had many delays when firing, so this model did not deserve approval among the troops, although it was much more advanced than the Italian Revelli submachine gun. Non-commissioned officers from machine-gun and mortar crews were armed, in addition to a carbine, also with a P08 Luger or Mauser pistol. These pistols, thanks to a holster that could be used as a butt, could conduct aimed fire at a distance of more than 100 meters. There was an "assault" modification of the Luger with a 32-round drum-type magazine (the drum of the so-called "snail" type was developed in 1917). "Assault" LP 08 bore the stigma of "death's head" on the receiver. This innovation significantly increased the firepower of the pistol, although at the expense of its convenience and, in part, reliability - a complex cartridge supply system, a long neck, where the cartridges often warped, made the pistol more capricious, in addition, the complexity and considerable price of such a magazine were obvious " minus."

Hand grenades, used in 1914, soon gave way to more effective models. The most popular was the Stielhandgranate 15 mallet grenade, which became the favorite weapon of the assault battalions. When in February 1916, the German attack aircraft went on the attack near Verdun as part of the first echelon, rifles hung behind their backs, and both hands were free to throw grenades. A metal cylinder 75 mm in diameter and 100 mm long was placed on a wooden grenade handle 255 mm long. The cylinder was filled with explosive, which was a mixture of potassium perchlorate, barium nitrate, black powder and aluminum powder. A metal clip was attached to the side of the cylinder, allowing the grenade to be hung from the waist belt. At the end of the handle was a pin, by pulling which the soldier activated the igniter tube. The tube provided a deceleration of 5.5 seconds. There were tubes with a seven-second and a three-second delay, which was indicated on the grenade handle. There was a modification of the grenade with a spring-type percussion fuse that fired when the grenade hit the ground. In 1916, a new grenade, the Eierhandgranate 16, entered service with the German army. It weighed 310 grams and had a black-painted cast iron shirt. The fuse of the grenade provided a five-second slowdown, although there was a modification of the grenade with an eight-second delay (designed to fire from a grenade launcher). With a certain skill, this grenade could be thrown at 50 meters, but the radius of the grenade was quite limited. The Germans first used them in July 1916. Having counterattacked the British north of Tipwal (over the Somme), the German soldiers, throwing grenades at the British, managed to take the lost positions. These grenades were very popular among attack aircraft and infantrymen, and in general, their compactness and good qualities earned respect from front-line soldiers. The grenade used more powerful explosives than the Stielhandgranate 15. Other types of grenades were also used - Kugelhandgranate 13, Kugelhandgranate 15. The main damaging factor German grenades had a shock wave, not fragments, so grenades were especially effective in trench warfare, and not in open space. Stormtroopers attacking well-fortified Allied positions often used bundles of grenades, throwing them over the parapet or into the loophole.

In 1914, each infantry regiment had six machine guns in its machine gun company. In 1915, the regiments received additional machine-gun squads, numbering 30-40 people and 3-4 machine guns, and from the second half of 1916. in three machine gun companies (one company per battalion) the regiment was supposed to have 18 machine guns. In the winter of 1915/16, the formation of specialized machine gun units began - Maschinengewehr Scharfschuetzen Trupps (parts of machine gun shooters). The groups were intended to take part in offensive operations, their personnel were trained in four to five week courses. In fact, the group was a machine gun company with six machine guns. For the first time, machine-gunners participated in the battles near Verdun. Companies of machine-gunners were united in threes into machine-gun battalions. Usually one such battalion was attached to each front division. It was they who effectively interacted with divisional and corps assault units. When the assault battalions were formed, each had one or two machine-gun companies in its composition - the firepower was comparable to an infantry regiment. During 1917, the number of machine guns in a company was increased to eight, ten, and finally to 12. Assault battalions had from 12 to 24 machine guns as a standard, and individual units had a machine gun platoon with two machine guns. The main machine gun of the German army was the Maschinen Gewehr 08, a variant of the Maxim machine gun. The mass of the machine gun was 25 kg, and the combat one, with cooling water in the casing and the machine, reached 63.6 kg. Therefore, despite its effectiveness, the MG08 was mainly a defensive weapon - it was not easy to carry a machine gun weighing more than 60 kg under fire across a field pitted with funnels. However, during the offensive near Verdun in June 1916, machine gunners also walked in the advancing German formations. The Bavarian Life Guards Regiment, with the support of the assault battalion "Pop", occupied the town of Fleury, and the Germans used 24 MG08 machine guns in street battles. The Dreyse machine gun of the 1908/15 model was also used (combat rate of fire 250 rounds per minute, aiming range 2000 m, weighed almost 30 kg). The appearance of light (light) machine guns marked the beginning of infantry group tactics - a light machine gun gave the group greater combat value and independence. First of all, this concerned assault groups and detachments in need of a light machine gun. In 1915, the Germans tried to create their own light machine gun based on the MG08 machine gun. By that time, most of the Entente armies had already acquired this type of weapon, so the Germans formed machine-gun companies equipped with captured weapons. The first battalion of light machine guns was formed in August 1915 and took part in the battles in Champagne in September of that year. The battalion was armed with Madsen light machine guns. During the Battle of the Somme, many machine gunners were killed, and almost all of Madsen's machine guns were lost. But by the end of the battle, the Germans managed to capture a sufficient number of English Lewis, which, after alteration, which allowed the use of German ammunition, replaced the lost Madsens. The stormtroopers also liked the Lewis machine guns and many of them continued to use British weapons even after German-made light machine guns began to arrive in units. The Germans continued to use Lewis until the very end of the war, organizing production in Brussels for the repair and alteration of trophies. In 1916, the Bergmann LMG.15 light machine gun (but in small quantities) was adopted. The German troops on the Italian front were the first to receive it. In December 1916, the German army adopted its own MG08/15 light machine gun, which was a bipod-mounted MG08 equipped with a wooden rifle butt and pistol grip. The machine gun casing was still filled with water, but was smaller in volume. By these measures, it was possible to reduce the mass of the machine gun to only 19.5 kg, so it was “light” only in the imagination of its creators - it would be more correct to call it lightweight. On the other hand, the MG08/15 became the world's first general-purpose machine gun, light enough to move freely around the battlefield and heavy enough to deliver solid fire. Thanks to the belt feed (100 or 250 rounds), the MG08 / 15 machine gun made it possible to create a fairly dense fire, significantly surpassing the English Lewis and the French Shosh machine gun in this characteristic. The practical rate of fire was 100-150 rounds per minute with an effective range of fire of 2000 m. For the first time, the Germans used the MG08 / 15 on the Western Front in the spring of 1917. In 1918 the lighter model MG08/18 appears. At the end of the war, these machine guns were the main automatic weapons of the assault units. On the battlefield, a machine gunner could find cover in the same place as a shooter with a rifle - in craters, behind terrain folds, quickly change position, thereby making it difficult for the enemy to defeat a machine gun with fire weapons. The assault groups used machine guns both to ensure the capture of the line and to hold it until the main forces approached.

The German army was armed with two types of rifle grenades - Gewehrgranate M1914 and Gewehrgranate M1913. Both types weighed about one kilogram and both were fired from a standard rifle using a special blank cartridge. To fire a grenade, it is necessary to load a Mauser rifle mod. 1898 or Mannlicher arr. 1895 blank cartridge, resting its butt on the ground to give it a slope of about 50 degrees. After that, the ramrod is inserted into the barrel, the aiming is specified and a shot is fired. These grenades were equipped with an additional charge of black powder, which worked on impact with the ground and threw the grenade into the air, where it exploded, scattering fragments around. Later came the Gewehrgranate M1916. The grenade launchers could also fire flares. At the same time, the return was significant, the accuracy was minimal. By 1916, the first grenade launcher was adopted. With a mass of 40 kg, the grenade launcher consisted of two parts: the actual grenade launcher (23 kg) and the machine (15 kg). Thanks to this, it could be transferred quite quickly. The maximum range of a grenade launcher was 300 m, the minimum was 50 m. By 1916, each infantry regiment had 12 grenade launchers that fired special grenades. The grenade launcher was controlled by a calculation of two people. The grenade launcher was an effective weapon capable of supporting advancing infantry with fire from an open and closed position. In each company, detachments of grenade throwers were created, which were supposed to throw smoke grenades at the enemy to blind them. At the appropriate command, a series of conventional grenades followed the smoke grenades. Then the grenade launchers were the first to leave the trench, supported by conventional infantry and again threw grenades at the enemy in order to push him back and ensure penetration into the enemy trenches.

By 1914, the Germans were armed with three types of mortars: light 76 mm (mine weight 4.7 kg, range 1050 m), medium 170 mm (49.5 kg, 900 m) and heavy caliber 210 mm (100 kg, 550 m) and more. The 76 mm mortar fired using 76 mm shells obtained from defective 77 mm field gun shells, the barrel was rifled. The firing range varied between 325 (minimum) and 1425 meters (maximum at an angle of 45 degrees). The fire was fired along hinged trajectories from behind shelters, from trenches or from the reverse slopes of hills, from craters. The weapon was moved by calculation. The 170-mm mortar proved to be a fairly effective weapon for direct infantry support, as well as for destroying field shelters. The range of fire is up to one and a half kilometers. On the battlefield, the calculation, holding the beds, could transport the mortar across the battlefield. The calculation consisted of 6 people. Assault battalions, as a rule, had a mortar company in their composition. Separate assault companies usually had four light mortars. Grenade launchers and light mortars were placed either behind the starting position or in the second line of attackers.

On January 18, 1915, a volunteer sapper detachment was formed to test a new weapon - a flamethrower under the command of Major Reddeman. Soon this unit was reorganized into the 3rd Guards Engineer Battalion, and then into the Reserve Guards Engineer Regiment (the "father" of the flamethrower units of the Kaiser's army), which was called Flammenwerfer Abteilung and participated in the battles until the end of the war. Initially, the battalion consisted of six companies, but by the end of 1917 their number increased to 12. Each company had 20 heavy and 18 knapsack flamethrowers. Subsequently, Reddeman's regiment became a high-value strike unit, and he acquired his own assault unit. In combat conditions, two types of flamethrowers were tested: portable, serviced by a crew of two, and stationary, capable of throwing a fiery stream at distances of up to 20 meters. The calculation of a portable flamethrower consisted of a fighter who wore a cylinder with a combustible mixture, and an operator who directed the flamethrower pipe at the target. Throwing the mixture was carried out using compressed nitrogen, and the mixture was ignited at the pipe. In February 1915, the flamethrower was tested near Verdun against the French, and in June against the British. In both cases, the flamethrower caused panic in the ranks of the enemy infantry, the Germans managed to take the enemy positions with relatively few losses. Each assault battalion had a flamethrower platoon of four to eight light flamethrowers. The success of flamethrower units, equated to assault ones, depended on the situation and on other factors. So, on the Russian front, on November 9, 1916, the Germans for the first time launched knapsack flamethrowers in a battle north of the city of Baranovichi. However, the Russian soldiers of the 217th and 322nd infantry regiments, warned of the possibility of the appearance of flamethrowers, did not lose their heads and, with strong rifle and machine-gun fire, thwarted the attack of the flamethrowers and the German infantry following them, with heavy losses for the enemy.

The Krupp 37-mm trench gun tested in 1915 was not effective enough (37-mm infantry guns, being light and accurate, were very limited in their ability to hit live targets, both open and, in particular, hidden behind terrain folds - a light projectile could cause damage to the material part only with a direct hit, hit a living target only with a close gap), and soon it was replaced with a mountain howitzer, which could also be moved around the battlefield on its hands. Finally, in 1916, a 7.62-mm infantry gun began to enter service with the assault battalions. The infantry gun was a captured Russian 3-inch field gun, whose barrel was shortened from 2.28 m to 1.25 m. The gun was equipped with a sight calibrated to 1800 m and new wheels with a diameter of 1.1 m. weighing 5.9 kg. By 1917, 50 batteries of infantry cannons were operating on the Western Front (from 4 to 6 guns in a battery). Each assault battalion had one such battery. The guns were a great success - now there was no need to request artillery support from the divisional artillery in case of identifying single targets. Efficiency increased when hitting such targets, which saved the infantry from unnecessary losses in the event of an unexpected collision with enemy machine guns. Over time, the infantry gun began to act as an anti-tank weapon. In 1917, the Germans formed about 50 more batteries, equipped with already "native" 77-mm field guns mounted on special low carriages, and the barrel was attached not directly to the axle, but to the trunnion located in front of the axle. These guns were always moved around the battlefield by hand and over time became the main anti-tank guns of the German army (semi-armor-piercing shells were used). Assault guns shot small targets from a short distance (parts of trenches, machine-gun nests, posts of selected shooters and observers) and participated in repelling enemy attacks. Thus, the armament of the assault units was powerful and sufficiently adapted to the combat situation.

For fighting in the trenches, there were several types of weapons, including a variety of clubs, trench knives, bayonets, daggers. The latter were the distinctive weapons of the attack aircraft and were made by him at his own discretion, often from a standard bayonet. Many preferred to act with sharply sharpened sapper shovels. One of the side edges of the blade was sharpened, which turned it into a chopping weapon. Non-commissioned officers and especially heavy weapons crews wore bayonet-knives on their belts. The so-called combat knives differed from each other (there was no officially approved model of a combat knife), as they were produced by different companies. The blades were approximately the same, the handles had a different shape, although they were identical in design: in all cases they consisted of wooden cheeks riveted to the shank with deep transverse grooves to prevent slipping in the hand. The length of the blade was 125-160 mm, width 20-22 mm. This type of weapon was especially useful in close combat trenches. Structurally, the combat knife consisted of a blade, a handle and a crosshair. The combat knife successfully combined (unlike a bayonet) cutting and stabbing functions: the cutting edge of the blade (blade) and the bevels of the point with mutual sharpening turned it into a compact universal weapon. The blades of combat knives were made of stainless steel by stamping or from a specially rolled steel sheet of the appropriate profile. The handles of combat knives were overlaid plates made of hardwood (beech, oak, hornbeam or walnut), connected with rivets. The handles had a shape that was convenient for gripping, and transverse cuts were applied to them to reduce slip. The standard metal scabbard for a combat knife had a special bracket for attaching to a belt and was painted, as a rule, in black. In addition to the standard ones, various home-made and trophy knives were used. With such creativity of attack aircraft, the blades of bayonets were shortened to a convenient size and sharpened, or they took a metal bar from wire fences and processed and sharpened it until a blade and a handle (the so-called French nail) were obtained. The combat knife was sharpened on one or two sides.

Speaking about the acquisition of assault units, it should be noted that
until the end of 1917, assault battalions were staffed exclusively by volunteers, which was uncharacteristic for the German military system. But in any case, officers were appointed by order, which subsequently began to be practiced in relation to the lower ranks. In addition to volunteers, the cadres of various units also served as replenishment for the assault battalion. For example, when replenishing the assault companies of the 9th assault battalion, people came from the depot of the 50th infantry regiment, for light machine gun units - from the 3rd battalion of the machine gun school in Deberitsa, mortar units - from the depot of the 29th pioneer battalion. The requirements for people in the battalions were so high that when four jaeger battalions were reorganized into assault battalions, more than 500 people were weeded out as unfit. Soldiers and non-commissioned officers were generally under 25, unmarried or married but childless, and in good physical shape. Soldiers were selected on the basis of personal initiative and bravery. As the German order said: “Service in an assault unit is a great distinction. Confirmation of this is the fact that a difficult assault business exempts from the usual service in the trenches, and also delivers the best content and food. Rewards are distributed more generously. That person who does not show enough personal merit and diligence should be immediately expelled from the assault unit. Assault battalions were equipped with experienced, fired personnel. After the attack aircraft received the personal support of E. Ludendorff, the assault battalions began to perform a training function. Moreover, the training function was the most important for the battalions as permanent assault units. Thus, the establishment of assault battalions set the following tasks: "1) To facilitate the preparation of the largest possible number of officers and non-commissioned officers for service as instructors for positional warfare and mainly for close combat, 2) To achieve new improvements in methods of attacking fortified positions." When the assault units were outside the combat zone, the personnel were preparing new attack aircraft. Soldiers and especially non-commissioned officers of army units underwent short-term training as part of assault battalions, after which they returned to their units, where they applied new tactical skills and ideas gained while serving in assault groups. First of all, Rohr's exemplary battalion was engaged in this. According to the instructions of 1916, 50% of the battalion personnel were to be on the front line, and the rest were to conduct special courses for training infantrymen in new tactics. The courses were placed in Beauville. The battalion trained both battalion instructors and retrained ordinary military personnel. So, in December 1915, hundreds of officers and soldiers from the 12th Landwehr Division passed through Rohr's battalion. The Landwehrites learned to act as part of squads and platoons instead of the previous tactics of company chains, they were taught to read tactical maps, to storm the training lines of defense. Non-commissioned officers learned to be independent commanders, and not mere executors of the orders of officers, they had to carry themselves with confidence and be prepared for the role of junior commander and for taking the initiative. Ordinary fighters had to know all the ways of fighting. The training of fighters entering the assault units was divided into theoretical and practical courses. The purpose of the first was to familiarize officers and non-commissioned officers seconded from units with combat techniques based on the latest combat experience, about positional warfare, the use of combat means, and the interaction of assault forces and means in battle. Lectures were given on the action of German and enemy guns, communication and interaction between infantry, machine guns, artillery both in the offensive and defense. The main tasks of practical training were the introduction of iron discipline (not without reason, it was the stormtroopers who were one of the strongholds of order in revolutionary Germany), love for their work, confidence in their strength, tempering both the body and character, and developing the skills of modern combat. For the training of attack aircraft, special camps were created, equipped according to the latest front-line experience. The training camp near Sedan played a particularly important role. Attack aircraft learned how to fight in the trenches, how to handle domestic and enemy machine guns, throw domestic and enemy grenades, overcome obstacles, destroy wire obstacles using various means, handle a carbine and an automatic pistol, and participated in combined maneuvers using flamethrowers. Initially, individual, then group training of fighters was carried out, and then the entire unit using the full range of weapons of the assault battalion. During preparation, the following tasks were carried out at training positions: attacking an enemy trench, capturing several lines of enemy positions, counterattacks, clearing enemy resistance nodes, operations against machine guns and fortifications, repelling enemy counterattacks. The novel by Ludwig Rennes describes the experience of a non-commissioned officer who was sent to an assault battalion in the winter of 1917: “We carried machine guns, threw grenades, stormed trench lines, crawled like bellies without a single rustle. The first time was very hard. Seven sweats came down from me, sometimes the earth left from under my feet from fatigue. But it passed very quickly, and every day it became easier and easier to serve. Training continued from morning to evening with a short daytime break of two to three hours. I didn't have time to think, I was in great shape." The success of the Germans in March 1918 was due to the excellent preparedness of the attack aircraft. The battalions repeatedly practiced attacks on training lines of defense, which fully corresponded to real goals. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers had large-scale detailed maps created from the latest aerial photographs. In preparation, live ammunition was widely used, sometimes this led to undesirable results: “We carried out a training attack on defensive fortifications with a complex trench system, using live grenades, taking into account the lessons of the battle of Cambrai ... while our unit suffered some losses ... Machine gunner from my company, with a well-aimed burst, cut off an officer from another company who was observing the course of the exercises. Luckily, the wounds were non-fatal." The situation was as close as possible to combat, gas and smoke were used, life-size targets were used, the interaction of all types of weapons was practiced, repeated exercises to storm trenches using flamethrowers, mortars and infantry guns brought the actions of the fighters to automatism. The fighters of the assault units within the units were trained in the nearest military rear on training campuses specially equipped for fortified positions. The training of the fighter was based on perfecting the technique of movement (throw) in the attack, overcoming artificial obstacles and the technique of grenade combat in trenches. An ordinary soldier was required to be able to plan for himself in advance the entire path of movement to the attack, taking into account all the smallest shelters (craters, hollows, etc.), points of respite, and the technique of the movement itself. With such preparation, the attack was carried out rapidly and almost did not need to be controlled by the commanders. In throwing grenades, it was necessary to achieve such skill that, being in one of the breaks in the trench or the course of communication, it was precisely to throw a grenade into the next break defended by the enemy.

The visit of E. Ludendorff to the front in 1916, when he saw the Rohr assault battalion in action, was a feat to publish it in early 1917. an order to create new units of this type, to introduce the tactics used by attack aircraft into the training program for the rest of the formations of the German army. Moreover, on the eve of the last offensive of the German army in 1918. he tried to create assault formations in the form of the so-called. shock or assault divisions. But the growing shortage of manpower forced Ludendorff to abandon plans to reorganize all infantry divisions into assault divisions: in the winter of 1917/18, while planning the last offensive in the west, the general faced a demographic problem: too many soldiers were either over 30 years old or did not have the necessary physical training for services in active parts. Then E. Ludendorff decided to reorganize the army, gathering young soldiers in the ranks of shock divisions. The shock divisions received the lion's share of artillery, ammunition, supplies and preparation time. All this was supposed to lead to a breakthrough by the Germans in 1918 of the Western Front. However, there were an average of three conventional trench or position divisions for each shock division, with a much lower combat value. The latter were staffed with elderly people and youths, had a minimum of equipment and were distinguished by a lower morale. The strongest soldiers were sent to the shock units, many of them ended up in the ranks of the assault battalions. But, nevertheless, mass formations did not have the elite and quality of training assault battalions.

Uniform and equipment.

The German infantry during the 1st World War wore one of the most practical uniforms. The German uniform of the 1910 model was well suited for the maneuvering battles of 1914, but as the war moved into the positional stage, the uniform began to change. The cone, which crowned the helmet, had no practical function, but it perfectly indicated the place where the German soldier was. Therefore, front-line soldiers tried in every possible way to get rid of this part of the headgear. In 1915, a new type of helmet appeared, with a removable cone and a cloth cover. In addition, the new helmet was not made of leather, which was becoming less and less, but of metal, felt, and even pressed cardboard.
In 1915, the first stormtroopers wore standard uniforms. In general, in 1915, the uniform of soldiers on the front line differed from a single sample only in minor details. According to the program, approved even before the war, instead of field gray trousers (field gray), trousers of stengrau color (stone gray) were introduced, since field gray matter faded too quickly. Instead of the tunic of the 1907/10 model, a new, more practical tunic was introduced, which did not have false valves (in place of the missing pockets), and instead of the characteristic cuffs there were lapels. The soldiers were ordered to blacken leather items of equipment: boots, belts, cartridge bags, but in front-line conditions this was not always possible. Jaegers and riflemen retained the uniform of a characteristic gray-green hue, while in machine-gun units the uniform became gray-protective. This also applied to attack aircraft wearing the uniform of "native units". The designations of belonging to the unit were limited to the number on the shoulder straps, but the regimental galloons were also preserved, although now they were sewn only on the collar. The non-commissioned officer galloon was simplified and began to be sewn on only at the corners of the collar. The cuff galloon has turned into a small piece sewn on at the top of the cuff. The pre-war overcoat gave way to a gray-protective uniform overcoat intended for all military personnel, regardless of the type of troops.

Starting in 1915, a new item of equipment began to arrive in the unit - a gas mask. The gas mask of the 1915 model consisted of a mask made of rubberized fabric and a removable filter box (soldiers always carried a spare with them). On September 21, 1915, a completely new uniform was introduced in the German army. The former tunic was replaced with a blouse, although the old tunics continued to be worn until the end of the war. The blouse had a looser cut, two large slanting pockets were located in front. It was fastened with metal buttons painted gray. To provide additional camouflage, the buttonholes were closed with a placket. A blouse was sewn from a dark field gray fabric, and the turn-down collar was trimmed with green fabric. The Model 1895 satchel with a calfskin cover was too uncomfortable for trenches. In the east, the knapsack continued to be worn until the end of the war, and in the west it gradually gave way to the "assault pack". The pack consisted of an overcoat and a raincoat, rolled up and wrapped around a bowler hat. The resulting design was much more compact and lighter. Old knapsacks were sometimes used during marches outside the front lines, but most often they were handed over to the wagon train. Only at the beginning of 1916, the attack aircraft received a new piece of equipment, which immediately distinguished them from the general mass of soldiers. This item - a steel helmet - eventually became a kind of emblem of the German army. This helmet was tested by German attack aircraft along with various types of bulletproof vests throughout 1915. The German helmet, nicknamed the "coal bucket" by the British, was made of silicon-nickel steel and weighed 1.2 kg. Thanks to the ears and the back of the head, it protected the soldier’s head much better than the French helmet of the Adrian system or the English one, reminiscent of the Middle Ages and called the “shaving basin”. A shock absorber was located inside the helmet, and the chin strap could be adjusted in length. On the sides of the helmet, two ears protruded, which made it possible to mount an additional armor plate. As a rule, helmets were worn by snipers and guards, and among ordinary infantrymen she met at first infrequently, while attack aircraft wore it without exception. As an English document from the war notes: "The Germans have a very high opinion of their helmets, which in a very short time earned great confidence in the army." At first, Rora's battalion tested various types of bulletproof vests, which, according to their designers, were supposed to reduce losses in personnel. In addition to bulletproof vests, attack aircraft also tested shields. However, the imperfection of the technology of the beginning of the century led to the fact that the shields had to be made from a fairly thick steel sheet. As a result, the shield was too heavy and uncomfortable during an attack. As a result, he was more of a hindrance than a defense. Bulletproof vests were also uncomfortable and were used mainly by sentries and observers, that is, fighters who did not need to move much. Actively used the "cuirasses" and "shells" of the light machine gun department of the German assault groups. By February 1916 - the beginning of the offensive near Verdun - German attack aircraft outwardly already noticeably differed from ordinary infantrymen. Many attack aircraft wore a steel helmet, while most infantrymen continued to wear a pickelhaube helmet with the cone removed. Soldiers of the assault squads wore equipment adapted to their specific tasks. The use of pouches was quickly abandoned, and the cartridges began to be shoved into the pockets of the tunic. Later, a triple pouch began to be worn on one side, and on the other - on a belt - a trench knife. The fighters carried rifles behind their backs and did not have a waist belt with cartridge bags. The attack aircraft carried spare clips for the rifle in a cloth bandolier thrown over the neck (up to 70 rounds could be carried). The attack aircraft were armed with hand grenades, each had at least ten of them (as many as they could carry). Grenades were carried in bags hung over the shoulder, some fighters had wire cutters for making passages in barbed wire. Another distinctive feature of the attack aircraft was that they wore boots with windings instead of boots. Stormtroopers sewed large leather patches on their knees and elbows, reinforcing these problem areas, otherwise the uniform was quickly worn out with constant crawling. From personal belongings, the stormtroopers wore an overcoat in a roll and a bowler hat. German instruction 1917 He names a steel helmet, two bags for grenades, a gas mask, two water flasks, and a duffel bag as mandatory elements of the attack aircraft equipment. Given the fact that by the end of 1916, assault battalions were formed in all Western armies and soldiers served in their composition for a certain time, and then returned to their units, by the middle of 1917, officers and non-commissioned officers who had passed training in assault battalions. After serving in the assault battalion, the soldiers returned to their unit, bringing with them not only new tactical ideas, but also a characteristic uniform. In his autobiographical novel War, Ludwig Renn describes how a new officer asks a non-commissioned officer: “You are wearing wraps and leather patches on your knees. Is this required by the charter, sergeant major? When the sergeant major explained that he served in an assault battalion, the captain was satisfied with the explanation and said that he was going to create an entire assault platoon in his unit. However, Renn reports that many officers did not like that non-commissioned officers wear special uniforms and have their own view on combat tactics.

Speaking about the characteristic insignia of attack aircraft, it should be noted that the attack aircraft wore the uniform of their native units or assigned during formation. The latter was typical for assault battalions - that is, permanent units. But they were also assigned the uniform of the units that went to their formation (for example, the 1-3 battalions wore the uniform of light infantry, the 5th (Rora) and 10th - engineering units). On shoulder straps was the number of the assault battalion. For example, the Rohr battalion has a red number “5” on black with a red edging engineering shoulder straps, the 3rd Chasseur has a red number “3” on gray-green with green edging Chasseurs shoulder straps, the 1st has a red number “3” on field gray with white edging infantry shoulder straps red number "1". Common to all battalions was the red color of the number on shoulder straps. There were no official insignia for stormtroopers. Moreover, in the German army it was forbidden to wear hazing stripes, but attack aircraft often ignored this prohibition. In one of the group photos, members of the assault team wear a dark grenade-shaped patch on their left sleeve. The soldiers of the assault company of the 23rd Saxon reserve division, attached to the 12th army corps, wore a green armband with a white piping and a white letter S on their left arm. » (Minenwerfer) on shoulder straps for mortarmen. So, Reddeman's guards flamethrowers wore regular field uniforms with sapper shoulder straps (black with red edging, no number) and guards buttonholes in the form of "coils". In addition, on the cuff of the left sleeve there was a special insignia granted by the Kaiser himself - a round black patch with the image of a silver "dead head" in the middle. During winter operations, attack aircraft used white camouflage robes. The characteristic details of the uniforms of all attack aircraft were leather pads on the elbows and knees, the letter S of green cloth (from "stormtrooper" - attack aircraft) or the image of a grenade (the latter was typical for assault units in infantry units) on the left sleeve of a field blouse and boots with windings instead of boots . The fighters of the assault units often applied camouflage to steel helmets and gas mask boxes.

The supply of soldiers in the trenches was fraught with great difficulties. The delivery of food and ammunition to the front line was unreliable. Going to the front line, the fighters took with them a five-day supply of food. Small dry alcohol burners were used to heat food in the trenches, and special thermos flasks were used to deliver hot coffee and soup. As soon as the enemy reduced the intensity of shelling, parties of soldiers delivering food were immediately sent to the front line. Since many water sources in Northern France and Belgium were not suitable for drinking, the Germans had to organize a special system for supplying soldiers with drinking water. Wells were dug, pumps installed and pipes laid. Many breweries, sugar mills and other businesses have turned into water treatment plants. Drinking water pipelines were laid as close to the front line as possible and sometimes reached the forward trenches. In addition to fresh water, German soldiers received mineral water from operating factories for bottling this water. The Germans made large reserves of mineral water in the immediate vicinity of the front line. Going to the front lines, the soldiers took with them two bottles of fresh water and as much mineral water as they could carry. In 1914, a German soldier in the field received the following daily ration: 750 g of bread or 400 g of egg biscuits or 50 g of field biscuits, 375 g of fresh meat or 200 g of corned beef, 125-250 g of vegetables or 1500 g of potatoes or 60 g of dried vegetables , 25 g coffee or 3 g tea, 20 g sugar, 25 g salt. The meat ration was gradually reduced and by the end of 1915 fell to 350 g, and by the middle of 1916 to 288 g, in addition, one day a week was made fast. In October 1916, the daily norm of meat was cut to 250 g of fresh meat or 150 g of corned beef. Soldiers in the trenches since June 1916 received practically no more than 200 grams of meat per day. Junior commanders, in addition to rations, received half a liter of beer or 250 ml of wine or 125 ml of brandy or rum per day. Soldiers were entitled to two cigars or cigarettes or 30 g per day. pipe tobacco. At the front, soldiers often had to be content with dry rations. Each soldier had with him at least a daily dry ration, although usually dry rations were issued for several days. Dry rations consisted of: 250 g of biscuits, 200 g of corned beef or bacon, 150 g of canned vegetables, 25 g of coffee, 25 g of salt. Stormtroopers received reinforced rations.

Among the craters, it was also difficult for the food teams to find the infantry, who often returned back empty-handed or strayed so long that the food had time to spoil. It was also difficult to drag the wounded soldiers on their shoulders across the field, pitted with craters. Therefore, the wounded had to wait until dark before being sent to the rear - of course, such a delay cost many lives. But the fighters of the assault units were better than others aware of what they were doing.

Tactics and combat use

The German infantry training program changed during the course of the war. The total time for preparation was significantly reduced, while increasing its intensity. The infantry battalions of most belligerent countries at the beginning of the war deployed in a line of chains with approximately equal intervals between the arrows. Such tactics entailed a high level of losses, but this did not bother anyone. There was no consensus among the German high command as to how the infantry should advance through open space in the face of dense artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire. Since the commanders of the military districts dealt with the training of personnel, discord arose in the ranks of the German army: in some districts, the infantry was taught to advance in a rare chain, in others - in tight formation. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War was ignored by the Germans in vain. The year 1914 put everything in its place: French and Russian machine gunners mercilessly mowed down the dense chains of the advancing German infantry. But, despite any losses, the German infantrymen had one of the best training in Europe. This is illustrated by the fact, for example, that even by the end of 1918, from a quarter to a third of the personnel of the German army were soldiers who had begun service even before the war, while, for example, few English companies had one or two veterans who served before the war. 1914. In the course of hostilities, new forms and methods of action of the infantry and its elite, the assault troops, were developed. A new offensive tactic took shape by 1916. Traditionally, the Germans kept all the soldiers in the forward trenches and tried not to cede to the enemy a single piece of controlled territory, but such tactics cost the infantry dearly. Since September 1916 all junior officers gradually completed monthly courses, where they learned the principles of new defensive tactics. According to the Defense Instructions issued in December 1916, the front line to a depth of 500-1000 meters was to be covered by a few forward posts. The forward posts were engaged in the fight against enemy patrols, and it was also their task to bring disorder into the order of the advancing enemy infantry by fire. The main line of defense was at the rear, usually along the reverse slope of the hill, and had three lines of trenches. Well-camouflaged concrete pillboxes were erected 2000 meters behind the trenches, staggered and supporting each other. So the Germans organized their defense in those areas where they were not supposed to carry out offensive operations. The infantry, drawn back, was intended to deliver counterattacks at the moment when the enemy's advance began to stop. As soon as the allied infantry lost the support of heavy artillery and machine guns, the Germans launched a massive counterattack and recaptured the positions. The new defensive tactics of the Germans were based entirely on the counterattack, especially the counterattack from the flanks. Inflicting flank attacks, the Germans recaptured their positions and cut off the French and British infantry, which had reached the second or third line of trenches. The cut off infantry units were not able to call for artillery support and replenish ammunition, so they were easily eliminated. Such tactics, based on counterattacks, raised the role of attack aircraft even higher. The rapid advances of the infantry became the main reason for the successful defense of the German army in 1917; The infantrymen were trained in marksmanship, an art lost by the infantry of all the armies fighting on the Western Front. By February 1918, the battalions of the shock divisions made forced marches, passing up to 60 km per day. Thanks to such a pace, the Germans were able to seize the initiative when breaking through the Italian front near Caporetto and not give the enemy time to regroup. The load on the infantry exceeded all norms, since the German army experienced an acute shortage of horses, and there was also not enough road transport. The instructions for infantry training in 1918 were created on the basis of the manual for assault battalions. The new infantry tactics of the Germans came as a surprise to the Allies.

Assault troops, on the other hand, must lead the infantry in difficult places, expand the places of breakthroughs, capture enemy trenches, take possession of machine guns and blockhouses, supporting the infantry when settling in a occupied position. In 1917-1918. both in attack and defense, group tactics are formed - small infantry groups gathered around light machine guns become the basis of the battle order. Now the main tactical infantry unit was a squad (equipped with a wide variety of weapons), which in turn was subdivided into a machine gun group consisting of two MG08 / 15 crew soldiers and two ammunition carriers, and a rifle group consisting of eight to ten shooters led by a non-commissioned officer -officer. Attack aircraft were divided into threes and attacked the trenches from the flank. The first soldier of the troika was armed with a shield from an easel machine gun and a sharpened sapper shovel. He was followed by a soldier with a bag of hand grenades equipped with a short-delay fuse. The third soldier was armed with a knife or bayonet. Soldiers armed with hand grenades marched in the first echelon of the offensive.

The assault battalion should be used only as part of a properly organized operation. Despite the fact that its main task is to capture a fortified position, it could also be used during a long operation for a counterattack and other actions. Assault groups were separated from the battalion and distributed among the infantry battalions. Reconnaissance was carried out in advance (1-2 days before the battle), preparatory work was carried out (wire was cut 1-2 days before the battle, passages were made in enemy barriers with mortar fire), during the attack, groups of attack aircraft attached to the attacking infantry made gaps in the defense the enemy, built crossings through enemy trenches, destroyed field fortifications and machine-gun points, and equipped the captured positions. During the attack, the fighters were covered by barrage artillery fire, the attackers advanced in groups using funnels, and reinforced support groups were located on the flanks. The way the assault unit was used demonstrated its elitism. As the German instructions from the time of the Battle of the Somme said: “A shock detachment, supported by selected infantry units, will form the first attack wave. It should not be poured into infantry to give it stamina. Each strike force will lead an attack on a specific target and receive a special task. Accordingly, the attack aircraft, being attached to the infantry, did not dissolve in it, but went to the spearhead of the attack in independent groups. After the attack, the assault groups again gathered as part of the battalion. An assault detachment could also be used for a counterattack: “In these cases, it is brought to the place a few days before the counterattack, so that it can make a detailed reconnaissance of the area.” The Germans considered the reduction of assault units into large military units inappropriate (unlike, for example, the Italians who created the assault corps): "due to the special training of the people included in them, it is difficult to replace losses in them and it is considered unprofitable to reduce them into larger units." Interestingly, the assault battalion could be withdrawn from the battle only at the direction of the operation commander. The tactics of attack aircraft with the use of flamethrowers are interesting. It is illustrated by the actions of the Germans in the battle on November 9, 1916. near the Skrobovsky stream on the Russian front: “The initial exit of the flamethrowers from the enemy trenches and their initial movement was no different from the usual start of the infantry’s attack, so it was not always possible to distinguish from a distance whether they were flamethrowers or grenadiers. Against some contiguous areas, the flamethrowers immediately showed themselves, acting directly from their trenches. So, against the section of the 6th company of the 217th regiment, where the distance between the trenches was 30 paces, the German flamethrowers climbed out onto the parapet of the trench and from there tried to water our trenches, but the jet did not reach; only one of the loopholes got a few drops that burned one lower rank. After 2-3 minutes, the flamethrowers were driven away by our fire. In the same way, against the 3rd company of the 218th Gorbatov Regiment, where the distance between the trenches was about 25 paces, several Germans came out of the trench, one in front with a gut, from which the flame directly reached our trench and set it on fire. With the further advance of the flamethrowers, they usually gathered in groups of 5 - 7-10 people; each such group, apparently, was some kind of organizational connection with 1 flamethrower. According to the testimony of some eyewitnesses, such a group included grenadiers and people with light machine guns or automatic rifles. Sometimes the grenadiers advanced in front, sometimes on the sides of the flamethrower, and sometimes behind him. The infantry was already advancing behind the flamethrowers (but in some areas the 217th infantry regiment advancing behind the flamethrowers was not there). Approaching 150 paces to our trenches, and where the distance between the trenches was closer, then immediately upon exiting, the flamethrowers arranged a smoke screen in front of them. To this end, they directed a jet from the apparatus to the ground, as a result of which a thick, mostly black, and in some places bluish smoke was obtained, almost completely hiding them from the eyes of the defenders: using this curtain, the flamethrowers advanced several steps and then repeated the same thing again, until did not reach our trenches. At the same time, some eyewitnesses noticed that the flamethrowers seemed to be bypassing the newly poured place, since their movement was not straightforward. Having reached our trenches, the flamethrowers usually went along them, watering the trenches and the remaining defenders. The tactical unit was a group of two flamethrower squads and several grenade launchers or fighters armed with hand grenades. The interaction of attack aircraft with flamethrowers was most effective - assault units moved ahead, units for "cleaning" trenches followed them at a short distance. At the disposal of the commander of the assault detachment, flamethrowers equipped with knapsack devices were sent. They hit machine-gun emplacements that remained in action, nodes of resistance in fortifications, etc., pouring them with a short fire stream. It was extremely important to push the enemy back simultaneously on both flanks of the trench for a considerable distance, for which, in addition to flamethrowers, they resorted to the help of hand grenades, then in these places the trenches were barricaded with earthen bags. The captured communication passages up to 25 m in the direction of the enemy from the occupied position had to be cleared of the enemy and also barricaded. The group's work on arranging communications began immediately, as soon as the troops occupied the nearest position. A detachment of porters promptly delivered the required material and tools from the rear.

The actions of the assault units were described most thoroughly in connection with the preparation of the German offensive in the spring-summer of 1918. As noted in the German instructions: “How important for the success of the offensive, the importance of well-prepared and well-knit shock units, shows the German counterattack at Cambrai. The command of the 2nd Army pointed out the need for each division to have strike or assault units with great striking power and capable of resolving the most complex combat missions. Where such units did not yet exist, they should have been created by order of the divisions themselves. It was noted that the strike units should be provided with all the combat means necessary for the offensive infantry combat, up to and including escort guns. The personnel of the divisional assault units were not to be distributed to other shock units. Divisional assault units were to serve as exemplary units, and regiments, battalions and companies were required to form their own shock units following their model. Divisional assault units were involved in all activities in order to work closely with the troops. Regardless of the assault units at the divisional level, assault battalions operated, which were the most persistent and well-trained units on the scale of the entire army. In especially serious cases, the divisions were given the right to request that they be given assault units from the shock battalion. At the same time, assault companies in full strength were usually attached to divisions. To carry out particularly serious tasks, the divisions, in turn, attached their assault units to the regiments, reinforcing them with special units from the assault battalions. The infantry commanders, at whose disposal the assault battalions and shock units were given, are obliged, together with the command of the latter, to carry out reconnaissance on the ground and carefully consider all the measures necessary to fulfill the common task. The strengthening qualitatively and quantitatively of the assault units at this time is evidenced by the fact that the 3rd Jaeger assault battalion in February 1918. was brought to the composition of about 40 strike groups, provided with appropriate combat support equipment, including: 24 light machine guns and 4 Lewis machine guns (machine guns are distributed equally between 4 companies), 6 infantry guns, 8 light mortars and 8 light flamethrowers. During the offensive, one assault group should be attached to an infantry company, which will amount to 12 assault groups per division, and up to 20 in the most serious areas. In addition to their own machine guns, the attack aircraft were reinforced by machine guns taken from the infantry located in passive areas.

Thorough and accurate reconnaissance and no less thorough preparation of the assault were recognized as the key to success. The procedure for providing assault units, infantry units attached to them, and infantry waves following behind them with auxiliary combat means did not differ from the methods used in trench warfare. “Under the conditions of a positional war, during an assault undertaken to occupy any section of an enemy position, immediately after the wedging, a gradual spread through the trenches begins. In the event of a large-scale offensive (breakthrough), the assault units, together with the auxiliary combat equipment and infantry units attached to them, must continuously break through into the depths of the enemy’s location under the cover of a fire shaft, which is appropriately moved forward. To do this, the assault units need to accurately indicate clearly visible orientation points and directions. The trenches, which are weakly defended by the enemy, are quickly passed by the assault units; the latter should not linger on them for long even when meeting more stubborn resistance; the fight against them, as well as against enemy machine guns, can only temporarily delay the assaulting units. Supported by the fire of infantry guns and advancing close behind the firing hall, the assault units wedged further and further into the enemy's deeper lines of trenches. Clearing the trenches and shelters from the garrisons is part of the task behind the advancing infantry waves ... Particular attention should be paid to the interaction of advanced waves with assault units, in no case allowing a disruption of communication between them. Sometimes, after reaching the last line of enemy trenches, and in some cases even after capturing enemy artillery, reconnaissance waves stood out from the composition of the waves within the company's offensive zones, which rushed into the depths of the enemy's location. The reconnaissance wave was a rare rifle chain, 200-250 m behind an assault wave, which consisted of two lines advancing at distances of 50 m. . Ordinary infantry was both fighters and carriers of cartridges and hand grenades. Behind the assault wave, as many infantry waves advanced as needed to ensure the depth of the attack; the distance between the waves was about 150 m. The waves included several machine guns mod. 1908 on lightweight machines and skids. These machine guns were supposed to take part in the battle of the assault units, occupying commanding positions. The task of the reconnaissance wave was to locate the enemy's points and nests of resistance as quickly as possible and report them to the assault wave advancing from behind. The assault wave, with extensive support from auxiliary combat assets, took possession of these nests of resistance with the help of an enveloping blow. The assault units that were part of the assault wave and the groups attached to them moved forward in chains, rows or small groups, depending on the nature of the terrain. The assault wave was given the fullest possible freedom of action to deal with the nests of enemy resistance. The direction of the onset of this wave was regulated by reference points available on the ground. The assault wave was supported by reinforcement artillery and mortars of the assault units themselves. At further development offensive in the depths of the enemy's defensive zone, it was recommended to attach the assault battalion and other auxiliary combat means consisting of it as an operational means, first of all, to those military units that have to operate on rough and closed terrain. It is in such areas of terrain that assault units are able to make maximum use of their characteristic features, while on open and well-observed terrain, enemy resistance will already be broken by the fire of attack artillery and escort batteries. For a more complete interaction of troops with assault units, it is very useful to involve them in joint exercises with those units to which they will be attached during the offensive. It is highly desirable to provide the command of the assault units with time and the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the area of ​​their future operations. The situation will subsequently indicate the moment when it will be possible to withdraw the assault units and other special units of the assault battalion from the battle in order to give them time to quickly recover and prepare for new tasks. It is also interesting that the infantry guns of the assault battalion always acted in conjunction with their assault units and were never used as escort guns or batteries for other infantry units. The assault units of the assault wave were supposed to advance in groups of fighters, while the infantry of other waves - in rare chains. The group tactics of the strike units were officially consolidated.

During the 1st World War, the psychological burden on the soldiers was very high. The battle could last not a few days, but weeks and months. The warring parties did not see each other: the soldiers dug into the ground, trying to avoid bullets and shells. The battlefields were vast cemeteries littered with human remains. Infantrymen, as a rule, did not have to triumphantly enter the positions left by the defeated enemy. It was also extremely rare to pass through the conquered cities - the front line (especially in the West) hardly moved. All this had a destructive effect on the human psyche. But the attack aircraft were in a different position: they practically did not participate in the defense and did not knead the trench dirt: they were delivered by trucks to the front line, after sunset they went to their original positions and, after dark, delivered an unexpected blow to enemy positions. By dawn, the attack aircraft returned to base, carrying trophies and prisoners with them, and the infantry remained in place, waiting for the inevitable counterattack of the enemy. Like fighter pilots and submariners, attack aircraft were surrounded by a romantic halo, they enjoyed the attention of the German press. If German propaganda posters in 1914-16 exploited the image of a medieval knight, then by 1917 the knights gave way to heroes with narrow faces, steely eyes, in a helmet, with a gas mask around their neck and a bag of hand grenades on their shoulders. Such was the appearance of the new German warrior. Assault battalions were used to raise morale throughout the army. Many young recruits dreamed of getting into the ranks of the stormtroopers. The soldiers, who had been under constant artillery fire for weeks, read with great pleasure about the successes of the assault battalions. The actions of the attack aircraft were savored by the German trench newspapers. Thus, the morale in the assault battalions was much higher than the average for the army.

The combat use of assault units is interesting. After the failure of the Schlieffen plan, the German army in the West spent almost the entire year of 1915 on the defensive. But the Germans did not only sit in the trenches: division commanders often launched attacks with limited targets, during which they occupied more convenient terrain for defense or delivered a preemptive strike against the enemy. And assault units participated in them. Howitzers, hand grenades and mortars helped the Germans to seize enemy trenches and hold them in case of a counterattack. Thus, Pilkem Hill, which the Germans suffered heavy losses in their unsuccessful attempts to take in 1914, was taken in April 1915 with 150 tons of chlorine and one attack with limited targets. Assault companies received a baptism of fire during the battle of Verdun. In the battles near Verdun in early 1916. neither new weapons nor artillery could help break through the front. The attacking infantry ran into two main obstacles: barbed wire and machine-gun nests. When the Germans repeated the assault on Verdun, attack aircraft and sappers were already in the first echelon of the offensive. As soon as the German artillery suppressed the French batteries with chemical shells, stormtrooper squads began to make passages in the barbed wire. Concrete pillboxes built along the gentle slope of the hill on the east bank of the Moz were attacked by Reddeman's flamethrowers from the 3rd Guards Sapper Battalion. Other attack aircraft, meanwhile, threw hand grenades into the French trenches. In some areas, the Germans pushed forward mountain guns and suppressed machine-gun nests with direct fire. Behind the stormtroopers were infantry lines. The infantrymen occupied the French trenches, then the Germans brought up machine guns, which helped repulse the subsequent French counterattacks. However, success accompanied the offensive only the first week. The French brought fresh infantry divisions and a huge amount of artillery to Verdun. The losses of the advancing side increased sharply. The advancing German regiments continued to put up assault units in the first echelon, which predetermined the fact that these elite troops were the first to be knocked out. In order to deliver the deepest blow to the enemy's defenses, the German attack aircraft moved forward at maximum speed, not looking back at the flanks and rear, counting on the next infantry in the second echelon. German artillery fired on the principle of "barrage", shifting fire forward as the advancing infantry advanced. However, as a rule, the fire shaft too often "ran far ahead." Assault groups, advancing deep into enemy positions, inevitably bypassed some enemy strongholds, thus initiating the infiltration tactics. The successes of the German weapons near Verdun at the initial stage are explained primarily by the actions of the assault units. Reddemann's flamethrowers distinguished themselves as early as February 1915 in a battle near the Melancourt forest near the same Verdun. And already in 1916, the guards flamethrowers defended Fort Douaumont as valiantly as they had stormed before. The divisions of the Rohr battalion were at the forefront of the February German attack on Verdun.
As soon as the reorganization of the four Jaeger battalions into Jaeger assault battalions began, major strategic changes took place in the east: the Brusilovsky breakthrough was made, and Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente. The command was forced to send three of the four battalions to the Eastern Front, and only one of them - the 3rd Brandenburg Jaeger Battalion was able to complete the training program and on August 4, 1916 was named the 3rd Jaeger Assault Battalion. It is interesting to note that many assault battalions had their own vehicles, which was extremely rare in the German army of that time, so their transfer to the front and back to the rear was carried out in the shortest possible time. Summer 1916 the French front was also tense. In the battles for Fleury on June 23, 1916, Rohr's assault battalion and the 3rd Guards Pioneer Regiment distinguished themselves by rescuing the Bavarian Foot Guards in a very difficult French position saturated with machine guns. The Somme became a new test for attack aircraft. For the German infantry, doomed to sit in dark dugouts trembling under the explosions of thousands of tons of explosives, the Somme became a nightmare, entire units were buried alive: “The English artillery opened fire every hour. Even when night fell on the warped earth, the artillery cannonade did not stop ... For three days and nights, Ebelhauser and his comrades experienced in their own skin what hell is on earth. The fire was everywhere ... the craters crowded one on one, each of them was an open and silent grave. How many soldiers were buried in these graves, soldiers whose remains were never found? The ground shook day and night... the few surviving defenders of this section of the Western Front turned into crawling animals trying to hide in a fresh funnel. They crawled from one sinkhole to another, trying in vain to find food and shelter. But neither one nor the other could be found anywhere. The infantry regiments followed the old Prussian tradition: "Halten zu halten ist" ("hold all that can be held"). The forward line was filled with soldiers, which was very useful for the British gunners, who did not lack ammunition (ammunition consumption fluctuated widely, but at the height of the battle it was 500 tons per division with a front of about 2000 m). The German commanders did not have the right to leave the plot plowed up and down - those who decided to take people out from under the fire were deprived of their posts. The words of General von Falkenhain were unequivocal: "The enemy can only move forward over our corpses." Therefore, the German infantrymen held out to the end. It is not surprising that by August 1916, in two months of fighting on the Somme, the German army had lost as many people as in six months of fighting near Verdun. By the end of the battle on the Somme, up to 135 infantry divisions were assembled on this sector of the front (near Verdun 75). Like the French at Verdun, the Germans on the Somme were unable to hold their positions. I had to fight among the craters, organizing improvised firing points. The bulk of the infantry was taken a few kilometers back, from where counterattacks were carried out. Counterattacks had to be carried out day and night. Usually counterattacks were delivered by the forces of a battalion or regiment. Sometimes, instead of a counterattack, a real assault was carried out, for example, the Delville forest was taken by storm, which had been plowed up by German artillery for four days before. It was here that assault units were most effectively used. Among the reasons for the retreat on the Somme, the German High Command cited the insufficient depth of defense, the excessive concentration of infantry on the front line, as well as the superiority of the allies in artillery and aviation. Allied airplanes correcting fire were very demoralizing for the German infantry.

The actions of the assault company of the German army (winter 1916, Russian front - Wooded Carpathians) illustrate the memoirs of a participant in the war P. Sergeev: “On one of the companies of the 148th infantry. The Caspian regiment was attacked by a German assault company. The 148th Caspian Regiment occupied a position on a wide front, having almost no reserves. The trenches were poorly equipped, wire fences - in one lane, in 2-3 rows of stakes. The enemy positions were located 400-800 meters from our forward edge; it was quite deep snow. In the afternoon, the Germans began artillery and mortar shelling of the sector of one of the regiment's battalions. As it turned out later, the fire was fired for the purpose of shooting for the subsequent isolation of the intended attack site and to create shelters in the form of funnels for the attacking German unit. Before sunset, on the edge of the forest, 400 meters from the Russian trenches, enemy soldiers appeared. Artillery fell on the flanks and rear of one of the companies, and after that, with exceptional speed, the enemy literally fell into the Russian trenches. Attacking along continuous trenches towards the flanks with the use of hand grenades, the Germans cleared a significant part of the trenches of the first line from the Russians and retreated, capturing one heavy machine gun. A few days later, the commander of the Russian battalion, in the form of a kind of bait, in a sector convenient for attacking the enemy, puts up a model of an easel machine gun and puts forward a team of scouts in front of the front line into an ambush. When a German assault company tried to raid, its commander - a lieutenant - was taken prisoner.

On the French front, the use of attack aircraft near the Sechan forest in the battles of August 12-14, 1917 is interesting. The attack involved 20 soldiers of the 1st assault battalion, 8 people of the assault company of the 227th division and 60 infantrymen of the same division with 6 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers. The attack was preceded by careful preparation: the French trenches were photographed from the air, exercises were carried out on special terrain, and interaction with artillerymen was carried out. The attackers were divided into 8 groups - 6 central groups of 8-10 people each and 2 flank groups of 20 people each. The detachment was given 2 light machine guns and an automatic rifle, each fighter, in addition to standard weapons, is armed with a Mauser automatic pistol and 24 grenades. Several batteries, grenade launchers, about 50 mortars contributed to the attack. On August 12, passages were cut through the German wire, on the 13th the detachment was transferred by trucks to the front line, on the 14th the French wire was cut and the detachment, under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, using funnels, advanced to the French position. But the attackers were detected by flares, and the infantry could not help them because of the heavy machine-gun fire of the French.

Operations near the forest of Eparzh June 30-July 2, 1917. thorough preparation also preceded: reconnaissance, all platoon commanders had schemes of French fortifications, theoretical and practical classes were held. After artillery preparation (the fire raid lasted 5 minutes and was carried out on identified targets), assault groups of 6-8 people went ahead of the infantry. The attack, carried out in the dark, was successful. The French were knocked out from the first line. But later, with their counterattacks, they restore the situation. But the level of training of the assault troops was so high that most of the operations with their participation ended in success.

In the battles near Riga in August 1917. a Russian eyewitness noted the advantages of assault tactics over linear tactics: “Our troops strove at all costs to maintain a solid location, as in a positional warrior. Soldiers and officers tried not to expose the flanks of their unit, not to lose its contact with other units to the left and right. When communication was broken and the flank exposed, each time there was anxiety in the troops; a rumor was born that the detachment was bypassed and cut off by the enemy. At this time, the Germans acted in small detachments, having nothing to cover the flanks, to prevent a detour. All their forces were entirely used for the strike, and this ensured their superiority at every point where they advanced. Attack aircraft distinguished themselves on September 8, 1917 in the battles for the Jakobstadt bridgehead as part of the Riga operation on the Eastern Front. With the most advantageous position of the Russians, the actual equality of forces (although the Russian troops had already noticeably decomposed by this time as part of the “deepening of the revolution”) and the insufficiently powerful artillery fire of the Germans, success at the key point of the position (which led to the subsequent withdrawal of the Russian troops) was achieved precisely by the fighters of the assault units . A Russian source reports: “Having broken through the location of the 736th regiment, the enemy began to quickly seep into the depths of our location, acting in small parties and groups. These groups, consisting of people specially trained in the so-called assault tactics, went very quickly forward, carrying machine guns and automatic rifles. Encountering resistance, they retreated and tried to get around us from the flank or from the rear. First of all, their efforts were directed at the batteries, which, at the location of the 184th division, were all captured, since the servants and horses were killed by machine-gun and rifle fire. Also, as it was noted that: "... the enemy, lingering or even retreating in those places where he met resistance, bravely seeped forward and penetrated deep into the gaps between our detachments." As a result, the Germans won the most important operation, disrupting the connectivity of the entire Russian Northern Front and seizing bridgeheads, which deprived the Russians of the possibility of extensive offensive operations on Shavli-Kovno-Vilna in the future. Stormtroopers (Major Sluyter's 10th assault battalion) also took part in the capture of the islands of the Moonsund archipelago during Operation Albion. So, October 12, 1917. The 10th assault company landed in Tagalakht Bay (landed by 2 destroyers on both sides of the bay, and on the eastern beret the landing was carried out under the fire of two Russian machine guns). The company moved to Ninast and Hundsort and captured both 120-mm and 152-mm batteries; the gun crews of the batteries were completely captured. The 18th assault company fought for the bridgehead of the dam between the islands of Ezel and Moon. Interestingly, in this battle, German attack aircraft collided with Russians - fighters of the Revel shock battalion (death battalion of captain 2nd rank Shishko). The attack of the 18th assault company in the battle on October 14 was not successful: “Cap. Winterfeld decided to move as far south as possible, towards Türn, the 18th Assault Company, which had been held up as a reserve at Orrisar at noon. In the future, he expected ... to master the bridgehead position. However, the attack was not successful. The company, shelled by enemy machine-gun fire, approached only 600 m to the copse and lay down. The battle for the dam is the most intense episode of the land component of Operation Albion. The 18th assault company also participated in the final offensive on about. Moon. On the night of October 18, the assault company was supposed to cross to the island with the assistance of the 2nd battalion of the 138th infantry regiment. At dusk, a platoon of an assault company and a machine-gun platoon began crossing, but lay in front of the dam, falling under enemy machine-gun fire. Only after the withdrawal of the Russians, the assault company vigorously pursued the enemy and took up a bridgehead position between Linuet and Nauze (2 guns, a burnt armored car and 1 machine gun were captured).

The offensive near Caporetto on the Italian front in October-November 1917 was preceded by a period of preparation for military operations in the mountains. The soldiers intended to participate in the operation arrived in September 1917 at the location of the 14th Army to acclimatize to mountain conditions. The main point of the training program was long marches in the highlands. In addition, the soldiers mastered the MG08 / 15 machine guns - each company received three of these machine guns. Under Caporetto in 1917, it was thanks to the attack aircraft that the Germans managed to break through the Italian front and put Italy on the brink of defeat. The British and French had to urgently remove precious divisions from the French front and transfer them over the Alps. Under Caporetto, the Württemberg Mountain Battalion (of nine companies) distinguished itself, especially in the battles for the passes, led by Lieutenant (future Field Marshal) E. Rommel. The assets of the battalion include the destroyed communications of the Italians, the defeat of the Bersaglieri regiment, among the trophies - 150 captured officers, 9000 lower ranks of the enemy, 81 guns. For distinction, E. Rommel was promoted to captain and awarded the highest order of the German Empire - Pour le Merit. The battalion was formed in 1915 and initially acted against the Russian army on the Carpathian front.

But the war was clearly not in favor of Germany. The French abandoned wasteful infantry attacks and began to occupy the territory only after all life was destroyed by artillery fire there. The British also adopted a similar tactic. Near Messines, 2,266 British guns rained down 144,000 tons of explosives on the German defenses, and sappers brought mine galleries under the German positions only so that the infantry could carry out an offensive with limited targets. Massive artillery preparation also preceded the British offensive in Flanders.

Battle of Cambrai in 1917 began so unsuccessfully for the Germans because the allies launched a massive tank attack. Seeing the tanks, many German infantry units fled the battlefield in panic. Despite their shortcomings, the tanks were able to fully show their capabilities on the even and solid ground near the town of Cambrai. A massive tank attack of 378 vehicles began unexpectedly. The noise of tank engines was drowned out by British airplanes circling over the German trenches at low level, in addition, the Allies did not carry out the usual artillery preparation. The German front was broken. Fortunately for the Germans, in 1917 tanks were not yet very reliable, many combat vehicles were out of order for technical reasons. Therefore, when the Germans launched a counteroffensive ten days later, the Allies did not have enough tanks to fend off the enemy advance. Very quickly, the German troops reached their starting lines, and in some places they even captured the positions of the allies. The Germans still had no tanks at their disposal. Instead of tanks, they used people: detachments of elite infantry - assault groups - were at the forefront of the attack. Attack aircraft operated in small detachments, abundantly equipped with automatic weapons, mortars, grenade launchers and hand grenades. The pace of the advance of the attack aircraft in those conditions was astonishing - by noon on November 30, the Germans had advanced almost 10 km. On November 30, German airplanes appeared over the battlefield. For the first time in the entire war, aircraft were used to directly support the infantry: “Having sent forward patrols, the Germans moved forward at 7 o’clock in the morning, lining up in small columns, reinforced with light machine guns and in some places with flamethrowers. German airplanes flying at a strafing flight bombed and machine-gunned the British, bringing disorder to the ranks of the defenders. The attackers almost never attacked fortified points from the front, but bypassed them from the flanks and rear. The Germans used the infiltration tactic. The German counterattack was unexpected and fierce. “It all started with targeted artillery fire, concentrated at the place of the counterattack. The section of the front that the Germans planned to retake was methodically filled with smoke and fire, pouring from the skies that were grinding and ready to collapse to the ground. The trenches shook and collapsed under the bursts of shells, the air was filled with the whistle of German bullets... Suddenly, the fire was moved further, and figures of German soldiers emerged from the smoke of the last explosions, who were rapidly moving forward, throwing hand grenades on the move. The Germans used the tactics of coordination, meaning by this that several types of weapons operate in concert within the framework of one infantry battalion. This coordination can be illustrated by the example of the action of one of the parts. On November 30, the 2nd Battalion, 109th Infantry Regiment infiltrated deep into the British defenses, but was stopped by machine-gun fire about 500 meters from Gonelier. Several British machine guns pinned the German infantry to the ground, and there was no way to call for artillery support - a common problem in the First World War. The 5th company of the 110th Infantry Regiment, which was in reserve, was thrown forward in order to suppress enemy machine guns that prevented further advancement. The Germans suppressed the positions of the English infantry with machine-gun fire, and a mortar was installed in one of the funnels, from which they opened fire on machine-gun nests. Finally managed to call artillery support, and the gunners covered the British positions with fire, directly behind the machine-gun nests. Divided into squads, the 5th company began to approach the British machine guns, making short runs under the cover of mortar fire. Corporal Gersbach's squad reached an old trench that led to one of the British machine-gun nests, and, making their way with hand grenades, moved along the trench. The machine gun was captured and the infantry advance resumed. The entire operation, from the moment when the commander sent attack aircraft and a mortar to help destroy the machine gun nest, took two hours. Thanks to the joint use of various weapons, success was achieved. “The squad leader, supported by heavy weapons fire and acting together with riflemen and machine gunners, continued to move from one stronghold to another, each time striking the enemy in the flank.” The tanks were fired from machine guns, grenade launchers and mortars worked. Often the fighters rushed at the tanks with hand grenades and rendered the caterpillars unusable or put the tank to flight with the concentrated fire of several machine guns. At close range, the fire was carried out with armor-piercing bullets. Especially famous in the counterattack near Cambrai 3rd Jaeger assault battalion. Moreover, he was transferred already during the battle from under Caporetto. Manually moving the battalion mortars, the attack aircraft crushed the British strongholds without the unrealistic support of their artillery in this situation. The offensive of 1918 was the last German offensive, it was to decide the fate of Germany. Therefore, the attack aircraft were ordered to advance, regardless of the losses. As at Verdun, the attack aircraft steadily moved forward towards the designated targets. If the position could not be taken on the move, they bypassed it and continued to move. Such a swift offensive turned into heavy losses, since the attack aircraft very quickly lost the support of artillery, and the heavy infantry weapons also lagged behind.
From March to June 1918 - the peak in the activities of assault battalions. The attack aircraft managed to achieve many tactical successes, but these successes had only local significance. For greater speed of advance, all weapons of the assault battalions, even heavy ones, were moved manually. And here the fighters have captured allied batteries, machine guns and prisoners. So, General E. Ludendorff, for example, notes the 3rd Jaeger Battalion as a unit distinguished by "special tactical training." In these battles, anti-tank rifles were used. The armor penetration of the M1918 PTR for that time was quite sufficient: at a distance of 100 m - 26 mm; at 200 m - 23.5 mm; at 400 m - 21.5 mm; at 500 m -18 mm, which made this weapon a formidable opponent for all types of tanks, especially in combination with a relatively low weight (17.3 kg with a bipod). True, the return was very strong, and the resource of the barrel is very small. But, in the end, tactical superiority could not compensate for the political and strategic blindness of the German high command. Trying to withstand the unrealistic pace of the offensive and focusing on tactics, not strategy, the command doomed Germany to defeat. And this defeat was not the fault of the assault groups. One of the officers wrote: “The unshakable Prussian fighting spirit remained in our infantry. Even after forty-four months of the war, the soldiers fought with the same enthusiasm as in August 1914. It is not surprising that it took the efforts of the armies of almost the whole world to stop this indomitable flow".

The practice of using assault units by the German Imperial Army during the First World War is interesting both for new methods of combat use of attack aircraft and for the specifics of their combat service. The assault battalions are interesting because they were complex combat units - representatives of a wide variety of military specialties found their place in them: infantrymen, artillerymen, machine gunners, mortarmen, engineers and flamethrowers. New weapons and methods of their use were tested. In fact, the battalions were an excellent training ground for practicing the interaction of various forces and means in a combat situation. These units became the conductor of the new tactics of the infantry and the actions of the assault groups of the next big war - the Second World War. To some extent, the appearance of assault units marked the transition from murderous and wasteful mass frontal attacks to pinpoint strikes and the actions of professionals. If assault subunits within a unit or formation were primarily a tool for ensuring the actions of this unit or formation in a positional war, then independent assault battalions have already acquired a new quality - they have become a new weapon of attack and defense, often inclining the success of the most important operations in favor of the Kaiser troops. Attached to the armies, the assault battalions were in fact in the hands of the command a means of operational breakthrough, quite comparable to tanks and artillery (it was not for nothing that the fighters - attack aircraft were distributed in the form of strike groups between the attacking infantry units). In German hands, the assault units became the most important factor tactics and strategy, a new word in the history of military art.