Afghan war of losing sides. Afghan war brief information

And the republican system was established. This served as an impetus for the start of a civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty breaking of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, increased the resistance of the population to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, while NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had deteriorated sharply, and the threat of the overthrow of the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side at first rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the aggravation of the Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Input Soviet troops to Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders Soviet Union.

The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was to create a "cordon sanitaire" near the borders of the USSR in the face of the impending threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its full mobilization. First Deputy Commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before the entry.

The introduction and placement of OKSV in the DRA was carried out from December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat composition of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly refined in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four regiments of front-line and two regiments of army aviation, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of the OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, since 1985 - General of the Army Valentin Varennikov. The direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, who was subordinate to the command of the troops of the TurkVO.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, roads vital for the country, carried out convoys of transport convoys with goods through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, the OKSV conducted active hostilities of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous shelling of their garrisons and transport columns by opposition detachments, began to conduct military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive enemy armed groups. Thus, the Soviet troops introduced into Afghanistan became involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, which received the most assistance from Pakistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.

Stage 3: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six Soviet regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. The participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

Even after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, the USSR continued to seek opportunities for a political solution to the intra-Afghan conflict. From August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, from April 1986 - to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988 in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, under which the USSR and the USA assumed obligations. Deadlines were set for the withdrawal of Soviet troops: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the rest of the units after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which ended on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620,000 servicemen completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525,200 people in the OKSV.

The losses of the military personnel of the 40th Army were: killed and dead - 13,833 people, including 1979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the hostilities in Afghanistan, in addition, 572 servicemen of the state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. 172 officers stopped their service in the Armed Forces due to injuries. 6,669 "Afghans" became disabled, including 1,479 disabled people of the first group.

For military and other services, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

The relations of the Soviet Union with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were traditionally friendly, regardless of the political regimes that changed in Kabul. By 1978, industrial facilities built with the technical assistance of the USSR accounted for up to 60% of all Afghan enterprises. But in the early 1970s XX century Afghanistan was still one of the poorest countries in the world. Statistics showed that 40% of the population lived in absolute poverty.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan received a new impetus after the victory in April 1978 of the Saur, or April, Revolution, carried out by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). General Secretary of the Party N.-M. Taraki announced that the country had entered the path of socialist transformations. In Moscow, this was met with increased attention. The Soviet leadership turned out to be quite a few enthusiasts of Afghanistan's "jump" from feudalism to socialism, like Mongolia or the Soviet republics of Central Asia. On December 5, 1978, a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed between the two countries. But it was only due to a great misunderstanding that the regime that had established itself in Kabul could be qualified as socialist. In the PDPA, the long-standing struggle between the factions "Khalk" (leaders - N.-M. Taraki and H. Amin) and "Parcham" (B. Karmal) intensified. In the country, in essence, the agrarian reform failed, it was in a fever of repression, and the norms of Islam were grossly violated. Afghanistan faced the fact of unleashing a large-scale civil war. Already in the early spring of 1979, Taraki asked for Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan in order to prevent the worst-case scenario. Later, such requests were repeated many times and came not only from Taraki, but also from other Afghan leaders.

SOLUTION

In less than a year, the position of the Soviet leadership on this issue changed from restraint to consent to open military intervention in the intra-Afghan conflict. With all the reservations, it boiled down to the desire "under no circumstances to lose Afghanistan" (the literal expression of the KGB chairman Yu.V. Andropov).

Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko at first opposed the provision of military assistance to the Taraki regime, but failed to defend his position. Supporters of the introduction of troops into a neighboring country, first of all, Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, had no less influence. L.I. Brezhnev began to lean towards a forceful solution of the issue. The unwillingness of other members of the top leadership to challenge the opinion of the first person, together with a lack of understanding of the specifics of Islamic society, ultimately predetermined the adoption of an ill-considered decision to send troops.

The documents show that the Soviet military leadership (except for the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov) thought quite sensibly. Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov recommended refraining from attempts to resolve political issues in the neighboring country by military force. But at the top, they ignored the opinion of experts not only from the Ministry of Defense, but also from the Foreign Ministry. The political decision to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 in a narrow circle - at a meeting of L.I. Brezhnev with Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko, as well as the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU K.U. Chernenko, i.e. five members of the Politburo out of 12. The objectives of the entry of troops into the neighboring country and the methods of their actions were not determined.

The first Soviet units crossed the border on December 25, 1979 at 18:00 local time. Paratroopers were airlifted to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. On the evening of December 27, KGB special groups and a detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate carried out the special operation "Storm-333". As a result, the Taj Beck Palace, where the residence of the new head of Afghanistan, H. Amin, was located, was captured, and he himself was killed. By this time, Amin had lost Moscow's confidence in connection with the overthrow and assassination of Taraki organized by him and information about cooperation with the CIA. The election of B. Karmal, who arrived illegally from the USSR, as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, was hastily formalized.

The population of the Soviet Union was faced with the fact of bringing troops into a neighboring country in order, as they said, to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people in protecting the April Revolution. The official position of the Kremlin was set out in the answers of L.I. Brezhnev to questions from a Pravda correspondent on January 13, 1980, Brezhnev pointed to an armed intervention unleashed against Afghanistan from outside, the threat of turning the country into an "imperialist military foothold on the southern border of our country." He also mentioned the repeated appeals of the Afghan leadership for the entry of Soviet troops, which, according to him, would be withdrawn "as soon as the reasons that prompted the Afghan leadership to request their entry cease."

The USSR at that time was really afraid of interference in Afghan affairs by the United States, as well as China and Pakistan, a real threat to its borders from the south. For reasons of politics, morality, and the preservation of international prestige, the Soviet Union also could not continue to indifferently observe the development of civil strife in Afghanistan, during which innocent people died. Another thing is that it was decided to stop the escalation of violence by another force, ignoring the specifics of intra-Afghan events. The loss of control over the situation in Kabul could be regarded in the world as the defeat of the socialist camp. Not the last role in the events of December 1979 was played by personal, as well as departmental assessments of the situation in Afghanistan. The fact is that the United States was extremely interested in drawing the Soviet Union into the Afghan events, believing that Afghanistan would become for the USSR what Vietnam was for the USA. Through third countries, Washington supported the forces of the Afghan opposition, which fought against the Karmal regime and Soviet troops.

STAGES

The direct participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Afghan war is usually divided into four stages:

1) December 1979 - February 1980 - commissioning of the main staff of the 40th Army, placement in garrisons; 2) March 1980 - April 1985 - participation in hostilities against the armed opposition, assistance in the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA; 3) May 1985 - December 1986 - a gradual transition from active participation in hostilities to supporting operations conducted by Afghan troops; 4) January 1987 - February 1989 - participation in the policy of national reconciliation, support for the DRA forces, withdrawal of a contingent of troops to the territory of the USSR.

The initial number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 50 thousand people. Then the number of OKSV exceeded 100 thousand people. Soviet soldiers entered the first battle already on January 9, 1980, during the disarmament of the insurgent artillery regiment of the DRA. In the future, the Soviet troops, against their will, were drawn into active hostilities, the command switched to organizing planned operations against the most powerful groups of the Mujahideen.

Soviet soldiers and officers showed the highest fighting qualities, courage and heroism in Afghanistan, although they had to act in the most difficult conditions, at an altitude of 2.5-4.5 km, at a temperature of plus 45-50 ° C and an acute shortage of water. With the acquisition of the necessary experience, the training of Soviet soldiers made it possible to successfully resist the professional cadres of the Mujahideen, trained with the help of the Americans in numerous training camps in Pakistan and other countries.

However, the involvement of the OKSV in hostilities did not increase the chances of a forceful resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. The fact that it was necessary to withdraw troops was understood by many military leaders. But such decisions were beyond their competence. The political leadership of the USSR believed that the peace process in Afghanistan, guaranteed by the UN, should become a condition for the withdrawal. However, Washington interfered in every possible way with the UN mediation mission. On the contrary, American assistance to the Afghan opposition after the death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of Yu.V. Andropov has risen sharply. Only since 1985 did significant changes take place in relation to the participation of the USSR in the civil war in a neighboring country. The need to return OKSV to their homeland became completely obvious. The economic difficulties of the Soviet Union itself became more and more acute, for which large-scale assistance to the southern neighbor became ruinous. By that time, several thousand Soviet servicemen had died in Afghanistan. A latent dissatisfaction with the ongoing war was ripening in society, about which the press spoke only in general official phrases.

PROPAGANDA

ABOUT THE PROPAGANDISM SUPPORT OF OUR ACTION IN REGARD TO AFGHANISTAN.

Top secret

Special folder

When covering in our propaganda work - in the press, on television, on the radio, an action undertaken by the Soviet Union at the request of the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, an action of assistance in relation to external aggression, be guided by the following.

In all propaganda work, proceed from the provisions contained in the appeal of the Afghan leadership to the Soviet Union with a request for military assistance and from the TASS report on this matter.

As the main thesis, to emphasize that the sending of limited Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan, carried out at the request of the Afghan leadership, serves one goal - to provide the people and government of Afghanistan with assistance and assistance in the fight against external aggression. This Soviet action does not pursue any other goals.

Emphasize that as a result of acts of external aggression and growing interference from outside in internal Afghan affairs, a threat arose to the gains of the April Revolution, to the sovereignty and independence of the new Afghanistan. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, to which the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has repeatedly asked for help in repelling aggression over the past two years, responded positively to this request, guided, in particular, by the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation .

The request of the government of Afghanistan and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union is exclusively a matter for two sovereign states, the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which regulate their own relations. They, like any UN member state, have the right to individual or collective self-defence, which is provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

When highlighting changes in the Afghan leadership, emphasize that this is internal affairs of the Afghan people, proceed from the statements published by the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, from the speeches of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak.

Give a firm and reasoned rebuff to any possible insinuations about the alleged Soviet interference in internal Afghan affairs. Emphasize that the USSR had and has nothing to do with changes in the leadership of Afghanistan. The task of the Soviet Union in connection with the events in and around Afghanistan is to render assistance and assistance in safeguarding the sovereignty and independence of friendly Afghanistan in the face of external aggression. As soon as this aggression ceases, the threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Afghan state will disappear, the Soviet military contingents will be immediately and completely withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan.

WEAPON

FROM THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL AMBASSADOR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

(Secret)

Specialist. No. 397, 424.

Visit Comrade Karmal and, referring to the instructions, inform him that the requests of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the supply of special equipment for the border troops and detachments of party activists and the protection of the revolution have been carefully considered.

The government of the USSR, guided by the desire to assist the government of the DRA in carrying out measures to combat the counter-revolution, found an opportunity to supply the DRA in 1981 45 BTR-60 PB armored personnel carriers with ammunition and 267 military radio stations for the border troops and 10 thousand Kalashnikov AK assault rifles, 5 thousand Makarov PM pistols and ammunition for detachments of party activists and the defense of the revolution, totaling about 6.3 million rubles ...

GRAVES

... Suslov. I would like to advise. Comrade Tikhonov presented a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding the perpetuation of the memory of the soldiers who died in Afghanistan. Moreover, it is proposed to allocate a thousand rubles to each family for the installation of tombstones on the graves. The point, of course, is not the money, but the fact that if we now perpetuate the memory, we write about it on the tombstones of the graves, and in some cemeteries there will be several such graves, then from a political point of view this is not entirely correct.

Andropov. Of course, it is necessary to bury warriors with honors, but it is still too early to perpetuate their memory.

Kirilenko. It is not advisable to install tombstones now.

Tikhonov. In general, of course, it is necessary to bury, it is another matter whether inscriptions should be made.

Suslov. We should also think about the answers to parents whose children died in Afghanistan. There should be no liberties here. Answers should be concise and more standard...

LOSSES

The servicemen who died in hospitals on the territory of the USSR from wounds received during the fighting in Afghanistan were not included in the official statistics of the losses of the Afghan war. However, the casualty figures directly on the territory of Afghanistan are accurate and carefully verified, Vladimir Sidelnikov, professor of the Department of Thermal Injuries at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, said in an interview with RIA Novosti. In 1989, he served in the Tashkent military hospital and worked as part of the commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense based on the headquarters of the Turkestan military district, which checked the true number of losses during the war in Afghanistan.

According to official figures, 15,400 Soviet servicemen were killed in Afghanistan. Sidelnikov called "speculation" the assertions of some media that in Russia, even 28 years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, they are silent about the true scale of losses in the Afghan war. “The fact that we are hiding colossal losses is stupidity, this cannot be,” he said. According to the professor, such rumors appeared due to the fact that a very large number of military personnel needed medical assistance. 620 thousand citizens of the USSR went through the war in Afghanistan. And during the ten years of the war, medical assistance was provided to 463,000 servicemen, he said. “This figure includes, among other things, almost 39 thousand people who were injured during the hostilities. The most significant part of those who applied for medical assistance, about 404,000, are infectious patients who have had dysentery, hepatitis, typhoid fever and other infectious diseases,” the military physician said. “But a significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died due to severe complications, wound disease, purulent-septic complications, severe wounds, and injuries. Some stayed with us for up to six months. These people who died in hospitals were not among the officially announced losses,” the military doctor noted. He added that he could not name their exact number due to the fact that there are simply no statistics on these patients. According to Sidelnikov, rumors about colossal losses in Afghanistan are sometimes based on the stories of combat veterans themselves, who often "tend to exaggerate." “Often such opinions are based on the statements of the Mujahideen. But, naturally, each belligerent side tends to exaggerate its victories,” the military doctor noted. “The largest reliable one-time losses were, as far as I know, up to 70 people. As a rule, more than 20-25 people did not die at a time,” he said.

After the collapse of the USSR, many documents of the Turkestan military district were lost, but the medical archives were saved. “The fact that documents about the losses in the Afghan war have been preserved for our descendants in the Military Medical Museum is an undoubted merit of military doctors,” former military intelligence officer, retired colonel Akmal Imambaev told RIA Novosti by phone from Tashkent. After serving in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar, he served at the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO).

According to him, they managed to save “every single case history” in the 340th combined-arms hospital in Tashkent. All the wounded in Afghanistan were admitted to this hospital, and then they were transferred to other medical facilities. “In June 1992, the district was disbanded. His headquarters was occupied by the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan. Most of the servicemen by this time had already left for new places of service in other independent states,” said Imambaev. Then, according to him, the new leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense refused to accept the documentation of the TurkVO, and behind the building of the former headquarters of the district, a furnace was continuously working, in which hundreds of kilograms of documents were burned. But still, even at that difficult time, officers, including military doctors, tried to do everything possible so that the documents did not sink into oblivion, Imambaev said. According to the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan, the case histories of servicemen who were wounded in Afghanistan were sent to the Military Medical Museum after their closure. “Unfortunately, no other statistical data on this issue has been preserved in Uzbekistan, since all orders and accounting books for the 340th combined-arms military hospital in Tashkent were handed over to the Podolsky archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense until 1992,” the veteran noted. “It is difficult to overestimate what military doctors and officers of the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan have preserved for posterity,” he said. “However, it is not for us to evaluate it. We only honestly fulfilled our duty to the Fatherland, remaining true to the oath. Let our children judge whether this war was just or not,” said the veteran of the Afghan war.

RIA Novosti: The statistics of the losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan do not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR. 15.02.2007

AMNESTY

Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Decree

ON AMNESTY FOR FORMER SOVIET TROOPS COMMITTED CRIMES IN AFGHANISTAN

Guided by the principles of humanism, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decides:

1. Release former servicemen from criminal liability for crimes committed by them during their military service in Afghanistan (December 1979 - February 1989).

2. Release from serving sentences persons convicted by the courts of the USSR and Union republics for crimes committed during military service in Afghanistan.

3. Remove the convictions of persons released from punishment on the basis of this amnesty, as well as those who have served sentences for crimes committed during military service in Afghanistan.

4. Instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR within ten days to approve the procedure for the implementation of the amnesty.

Chairman

Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Afghan war 1979-1989
	Afghanistan
	The overthrow of H. Amin, the withdrawal of Soviet troops
Opponents
	Afghan Mujahideen
	Foreign Mujahideen
	With the support of:
Commanders
Yu. V. Tukharinov, B. I. Tkach, V. F. Ermakov, L. E. Generalov, I. N. Rodionov, V. P. Dubynin, V. I. Varennikov, B. V. Gromov, Yu. P. Maksimov, V. A. Matrosov Muhammad Rafi, B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, Abdul Rashid Dostum	G. Hekmatyar, B. Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Ismail Khan, Yunus Khales, D. Haqqani, Said Mansour, Abdul Ali Mazari, M. Nabi, S. Mojaddedi, Abdul Haq, Amin Wardak, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Syed Gailani
Side forces
USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to the NVO, no more than 300 thousand	From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)
Military casualties
USSR: 15,051 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing DRA: casualties unknown	Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a prolonged political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of the Afghan society sympathizing with them, with political and financial support of foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. friendly regime in Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging special unit of the KGB "Vympel" killed the incumbent President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the protege of the USSR, the former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, B. Karmal, became the new leader of Afghanistan, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.

background

"Big game"

Afghanistan is located in the very center of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan began between the Russian and British empires, called the "Great Game" (Eng. TheGreatGame).

Anglo-Afghan Wars

The British attempted to forcefully dominate Afghanistan by sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. Thus began the first Anglo-Afghan war. Initially, success accompanied the British - they managed to overthrow Emir Dost-Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. The rule of Shuja Khan, however, did not last long and in 1842 he was overthrown. Afghanistan concluded a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.

Meanwhile, the Russian Empire continued to actively move south. In the 1860-1880s, the accession of Central Asia to Russia was basically completed.

The British, worried about the rapid advance of Russian troops to the borders of Afghanistan, began the second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878. The stubborn struggle lasted two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal Emir Abdur-Rahman on the throne and thus maintaining control over the country.

In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint agreements between Russia and Britain.

Independence of Afghanistan

In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared the independence of Afghanistan from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.

The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided significant economic and military assistance to Afghanistan.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely impoverished population, over half of which was illiterate.

Republic of Dauda

In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'état took place in the country. Power was seized by a relative of Zahir Shah, Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.

Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and attempted reforms, but most of them failed. The first republican period in the history of Afghanistan is characterized by strong political instability, rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. The Islamists raised several uprisings, but they were all crushed by government forces.

Daoud's reign ended with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.

Saur Revolution

On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, proclaiming the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the backlog of Afghanistan ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

In March 1979, during a mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the strengthening of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing in Afghanistan by the landing method of the 105th Guards Airborne Division.

The further development of the situation in Afghanistan - the armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle, and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet guides. It warily followed the activities of Amin at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA who were supporters of Taraki. Repression also affected the army, the main pillar of the PDPA, which led to the fall of its already low morale, caused mass desertion and riots. The Soviet leadership was afraid that further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, information was received through the KGB about Amin's connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement by a leader more loyal to the USSR. As such, B. Karmal was considered, whose candidacy was supported by the chairman of the KGB, Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing an operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use the requests of Amin himself for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979, there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a special-purpose detachment of the GRU - specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to protect Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. Chief of the General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

According to V. I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A. N. Kosygin, and from that moment A. N. Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage .

On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev, which began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Airborne Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding the Soviet military in Bagram since July 7, 1979. transport aircraft and helicopters.

At the same time, B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet military personnel. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Amin, but he survived, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a “Muslim battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which entered the guard brigade of Amin’s palace, which greatly facilitated the preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, in mid-December, 2 special groups of the KGB also arrived in Afghanistan.

Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan military district, the field command of the 40th combined arms army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, units of combat and logistics support were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps command, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, parts of aviation technical and airfield support. Three more divisions were mobilized as a reserve in both districts. More than 50,000 people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up to complete the units, about 8,000 cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. It was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for the transfer to Afghanistan, which was transferred to airfields in the Turkestan military district on December 14.

By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported that the troops were ready to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed Directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan, and the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense purposes was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov issued an order to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would become garrisons and guard important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition groups, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed over the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya border river, which was tasked with capturing the Salang high mountain pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure unhindered passage of Soviet troops.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed the landing method by noon on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in the designated areas of Kabul, where they received the task of blocking the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. The 357th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Airborne Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield after a skirmish with Afghan servicemen. They also provided protection for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, during the assault Amin was killed. Government offices in Kabul were captured by Soviet paratroopers.

On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and radio Kabul broadcast the appeal of this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the "second stage of the revolution" was proclaimed.

Main events

In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Airborne Regiment arrived in Bagram (111 pdp) 105th Airborne Division (105 vdd), the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after the regular reorganization in 1979 - a separate battalion 345 opdp. These were the first military units and units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

From December 9 to 12, the first "Muslim battalion" arrived in Afghanistan - 154 ooSpN 15obrSpN.

December 25 columns of the 40th Army (40 BUT) of the Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.

• January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and start of hostilities - raids against rebel detachments in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, by forces of a no less reinforced battalion and the use of army firepower, including the Air Force to suppress resistance.

• February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. When passing the tunnel units 186 SME and 2 zrr in the absence of a commandant's service, a traffic jam formed in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated 2 zrr. No data are available for suffocated Afghans.
• February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in the mountain infantry regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region entered into heavy bloody battles, due to the blocking of the 3rd Airborne Battalion by dushmans in the Asmara Gorge. 33 people were killed, 40 people were injured, one soldier was missing.
• April – The US Congress authorizes $15,000,000 in "direct and open aid" to the Afghan opposition.

The first military operation in Panjshir.

• May 11 - the death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
• June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
• August 3 - battle near the village of Shaest. In the Mashkhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the city of Faizabad, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st MSD was ambushed, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
• August 12 - the arrival of the special forces of the KGB of the USSR "Karpaty" in the country.
• September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach is appointed Commander of the 40th Army.

• September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; the death of Major General Khakhalov.
• October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").
• December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province).

• April 5 - During a military operation in western Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iran. Iranian combat aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
• In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which for the first time a mass landing was carried out in Afghanistan: over 4,000 airborne troops were parachuted during the first three days alone. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various branches of the armed forces took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously for all 120 km into the depths of the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was taken.
• November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel.
• November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani President, during which he informed him of " the new flexible policy of the Soviet side and the understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis". The meeting also discussed the expediency of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen kidnapped a group of Soviet "civilian specialists" numbering 16 people.
• February 2 - Hostages kidnapped in Mazar-i-Sharif and located in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
• March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Yu. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for " problem understanding”and assures the mediators that he is ready to undertake“ certain steps”, but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
• April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
• May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan " set deadlines for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops».
• July - offensive of the Mujahideen on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
• August - the hard work of D. Cordoves' mission to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about dialogue with the UN».
• Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.

• January 16 - the Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

• April 30 - in the Khazar Gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
• October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft from the Strela MANPADS over Kabul.

• April 21 - The death of the Maravar company.
• April 26 - Soviet and Afghan POWs revolt in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.
• May 25 - Kunar operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara Gorge, Kunar province, 4th company of the 149th Guards. Motor Rifle Regiment. Once in the ring surrounded by the Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - "Black Storks" guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
• June - army operation in Panjshir.
• Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".
• October 16-17 - Shutulskaya tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
• The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of stronghold fortified areas in hard-to-reach areas of the country began.
• On November 22, 1985, while performing a task, an outpost of the Motomaneuverable Group (MMG) of the Panfilov Border Detachment of the Eastern Border District of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. In the battle near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of the province of Badakhshan, 19 border guards were killed. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan war of 1979-1989.

• February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
• April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.
• May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.
• June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsaj of the 783rd ORB of the 201st MSD - Jarav Gorge, in which 18 scouts died, 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
• July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7,000 people). Late term the output will be moved. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.
• August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.
• August 18-26 - Military operation "Trap" under the command of General of the Army V. I. Varennikov. The assault on the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area in the province of Herat.
• Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group of 173 ooSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of MANPADS "Stinger" in the amount of three pieces in the Kandahar region.
• October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
• November 13 - at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “ We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years now. If we do not change approaches, then we will fight for another 20-30 years". Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeev said: There is not a single military task that would be set, but not solved, but there is no result.<…>We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We lost the fight for the Afghan people". At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
• December - an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

• January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.
• February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.
• February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
• March 8 - shelling by Mujahideen of the city of Panj, Tajik SSR.
• March - Operation "Thunderstorm" in the province of Ghazni.
• March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Asadabad battalion, defeated a large Mujahideen base in Karer.

Operation Circle in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.

• April 9 - Mujahideen attacked the Soviet frontier post. When repelling an attack, 2 Soviet servicemen are killed, 20 Mujahideen are destroyed.
• April 12 - the defeat of the base of the rebels Milov in the province of Nangarhar.
• May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.

Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.

• Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the state border.
• November 23 - the beginning of Operation Highway to deblock the city of Khost.

• January 7-8 - battle at height 3234.
• April 14 - With the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
• June 24 - Opposition detachments captured the center of the province of Wardak - the city of Maidanshehr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maidanshehr carried out an operation to destroy the Khurkabul base area.
• August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz

• January 23-26 - operation "Typhoon", Kunduz province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
• February 4 - The last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
• February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Military Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to the official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (Termez). He declared: "There was not a single Soviet soldier left behind me." This statement was not true, since both Soviet military personnel who were captured by the Mujahideen and border guard units remained in Afghanistan, covering the withdrawal of troops and returning to the territory of the USSR only in the afternoon of February 15. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR performed the tasks of protecting the Soviet-Afghan border by separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

results

• Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could. The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army. Before the Limited Contingent, no one has ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan. All the combat operations that the 40th Army had to conduct from 1980 until almost the last days of our stay in the country were either preemptive or retaliatory. Together with government troops, we carried out military operations only to exclude attacks on our garrisons, airfields, motorcades and communications that were used to transport goods.

Indeed, before the beginning of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, the Mujahideen never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov's opinion that the 40th Army was not faced with the task of military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who in 1985-1987 was the deputy head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 40th army, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued the same goals - to suppress the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthen the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition formations only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence), the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the leadership of Afghanistan actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000 military units (army, police, state security).

• After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries declared a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow.

Humanitarian consequences

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a considerable percentage of whom remain there to this day. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the problem of refugees around the world.

The bitterness of the belligerents reached extreme limits. It is known that the Mujahideen subjected prisoners to torture, among which such as the "red tulip" is widely known. Weapons were used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from rockets left over from the departure Soviet army, residents used rockets to build houses, as ceilings, window and door beams, however, statements by the US administration about the use of the 40th Army chemical weapons, voiced in March 1982, were never documented.

Side losses

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more were in the ranks of refugees, many of whom left the country” . Apparently, there is no exact division of victims into government army soldiers, Mujahideen and civilians.

USSR losses

Total - 13 833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. In the future, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to deaths from the consequences of injuries and illnesses after dismissal from armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and in accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

• Soviet Army - 14,427
• KGB - 576
• Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand cases.

According to Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the St. Petersburg Military Medical Academy, the final figures do not include servicemen who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals in the USSR.

In a study of the Afghan war, conducted by officers of the General Staff under the direction of prof. Valentina Runova, gives an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in action, those who died of wounds and disease, and those who died in accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

Of the approximately 400 servicemen who were listed as missing during the war, a certain number of prisoners were taken by Western journalists to the countries Western Europe and North America. According to the USSR Foreign Ministry, as of June 1989, about 30 people lived there; three people returned to the Soviet Union after the USSR Prosecutor General's statement that the former prisoners would not be prosecuted. As of February 15, 2009, the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Warriors under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth (CIS) member states included 270 people in the list of missing Soviet citizens in Afghanistan in the period from 1979 to 1989.

The number of dead Soviet generals according to publications in the press, it is usually four dead, sometimes a figure of 5 dead and dead in Afghanistan is given.

		Title, position			Circumstances
Vadim Nikolaevich Khakhalov		Major General, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Turkestan Military District	gorge Lurkoh		He died in a helicopter shot down by Mujahideen
Petr Ivanovich Shkidchenko		Lieutenant General, Head of the Combat Control Group under the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan	province of Paktia		He died in a helicopter shot down by ground fire. Posthumously awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation (4.07.2000)
Anatoly Andreevich Dragun		lieutenant general, head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces	DRA, Kabul?		Died suddenly while on a business trip to Afghanistan
Nikolay Vasilievich Vlasov		Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Afghan Air Force	DRA, Shindand Province		Shot down by a MANPADS hit while flying a MiG-21
Leonid Kirillovich Tsukanov		Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Artillery of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan	DRA, Kabul		Died of illness

Losses in equipment, according to official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, no information was published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.

Some of the Soviet servicemen who fought in Afghanistan experienced the so-called "Afghan syndrome" - post-traumatic stress disorders. Testing conducted in the early 1990s showed that at least 35-40% of the participants in the war in Afghanistan were in dire need of the help of professional psychologists.

Other losses

According to the Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

In works of culture and art

Fiction

• Andrey Dyshev. Reconnaissance. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-14711-X
• Dyshev Sergey. Lost Squad. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-15709-3
• Mikhail Evstafiev. Two steps from paradise. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18424-4
• Nikolai Prokudin. Raid Battalion. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18904-1
• Sergei Skripal, Gennady Rytchenko. The doomed contingent. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-16949-0
• Gleb Bobrov. Soldier Saga. - M.: Eksmo, 2007 - ISBN 978-5-699-20879-1
• Alexander Prokhanov. A tree in the center of Kabul. - M.: Soviet writer, 1982. - 240 p.
• Svetlana Aleksievich. Zinc boys. - M.: Time, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-9691-0189-3
• Frolov I. A. Walks with a flight engineer. Helicopter. - M.: EKSMO, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-699-21881-3
• Viktor Nikolaev. Alive in help. Notes of an Afghan. - M.: Soft Publishing House, 2006. - ISBN 5-93876-026-7
• Pavel Andreev. Twelve stories. "Afghan war 1979-1989", 1998-2002.
• Alexander Segen. Lost APC. - M.: Armada-Press, 2001, 224 p. - ISBN 5-309-00098-4
• Oleg Ermakov. Afghan stories. The sign of the beast.
• Igor Moiseenko. Firing sector. - M.Eksmo, 2008

Memoirs

• Gromov B.V."Limited contingent". M., ed. Group "Progress", "Culture", 1994. 352 p. The book of the last commander of the 40th Army contains many documents that reveal the reasons for the introduction of troops, many events of the war are described.
• Lyakhovsky A. A. The tragedy and valor of Afghan M., Iskona, 1995, 720 p. ISBN 5-85844-047-9 Large fragments of the text coincide with the book by Gromov B.V.
• Mayorov A. M. The truth about the Afghan war Testimonies of the chief military adviser. M., Human Rights, 1996, ISBN 5-7712-0032-8
• Gordienko A. N. Wars of the second half of the XX century. Minsk., 1999 ISBN 985-437-507-2 A large section of the book is devoted to the background and course of hostilities in Afghanistan
• Ablazov V.I."Afghanistan. The Fourth War”, Kyiv, 2002; “A cloudless sky over all of Afghanistan”, Kyiv, 2005; "Long way from Afghan captivity and obscurity", Kyiv, 2005
• Bondarenko I. N.“How we built in Afghanistan”, Moscow, 2009
• Pillows D. L. Confession to oneself (on participation in hostilities in Afghanistan). - Vyshny Volochek, 2002. - 48 s
• David S. Insby. Afghanistan. Soviet Victory // Flame of the Cold War: Victories that never happened. = Cold War Hot: Alternative Decisuicions of the Cold War / ed. Peter Tsouros, trans. Y.Yablokova. - M.: AST, Lux, 2004. - S. 353-398. - 480 s. - (Great confrontations). - 5000 copies. - ISBN 5-17-024051 (alternative history of the war)
• Kozhukhov, M. Yu. Alien stars over Kabul - M .: Olympus: Eksmo, 2010-352 p., ISBN 978-5-699-39744-0

In cinema

• "Hot Summer in Kabul" (1983) - a film directed by Ali Khamraev
• "Paid for Everything" (1988) - a film directed by Alexei Saltykov
• "Rambo 3" (1988, USA)
• "Sergeant" (1988) - a film as part of the film almanac "Bridge", dir. Stanislav Gaiduk, production: Mosfilm, Belarusfilm
• "Scorched by Kandahar" (1989, director: Yuri Sabitov) - a Soviet Afghan officer decommissioned due to injury enters the fight against the mafia and, in the end, at the cost of his own life, exposes the criminals
• "Cargo 300" (1989) - a film by the Sverdlovsk film studio
• "Two Steps to Silence" (1991) - a film directed by Yuri Tupitsky
• "Gorge of Spirits" (1991) - a film directed by Sergei Nilov
• "Afghan break" (1991, USSR-Italy) - a film by Vladimir Bortko about the war in Afghanistan
• "Leg" (1991) - a film directed by Nikita Tyagunov
• "Afghan" (1991) - a film directed by Vladimir Mazur. Contrabalt
• "Afghan-2" (1994) - continuation of the film "Afghan"
• "Peshawar Waltz" (1994) - a film by T. Bekmambetov and G. Kayumov, in the opinion of "Afghan" veterans, one of the most poignant and truthful films about that war, dedicated to the events in Badaber
• "Muslim" (1995) - a film by Vladimir Khotinenko about a Soviet soldier who returned home after 7 years in captivity of the Mujahideen
• "9th Company" (2005, Russia-Ukraine-Finland) - a film by Fyodor Bondarchuk
• "Star of a Soldier" (2006, France) - a film by French journalist Christophe de Ponfilly about the history of a Soviet prisoner of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prototype of the protagonist was one of the participants in the armed uprising in the camp of Badaber
• "Charlie Wilson's War" (2007, USA) - film based on real history about how, during the Afghan war, Congressman from Texas Charles Wilson organized the financing of a covert CIA operation to supply weapons to the Afghan resistance forces (Operation Cyclone)
• The Wind Runner (2007)
• "Afghan War" 2009 - a documentary series with elements of historical reconstruction
• "Caravan Hunters" (2010) - a military drama based on the works of Alexander Prokhanov "Caravan Hunter" and "Muslim Wedding".

In music

• "Blue Berets": Our Afghan, Afghan kink, Silver plane, War is not a walk, Borders
• "Cascade": Cuckoo, We leave at dawn, On the Bagram road, I'll be back, We're leaving, Warriors-motorists, Who needed this war?
• "Contingent": Cuckoo, Prisoners, Meter by two
• "Echo of Afghanistan": I was killed near Kandahar, Cigarette smoke
• "Lube": For you
• "Survival Manual": 1988 - Confrontation in Moscow - Afghan Syndrome
• Igor Talkov: Ballad of an Afghan
• Maxim Troshin: Afghanistan
• Valery Leontiev. Afghan wind (I. Nikolaev - N. Zinoviev)
• Alexander Rosenbaum. Pilot's monologue of the "Black Tulip", Caravan, In the mountains of Afghanistan, It's raining on the pass, We'll be back
• Yuri Shevchuk. War is childish, don't shoot
• Konstantin Kinchev. Tomorrow may be late (album "Nervous Night", 1984)
• Egor Letov. afghan syndrome
• N. Anisimov. The last monologue of the Mi-8, Helicopter gunner's song
• M. Bessonov. Heart shrinks to pain
• I. Burlyaev. In memory of the helicopter pilots of Afghanistan
• V. Verstakov. Allah Akbar
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• Front line. Afghanistan 82

The last ten years of the Soviet state was marked by the so-called Afghan war of 1979-1989.

In the turbulent nineties, as a result of vigorous reforms and economic crises, information about the Afghan war was practically ousted from the collective consciousness. However, in our time, after the colossal work of historians and researchers, after the removal of all ideological stereotypes, an impartial look at the history of those bygone years has opened up.

Conditions for a conflict

On the territory of our country, however, as well as on the territory of the entire post-Soviet space, the Afghan war can be associated with one ten-year period of 1979-1989. It was a period when a limited contingent of Soviet troops was present on the territory of Afghanistan. In fact, it was just one of many moments in a long civil conflict.

The prerequisites for its emergence can be considered 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown in this mountainous country. After that, power was seized by a short-lived regime headed by Mohammed Daoud. This regime lasted until the Saur Revolution in 1978. Following her, power in the country passed to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which announced the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The organizational structure of the party and the state resembled the Marxist one, which naturally brought it closer to the Soviet state. The revolutionaries gave preference to the leftist ideology, and of course made it the main one in the entire Afghan state. Following the example of the Soviet Union, they began to build socialism there.

For all that, even before 1978, the state already existed in an environment of ongoing unrest. The presence of two revolutions, a civil war, served to eliminate a stable socio-political life in the entire region.

The socialist-oriented government fought against a wide variety of forces, but the first fiddle was with the radical Islamists. According to Islamists, members of the ruling elite are enemies not only for the entire multinational people of Afghanistan, but also for all Muslims. In fact, the new political regime was in the position of a declared holy war against the "infidels".

Under such conditions, special detachments of Mujahideen warriors were formed. Actually, the soldiers of the Soviet army fought with these Mujahideen, for whom the Soviet-Afghan war began after some time. In a nutshell, the success of the Mujahideen is due to the fact that they skillfully carried out propaganda work throughout the country.

The task of the Islamist agitators was made easier by the fact that the vast majority of Afghans, and this is approximately 90% of the country's population, were illiterate. On the territory of the country, immediately upon leaving the large cities, a tribal system of relations with extreme patriarchy reigned.

The revolutionary government that came to power had no time to properly settle in the capital of the state, Kabul, when an armed uprising began in almost all provinces, fueled by Islamist agitators.

In such a sharply complicated situation in March 1979, the Afghan government received the first appeal to the Soviet leadership with a request for military assistance. Subsequently, such appeals were repeatedly repeated. There was nowhere else to look for support for the Marxists, who were surrounded by nationalists and Islamists.

For the first time, the problem of providing assistance to the Kabul "comrades" was considered by the Soviet leadership in March 1979. At that time, General Secretary Brezhnev had to speak out and forbid armed intervention. However, over time, the operational situation at the Soviet borders worsened more and more.

Gradually, the members of the Politburo and other top state functionaries changed their point of view. In particular, Defense Minister Ustinov received statements that the unstable situation on the Soviet-Afghan border could also be dangerous for the Soviet state.

So, already in September 1979, another upheaval took place on the territory of Afghanistan. Now there has been a change of leadership in the local ruling party. As a result, the party and state administration was in the hands of Hafizullah Amin.

The KGB reported that the new leader had been recruited by CIA agents. The presence of these reports increasingly persuaded the Kremlin to intervene militarily. At the same time, preparations began for the overthrow of the new regime.

The Soviet Union was leaning towards a more loyal figure in the Afghan government - Barak Karmal. He was one of the members of the ruling party. Initially, he held important positions in the party leadership, was a member of the Revolutionary Council. When the party purges began, he was sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He was later declared a traitor and conspirator. Karmal, who was then in exile, had to stay abroad. However, he managed to move to the territory of the Soviet Union, and become the person who was elected by the Soviet leadership.

How were the decisions to deploy troops made?

In December 1979, it became quite clear that the Soviet Union could be drawn into its own Soviet-Afghan war. After brief discussions, clarifications of the last reservations in the documentation, the Kremlin approved a special operation to overthrow the Amin regime.

It is clear that it is unlikely that at that moment in Moscow anyone understood how long this military operation. However, even then, there were people who opposed the decision to send troops. They were Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kosygin. For the latter, such his conviction became another and decisive pretext for an irrevocable break in relations with General Secretary Brezhnev and his entourage.

For the last preparatory measures for the direct transfer of Soviet troops to the territory of Afghanistan, they preferred to begin the next day, namely on December 13th. The Soviet secret services made an attempt to organize the assassination of the Nafghan leader, but as it turned out, this did not affect Hafizullah Amin. The success of the special operation was in jeopardy. Despite everything, preparations for the special operation continued.

How the palace of Hafizullah Amin was stormed

The troops decided to enter at the end of December, and this happened on the 25th. A couple of days later, while in the palace, the Afghan leader Amin became ill, and he fainted. The same situation happened to some of his associates. The reason for this was the general poisoning, organized by Soviet agents, who settled in the residence as cooks. Not knowing the true causes of illness and not trusting anyone, Amin turned to Soviet doctors. Arriving from the Soviet embassy in Kabul, they immediately began to provide medical assistance, however, the president's bodyguards became worried.

In the evening, at about seven o'clock, near the presidential palace, a car stalled near the Soviet sabotage group. However, he died in a good place. This happened near a communication well. This well was brought to the distribution center of all Kabul communications. The object was quickly mined, and after a while there was a deafening explosion that was heard even in Kabul. As a result of the sabotage, the capital was left without electricity.

This explosion was the signal for the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). Quickly assessing the situation, the commander of the special operation, Colonel Boyarintsev, ordered the start of the assault on the presidential palace. When the Afghan leader was informed about the attack by unknown armed men, he ordered his close associates to request help from the Soviet embassy.

From a formal point of view, both states remained on friendly terms. When Amin learned from the report that Soviet special forces were storming his palace, he refused to believe it. There is no reliable data on the circumstances of Amin's death. Many eyewitnesses later claimed that he could say goodbye to life as a result of suicide. And even before the moment when Soviet special forces broke into his apartment.

Be that as it may, the special operation was carried out successfully. They seized not only the presidential residence, but the entire capital, and on the night of December 28, Karmal was brought to Kabul, who was declared president. On the Soviet side, as a result of the assault, 20 people were killed (representatives of paratroopers and special forces), including the commander of the assault, Grigory Boyarintsev. In 1980, he was posthumously nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Chronicle of the Afghan War

Based on the nature of hostilities and strategic objectives, briefly the history of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) can be divided into four main periods.

The first period is the winter of 1979-1980. The beginning of the entry of Soviet troops into the country. The military personnel were sent to capture garrisons and important infrastructure facilities.

The second period (1980-1985) is the most active. Fighting spread throughout the country. They were offensive. There was a liquidation of the Mujahideen, and the improvement of the local army.

The third period (1985-1987) - military operations were carried out mainly by Soviet aviation and artillery. Ground forces practically did not participate.

The fourth period (1987-1989) is the last one. The Soviet troops were preparing for their withdrawal. Nobody stopped the civil war in the country. The Islamists also failed to win. The withdrawal of troops was scheduled due to the economic crisis in the USSR, as well as due to a change in political course.

The war goes on

The leaders of the state argued that the troops of the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan by the fact that they only provided assistance to the friendly Afghan people, moreover, at the request of their government. Following the introduction of Soviet troops into the DRA, the UN Security Council was promptly convened. There they presented an anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States. However, the resolution was not supported.

The American government, although not directly involved in the conflict, was actively financing the Mujahideen. The Islamists possessed weapons purchased from Western countries. As a result, the actual cold war of the two political systems found the opening of a new front, which turned out to be the Afghan territory. The conduct of hostilities was at times covered by all the world's media, which told the whole truth about the Afghan war.

American intelligence agencies, in particular the CIA, organized several training camps in neighboring Pakistan. They trained the Afghan Mujahideen, also called dushmans. Islamic fundamentalists, apart from the generous American financial flows, kept at the expense of money from drug trafficking. Actually, in the 80s, Afghanistan led the world market for the production of opium and heroin. Often, Soviet soldiers of the Afghan war in their special operations eliminated just such productions.

As a result of the Soviet invasion (1979-1989), confrontation began among the majority of the country's population, which had never before held a weapon in their hands. Recruitment into Dushman detachments was carried out by a very wide agent network, spread throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was that they did not have any single center of resistance. Throughout the Soviet-Afghan war, these were numerous heterogeneous groups. They were led by field commanders, but no "leaders" stood out among them.

Many raids did not give proper results due to the effective work of local propagandists with the local population. The Afghan majority (especially the provincial patriarchal one) did not perceive the Soviet military personnel, they were ordinary occupiers for them.

"Policy of National Reconciliation"

Since 1987, the so-called "policy of national reconciliation" has been put into practice. The ruling party decided to give up its monopoly on power. A law was passed allowing "oppositionists" to form their own parties. The country adopted a new constitution and also elected a new president, Mohammed Najibullah. It was assumed that such events were supposed to end the confrontation through compromises.

Along with this, the Soviet leadership, in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev, took a course to reduce their armaments. These plans also included the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring state. The Soviet-Afghan war could not be waged in the situation when the economic crisis began in the USSR. Moreover, the Cold War was coming to an end. The Soviet Union and the United States began negotiations and signed many documents related to disarmament and the end of the Cold War.

For the first time, Secretary General Gorbachev announced the impending withdrawal of troops in December 1987, when he officially visited the United States. Following this, the Soviet, American and Afghan delegations managed to be seated at the negotiating table on neutral territory in Switzerland. As a result, relevant documents were signed. Thus ended the story of another war. Based on the Geneva agreements, the Soviet leadership received promises to withdraw its troops, and from the American - to stop funding the Mujahideen.

Most of the Soviet military limited contingent left the country since August 1988. Then they began to leave military garrisons from some cities and settlements. The last Soviet soldier who left Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 was General Gromov. Footage flew around the world of how Soviet soldiers of the Afghan war were crossing the Friendship Bridge across the Amu Darya River.

Echoes of the Afghan war: losses

Many events of the Soviet era were one-sidedly assessed taking into account party ideology, the same applies to the Soviet-Afghan war. Sometimes dry reports appeared in the press, heroes of the Afghan war were shown on central television. However, before Perestroika and glasnost, the Soviet leadership kept silent about the true scale of combat losses. While the soldiers of the Afghan war in zinc coffins returned home in semi-secrecy. Their funerals were held behind the scenes, and the monuments of the Afghan war were without mention of the places and causes of death.

Beginning in 1989, the Pravda newspaper published what it claimed to be reliable data on casualties of almost 14,000 Soviet troops. Until the end of the 20th century, this number reached 15,000, since the wounded Soviet soldier of the Afghan war was already dying at home due to injuries or illnesses. These were the true consequences of the Soviet-Afghan war.

Some references to combat losses from the Soviet leadership further strengthened conflict situations with the public. And in the late 80s, the demand for the withdrawal of troops from the "Afghan" was almost the main slogan of that era. In the years of stagnation, this was demanded by the dissident movement. In particular, Academician Andrei Sakharov was exiled to Gorky for criticizing the "Afghan issue".

The consequences of the Afghan war: results

What were the consequences of the Afghan conflict? The Soviet invasion lengthened the existence of the ruling party for exactly the time for which a limited contingent of troops remained in the country. With their withdrawal, the ruling regime came to an end. Numerous detachments of the Mujahideen quickly managed to regain control over the entire territory of Afghanistan. Some groups of Islamists began to appear at the Soviet borders, the border guards were often under their fire even after the end of hostilities.

Since April 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is no more, it was completely liquidated by the Islamists. Complete chaos reigned in the country. It was divided by numerous factions. The war against everyone there lasted until the very invasion of NATO troops after the New York attacks of 2001. In the 90s, the Taliban movement emerged in the country, which managed to achieve a leading role in modern world terrorism.

In the minds of post-Soviet people, the Afghan war has become one of the symbols of the outgoing Soviet era. The theme of this war was devoted to songs, films, books. Nowadays, in schools, it is mentioned in history books for high school students. It is evaluated differently, although almost everyone in the USSR was against it. The echo of the Afghan war still haunts many of its participants.

The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked the crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15,000 Soviet servicemen, the emergence of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, exacerbated the already severe socio-economic crisis that the Soviet Union found itself in in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military spending unbearable for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The real causes of the war were the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth at the expense of the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

Since the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form in the region, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which began to spread everywhere in abundance. The political rift in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow erroneously imagined, but along religious lines.

The entry of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States as the arena of some “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow's misunderstanding of its national interests, incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political myopia.

Afghanistan showed the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy to the real state of affairs in the world.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by growing instability in the Middle East, which was the result of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes an uproar in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a pretext for an armed conflict and finds it in a war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (senior), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi sponsors various terrorist groups; Turkey's centre-left government resigns.

The situation is also radicalizing in peripheral Afghanistan. In April 1978, the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a "client" of the USSR, counting on financial, economic and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent, relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. In all the decades that have passed since then, there is no mention of Afghanistan in a negative context in Soviet history. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West has tacitly acknowledged this fact and has never been interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from a monarchy to a republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April "revolution" of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, the leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many participants in the coup were well known - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) worked closely with them.

It seemed that Moscow had nothing to lose from regime change. However, the "socialists" repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures provoked resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the "socialists" was steadily shrinking. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began to send groups of their servicemen in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as to support the opposition with weapons. China has been active. In parallel, historically existing and earlier contradictions between the leaders of the "socialists" intensified.

As a result, a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more out of 34 provinces remained under its control.

March 18, 1979 Taraki in extended telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin, he explains the current situation and insistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. Despair, the consciousness of hopelessness, comes through in every word of Taraki. He returns each question of the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin wonders why, they say, you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin's naive, ideologically motivated proposals to rely on "workers", Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet premier proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov almost the same thing.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his colleagues in the Politburo about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly sensible considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean war on the population. There seems to be a reason to revise or at least correct the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, and so on. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin suggested to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send troops. Then it was necessary to answer the question: what to do in the event of an inevitable fall of the regime, about which the regime itself warns? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of waiting and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

In the Politburo, 3 groups are gradually distinguished: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The ailing Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and with difficulty focuses on problems that need to be addressed. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making appropriate decisions.

During the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increase pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help the troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, are heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin takes place in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power, removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since that time, Moscow has set itself the goal of achieving the removal of Amin, whom it does not trust, to bring to power "its" man - Karmal, and to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into a dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these actions, in themselves reasonable, but committed without agreement and secretly from the Soviet side, are considered as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to withdraw Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, issues of a special operation by the Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, which should be covered by the second, parallel and subordinate to the first operation of introducing a "limited" contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with the support of Amin among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives were replaced with new ones, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin.

By December 1, the study of issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note on this matter. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the introduction of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, he was actively resisted by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov. It came to his open clashes and squabbles in raised tones with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and heavy losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border, there was no border crossing either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was eliminated and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. The troops gradually began to enter - more and more.