The Germans are explainably leading - 2,389,560 Fritz,

then the Japanese - 629635 (fell under the distribution in the summer of the 45th),

Hungarians - 513767 (fought very seriously for Hitler),

Austrians - 156682,

Czechs and Slovaks - 69977,

Poles - 60280,

Italians - 48957,

French - 23136,

Yugoslavs - 21822 (the stump is clear, Croats),

Moldovans - 14129,

Chinese - 12928 (just don't tell me that there are fewer Chinese in the world than Moldovans),

Jews - 10173 (buds, here's the Holocaust for you),

Koreans - 7785,

Dutch - 4729,

Mongols - 3608,

Finns - 2377,

Belgians - 2010,

Luxembourgers - 1652 (the country is empty, you see),

Danes - 457,

Spaniards - 452,

gypsies - 383,

Norwegians - 101,

Swedes - 72.

Important: this does not include those who were released right at the fronts - these are about 600 thousand more people, mostly those who were really forcibly drafted (or those who managed to convince our people of this), and these are mostly Eastern Europeans.

The figures for a person who takes the official version of history seriously are somewhat unexpected. It is completely unclear where so many Jews came from among the * prisoners of war *. Even in the entire Finnish army there were no more than three hundred of them, even if they kept a camp synagogue there for them, and two of them were presented to the Iron Cross, but ten thousand? More than the same Finnish prisoners? Either I don't understand something, or the official history suffers, er, from some incompleteness.

French people. Unfortunately, the Soviet army did not reach Paris - where did so many of them come from? They came voluntarily. Division "Charlemagne", aka "Charlemagne". And if more than twenty thousand * volunteers * were taken prisoner, how many uninvited French had to be killed for this? IMHO, a little more than there were in the Normandy squadron. By the way, the entire widely advertised French "resistance", sponsored by both Western intelligence agencies and the Comintern, stood up to the French in less than 20 thousand people.

I saw the chronicle ... French prisoners are coming - not those about whom above, but those whom the Germans took in the 40th. They march in formation, their overcoats are not crumpled, rolls on their shoulders, helmets shine, muzzles are full. They had such a war. The German generals put the division in a stalemate, and it naturally surrendered. Because it is supposed to be so in civilization, they are not barbarians, they fight to the last. By the way, there are no complaints about the French regular officers, they did their duty, and they were beaten out with high quality. The *population* itself did not want to defend its *freedom*.

Roughly the same can be said about the Dutch, Belgians and Luxembourgers. The small number of Norwegian and Swedish prisoners is explained very simply - SSmen were not taken prisoner; if the same Frenchman could still babble in his native language and puzzle our soldiers, then they did not believe the Vikings, and the brotherhood of the Nordic peoples continued in some kind of execution ditch.

Separately, about other brothers, Slavs. The Bulgarians do not appear on the list, as they unequivocally refused to send their troops to the Eastern Front. Yugoslavs, as was said, in this case are Croats, Catholics, who often made up punitive teams. Having no religion and nationality exactly to the same extent as Western Ukrainians, they just as methodically and purposefully slaughtered Orthodox Serbs, Ukrainians and Russians and achieved remarkable success in this.

From innocent sufferers such as Czechs, Slovaks and especially Poles, auxiliary units of the Wehrmacht were often recruited, and although they try to convince us that the fiery hearts of secret fighters against Nazism were beating in Eastern European breasts, let me not believe this. The efficiency is too low for such a number of biological reactors in the supercritical mode, and even films like "Calling Fire on Ourselves" do not convince.

Gypsies... hmm. The Germans often used them as scouts; in general, at the level of purely undercover work, the Abwehr was extremely resourceful and not subject to prejudice. As scouts, both Jews and local teenagers were used - the latter textbook, for wine and chocolate. Wait a minute: up to 150 thousand Jews served in the ranks of the Wehrmacht ... Rigg calculated - the term Holocaust did not exist then, it appeared in the USA only in 1979, and many Jews served directly in the Wehrmacht, among them were officers. These were citizens of Germany, and the state made no distinction on national or religious grounds when conscripting its citizens for military service.

The peoples who were part of the USSR at the time of the war are not mentioned among the "those who do not have a nationality", although the list would be no less expressive. And at least for many, the motivation for Operation Lentil would be much clearer, and much of what is happening with us today. But this is poetry.

So, WHO WAS AGAINST US? In general, it is already clear that abstract "fascists" have little to do with it: half a hundred thousand captured Italians, who are fascists, are a drop in the bucket against the background of captured Germans, and are even inferior in number to the captured Czechs and Slovaks. The Germans, as National Socialists, are already closer to the truth, but the problem is that the rest of the freak show without the Far East is a million in number, and somehow it’s impossible to write off such numbers as a first approximation.

Further. Let me remind you of one banal fact - our ideas about war are formed from the position of entertainment, not functionality. The picture of a tank battle occupies much more space in these representations than the boring description of technological chains and transport tasks that lead to the fact that two tank avalanches roll on top of each other. Smoke and roar, roar and smoke. All this is complemented by reasoning about the strategy and close-ups of the heroically distorted face and hand with the last grenade in it. In fact, every belligerent side is a combination of front and rear, and one could not exist without the other. It is necessary to determine the belligerent side precisely through this totality, through all its terms, and not through the percentage of prisoners and not even through the symbols on the banners!

We sometimes remember "home front workers" (say, when it is necessary to take away their benefits). The boys standing on the boxes at the milling machines, the women who plowed on themselves ... We rightly regard this as a feat, albeit a labor one. What do you call those who worked for the invading army? Do they have a nationality with a religion?

What a thread, Jean-Paul himself did not shoot at the Russians, what are you, what are you ... he worked. And after work I drank beer or some other aperitif for honestly earned money for assembling cannons and tanks. And there is no need to dig into him, he is a victim of the occupation, the personification of enslaved Europe. Himself to whom he likes to get to the bottom.

Here, for example, Sevastopol. Our fortifications are being burned by flamethrower tanks. What? And "Shabi 1-bis". And what do the punishers use in counterterrorism ... excuse me, in counterguerrilla operations in the year 43? Well, wow, Somua S-35 ... who would have thought. And how many French tanks are in the Wehrmacht at this time? 700? Out of six thousand? Well, it's not a percentage, it's almost imperceptible. And the car park: well, you go, one-fifth of it in the Wehrmacht is only French-made. Why would it, huh?

Well, okay, these are evil Westerners. But the brothers-Slavs. Czechs. They made a very decent LT-38 tank, which the treacherous invaders, who took Czechoslovakia without firing a shot, insidiously renamed it 38 (t). The tank turned out even better than the early samples of the T-III, it fought against our forty-five at a time, and it did not give in to the BT. The poor occupied Czechs supplied it to Hitler from 1939 to 1942, and 815 of these vehicles crept in on June 22, 1941. The evil Nazis even admitted in their memoirs that without this help they would not have risked attacking the USSR. But we will not be distracted from the plight of enslaved Europe. We will not, even if after 1942 our Czech brothers supplied the Fuhrer with more than 5 thousand armored vehicles - mostly self-propelled guns on the 38 (t) chassis. We won’t, even if from January to March 1945 the Czechs gave Hitler a third of the production of equipment, more than a thousand units, and the overall percentage of Czech-made armor in the Nazi troops for the war was slightly higher than the British and American in the Soviet army. Poor things, torture yourself like that. And this is not counting mortars, cars, small arms and parts for the V-2.

In total, the French and Czechs provided the "cursed, insensitive and antipathetic" Fuhrer with about 10 thousand armored vehicles. I mean, only on my own. If we consider participation in the technological chains of certain products, there will be many more and different things.

These two "enslaved peoples" gave the Germans about a sixth of the anti-tank guns, a quarter of medium-caliber artillery and half of heavy artillery. Not without ammunition, pfennig is clear. Guess who this ammunition flew into? No, not the Argentines.

Or, say, "Focke-Wulf" -189 a.k.a. "rama", an excellent spotter of artillery fire, on whose conscience God knows how many lives of Soviet soldiers. Yeah, yeah, in Bremen they made about a quarter of their total. The rest is France and the Czech Republic. And to think about and exclude from Hitler's "native" production capacities, say, Austrian ones ... the picture turns out to be completely unsightly.

If someone believes that they were terribly afraid of the gas chambers there, which is why they worked in the Stakhanov style, they are forced to disappoint. They would be afraid, they would not come out with their initiative developments, say, all-terrain vehicles for Russian forests. And the Germans did not get enough of them. British and communist agents, alas, were an exception, and a rare and weak exception, having practically no influence on the labor impulse of the oppressed masses and its results. No matter how our propagandists of the old times inspire us to the contrary (we were generally TOO afraid to offend our satellites) or the whole world in the new times (to wash off the mud from ourselves and pour it on the Soviets, because any donkey can kick a dead lion).

I’m not going on like a tree here, describing the enthusiasm of other enslaved people, and it would be dishonest to count the efforts of, say, Romanian, Hungarian, Finnish or Bulgarian industries: they were normal allies of Adolf and they didn’t make girls out of themselves - at least then.

As I understand it, some readers are itching to get personal and say something like: what would you do in their place, so smart? Everyone can roll on someone else's misfortune; practicing righteousness is not a problem. Not a problem, I agree. Only I didn’t give a damn about impartiality, because I was born in a country in which all of the above shot, crushed, bombed and killed, and not only caused existential suffering to a free person. Killed, among other things, my tribe, my people of various nationalities. Let the new passport refuse me one, like any decent terrorist.

Bringing my natural honesty to the point of acquired cynicism, I will point out one little-known document. As you know, Comrade Stalin, in his famous speech "Brothers and Sisters" (he said so strangely then, either "sisters", or "sisters", I have a wav file), called for the tactics of "scorched earth" that he was mentioned more than once both by our and foreign holy fools. However, few people know that in a specific order regulating this exciting activity, it is expressly forbidden to ruin personal farms, etc. Like, if your native factory was blown up, blow into the village and plow the land, as it was in the civilian one. At least on yourself.

So our oppressed and enslaved brothers in Europe feared not for their lives, but for their image. Well, they wanted the street lamps to still be lit, the waitresses to bring beer, and the morning papers to report on the results of football matches or whatever replaced them there then. And then I wanted them to be considered victims for this. Some even have exhibits, like Lidice or Oradour (how many Khatyn were in Belarus alone ...).

Finally, a few more figures. The German General Government occupied 1/4 of the territory of Poland, as it was before the start of World War II. And there were 271 factories. Poland could not be called an industrial giant, but these factories supplied the Reich with products worth 5.1 billion Reichsmarks in the same time that the enemy spent on our territory, where before the war there were 32 thousand enterprises. Of these, the Germans managed to launch 200 (I did not lose a single zero) and get from them products worth 4.9 billion Reichsmarks.

Conclusion: the words "war" and "occupation" in our and European lexicons generally describe completely different things that cannot be identified. And you should not joyfully sign up for the general company of "tormented by Adolf"; it is humiliating for us to compare ourselves with this honest, benevolent and industrious rump.

The USSR was attacked by a "united Europe" minus the British, Greeks and Serbs (the classic "neutrals" with the letter Sh helped the Fuhrer a lot to the best of their ability). It is foolish to look for a difference between those who shot at ours and those who fed these arrows with cartridges.

The Third Reich was preparing for a strike on the USSR very thoroughly, by the time the war began, a grouping of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of the satellite countries of Germany, which had no analogues until that time, was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions, in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - put up 141 divisions, 181 divisions were concentrated to attack the USSR, this is together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for the war, in just a few years turning its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because under the Versailles agreements, Germany was allowed to have only 100,000. army, without combat aviation, heavy artillery, tanks, powerful navies, universal conscription, into the best army in the world. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, the fact that in the period preceding the rise of the Nazis to power, with the help of the “financial international”, it was possible to maintain the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, passing on its experience to new generations.

The myth that "intelligence reported on time." One of the most enduring and dangerous myths that was created under Khrushchev, and even more strengthened during the years of the Russian Federation, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported on the date of the start of the war, but “stupid”, or in another version, “enemy of the people ”, Stalin dismissed these reports, believing more in his “friend” Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army had been brought to full combat readiness, it would have been possible to avoid a situation when the Wehrmacht reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, they say, it would have been possible to stop the enemy at the border. In addition, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of an armed provocation, as in 1914, when the Russian Empire began mobilization and was accused of “starting a war”, Berlin got a reason to start a war. There was a possibility that we would have to forget about the creation of the "Anti-Hitler coalition".

There were intelligence reports, but there is a very big “But” - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the people's commissariats for state security and defense literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports on the “final and firmly established” date for the start of the invasion of the Reich troops. At least 5-6 such dates have been reported. April, May, June dates were reported about the invasion of the Wehrmacht and the beginning of the war, but they all turned out to be disinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one has ever reported the date of June 22. The Reich troops should have known about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, so the directive that spoke about the date of the invasion of the USSR came to the troops only on June 19, 1941. Naturally, not a single intelligence officer managed to report this.

The same famous “telegram” by R. Sorge that “an attack is expected early in the morning on June 22 along a wide front” is a fake. Its text differs sharply from real similar cipher programs; furthermore, no responsible leader of the state would take any serious action on the basis of such reports, even if they came from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such messages regularly. Already in our years, on June 16, 2001, the Krasnaya Zvezda organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, where there were confessions of Colonel Karpov of the SVR: “Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev times . Such "fools" are launched simply ... ". That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the beginning of the invasion was launched by N. Khrushchev when he “debunked” the cult of personality.

Only after the Wehrmacht received the directive of June 19, various “defectors” began to cross the border and signals went through the border service to Moscow.

Intelligence was also mistaken in the number of Wehrmacht troops, allegedly thoroughly revealed by Soviet intelligence officers. The total strength of the armed forces of the Reich by Soviet intelligence was determined at 320 divisions, in reality at that time the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the forces of the Reich were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: 130 divisions each, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would direct its blow - it was logical to assume that it was against England. A completely different picture would have developed if intelligence had reported that out of 214 Reich divisions, 148 were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence was unable to track the process of building up the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to USSR intelligence, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, a significant build-up of forces, but at the same time it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping against England had doubled. What conclusions could be drawn from this? It could be assumed that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which he had long planned to do and was actively spreading disinformation about it. And in the east, the grouping was strengthened for more reliable cover for the “rear”. Wasn't Hitler planning a war on two fronts? This is the unequivocal suicide of Germany. And a completely different picture would have developed if the Kremlin had known that in February, out of all 214 German divisions in the east, there were only 23, and by June 1941 there were already 148.

True, there is no need to create another myth that intelligence is to blame for everything, it worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with Western intelligence services, she lacked experience.

Another myth, they say, Stalin is to blame for the fact that they incorrectly determined the main direction of the strike of the German armed forces - the most powerful grouping of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that it was there that the main blow would be. But, firstly, this is the decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, against the KOVO and the Odessa Military District (OVO), the Wehrmacht command fielded at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, and against the Western Special Military District (ZOVO), the German command concentrated 45 divisions, of which only 5 were armored. Yes, and according to the initial developments of the Barbarossa plan, Berlin planned the main blow precisely in the southwestern strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data, it is we who can now put together all the pieces of the puzzle. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, at the beginning of June 1941, in reality, there were 10 tank and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. And therefore, opposing them with 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of the KOVO and OVO was a completely correct step by our command. True, the problem is that our intelligence missed the moment when 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group of Gaines Guderian were transferred to the Brest region in mid-June. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, and 5 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions remained against the KOVO.

T-2

The Wehrmacht grouping in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units, they were distributed mainly in theaters of operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to German troops, large forces of the armed forces of the allied countries of Germany were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, in total 29 divisions (15 Finnish and 14 Romanian) and 16 brigades (Finnish - 3, Hungarian - 4, Romanian - 9).

T-3

The main striking power of the Wehrmacht was represented by tank and motorized divisions. What were they like? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks - 51 light tanks Pz.Kpfw. II (according to the Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 command tanks without weapons. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could be armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. In the tank division, equipped with German tanks, the state had: 65 T-2 light tanks, 106 T-3 and 30 T-4 medium tanks, as well as 8 command tanks, in total - 209 units. In the tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, there were: 55 T-2 light tanks, 110 Czechoslovak light tanks Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), 30 medium tanks T-4 and 14 command tanks Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), total - 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most of the T-2 and Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) had time to modernize, their frontal armor of 30 and 50 mm was now not inferior in armor protection to the medium tanks T-3 and T-4. Plus, the quality of sighting devices is better than in Soviet tanks. According to various estimates, the Wehrmacht had about 4,000 tanks and assault guns in total, and more than 4,300 with the allies.

Pz.Kpfw. 38(t).

But it must be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions were reinforced by: 6,000 motorized infantry; 150 artillery pieces, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized engineer battalion, which could equip positions, set up minefields or clear minefields, organize a crossing; motorized communications battalion - these are mobile communications centers based on cars, armored cars or armored personnel carriers, which could provide stable control of parts of the division on the march and in battle. According to the state, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and cars - 561), in some divisions their number reached up to 2300 units. Plus 1289 motorcycles (711 units with sidecars) in the state, although their number could also reach 1570 units. Therefore, the tank divisions were organizationally a perfectly balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structures of this unit of the 1941 model, with minor improvements, were maintained until the end of the war.

The tank divisions were also strengthened by motorized divisions. Motorized divisions differed from the usual Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the complete motorization of all units and divisions of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3 infantry in an infantry division, two light howitzer divisions and one heavy artillery division in an artillery regiment instead of 3 light and 1 heavy in an infantry division, plus they had a motorcycle rifle battalion, which was not in standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900–2000 vehicles and 1300–1400 motorcycles. That is, tank divisions were reinforced with additional motorized infantry.

The German armed forces were the first among other armies in the world not only to understand the need to have self-propelled artillery to support their infantry, but also the first to put this idea into practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 divisions and 5 separate batteries of assault guns, 7 divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers, another 4 batteries of 150-mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht. Assault gun units supported the infantry on the battlefield, this made it possible not to divert tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. Divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became a highly mobile anti-tank reserve of the Wehrmacht command.

The infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht numbered 16,500-16,800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was horse-drawn. In the infantry division of the Wehrmacht, there were 5375 horses in the state: 1743 riding horses and 3632 draft horses, of which 2249 draft horses belonged to the artillery regiment of the unit. Plus, a high level of motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 are trucks and 346 are cars), 527 motorcycles (201 units with a sidecar). In total, the German armed forces, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600,000 vehicles of various types and more than 1 million horses.

Artillery

The artillery of the German Armed Forces was traditionally strong: up to a quarter of the barrels of German divisions were guns with a caliber of 105–150 mm. The organizational structure of the military artillery of the Wehrmacht made it possible to provide a significant reinforcement of infantry units in battle. So, in the infantry regiments there were 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in battle. When firing direct fire with shells weighing 38 kg, 150-mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry, motorized regiments with a division of light 105-mm howitzers, while at the disposal of the commanders of infantry and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht there was a heavy howitzer division of 150-mm howitzers, and at the disposal of the commanders of tank divisions - a mixed heavy division of 105-mm guns and 150 mm howitzers.

Tank and motorized divisions also had air defense guns: according to the state, the division had a company of ZSU (18 units), these were self-propelled anti-aircraft installations based on half-track tractors, armed with single-barreled or quad 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The company was part of the anti-tank battalion. ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move in the march. Plus anti-aircraft divisions with 8-12 88-mm Flak18 / 36/37 anti-aircraft guns, which, in addition to fighting the enemy air force, could fight enemy tanks, performing anti-tank functions.

To strike at the Red Army, the Wehrmacht command also concentrated significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 105-mm heavy guns each); 37 divisions of heavy field howitzers (12 150-mm units each); 2 mixed divisions (6 211-mm mortars and three 173-mm guns each); 29 heavy mortar divisions (9 211-mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery divisions (9 149.1 mm heavy guns in each division); 2 heavy howitzer divisions (four 240-mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank battalions (36 37-mm Pak35/36 anti-tank guns each); 9 separate railway batteries with 280 mm naval guns (2 guns per battery). Almost all of the artillery of the RGK was concentrated on the direction of the main attacks, and all of it was motorized.

To ensure comprehensive preparation for combat operations, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 artillery instrumental reconnaissance battalions, 52 separate engineer battalions, 25 separate bridge building battalions, 91 construction battalions and 35 road construction battalions.

Aviation: 4 air fleets of the Luftwaffe, plus Allied aviation, were concentrated to strike at the USSR. In addition to 3,217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force had 1,058 reconnaissance aircraft, which played a crucial role in supporting the operations of the ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, almost 60% were aircraft of the new Bf.109F modification, they were superior in speed and rate of climb not only to the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also new ones, only received by the Air Force of the Red Army "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3".

The Reich Air Force had a large number of units and subunits of communications and control, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat effectiveness. The German Air Force included anti-aircraft divisions that provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division included air surveillance, warning and communications units, logistic and technical support units. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft divisions with 88-mm Flak18 / 36/37 anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm and 20-mm Flak30 and Flak38 anti-aircraft automatic guns, including quadruple installations of 20-mm Flakvierling38 / 1 machine guns. At the same time, the anti-aircraft divisions of the Air Force interacted well with ground forces, often advancing directly with them.

In addition to the armed forces themselves, numerous paramilitary auxiliaries, such as the Speer Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps and the Imperial Labor Service, reinforced the striking power. They performed tasks for the logistics, technical and engineering support of the Wehrmacht. There were many volunteers from the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, who were not formally at war with the USSR.

Summing up, it must be said that this military machine at that time did not know equals. It was not in vain that in Berlin, London and Washington they believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall within 2-3 months. But they miscalculated, once again ...

Sources:
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. Stopped blitzkrieg. M., 2010.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2005.
Pykhalov I. Great slandered leader. Lies and truth about Stalin. M., 2010.
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-06-10/1_2ww.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War
http://vspomniv.ru/nemetskie.htm
http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=588260
http://waralbum.ru/
http://ww2history.ru/artvermaht
http://www.airpages.ru/lw_main.shtml
http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1271220706.php

Wehrmacht "invincible and legendary" [Military art of the Reich] Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEhrmacht DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A. Hitler and his inner circle chose the armed forces as the main instrument for implementing their policy aimed at gaining world domination. Therefore, all military events that preceded and took place during the Second World War on the part of Germany were closely connected with the Wehrmacht. The first serious step in the development of the Wehrmacht was made already in the first three years after its creation, at a time when Germany was just getting ready to announce its aggressive course. It was during the period from 1935 to 1938 that the structures of the three types of armed forces were clearly identified, associations and formations of the military branches were created, operational control bodies were deployed, and a number of professional personnel underwent combat testing on the battlefields in Spain.

The Anschluss of Austria and the capture of Czechoslovakia in 1938–1939 contributed to the quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of the Wehrmacht along with the use of the human and economic resources of Germany. After this bloodless operation, the entire Austrian army of 38 thousand people was included in the Wehrmacht. Six divisions were formed on the territory of Austria, including one tank division. The trophies captured from the Czechoslovak army were enough to equip another 15 infantry and 3 tank divisions formed in Germany with weapons and military equipment. By the spring of 1939, the Wehrmacht already numbered 1,131 thousand people and included 51 personnel divisions. It was still the so-called peacetime army. For open aggression in the framework of the policy of conquest, more numerous armed forces were required.

In August 1939, a prearranged mobilization was carried out in Germany through the call of the reserve of the first stage and some additional ages. Thanks to this, by September 1, 1939, the German armed forces had quadrupled, reaching 4.5 million people. By this time, the structure of the Wehrmacht and its strategic leadership had already fully developed, which basically remained unchanged throughout the Second World War. The Wehrmacht included three types of armed forces, as well as SS troops.

Orientation towards the continental nature of hostilities predetermined the significant predominance of the ground forces, which accounted for more than 70% of the total personnel of the total number of armed forces. With the outbreak of World War II, the German ground forces were divided into the active army, intended directly for combat operations, and the reserve army, in which replenishment was being prepared. The main strategic formation of the active army in the theater or strategic direction was the army group. Depending on the tasks ahead, it included two or three field armies and one or two tank groups (later tank armies). The field army united several corps, each of which included up to five divisions.

The reserve army was intended to carry out mobilization through the military districts, to train personnel for the active army in spare parts and military educational institutions. It also served as a source for replenishment of the personnel of all branches of the armed forces. It was also entrusted with the protection of rear facilities and prisoner of war camps, the treatment of sick military personnel, the provision of the needs of the Wehrmacht in small arms, vehicles, fuels and lubricants, horse composition, chemical, medical, veterinary property. The reserve army included security troops and territorial formations of military districts, military hospitals stationed in Germany.

The SS troops were in fact the armed forces of the Nazi Party. They were included in the active army after the outbreak of World War II and were subordinate to the commanders of formations and associations, which they included only in operational terms. Until 1939, there were only separate paramilitary SS units, which were used for security service and "restoring order" in case of any internal unrest. The first unit of the SS troops since September 1939 was the SS personal guard brigade of the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", which since June 1941 acted as a motorized division. In October-November 1939, three SS divisions were formed, and in the first half of 1941, two more. They were formed from persons especially devoted to the Nazi regime and were, in essence, a kind of guard of the Nazi regime. The number of SS troops during the war continuously increased and by March 1945 exceeded 800 thousand people, which amounted to about 11% of the total strength of the Wehrmacht.

The recruitment of the German armed forces was carried out on the basis of universal military service, introduced by the law on the creation of the Wehrmacht of March 16, 1935. In May 1940, 27.6 million persons liable for military service were registered in the country, which included men born in 1883-1919. Of these, 19.4 million were deemed fit for military service. These human resources allowed the leadership of Germany to continuously replenish the armed forces. By the time of the attack on the USSR, they numbered 7.3 million people, and they were the largest and most powerful military machine that the history of mankind has ever known. Most of the military personnel had already participated in hostilities, and the command staff was distinguished by professionalism and had significant combat experience.

The command of the Wehrmacht paid great attention to the professional training of military personnel, including privates and junior commanders. At the same time, the emphasis was on their knowledge of their weapons and skillful possession of them within the framework of the tactics of various types of combat. Initially, the training of the mobilized took place in the spare parts of the reserve army for four months and was carried out in accordance with the practical needs of the war. Shagistics and memorization of statutory provisions were excluded from the curricula. The main attention was paid to the possession of weapons. In training and exercises, only live ammunition and shells were used. This sometimes led to losses, but justified itself at the front. With technical specialists (repairmen, suppliers, gunsmiths, etc.) additional classes were held (from two to six months).

Particularly high demands were placed on the training of junior commanders. The non-commissioned officer had to not only be able to perform all the functions of his subordinates, but also have certain skills in managing the battle of several dozen people. The overwhelming majority of non-commissioned officers received this rank only after special training, which lasted for six months and the delivery of a number of tests.

Officers from among the junior commanders were trained for nine months at special courses. At the same time, the calculation was made on the fact that this person had already fully comprehended the art of owning weapons and organizing a battle with a small unit consisting of homogeneous fighters. He was trained as a combined arms commander, capable of directing the battle of larger units, reinforced with artillery or interacting with tanks. There were very rare cases of conferring officer ranks without studying at military schools or courses. This mainly concerned military personnel of non-combat units (financiers, doctors, and other rear servicemen).

The German soldiers knew their job well, were disciplined, distinguished by their stamina in battle. Much attention was paid to their indoctrination. In accordance with the theoretical postulates of the Nazis, they were inspired by ideas about the racial superiority of the Germans over other peoples, about the need to acquire a new "living space" for Germany, about the invincibility of the Wehrmacht.

In order to unite the soldiers, the command of the Wehrmacht formed separate parts of the active army with replenishment, as a rule, from the same locality. Training in the reserve army took place within the boundaries of "their" military district. There was a close connection between the spare part and the corresponding part in the active army. Reinforcement for an infantry division was usually prepared by a specific reserve infantry regiment, consisting of three battalions, which had the same numbers as the three infantry regiments of this division. Replenishment from these battalions came only to their respective regiments. Spare parts of other military branches acted in a similar way. In order to maintain the constancy of the composition of the units of the active army, all the recovered wounded and sick were sent to the front in their former unit.

During the Great Patriotic War, German troops were forced to fight alongside the troops of their allies, which were Finland, Romania, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia. After the outbreak of the war, Croatia, Spain and Vichy France also offered to send their volunteers to the Eastern Front.

In July 1941, an expeditionary corps of three divisions with 62,000 men was formed in Italy. By August 5, he was transferred to Romania and a week later took part in the battles against the Soviet troops on the western bank of the Bug, north of Nikolaev. Already on June 24, Slovakia sent its elite "fast brigade" in the amount of 3.5 thousand people to the East to help the Wehrmacht, and in July it began to form a 45,000-strong corps. But in fact, only two Slovak divisions operated on the Soviet-German front until the autumn of 1944. The initiative to send Croatian volunteers "to fight against Bolshevism" was shown by the head of the Croatian puppet regime A. Pavelic on the day of the German attack on the USSR. Over the following months, the “reinforced Croatian 369th Infantry Regiment” was created, whose soldiers, dressed in German uniforms, took part in the battles on the Eastern Front from September 1941.

Spain sent one division to the Soviet-German front. Formed on the basis of the principle of voluntariness, it received the name "blue". Already on July 13, 1941, this division was loaded into echelons and sent to the German military town near Nuremberg. There, the Spaniards were dressed in Wehrmacht uniforms. Their hallmark was a patch on the right sleeve of the uniform with the word "Spain" against the background of the Spanish national flag. The Blue Division arrived at the front in October 1941.

In France, the recruitment of volunteers for the war against the USSR was carried out by pro-fascist parties and organizations. The so-called French Volunteer Legion enrolled persons aged 19 to 30 who had military training and were distinguished by good physical data. The Germans promised to free two French soldiers from captivity for each volunteer. Of the 6 thousand legionnaires, a special 638th infantry regiment was formed, included in the 7th infantry division of the Wehrmacht. In the late autumn of 1941, this regiment was sent to the Eastern Front and in December took part in the battles with the Red Army.

It should be noted that "volunteers" from France, Spain and Croatia, as well as Slovak and, to some extent, Italian troops did not play a significant role. They served more the goals of Nazi propaganda, which sought to present the war against the USSR as a "crusade to save Europe from the Bolshevik danger." The German command did not place special hopes on the armed forces of Romania, Hungary, Finland and other countries. Among them, the Finns fought most stubbornly. At the expense of the allies, secondary sectors of the Eastern Front were covered, while German troops concentrated on the directions of the main attacks.

The defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow in December 1941 caused tension in making up for losses, which turned out to be much higher than the German command had envisaged. There was a shortage of personnel. Therefore, the contingent of 1922 born in the Wehrmacht, which was planned to be used in the operations of 1942, had to be transferred to the active army at the end of 1941. 17 divisions were transferred to the east from the west and the Balkans. At the same time, due to the difficult situation on the Eastern Front, in January 1942, a ban on vacations for personnel was introduced. It was canceled three months later, and even then only partially.

At the beginning of 1942, A. Hitler turned to the Allies with a request for additional help, and they readily responded to the Fuhrer's appeal. The Italians sent the newly formed 8th Army (10 divisions) to the war against the USSR in the amount of 220 thousand people. Romania provided 2 armies, which included 15 divisions, and, in addition, reinforced its troops with 11 more divisions. From Hungary, the 2nd Army arrived on the Eastern Front, consisting of 10 divisions, the number of which reached about 200 thousand people. All these troops took part in the offensive of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1942, and almost all were defeated near Stalingrad. After that, the Italians no longer participated in hostilities against the Red Army, and the number of Romanian and Hungarian troops was sharply reduced. In October 1943, apart from the Finns, there were 136,000 soldiers and officers of the states allied to Germany and another 52,000 foreigners on the Eastern Front in various volunteer units of the Wehrmacht. On the whole, it must be said that the hope of the Nazis for an increase in military power at the expense of the Allies did not come true. By that time, the contradictions between Germany and its allies had sharply intensified, and they began to look for ways out of the war.

The total strength of the German armed forces continued to grow until 1944. The system of total mobilization has come into effect. If in 1941 only persons who had reached the age of 20 and older were called up for military service, then in 1943-1944. - from the age of 17, and from February 1945, even 16-year-old teenagers began to be put under arms. In 1943–1944 the Wehrmacht numbered 9.4 million, but compared to previous years, the quality of its personnel has deteriorated markedly.

A decrease in the number of conscripts trained in the reserve army led to the creation in 1942 of field training and reserve divisions. Usually they were formed from reserve battalions, but had a limited number of supporting units and services. Unlike the training units of the reserve army, these divisions were located outside Germany in order to simultaneously perform two tasks: to train conscripts in military affairs and to carry out occupation functions. But the restless rear, especially the actions of the partisans, often forced them to interrupt the educational process, and therefore the conscripts did not receive proper military training. When the war approached the borders of Germany itself, most of these formations were hastily converted into regular divisions of the army in the field. And although at the expense of them the command of the Wehrmacht received additional troops at its disposal, the once-established process of preparing reinforcements by the end of 1944 completely went wrong. This was not slow to affect the combat capability of the army in the field.

The growing losses forced the German command to find non-standard ways to replenish the army in the field. Along with carrying out total mobilization, it was necessary to redistribute personnel between the branches of the armed forces. Back in the autumn of 1942, Hitler ordered Goering to separate 100 thousand people from the Air Force and organize their training for use in infantry formations. Goering, not interested in reducing the forces subordinate to him, offered twice as many people, but with the condition that special airfield divisions be created from them, which would remain organizationally part of the Air Force. Hitler accepted his offer. A total of 21 airfield divisions were created. But in terms of their combat qualities, they were much inferior to the infantry formations of the ground forces, and therefore they turned out to be unreliable at the front. The vast majority of them were defeated in the first half of 1943. The surviving formations were completed by other infantry formations. From November 1943, the airfield divisions were transferred to the ground forces.

In addition to the air field, as part of the Air Force in 1943–1945. more than ten so-called parachute divisions were formed. At the beginning of 1945, three marine infantry divisions were formed as part of the Navy. All of them acted as ground formations, but also did not differ in high combat effectiveness, since their personnel were not trained in ground combat techniques.

Despite all the efforts of the Nazi leadership, the size of the German army in the summer of 1944 has been steadily declining, while the number of ground troops has become more and more (in February 1945 - 375 divisions compared to 327 divisions at the end of 1942). In general, there were 3.7 million people in the active army (without the Air Force and Navy), including 214 thousand Hungarian soldiers and officers. The fact that the number of formations at the final stage of the war was increasing was of great propaganda importance for the Nazi leadership, since it created the illusion among the German people that the Wehrmacht's forces were not decreasing and that the war could still be won. In fact, the combat power of the Wehrmacht was largely undermined. At the same time, it must be admitted that many regular divisions of the ground forces retained a high combat capability until the very last days of the war.

The difficulties that arose at the front forced the Nazi command in 1942 to create auxiliary military units from Soviet prisoners of war, who for one reason or another agreed to serve the Germans. The non-commissioned officers and officers of the Wehrmacht commanded these units and the units that were part of them.

On September 25, 1944, by a special decree of Hitler, the creation of the Volkssturm was announced - militia units subordinate to the Nazi Party. It included the entire male population of Germany, regardless of property status, aged 16 to 60, capable of carrying weapons and not drafted into the Wehrmacht. Propaganda portrayed the Volkssturm as a symbol of the unity of the nation. It was assumed that he would not only take part in the battles at the front, but also become the basis of partisan detachments.

However, the Volkssturm did not live up to the expectations of the Nazi leaders. His numerous battalions, formed in late 1944 - early 1945 and numbering almost 1.5 million people, had poor military training and were poorly armed. At the first collision with the enemy, they disintegrated. Only in the eastern regions of Germany, where there were many members of the Nazi Party from wealthy peasants in the Volkssturm units, did they stubbornly resist the advancing Soviet troops. The very fact of the creation of the Volkssturm testified that Nazi Germany had exhausted its human resources, found itself in a state of crisis, and then agony.

From the second half of 1944, women and girls began to be widely recruited into the German armed forces. By mid-November, there were already 300 thousand people. Women replaced men in military medical and headquarters institutions, as well as in searchlight units of the Air Force. Until January 15, 1945, another 150,000 women were drafted into the Wehrmacht, mainly for service in the air defense forces. From February 1945, women from the age of 18 were included in the Volkssturm. Often, young men and women from the Volkssturm were sent to the active army without any additional military training.

By order of the OKW dated March 28, 1945, all formations and units of the Wehrmacht were ordered to be used in combat, regardless of their state of combat readiness. Nevertheless, the combat effectiveness of some of the 40 new divisions formed in 1945 was quite high. Among them, the division of tank destroyers created in January 1945 stood out. Organizationally, it consisted of battalions that operated on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Each of them had several groups of tank destroyers. These units were led by junior officers who had experience in fighting tanks with melee weapons. The personnel were armed with faustpatrons, hand-held smoke grenades, anti-tank mines, etc. The groups moved on bicycles, which increased their mobility. Sudden strikes in place and time by groups of tank destroyers were often very sensitive.

At the same time, it must be admitted that the defeats of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front had a negative effect on the mood of the servicemen. In Germany itself and its armed forces, there were many dissatisfied with the protracted war, who understood the futility of its continuation. Among the generals and officers, there was growing indignation at the methods of leading the armed struggle on the part of Hitler as commander-in-chief, because his demand to "stand to the death" on the occupied lines led to an increase in losses and a decrease in the maneuverability of troops. The generals were also greatly indignant at Hitler's persistent attempts to dictate decisions in the field of operational art and tactics.

But the Fuhrer firmly pursued a course to continue the war, and he considered all those who doubted its victorious outcome as traitors. To increase the morale and combat power of the troops, by order of December 22, 1943, he introduced the service of the National Socialist leadership in the Wehrmacht. Its highest body was the headquarters under the supreme command of the Wehrmacht, which was headed by General X. Reinecke. The headquarters "acted on the direct orders" of Hitler and maintained the closest connection with the Imperial Chancellery of the Nazi Party (NSDAP). Similar headquarters were established under the high commands of the branches of the armed forces. Corresponding departments were created in army groups, armies and army corps, full-time officers were introduced in divisions, and freelance positions of officers for the National Socialist leadership were introduced in regiments and battalions. Their task was to raise the level of political education of military personnel. They were appointed from among the officers who had front-line experience and were members of the NSDAP.

By the spring of 1944, all officers in the National Socialist leadership were appointed and actively involved in the work. But this did not lead to a noticeable improvement in the combat effectiveness of the troops, and the activities of these officers caused a mixed reaction. The persecution of dissidents and suspects undermined trust in each other among officers and soldiers. Denunciations became a frequent occurrence. Cohesion and mutual understanding weakened in military collectives.

As the front approached the borders of Germany, Hitler sought to increasingly strengthen the influence of the Nazi Party on the armed forces. After the failed attempt on his life on July 20, 1944, instead of the statutory salute in the Wehrmacht, a party greeting was introduced. When meeting with each other, the soldiers threw their right hand forward up with the exclamation "Heil Hitler!". In addition, they were allowed to retain their membership in the NSDAP, which had previously been suspended under the law of May 21, 1935, for the period of service of a party member in the armed forces. By Hitler's decree of September 20, 1944, military courts no longer heard cases of military personnel related to political crimes. From now on, they were transferred to the so-called people's courts, which were, in fact, the instrument of the Nazis' reprisals against dissidents.

The grenadier divisions created in July 1944 were renamed the people's grenadier divisions. The term "people's" was supposed to symbolize the close connection of the army with the people. The divisions formed in August 1944 began to be called in the same way, which were assigned the numbers of previously defeated infantry divisions, their banners, remnants of personnel and combat traditions were transferred. By the end of the war, there were about 50 such divisions in the Wehrmacht. In disciplinary and legal terms, they were all subordinate to the Reichsführer SS Himmler, who on July 20, 1944 was also appointed commander of the reserve army.

In general, the role of the Waffen-SS in the last year of the war increased dramatically. From August 1944, all foreign units and formations were transferred to their composition. In October, the first SS army headquarters (6th SS Panzer Army) was formed. To the pre-existing SS Panzer Corps in 1944-1945. seven SS army corps were added. A large number of officers of the ground forces were assigned to the highest headquarters of the SS troops with the assignment of the corresponding SS ranks, and officers of the SS troops were assigned to the supreme command of the Wehrmacht. From December 1944, freelance National Socialist leaders appeared in platoons and squads. This position was awarded to non-commissioned officers and soldiers - members of the NSDAP, who had proven themselves from a military point of view. They were instructed to resolutely suppress any panic moods, to ensure that the Fuhrer’s order was carried out in their units, the main of which at that time was the order to “stand to the death” at the occupied line.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, the leadership of Germany, under the pressure of military failures, in order to strengthen the resistance of the Red Army, was forced to take the same steps that the Soviet leadership had taken at the beginning of the war. In the Wehrmacht, the influence of the ruling party was maximized, orders appeared similar to the famous Stalinist order 227 “Not a step back”, a course was taken to deploy guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, the Wehrmacht began to replenish at the expense of allied formations and even prisoners of war, and they were drafted into its ranks teenagers and women.

As for the German infantry and artillery weapons, in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics, they differed little from the Soviet ones. During the war years, it was mainly only its modernization. Machine guns and machine guns have become more advanced. From small arms in 1944, a new MP-44 automatic assault rifle was adopted, which combined the main parameters of an assault rifle, rifle and light machine gun. Compared to a conventional rifle cartridge, a shortened cartridge was created for it. Her magazine was designed for 30 rounds. The fire was carried out both by single shots and in short bursts. Until the end of the war, Germany produced only 400 thousand of these rifles, so there is no need to talk about the mass production of these weapons. Since 1943, the German infantry has widely used a new individual anti-tank weapon - the Faustpatron. It was a single-shot grenade launcher with an over-caliber cumulative grenade that pierced 200-mm armor from a distance of 90 meters. Although in 1944-1945. serial production of faustpatrons was launched, their use did not give a high effect. According to German data, in the first half of 1944 they destroyed less than 10% of Soviet tanks.

There was some lag behind the German army from the Soviet in mortars. Only when faced with Soviet 120-mm mortars did the Germans engage in similar production. Since 1944, such a mortar began to enter service with Wehrmacht infantry battalions, which significantly increased their firepower.

Already the first months of the armed struggle on the Eastern Front showed the vulnerability of the armor protection of German medium tanks. Their frontal armor did not exceed 40 mm and was penetrated by the 76 mm gun of the Soviet T-34 tank. An attempt to strengthen the armor by filming the frontal part of the tank did not solve the problem of armor resistance. Therefore, from the end of 1942, Germany began to produce more powerful combat vehicles: the T-VI Tiger-1 heavy tank with an 88-mm cannon, and a little later, the Panther T-V tank with an elongated 75-mm cannon. The T-IV medium tank was modernized in 1943, and the production of the T-III tank was completely discontinued. In 1944, the Panther and Tiger tanks already accounted for half of all armored vehicles at the front. In terms of their armor resistance, they surpassed the Soviet T-34 tanks.

Along with tanks, Germany had a large number of assault guns and tank destroyers. Unlike tanks, they did not have a rotating turret, but they were equipped with a larger caliber gun. In addition, their production was much cheaper than tanks. If the latter were intended mainly for the offensive, then assault guns were used mainly as a defensive tool. Since the middle of 1943, when the Wehrmacht was forced to go on the defensive on all fronts, their share among armored vehicles has been continuously increasing. Since August 1944, they were already producing more than tanks, and in January 1945 there were as many as tanks. The result from the use of assault guns in the fight against Soviet tanks at the final stage of the war was twice as high as from conventional anti-tank guns.

The basis of the aircraft fleet of the German Air Force was combat aircraft, the production of which was established by the beginning of World War II. In the course of it, they were modernized mainly by increasing the power of the engines and strengthening the weapons. New models of aircraft appeared primarily in fighter aviation, which was explained by the needs of defense. In 1943–1945 The main German fighter instead of the Messerschmitt M-109 was the Focke-Wulf FV-190, which developed speeds of up to 625 kilometers per hour. Since 1944, Germany began to produce jet aircraft. The Me-262 jet fighter, whose speed reached 870 kilometers per hour, was used mainly as an air defense tool in the fight against Anglo-American bombers; it was almost never used on the Eastern Front. If in the first period of the war, German aircraft were more perfect in their main tactical and technical indicators, then at its final stage they were already inferior to most Soviet aircraft.

In general, the armed forces of Germany at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War were a well-oiled military machine and surpassed the Red Army in terms of professionalism of personnel, combat readiness and the use of modern forms of struggle. The defeat near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42 and the forced transition to a protracted war caused the first crisis phenomena, which gradually increased. The new contingents that arrived in the German active army were inferior to the previous ones in terms of their combat training. The command of the Wehrmacht tried to compensate for the decrease in the quality level of personnel and the reduction in the number of military formations by equipping the troops with more advanced modernized weapons and military equipment. Despite this, the combat power of the Wehrmacht, compared with the Red Army that opposed it, was rapidly decreasing, although it continued to be a strong and formidable opponent until the last days of the war.

The tank and motorized units of the Wehrmacht were distinguished by high combat effectiveness. In terms of the effectiveness of their actions, until the end of the war, they surpassed the corresponding Soviet formations. The combat capabilities of the infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army by the end of the war were approximately equal, but in its first period they were two to three times the potential of Soviet infantry formations. Although the armament of the Wehrmacht during the war with the USSR was improved and was no worse than the Soviet one in quality, and even better in some types, the quantitative gap was increasing. By the end of 1944, the superiority of the Soviet troops over the Germans in the number of weapons became overwhelming, especially in artillery, tanks and aircraft.

But no effort by the Nazi leadership in 1944 and 1945 could have raised the fallen combat capability of the troops. The result of continuous strikes from the east and west were more and more tangible losses, it was more and more difficult to restore the defeated units and formations, to provide them with weapons and ammunition. Anticipating the inevitability of defeat, the Wehrmacht soldiers cared not so much about protecting the crumbling Third Reich, but about their personal future. Describing the situation, Goebbels wrote in his diary on March 7, 1945: “... the German troops are tired, exhausted in battles and do not want to fight the enemy anymore ... We no longer have such military forces to again win a decisive moment at a decisive moment. victory."

Nevertheless, despite the crisis in which Germany found itself by the beginning of 1945, the German troops continued to stubbornly resist the advancing Red Army until the very last days of the war, while showing enviable military skill. The professionalism of the commanding staff and the majority of ordinary soldiers, high military training and combat experience acquired before the attack on the USSR, the effectiveness of German weapons and military equipment affected. It must be admitted that throughout the war the Wehrmacht was a strong and skillful opponent.

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According to military experts, by 1941 the German army was the strongest in the world. Hardened in battles, knowing the taste of victories, the German units approached the Soviet border with a sense of their superiority. Wehrmacht soldiers considered themselves invincible.
Systems approach
The German historian Werner Picht believed that it was the Treaty of Versailles, according to which Germany did not have the right to have an army of more than 100 thousand people, that forced the Berlin generals to look for new principles for the formation of the armed forces. And they were found. And although Hitler, having come to power in 1933, abandoned the "norms of Versailles", the ideology of military mobility of the new army has already won the minds of German military leaders. Later, the transfer of German soldiers to Spain to protect the Franco regime made it possible to test 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, Me-109 fighters and dive bombers of the Stuka-87 type in real conditions. In the same place, the young Nazi aviation created its own school of air combat. The Balkan campaign of 1941 showed how important it is to coordinate a large amount of equipment. As a result, the German staff officers in front of the Russian company had a successful experience in the use of mobile units reinforced by aviation. All this allowed them to create a military organization of a new and, most importantly, systemic type, optimally tuned to carry out combat missions.
Special training
In 1935, the concept of special training for Wehrmacht soldiers arose in order to make a kind of “motorized weapon” out of a fighter. For this, the most capable young men were chosen from among the youth. They were trained in training camps. To understand what the German soldiers of the 1941 model were like, you should read Walter Kempovsky's multi-volume Echo Sounder. The books provide numerous testimonies explaining the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, including soldiers' correspondence. For example, it tells about a certain corporal Hans, who at a distance of 40-50 meters could hit a small window with a grenade. the other side of the street. If he were alive, we could easily take this damn house, because of which half of our platoon died. But in August 1941, a captured Russian lieutenant killed him with a shot in the back. It was ridiculous, because there were so many who surrendered that we did not even have time to search them. Dying, Hans shouted that it was not fair. According to official figures, in 1941 the Wehrmacht lost 162,799 soldiers killed, 32,484 missing and 579,795 wounded, most of whom died in hospitals or became disabled. Hitler called these losses monstrous, not so much because of the numbers, but because of the lost quality of the German army. In Berlin, they were forced to state that the war would be different - a war by all available means. Russian soldiers in the summer and autumn of 1941 offered active resistance. As a rule, these were attacks by desperate and doomed Red Army soldiers, single shots from burning houses, self-explosions. In total, 3138 thousand Soviet soldiers died in the first year of the war, most often in captivity or in "boilers". But it was they who bled the elite of the Wehrmacht, which the Germans had been preparing so carefully for six years.
Massive military experience
Any commander will tell you how important it is to have fired soldiers under your command. The German army that attacked the USSR had this invaluable experience of military victories. In September 1939, the Wehrmacht soldiers, having easily defeated 39 Polish divisions of Edward Rydz-Smigly, felt the taste of victory for the first time. Then there was the Maginot Line, the capture of Yugoslavia and Greece - all this only strengthened the self-consciousness of their invincibility. No country in the world then had so many fired fighters motivated for success. Retired infantry general Kurt von Tippelskirch believed that this factor was the most important in the first victories over the Red Army. Describing the concept of lightning wars, he emphasized that, unlike the anxious hours of anticipation of a war with Poland, self-confident German conquerors entered the territory of Soviet Russia. By the way, the multi-day defense of the Brest Fortress is largely due to the fact that the 42nd Rifle Division of the Red Army, which has combat experience in the Finnish War, was stationed on its territory.
Precise Destruction Concept
The Germans also emphasized the rapid destruction of pockets of resistance, no matter how firmly they were protected. According to the German generals, in this case, the enemy has a feeling of doom and futility of resistance. As a rule, accurate, almost sniper shelling was used. This was achieved through the successful use of visual optical observation posts, with the help of which shelling was adjusted at a distance of 7-10 km from our positions. Only at the end of 1941, the Red Army found an antidote to the all-seeing Nazi artillery, when it began to build defensive structures on the reverse slopes of the hills, out of reach of German optics.
Quality connection
The most significant advantage of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army was high-quality communications. Guderian believed that a tank without reliable radio communication would not show even a tenth of what it was capable of. In the Third Reich, since the beginning of 1935, the development of reliable ultrashort-wave transceivers has intensified. Thanks to the appearance in the German communications service of fundamentally new devices designed by Dr. Grube, the Wehrmacht generals were able to quickly control the huge theater of military operations. For example, high-frequency telephone equipment served the German tank headquarters without any interference at distances up to one and a half thousand kilometers. That is why on June 27, 1941, in the Dubno region, the Kleist group of only 700 tanks was able to defeat the mechanized corps of the Red Army, which included 4,000 combat vehicles. Later, in 1944, analyzing this battle, Soviet generals bitterly admitted that if our tanks had had radio communications then, the Soviet Army would have turned the tide of the war at its very beginning.
And still nothing helped them, not even the elephants! Thanks to the selfless courage and great love for the Motherland of our fathers and grandfathers, the most perfect military machine in the world was defeated and, I hope, will never be reborn!