Diogenes Laertes: biography, works, quotes. Life, teachings and sayings of famous philosophers

20.09.2019

Diogenes Laertes(Greek, first half of the 3rd century) - ancient Greek historian of philosophy, author of the largest historical and philosophical study containing biographical and doxographic information about ancient philosophical schools and their representatives.
Cover of the 1594 edition The very work of Diogenes Laertes is the only one of the ancient histories of philosophy that has survived to this day. Unfortunately, the original title of the work is completely unknown to us. So, in the Parisian manuscript of 1759 it is listed as: “D. L.: biographies and opinions of those who became famous in philosophy, and in a concise form of a set of views of each teaching. Stephen of Byzantium "History of the Philosopher" in Evstafiya - "Biography of the Sophists". Now it is called "On Life, Teachings and Sayings famous philosophers». It occupies almost the entire period of development of ancient thought and consists of 10 biographical books with the following topics:

- Hellenic wise men, telling about the so-called "Seven Wise Men";
- Ionian cosmologists, Anaxagoras, Socrates and Socrates;
- Plato;
— Followers of Plato academies(before Clytomach);
– Aristotle and the Peripatetics;
- Kiniki;
- Zeno and the Stoics;
- Pythagoras, Empedocles, Epicharmus and the Pythagoreans;
- Heraclitus, Eleatics, Democritus, Protagoras, skeptics;
- Epicurus.

In all books, the history of ancient philosophy is presented from the point of view of vigilantly distinguishing two lines of spadkovymnosti: Ionian and Italian. Covers the period from the semi-legendary sages to the New Academy, Chrysippus and Epicurus. The presentation is a compilation in which, mostly uncritically, about 200 sources are used and the teachings of more than 80 thinkers are described.
Despite the general desire for scholarship, demonstrated by constant references to authoritative sources and opinions, the author was unable to bring the diverse material into a coherent system. As a result, the text itself is often overloaded with quotes from different authors, which it ascribes to one person, and the philosophical theories of very different, often antagonistic schools, add up to one philosophical current.
The following cultural-historical translation of this text played a big transforming role. For example, the epigrams that preceded the presentation of the fate and views of each philosopher in this book primarily constituted a separate collection. And although these moments make the truth of the information as a whole somewhat relative, the text contains quality material about Empedocles, Pythagoras and the Stoics, authentic letters from Epicurus, etc.
Far from systematization and very chaotic in content, the work of Diogenes Laertes remains the weighty and most complete primary source on the philosophy of antiquity.

Current page: 4 (total book has 27 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 18 pages]

1.2. Philosophical and historical background of ancient skepticism

Skeptical tendencies were present to a greater or lesser extent in Greek philosophy long before the formation of an independent skeptical tradition in it. Some ancient sources speak of a very ancient origin of skepticism and spread its influence quite widely. So, for example, the famous historian of ancient philosophy, Diogenes Laertes, reports that Homer is often called the founder of the skeptical school: “some say that this school was founded by Homer, because he, like no one else, spoke about the same thing in different places in different places and not at all. did not strive for dogmatic certainty of his statements" 141
Diog. L.IX. 71.

Skeptical also, Diogenes reports, consider the sayings of the seven wise men, such as “nothing too much” and “Bail is retribution” 142
Ibid.

In addition, skepticism is attributed, according to Diogenes Laertius, to Archilochus, Euripides, Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, Democritus, Heraclitus and Hippocrates 143
See: Ibid. 71–73.

Cicero lists Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, Metrodorus of Chios, the Stoics and Cyrenaics among the supporters of skepticism 144
See: Cic. Acad. II. 5, 23.

According to Cicero, pre-Socratic philosophers, despite all, at first glance, their "non-skepticism", may well be considered as the forerunners of skepticism, since they, in despair from the difficulties of cognition, "exclaimed like crazy that nothing can be known" 145
See: Sokolskaya M.M. Infinite approximation to the truth // Cicero M.T. academic teaching. Per. ON THE. Fedorov. M.: "Indrik" 2004. S. 8–9.

R. Richter explains this kind of evidence by the desire of ancient authors to find support for the views that appeal to them in the teachings of outstanding predecessors, to attribute these views to authorities, appealing to which has always been an unspoken rule and almost an obligation. 146
See: Richter R. Skepticism in Philosophy. T. 1. Per. V. Bazarov, B. Stolpner. SPb., 1910. S. 40–41.

However, the skeptics themselves did not follow this trend. So Menodotus and Aenesidemus did not consider Plato a skeptic 147
Sext Emp. Pyrrh. I. 222-223.

And Sextus Empiricus took special care to delimit skeptical philosophy from views that are related or intersect with it at one point or another. 148
See: Ibid. 210–241.

In this case, it should be noted that partial or methodological skepticism is not alien to any philosophical construction, since the view that asserts something, precisely for the purpose of this assertion, must deny the opposite or doubt it, that is, treat it with skepticism. Therefore, it is not surprising that skepticism, or rather its elements, are somehow contained in any philosophical construction. No system of views, as a rule, can do without relative skepticism. It is not surprising, therefore, that authors who sympathize with skepticism see it almost everywhere, and this, as has just been shown, is not only justified, but necessary. It is also clear that the skeptics themselves decisively distinguished the partial skepticism of any philosophy from their absolute skepticism, which was an end in itself for them, emphasizing the fundamental difference and even opposition of the two types of skepticism: the first was ultimately only an element of positive dogmatism (according to skeptics), the second or self-sufficient doubt 149
See chapter II of this work.

However, skeptics still referred to the thinkers of the pre-Socratic and classical periods, not as their immediate predecessors, but as philosophers who developed some arguments acceptable to skeptics. The English researcher D. Sedley notes: “Of the early philosophers, to whose authority the skeptics of the Hellenistic era often appeal, some deserve respect not so much for their lack of dogmatism, but because they put forward arguments that were useful to skeptics. Heraclitus, the Eleatics, Anaxagoras and Protagoras are famous examples. Others, such as Xenophanes, Empedocles, Democritus, and Socrates, have won respect from skeptics by admitting, at least in moments of discouragement, that knowledge is unattainable or has not yet been achieved by people” (“Of the earlier philosophers to whose authority the Hellenistic skeptics often appealed, some deserved the honor less for any lack of dogmatism than because they had provided arguments useful to the skeptic. and Socrates, earned it by their admission, at any rate in their gloomier moments, that knowledge is unattainable, or as yet unattained, by man") 150
Sedley D. The Motivation of Greek Skepticism // The Skeptical Tradition. Ed. By Burnyeat M. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 9–29. R. 9.

It can be argued that ancient skepticism gradually matured in the process of a long prehistory of dogmatic (as the skeptics say) philosophy. Most likely, it will not be an exaggeration to assert that the very origin of philosophy in ancient Greece around the 6th century BC. BC e., the movement from “myth to logos” was fraught with considerable doubt: firstly, in the authority of mythological and religious traditions, and secondly, in the world that the senses draw to us, that is, in what something simple and familiar, familiar and understandable. The nascent philosophy, explaining the world in its own way, on the one hand, strove for understanding and enlightenment, tried to reach "to the very essence" of things and events, but, on the other hand, the love of wisdom made the previously simple difficult, the familiar - unfamiliar, understandable - incomprehensible, and thus could not but provoke doubts, a skeptical frame of mind. Despite all the differences between philosophical schools and areas of pre-Socratic philosophy, they have one fundamental similarity: the picture of the world drawn by each of them is a reversal of familiar ideas - it turns out that the visible, familiar, simple and understandable is not a true reality; The world is not what it seems to us. Philosophy surprises and puzzles the ordinary person (that is, the average person, or the so-called philistine). All the variety of things around us is actually various forms, manifestations, states, modifications of the world's primary principle - water, says Thales; air, - continuing the main idea of the teacher and at the same time objecting to him, - says his student Anaximenes. Well, we can probably still agree with this, although life experience, habitual expectations and common sense tell an ordinary (average) person who first encountered philosophy that stones, for example, are not water at all, much less air. But what should the same average person think if Pythagoras and his students say that the visible world is the otherness of the invisible, but really existing, perfect world of mathematical objects - numbers, proportions, symmetries, equations, geometric shapes, etc.; It seems to us, they continue, that mathematics is a product of our mind, but it turns out, as surprising as it may seem, that the world, and we along with it, are a product of mathematics (that is, that very perfect world of mathematical objects). It seems to us that everything around consists of parts, changes and moves, but in fact this state of affairs is just an imperfect reflection of the perfect and true reality, which is indivisible, unchanging and motionless, the Eleatic philosophers say: this reality is invisible, but intelligible, and therefore what is real is not what can be seen, but what can be thought clearly and without contradictions, and since only indivisibility, immutability and immobility can be thought clearly and without contradictions, then the world familiar to us, in which everything consists of parts, changes and moving is not reality. Heraclitus suggests the opposite - everything is a constant process of change, which is based on the unobservable unity of opposite principles that are in eternal struggle. If we see anything unchanging, then in fact it is also a manifestation of omnipresent change. According to Democritus, it turns out that the things we see are also not reality, because the true reality is not they, but invisible atoms moving and interacting in the void. So, no matter what picture of the world this or that thinker or philosophical school builds, the general ideological vector in the eyes ordinary person looks like this: “Everything is not as it seems to you, but just the opposite, turn the usual picture of the world, do not trust traditions and even your own eyes, give up the familiar, known and understandable in order to meet with the unfamiliar and incomprehensible, at first glance, but really existing, worthy of surprise and admiration. The very turning over of the usual picture of things is fraught with doubt, firstly, for the one who turns it over (because he needs to decisively doubt the old truths), and secondly, for the one in front of whom this revolution takes place; his doubt is doubled, because the old is collapsing, and the new offered to replace it is also doubtful due to its, as it seems to him, improbability. Finally, the doubt of the latter is even tripled, because each philosopher carries out the revolution in his own way: one says that everything is not like this, but that's it, the other says that everything is not like that, but not like that either, but somehow, etc. e. Which of them to believe, with whom to agree? Each of them is convincing and right in his own way, but at the same time, since there are many of them (philosophers), and they all argue with each other, it turns out that none of them is right. So how is it really? Seeds of confusion, bewilderment and doubt in the human soul are the inevitable companions of the emerging philosophy.

Let's go back to the Milesian philosophers, who were looking for the beginning of the world in something material or material, finding it in water (Thales), in air (Anaximenes), infinite (Anaximander). However, with no less reason, one could see the beginning in something ideal (form, concept, idea), which Pythagoras did when he declared number to be the world beginning. The skeptical tendency among the Milesians lies in the departure from popular religion and mythology, and in Pythagoras in his famous assertion that wisdom cannot be possessed, that one can only love it, strive for it. In addition, in the person of the Milesian philosophers and Pythagoras, ancient thought received two contradictory worldviews, the very opposition and antagonism of which inevitably gave rise to doubt in each of them.

Among the Eleatics and Heraclitus there is an even greater departure from popular religion and mythology. The founder of the Eleatic school, Xenophanes, made a brilliant critique of the Olympian religion, and Heraclitus countered popular polytheism with his philosophical monism. In addition, the Eleatics came to the conclusion that sensory knowledge is deceptive, since the senses constantly testify to change and multiplicity. To substantiate their conceivable being, they subtly proved the impossibility of obvious things (movement and divisibility), thereby laying the foundation for “dialectics” - the art of challenging the obvious and proving that any position can be affirmed and denied with equal grounds. In confirmation of the presence of skeptical elements in Eleatic philosophy, we note that, firstly, Gorgias derived his skeptical positions from the basic Eleatic principles, and secondly, Timon, ridiculing all philosophers, respected only Pyrrho and the Eleatics. As for their conceivable being, it appeared, according to the fair remark of A.F. Losev "only the result of the first passion from the disclosure of the difference between sensation and thinking" 152
Losev A.F. Cultural and historical significance of ancient skepticism ... S. 9.

Losev also notes that "... this principle of unknowable and indivisible being or unity saved Eleatic natural philosophy from skepticism very little" 153
There. C.10.

However, the latter is still far from skepticism, since in his philosophy, along with chaos, there is logos - the world law, the manifestation and expression of which is chaos (behind the general disorder is an absolute and unshakable order, the eternal and indestructible principle of the world). However, some students of Heraclitus drew extremely relativistic conclusions from his teachings. So, for example, Cratyl believed that “... you should not [even] say anything, but only moved your finger and reproached Heraclitus with his words that you cannot enter the same water twice. Namely, he himself thought that [this cannot be done] even once. 155
Arist. Metaph. III. 5.18.

There are clearly expressed skeptical elements in Democritus' system. The Abder thinker argued that only an indivisible particle (atom) can be the bearer of being, which, never falling apart, exists forever. According to Democritus, atoms move in the void, and their combination leads to the formation of things, and their separation leads to the death of things. Thus, the latter are just a temporary combination of atoms, due to which both the things themselves and their properties are not so much a being as its illusion; and the knowledge of the sensible world, therefore, is unreliable, since no one can discover the true reality - atoms and emptiness. “According to the established custom, sweet and customary bitter, customary warm, customary cold, customary colored,” says Democritus, “in reality, atoms and emptiness” 156
Diels. 55. B 9. Sext. Emp. Adv.math. VII. 135.

Honey in itself is neither sweet nor bitter - it is just a complex of atoms, it is "no more" than something else. 157
Democritus already uses this skeptical formula, but in a slightly different sense. See: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. I. 213-214.

In the ethical sphere, Democritus proclaimed the same life ideal of ataraxia (equanimity), which was also preached by skeptics. There is even a point of view, expressed by Hirzel, that the Democritanian doctrine was the only source of Pyrrho's skepticism. Richter considers and criticizes this view in detail. 158
See: Richter R. Skepticism in Philosophy. Note. C.VI

Skeptical elements in the teachings of Democritus were developed by his students. So Metrodorus of Chios argued: “we know nothing; and we don't even know that we don't know anything" 159
Sext. Emp. Adv.math. VII. 88.

Anaxarchus and Monim compared existence with a theatrical scenery and considered it similar to what happens during dreams or madness. 160
See: Ibid.

Sooner or later, due to philosophical heterogeneity, the question of the possibilities and limits of human cognition had to arise. It is possible to assert that the elements of epistemological problems arose in pre-Socratic philosophy. However, the sophists began to pay closer attention to it. They certainly stood much closer to skepticism than their predecessors. The famous saying of Protagoras that “man is the measure of all things that exist, that they exist, that do not exist, that they do not exist” 161
Diels. 74. B 1 = Sext. Emp. Adv.math. VII 60–61 = Diog. L.IX. 51

In fact, the only evidence of an outstanding sophist that has come down to us has been interpreted differently. According to Richter, Grot, Laas, Gomperz, Halbfas and others argued that the protagoraean thesis refers to the entire human race, and not a separate person, and therefore it has not an individual, but general meaning. This is refuted, Richter notes, by the evidence of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Sextus, and at the present time by Zeller, Natorp, Meyer 162
See: Richter R. Skepticism in Philosophy. Note. 30. S.VII.

Apparently, this position of Protagoras is a thesis that lies in the philosophical channel of subjectivism: what is true for every person is what appears, seems, or is such to him. In addition, Protagoras denied any knowledge other than sensory: "beyond what our sensations give us, our soul is nothing" 163
Diog. L. IX 51.

From the foregoing, a twofold conclusion can be drawn: perhaps, Losev suggests, Protagoras' position about man as the measure of all things should be understood as a statement that everything is true and there is nothing false, or vice versa 164
See: Losev A.F. Cultural and historical significance of ancient skepticism… С11.

Or it is possible to recognize in the thesis of Protagoras a complete doubt. In any case, we clearly see in Protagoras a subjectivist tendency, and therefore the possibility of affirming and denying any thesis, i.e., the principle of isosthenia (iaoaBeveux), which is, as will be discussed later, one of the main provisions of skepticism. The principle of isosthenia was first proclaimed by Protagoras, who, according to Diogenes Laertes, “for the first time said that two statements opposing each other can be made about any thing” 165
Diog. L.IX. 51.

Protagoras' isosthenic positions are well illustrated by his statement about the gods: “About the gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist; a lot prevents me from knowing this, and above all - the darkness of the subject and the brevity of human life " 166
Diog. L.IX. 51.

According to Sextus Empiricus, Gorgias in his work “On Non-Existent, or On Nature” originally formulated the sophistic doctrine, arranging three chapters in succession: the first - that nothing exists; the second - that even if it exists, it is incomprehensible to man; and the third - that if it is comprehensible, then in any case it is inexpressible and inexplicable for another. 167
Diels. 76. B 3 = Sext. Emp. Adv.math. VII. 65.

As for the first two theses, Gorgias does not assert them dogmatically, assuming the opposite (as evidenced by the implicative construction of the second and third thesis - “if ..., then”) Therefore, on the whole, his position is isosthenic.

McCall also emphasizes that the Sophists, unlike the Pyrrhonics, did not live by love of happiness, but by love of truth ("not from love of happiness but from love of truth") 169
Maccoll N. The Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho to Sextus. Lond. And Camb., 1869. P. 17.

. (Here, apparently, it should be noted that we are talking about the truth according to which there is no single and generally accepted truth.)

The Socratic opposition to the subjectivism and relativism of the sophists lies primarily in the assertion that, despite all the subjective characteristics of people, there must certainly be something common for everyone, which rises above the differences between people and unites the latter, and that the goal of philosophy is precisely to find and the rationale for this general. However, the heuristic method by which Socrates went to this goal contained a significant skeptical element: after all, according to Socrates, each person should not blindly follow an authoritative judgment, but independently, through doubts, contradictions, bewilderment and disappointment, seek the truth. It was precisely for this methodical, instrumental skepticism that contemporaries accused the outstanding philosopher of wickedness (ἀσέβεια), allegedly expressed in disrespect for state laws and corrupting youth.

; and elsewhere he says that: "our investigation must proceed in such a way as to achieve the greatest degree of probability" 171
Ibid. 44d.

Skeptical elements in the teachings of such non-skeptical philosophers as Plato and Aristotle are explained by the fact that in their systems, in addition to absolute being (ideas and forms), there is also matter, which is interpreted either as non-being, bearing, or as other being; and if Plato's ideas and Aristotle's forms are the guarantor of the stability and unconditionality of the world, then they use matter as a source of its uncertainty and instability. She is just a "receiver" 172
Plat. Tim. 41a: "of every birth, the recipient and nurse." There. 51a: "mother and recipient of everything sensual."

Being and therefore “... that which only reproduces the prototype and is only a semblance of the real image, and one can speak no more than plausibly. For as being is related to birth, so truth is related to faith. 173
Ibid. 29c.

As a result of this instability, Plato notes, any thing can be completely different from what it is to us at one time or another. 174
See: Ibid. 48e-50a.

This means that our judgments about these transient things can only be of a probabilistic nature. 175
See: Ibid. 56c.

In the teachings of Aristotle, discussions about the instability and relativity of things are contained in the treatise "Topeka", which is devoted to the interpretation of reality as a structure that is constantly becoming and therefore, to a certain extent, unpredictable. An innumerable number of different facets, sides or nuances (topoi) of the universe gives it an infinite qualitative diversity. In addition, the eternal interaction and movement of these nuances determines the probabilistic and transient nature of the cosmos.

So, with all the positiveness that is generally characteristic of the various teachings of Greek philosophy in all its periods, the Hellenic thinkers also spoke about such aspects of being that made them understand it not only as something stable, harmonious, absolute and unconditional, but also as a process of becoming and changes as something unstable, relative, to some extent even random and therefore, in many respects, conditional and unpredictable. As you can see, long before the appearance of the skeptical school in Hellenic philosophy, among others, the idea of the universe as something unstable and difficult to understand was fully formed. It remained for the skeptics to focus their attention precisely on such a worldview, to comprehensively substantiate and develop it.

In addition, the very historical context of the end of the 4th-3rd centuries. BC e. favored the emergence of skepticism as an independent philosophical direction. The Hellenistic era, which began with Alexander's campaign to the East, was characterized by extreme instability of both economic, political, social, and cultural realities. Historical life and individual existence were characterized at that time primarily by unpredictability and the loss of all previous guarantees and guidelines. The centuries-old measured and calm course of life was destroyed within a few years, and a person from a quiet and peaceful abode of the policy was thrown into the whirlpool of the raging Hellenistic elements. Such historical conditions have contributed to the emergence of skepticism in two ways. First, the general relativity and instability of life naturally evoked pessimism, unbelief, doubt, i.e., gave rise to so-called everyday skepticism, or mood skepticism; and any state or mood inevitably begins to create theoretical substantiation and confirmation. Thus, mood skepticism, provoked by a specific historical situation, gave rise to or stimulated philosophical skepticism. Secondly, already known historical realities, in the ethical sphere, characterized by the loss of any external, generally significant foundations, guidelines, principles and guarantees for the individual, inevitably forced him to look for postulates no longer outside, but within himself, turned human thought mainly to ethical issues, calling to life the need for a theoretical substantiation of subjectivism, the ethical and philosophical search for individual happiness. “... ancient philosophy,” notes M.M. Sokolskaya, speaking of the emergence of an independent skeptical trend in the last era of Hellenic philosophy, who at first promised to reveal to people the “true order” hidden behind the surface of perceived things, came over a long path of development to remind again that this surface is our only a given, and uncertainty is a state inseparable from the very nature of man. 176
Sokolskaya M.M. Infinite approximation to the truth / / Cicero M.T. academic teaching. Per. ON THE. Fedorov. Moscow: Indrik, 2004, pp. 4–48. S. 48.

The philosophical schools that appeared at that time went in different ways towards the same goal. Self-sufficient happiness (eudaimonia) among the Epicureans is the result of deviation from the world, among the Stoics, on the contrary, it is the result of following it, among the skeptics it is neither one nor the other, but a decisive doubt in everything.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ANCIENT SKEPTICISM

YES. Gusev

Department of Philosophy Moscow Pedagogical State University 88, Vernadsky Ave., Moscow State Pedagogical University, Moscow, Russia, 117571

The ancestor of the ancient skeptical school is considered to be the Greek philosopher Pyrrho of Elis (around the 3rd century BC), but skeptical elements were present in Greek philosophy long before Pyrrho. This article is devoted to the consideration of skeptical elements in Greek pre-Pyrrhonian philosophy; At the same time, the author's attention is focused on the analytical and evaluative characteristics of the signs of skepticism of the previous philosophy as a prerequisite and condition for the possibility of the formation of skepticism as a philosophical direction.

Skeptical tendencies were present to a greater or lesser extent in Greek philosophy long before the formation of an independent skeptical school in it. Some ancient sources speak of a very ancient origin of skepticism and spread its influence quite widely. So, for example, the famous historian of ancient philosophy, Diogenes Laertes, reports that Homer is often called the founder of the skeptical school: “Some say that this school was founded by Homer, because he, like no one else, spoke about the same thing in different places in different places and not at all. did not strive for dogmatic certainty in his statements. Skeptical also, Diogenes reports, consider the sayings of the seven wise men, such as "Nothing too much" and "Bail is retribution." In addition, skepticism is attributed, according to Diogenes Laertius, to Archilochus, Euripides, Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, Democritus, Heraclitus and Hippocrates ^onf.: Diog. L.IX. 71-73]. Cicero lists Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, Metrodorus of Chios, the Stoics and Cyrenaics among the supporters of skepticism ^onf.: Cic. Acad. II. 5, 23]. According to Cicero, pre-Socratic philosophers, in spite of all, at first glance, their "non-skepticism", may well be considered as the forerunners of skepticism, since they, in despair from the difficulties of cognition, "exclaimed like crazy that nothing can be known" .

Raul Richter explains this kind of evidence by the desire of ancient authors to find support for the views that appeal to them in the teachings of their great predecessors, to attribute these views to immutable authorities, appealing to which has always been an unspoken rule and almost an obligation. However, the skeptics themselves did not follow this trend. Thus, Menodotus and Aenesidemus did not consider Plato a skeptic [Сonf.: Sext Emp. Pyrrh. I. 222-223], and Sextus Empiricus took special care to delimit skeptical philosophy from views that are related or intersect with it in one point or another [^n£: Sext Emp. 210-241].

In this case, it should be noted that partial or methodological skepticism is not alien to any philosophical construction, since a view that asserts something, precisely for the purpose of this assertion, must deny the opposite or doubt it, i.e. be skeptical about it. Therefore, it is not surprising that skepticism, or rather, its elements, are somehow contained in any philosophical construction. No system of views, as a rule, can do without relative skepticism. It is not surprising, therefore, that authors who sympathize with skepticism see it almost everywhere, and this, as we have just shown, is not only justified, but necessary. It is also understandable that the skeptics themselves decisively distinguished the partial skepticism of any philosophy from their absolute skepticism, which was an end in itself for them, emphasizing the fundamental difference and even opposition of the two types of skepticism: the first was ultimately only an element of positive dogmatism (according to the skeptics), the second same - self-sufficient doubt.

The Milesian philosophers were looking for the beginning of the world in something material or material, finding it in water (Thales), in air (Anaximenes), infinite (Anaximander). However, with no less reason, one could see the beginning in something ideal (form, concept, idea), which Pythagoras did when he declared number to be the world beginning. The skeptical tendency among the Milesians lies in the departure from popular religion and mythology, and in Pythagoras - in his famous assertion that wisdom cannot be possessed, that one can only love it, strive for it. In addition, in the person of the Milesian philosophers and Pythagoras, ancient thought received two contradictory

worldviews, the very opposition and antagonism of which inevitably gave rise to doubt in each of them.

Any change, the impossibility of which the Eleatic philosophers argued, is always the emergence, the formation of something from nothing, which is unthinkable. Therefore, any change, movement and multiplicity, due to inconceivability, do not exist, being an illusion, a deception. Existing is that which can be clearly thought - motionless, boundless, single, eternal being. Elea-tam is opposed by Heraclitus, who believed that the whole world is a continuous process of passing and becoming, universal fluidity: "Everything flows and nothing becomes." The Eleatics and Heraclitus show an even greater departure from popular religion and mythology. The founder of the Eleatic school, Xenophanes, made a brilliant critique of the Olympian religion, and Heraclitus countered popular polytheism with his philosophical monism. In addition, the Eleatics came to the conclusion that sensory knowledge is deceptive, since the senses constantly testify to change and multiplicity. To substantiate their conceivable being, they subtly proved the impossibility of obvious things (movement and divisibility), thus laying the foundation for “dialectics” - the art of challenging the obvious and proving that any position can be affirmed and denied with equal grounds. In confirmation of the presence of skeptical elements in Eleatic philosophy, we note that, firstly, Gorgias derived his skeptical positions from the basic Eleatic principles, and secondly, Timon, ridiculing all philosophers, respected only Pyrrho and the Eleatics. As for their conceivable being, it appeared, according to the fair remark of A.F. Losev, "only the result of the first passion from the disclosure of the difference between sensation and thinking." Losev also notes that "... this principle of unknowable and indivisible being, or unity, saved Eleatic natural philosophy from skepticism very little."

The skeptical tendency is undoubtedly represented in the relativism of Heraclitus: is it possible to have reliable knowledge of the world, which is an eternally fluid chaos. Hence - distrust of sensory knowledge in the teachings of Heraclitus. However, the latter is still far from skepticism, since in his philosophy, along with chaos, there is logos - the world law, the manifestation and expression of which is chaos (behind the general disorder is an absolute and unshakable order, the eternal and indestructible principle of the world). However, some students of Heraclitus drew extremely relativistic conclusions from his teachings. So, for example, Cratyl believed that “... one should not [even] say anything, but only move his finger and reproach Heraclitus with his words that you cannot enter the same water twice. Namely, he himself thought that [this cannot be done] even once.

There are clearly expressed skeptical elements in Democritus' system. The Abder thinker argued that the bearer of being can be

only an indivisible particle (atom), which, never falling apart, exists forever. According to Democritus, atoms move in the void and their combination leads to the formation of things, and their separation leads to the death of things. Thus, the latter are just a temporary combination of atoms, due to which both the things themselves and their properties are not so much a being as its illusion. And the knowledge of the sensible world, therefore, is unreliable, since no one can discover the true reality - atoms and emptiness. “According to established custom, sweet and customary bitter, customary warm, customary cold, customary colored,” says Democritus, “in reality, atoms and emptiness.” Honey in itself is neither sweet nor bitter - it's just a complex of atoms, it is "no more" than anything else ^onf.: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. I. 213-214]. In the ethical sphere, Democritus proclaimed the same life ideal of ataraxia (equanimity), which was also preached by skeptics. There is even a point of view, expressed by Hirzel, that the Democritanian doctrine was the only source of Pyrrho's skepticism. Richter considers and criticizes this view in detail.

Skeptical elements in the teachings of Democritus were developed by his students. So, Met-rodor of Chios stated: “we know nothing; and we don't even know that we don't know anything." Anaxarchus and Monim compared existence with a theatrical scenery and considered it similar to what happens during dreams or insanity.

Sooner or later, due to philosophical heterogeneity, the question of the possibilities and limits of human cognition had to arise. It is legitimate to assert that the elements of epistemological problems arose in pre-Socratic philosophy. However, the sophists began to pay closer attention to it. They certainly stood much closer to skepticism than their predecessors. The famous statement of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things that exist, that they exist, that they do not exist, that they do not exist", in fact the only evidence of an outstanding sophist that has come down to us, was interpreted differently. According to Richter, Grot, Laas, Gomperz, Halbfas and others argued that the protagoraean thesis refers to the entire human race, and not to an individual, and therefore it has not an individual, but a general meaning. This is refuted, Richter notes, by the evidence of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Sextus, and at the present time by Zeller, Natorp, Meyer.

Apparently, this position of Protagoras is a thesis that lies in the philosophical mainstream of subjectivism: what is true for every person is what appears, seems or is so to him. In addition, Protagoras denied all knowledge, except for sensory: "beyond what our sensations give us, our soul is nothing." From what has been said, one can draw a twofold conclusion: perhaps, Losev suggests, Pro-

Tagore about man as the measure of all things should be understood as a statement that everything is true and there is nothing false, or vice versa [See: 12. p. 11].

Or it is possible to recognize in the thesis of Protagoras a complete doubt. In any case, we clearly see in Protagoras a subjectivist tendency, and, consequently, the possibility of affirming and denying any thesis with the same reason, i.e. the principle of isosthenia (laoaGsvsia), which is, as will be discussed later, one of the cornerstones of skepticism. The principle of isosthenia was first proclaimed by Protagoras, who, according to Diogenes Laertes, "for the first time said that two statements opposing each other can be made about any thing." Protagoras' isosthenic positions are well illustrated by his statement about the gods: “About the gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist; many things prevent me from recognizing this, and above all, the darkness of the subject and the brevity of human life.

According to Sextus Empiricus, Gorgias in his work “On Non-Existent, or On Nature” originally formulated the sophistic doctrine, arranging three chapters in succession: the first - that nothing exists; the second - that even if it exists, it is incomprehensible to man; and the third - that if it is comprehensible, then in any case it is inexpressible and inexplicable for another. As for the first two theses, Gorgias does not assert them dogmatically, assuming the opposite (as evidenced by the implicative construction of the second and third thesis - "if ..., then"). Therefore, in general, his position is isostenic.

Since the sophists were, for the most part, paid teachers of wisdom, philosophizing for them, apparently, was not an end in itself. Perhaps that is why the significant skeptical charge of Greek sophistry did not turn into proper philosophical skepticism. V. Brochard notes that in sophistry youthful activity prevails, in Pyrrhonism - senile fatigue. McCall also emphasizes that the Sophists lived, unlike the Pyrrhonics, not from love of happiness, but from love of truth ("not from love of happiness but from love of truth"). (Here, apparently, it should be noted that we are talking about the truth according to which there is no single and generally accepted truth.)

The Socratic opposition to the subjectivism and relativism of the Sophists lies, first of all, in the assertion that, despite all the subjective characteristics of people, there must certainly be something common for everyone, which rises above the differences between people and unites the latter, and that the goal of philosophy is to once the finding and justification of this common. However, the heuristic method by which Socrates went to this goal contained a significant skeptical element: after all, each person, according to Socrates, should not blindly follow an authoritative judgment, but independently, through doubts, contradictions, bewilderment and disappointment, seek the truth. It is for this methodical, instrumental skepticism that contemporaries

and they accused the eminent philosopher of wickedness (aaspsia), allegedly expressed in disrespect for state laws and corrupting youth.

The teachings of Plato and Aristotle, despite all their objectivism, were not alien to distinctly expressed skeptical tendencies. So, for example, in the Timaeus dialogue, Plato emphasizes that there is nothing surprising in the fact that “... we, considering many things in many respects, such as the gods and the birth of the Universe, will not achieve complete accuracy and consistency in our reasoning. . On the contrary, we should rejoice if our reasoning turns out to be no less plausible than any other, and, moreover, remember that I, the reasoner, and you, my judges, are only people, and therefore we have to be content in such matters with a plausible myth, not demanding more"; and in another place he says that: "our investigation must proceed in such a way as to achieve the greatest degree of probability." Skeptical elements in the teachings of such non-skeptical philosophers as Plato and Aristotle are explained by the fact that in their systems, in addition to absolute being (ideas and forms), there is also matter, which is interpreted either as non-being, bearing, or as other being. And if Plato's ideas and Aristotle's forms are the guarantor of the stability and unconditionality of the world, then they use matter as a source of its uncertainty and instability. She is just a “receiver” of being and therefore “... about what only reproduces the prototype and is only a semblance of the real image, and one can speak no more than plausibly. For as being is related to birth, so truth is related to faith. As a result of this instability, Plato notes, any thing can be completely different from what it is to us at one time or another ^onf.: Plat. Tim. 48e - 50a], which means that our judgments about these transient things can only be of a probabilistic nature ^onf.: Plat. Tim. 56c]. In the teachings of Aristotle, discussions about the instability and relativity of things are contained in the treatise "Topeka", which is devoted to the interpretation of reality as a structure that is constantly becoming and therefore, to a certain extent, unpredictable. An innumerable number of different facets, sides or nuances (topoi) of the universe gives it an infinite qualitative diversity. In addition, the eternal interaction and movement of these nuances determines the probabilistic and transient nature of the entire cosmos.

So, with all the positiveness that is generally characteristic of the various teachings of Greek philosophy in all its periods, the Hellenic thinkers also spoke about such aspects of being that made them understand it not only as something stable, harmonious, absolute and unconditional, but also as a process of becoming and change as something unstable, relative, to some extent even random, and therefore largely conditional and unpredictable. As you can see, long before the appearance of the skeptical school in Hellenic philosophy, among others, the idea of the universe as something unstable and difficult to understand was fully formed. The skeptics remained to focus

focus our attention precisely on such a worldview, comprehensively substantiate and develop it.

Such historical conditions have contributed to the emergence of skepticism in two ways. Firstly, the general relativity and instability of life naturally caused pessimism, unbelief, doubt, that is, they gave rise to the so-called everyday skepticism or mood skepticism. And any state or mood inevitably begins to create a theoretical justification and confirmation for itself. Thus, mood skepticism, provoked by a specific historical situation, gave rise to or stimulated philosophical skepticism. Secondly, the already known historical realities, in the ethical sphere, characterized by the loss of any external, generally significant foundations, guidelines, principles and guarantees for the individual, inevitably forced him to look for postulates no longer outside, but within himself, turned human thought, mainly towards ethical problematics, bringing to life the need for a theoretical substantiation of subjectivism, the ethical and philosophical search for individual happiness. The philosophical schools that appeared at that time went in different ways to the same cherished goal. Self-sufficient happiness (eudaimonia) among the Epicureans is the result of deviation from the world, among the Stoics, on the contrary, it is the result of following it, among the skeptics - neither one nor the other, but a decisive doubt in everything.

So, ancient skepticism, on the one hand, was a definite result of individual, more or less pronounced, skeptical tendencies in the development of Greek philosophy from the pre-Socratic to the Hellenistic period; on the other hand, it represents a kind of intellectual reaction to the emergence of the philosophical priority of the unconditional eudemonistic orientation of Hellenism, which found its expression in the philosophical constructions of not only skeptics, but also Epicureans, Stoics, Cynics, Cyrenaics and was largely due to the socio-economic and political instability and, as a result, the emotional and psychological disorder characteristic of this era. In pre-Pyrrhonian philosophy, skepticism, although it existed in the form of separate fragments, nevertheless, as a whole, was an essential stream in ancient philosophizing, which largely determined its type and specificity.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ATECEDENTS OF ANCIENT GREEK SKEPTICISM

Moscow teachers-training state university subfaculty of philosophy

Vernadskogopr., 88, Moscow, Russia, 117571

The founder of ancient sceptical trend is considered greek philosopher Pyrrho from Elith (about III c. B.C.), but sceptical elements had also circulation in Greek philosophy before Pyrrho. These elements are analyzed by the author of the article.

Further, he wrote in letters to Leontiya: "Vladyka Apollo! What noise we were full of, dear Leontiya, reading your letter!" And to Themista, Leontey's wife: "If you never get out to me, really, I myself am ready to roll a ball, wherever you, Themista and Leontey, call me." And to Pythokles, the blooming boy: "Well, I will sit and wait for your arrival, desired and divine!" And also to Themis - about what instructions were between them (as Theodore writes in the IV book of "Against Epicurus"). And he wrote letters to other getters, but most of all - to Leontia, with whom Metrodorus was also in love. And in the essay "On the Ultimate Goal" he writes as follows: "I do not know what to think good, if not the pleasure of eating, from love, from what you hear, and from the beauty that you see." And in a letter to Pythocles: "From all upbringing, my joy, save yourself at full sail!"

Epictetus calls him a lecher and scolds him with his last words. Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who himself studied with Epicurus, but then left him, says in a book entitled "Recreations" that Epicurus vomited twice a day from overfeeding and that he himself barely managed to evade Epicurean philosophy of the night and from initiation into everything its mysteries; he also says that Epicurus was very ignorant in reasoning, and even more so in life, that his body was stunted and for many years he could not even get up from a stretcher, that he spent a mine a day on gluttony (as he himself writes in letters to Leontius and the Mytilenian philosophers) that other hetaerae - Mammaria, Gedea, Erotia, Nikidia - were confused with him and Metrodorus - and that in his 37 books "On Nature" he repeats a lot and endlessly recounts other philosophers, especially Nafsifana; here it is own words: "Well, them! Indeed, from his lips, even in agony, sophistical swagger sounded, like many such lackeys." And here are the words in the letters of Epicurus himself about Navsifan: "He has reached such a frenzy that he reviles me and calls me a schoolboy-teacher!" He called this Navsifan a slug, an ignoramus, a rogue and a woman; disciples of Plato - Dionysian sycophants; Plato himself - a gold-plated sage; Aristotle - a spendthrift who drank his father's good and went to hire and fool people; Protagora as a wood-carrier, Democritus scribe and village literate; Heraclitus as a water mutant; Democritus - Void Crit; Antidora by Vertidore; cynics - the scourge of all Hellas; dialecticians - pests; Pyrrho - ignorant and ignorant.

But everyone who writes like that is just crazy. This man has enough witnesses of his incomparable benevolence to all: the fatherland, which honored him with copper statues, and so many friends that their number cannot be measured by whole cities, and all the students chained to his teachings like the songs of the Sirens (except only one Metrodorus of Stratonikeia , who defected to Carneades almost because he was weary of the immeasurable kindness of his mentor), and the succession of his successors, eternally maintained in the continuous change of students, while almost all other schools have already died out, and his gratitude to his parents, and beneficence to the brothers, and meekness towards the slaves (which is visible both from his will and from the fact that they were engaged in philosophy with him, and the aforementioned Mies is most famous of all), and all his humanity in general towards anyone. His piety before the gods and his love for the fatherland are inexpressible. His modesty reached such an extreme that he did not even touch state affairs. And although his times were very difficult for Hellas, he lived in it all his life, only two or three times going to Ionia to visit friends. Friends themselves came to him from everywhere and lived with him in his garden (as Apollodorus also writes); this garden was bought for 80 minutes. And this life was modest and unpretentious, as Diocles declares in book III of the Review; "Mugs of weak wine were quite enough for them, but usually they drank water." At the same time, Epicurus did not believe that good should be owned together, according to the Pythagorean word, that friends have everything in common - this would mean distrust, and whoever does not trust is not a friend. - He himself writes in letters that water and simple bread are enough for him; "Send me a pot of cheese," he writes, "so that I can luxuriate whenever I feel like it." Such was the man who taught that the ultimate goal is pleasure! And Athenaeus in his poem sings of him like this: People, you work in vain in your insatiable self-interest,
Again and again starting quarrels, and scolding, and war.
A narrow limit is set for everything that is given by nature.
But the ways of human idle judgments are endless.
The sage Epicurus, son of Neocles, heard these speeches from the Muses,
Or their tripod was opened by the holy Pythian god.

Of the ancient philosophers, Anaxagoras was closest to him, although he did not agree with him in some ways (says Diocles), as well as Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates; According to Diocles, he forced his neighbors to memorize his compositions for exercise.

Apollodorus in the Chronology says that Epicurus was a student of Nausifan and Praxifan, but Epicurus himself (in a letter to Eurylochus) renounces this and calls himself self-taught. He likewise denies (as does Hermarchus) that there was a philosopher, Leucippus, whom others (and even the Epicurean Apollodorus) regard as the teacher of Democritus. And Demetrius of Magnesia says that he even listened to Xenocrates.

He called all objects by their proper names, which the grammarian Aristophanes considers a reprehensible feature of his style. His clarity was such that in his work "On Rhetoric" he does not consider it necessary to demand anything but clarity. And in his letters he does not address "I want to rejoice," but "I wish well-being" or "I wish you well."

Ariston in the "Biography of Epicurus" assures that he wrote off his "Canon" from the "Tripod" of Navsifan, especially since he was even a listener of this Navsifan, as well as the Platonist Pamphilus on Samos. And he began to study philosophy at the age of 12 and started school at the age of 32.

He was born (according to Apollodorus in the "Chronology") in the third year of the 109th Olympiad, under the archon Sosigene, on the seventh day of the month of gamelion, seven years after the death of Plato. At the age of 32, he founded his school, first in Mytilene and Lampsacus, and five years later he moved with her to Athens. He died in the second year of the 127th Olympiad, under Archon Pifarat, at the age of seventy-two; the Mytilenian Hermarchus, the son of Agemort, took over the school from him. His death happened from a kidney stone, and he had been ill for fourteen days before (this same Hermarch says in his letters). Hermippus says that he lay down in a copper bath with hot water, asked for undiluted wine, drank it, wished his friends not to forget his teachings, and so died. Our verses about him are as follows: Be happy, friends, and remember our teachings! -
So, dying, Epicurus said to his dear friends,
He lay down in the hot pool and got drunk with pure wine,
And through this he entered the eternally cold Hades.

That's what life was like, and that's what death was like for this man.

He left this will:

“I leave all my property to Aminomachus, the son of Philocrates, from Bata, and Timocrates, the son of Demetrius, from Potam, according to the donation recorded in the Metroon in the name of both, and with the condition that they provide the garden and everything belonging to it to Germarchus son of Agemort, a Mytilenian, with fellow students of philosophy, and then to those whom Hermarchus leaves as successors in philosophy, so that they spend their time there as befits philosophers. heirs in arranging the garden and living in it, so that those heirs will tend the garden in the surest way on an equal footing with those to whom our successors in philosophy entrust this. Hermarch is alive.

And from the income that we bequeathed to Aminomachus and Timocrates, let them, with the knowledge of Hermarchus, devote a part to sacrifices for my father, mother, and brothers, and for myself at the usual celebration of my birthday every year on the 10th day of the gamelion and on then, on the 20th day of each month, schoolmates should gather in the prescribed manner in memory of me and Metrodorus. Let them also celebrate the day of my brethren in the month of Posideon, and the day of Useful in the month of Metagythnion, as has been done hitherto with us.

And let Aminomachus and Timocrates take care of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and the son of Polienus, while they study philosophy and live under Hermarchus. In the same way, let them take care of the daughter of Metrodorus, if she is well-behaved and obedient to Hermarchus, and when she comes of age, then let her give her to whom Hermarchus will indicate among his comrades in philosophy, and let them appoint so many , how much they and Hermarch will honor for what they need. Let them appoint Hermarchus next to them as guardian of revenues, so that nothing can be done without the one who has grown old with me in philosophy and left after me the leader of my comrades in philosophy. Even as a dowry for the girl, when she enters her age, Aminomachus and Timocrates will take from the presence as much as they deem necessary, with the knowledge of Hermarch. Let them take care of Nicanor, as we took care of him, so that none of our comrades in philosophy, rendering us services in business, showing all kinds of benevolence and growing old with me in philosophy, should not remain needy through my fault after that.

The books that we have should be given to Hermarch. But if something happens to Hermarchus before the children of Metrodores come of age, and if they are well-behaved, then let Aminomachus and Timocrates give out of the income left by us, as much as possible, so that they do not know the need for anything. And let them take care of everything else, as I have ordered, so that everything can be done that will be possible. Of my slaves, I release Misa, Nikias and Lycon, and of the slaves Phaedria.

And already dying, he writes the following letter to Idomeneo:

“I wrote this to you on my blessed and my last day. My pains from diarrhea and from urination are already so great that they can no longer become; but in everything they are opposed by my spiritual joy at the recollection of the conversations that were between us. how from an early age you treated me and philosophy, it is fitting for you to take care of Metrodor's children."

This was his last will.

He had many students, and the most famous of them are as follows:

Metrodorus of Lampsacus, son of Athenaeus (or Timocrates) and Sanda; recognizing Epicurus, he no longer parted with him and only once for six months went to his homeland and returned. He was good to everyone, as Epicurus himself testifies in his introductory notes and in Book III of Timocrates. He gave his sister Batis to Idomeneo, and took Leontia, an Attic hetaera, as his concubine. Before all sorts of worries and death itself, he was inflexible, as Epicurus says in the first book of Metrodorus. He died, they say, at the age of 53, seven years before Epicurus, who, in his above-mentioned will, himself clearly speaks of him as dead and takes care of the guardianship of his children. He had a brother Timocrates, a small man, whom we have already mentioned. The works of Metrodorus are as follows: "Against Doctors" - 3 books, "On the Feelings", "Against Timocrates", "On the Greatness of the Spirit", "On Epicurean Help", "Against the Dialectics", "Against the Sophists" - 9 books, "On the Road to wisdom", "On change", "On wealth", "Against Democritus", "On nobility".

Further, Hermarch of Mytilene, the successor of Epicurus, the son of a poor father, at first engaged in rhetoric. Such excellent books of his are known: "Letters on Empedocles" - 22 books, "On Knowledge", "Against Plato", "Against Aristotle". He died of paralysis, showing himself to be a capable man.

Further, Leontey Lampsaksky and his wife Themista to whom Epicurus wrote letters; Further, stab and Idomeneo, also from Lampsak, famous people; so is polystratus, successor of Hermarchus; and he was replaced Dionysius, and that - Basilid. Also known Apollodorus, nicknamed the Garden Tyrant, the writer of more than four hundred books, and two Ptolemaic Alexandrian, Black and White; and Zeno Sidonsky, the listener of Apollodorus, the great scribbler; and Demetrius nicknamed the Laconian; and Diogenes Tarssky, compiler of Selected Lessons, and Orion, and others whom the real Epicureans call sophists.

There were three other Epicuri: the first was the son of Leonteus and Themista, the second was from Magnesia, and the third was a teacher of sword fighting.

Epicurus was the most abundant writer and surpassed everyone in the multitude of his books: they make up about 300 scrolls. In them there is not a single extract from the outside, but everywhere the voice of Epicurus himself. Chrysippus competed with him in the abundance of what was written, but it’s not for nothing that Carneades calls him a freeloader of the Epicurean writings: for everything that was written by Epicurus, Chrysippus wrote exactly the same amount out of rivalry, and therefore he repeated himself often, and wrote whatever he wrote, and did not check what was written, and he has so many extracts from outside that they alone can fill entire books, as is the case with Zeno and Aristotle. Here are how many and what are the writings of Epicurus, and the best of them are the following:

"On Nature" 37 books, "On Atoms and Emptiness", "On Love", "Short Objections to Physicists", "Against Megariks", "Doubts", "Main Thoughts", "On Preference and Avoidance", "On the Ultimate goals", "On the criteria, or Canon", "Heredem", "On the gods", "On goodness", "Hegesianakt", "On the way of life" 4 books, "On justice", "Neocle", to Themis, " Feast", "Eurilochus", to Metrodorus, "On Sight", "On Angles in Atoms", "On Touch", "On Destiny", "Opinions on Suffering", to Timocrates, "Foresight", "Encouragement", " On Appearances", "On Ideas", "Aristobulus", "On Music", "On Justice and Other Virtues", "On Gifts and Gratitude", "Polymedes", "Timocrates" - 3 books, "Metrodor" - 5 books , "Antidore" - 2 books, "Opinions on diseases", to Mitra, "Kallistol", "On royal power", "Anaksimen", "Letters".

I will try to present his opinions expressed in these books by citing three of his epistles, in which his whole philosophy is briefly surveyed; I will also add his "Main Thoughts" and what else seems worthy of selection, so that this man can be fully known and properly appreciated. The first epistle is written to Herodotus [and speaks of physics; the second - to Pythocles], about celestial phenomena; the third to Menekey, on the way of life. We will begin with the first, but first we will say briefly about the division of his philosophy.

His philosophy is divided into three parts: canonics, physics and ethics. The canonica is an approach to the subject and is contained in a book called "Canon". Physics is all speculation about nature and is contained in 37 books "On Nature", and in its main features - in letters. Ethics speaks of preference and avoidance; it is contained in the books "On the Way of Life", in letters and in the essay "On the Ultimate Goal". Usually, however, canonics is considered together with physics: canonics is the science of criteria and beginnings in their very foundations, and physics is the science of emergence and destruction and nature; ethics, on the other hand, is the science of what is preferred and avoided, about the way of life and the ultimate goal.

They reject dialectics as a superfluous science - in physics, they say, it is enough to use words corresponding to subjects. So, in the "Canon" Epicurus says that the criteria of truth are sensations (aistheseis), anticipation (prolepseis) and suffering (pathe), and the Epicureans also add a figurative throw of thought (phantasticai epibolai tes dianoias). He says the same thing in the epistle to Herodotus, and in the Main Thoughts. Any sensation, he says, is unreasonable and independent of memory: neither by itself, nor from a third-party shock, can it add anything to itself, or subtract anything. It is also impossible to refute it: a kindred sensation cannot be refuted by kindred, because they are equivalent, and unkind cannot be refuted by unkind, because they do not judge the same thing; reason cannot refute sensations, because it itself relies entirely on sensations; and one sensation cannot refute another, because we trust each of them. The very existence of perceptions serves as confirmation of the truth of feelings. After all, we actually see, hear, experience pain; from here, starting from the obvious, one must also conclude about the meaning of what is not so clear. For all our thoughts arise from sensations by virtue of their coincidence, proportionality, similarity or comparison, and reason only contributes to this. The visions of madmen and sleepers are also true, because they set [the senses] in motion, and the non-existent is incapable of this.

They call anticipation something like a comprehension, or a correct opinion, or a concept, or a general thought embedded in us, that is, remembering what often appeared to us from outside, for example: "This is a man." In fact, as soon as we say "man", anticipation evokes in our thought its impression, the forerunner of which was sensations. In the same way, for any word, its primary underlying basis becomes clear; and we could not even begin the search if we did not know in advance what we are looking for. So, to ask: "Who is standing there at a distance, a horse or a cow?" - you need to know in advance, thanks to anticipation, the appearance of both. After all, we could not even name an object if, by virtue of anticipation, we did not know in advance its imprint. Therefore, anticipations have the power of evidence.

The object of opinion also proceeds from something primary-visible, and in our proposals we go back precisely to this basis, for example: "How do we know that this is a person?" The opinion itself, according to them, is also a conjecture, and it can be both true and false: if it is confirmed and not refuted by the evidence of sensations, then it is true, if it is not confirmed and refuted, then it is false. That is why the concept of "waiting" (prosmenon) is introduced; for example, to wait to get closer to the tower and find out what it is like up close.

Of suffering, they say, there are two pleasures and pains; they arise in every living being, and the first of them is close to us, and the second is alien; this determines what we prefer and what we avoid.

Research can be conducted either about objects or about pure words.

Such, in the form of a list, is his doctrine of division and criterion. Now let's move on to writing.

Epicurus sends greetings to Herodotus.

Those who cannot, Herodotus, carefully study everything that we have written about nature, and delve into our more extensive writings, for those I have already compiled an overview of the whole subject, sufficient to keep in memory at least the most important thing. I wanted it to help you in important cases whenever you have to take up the study of nature. Yes, and those who have already achieved success in considering the whole should remember the main features of the appearance of the whole object: the general movement of thought is often necessary for us, but the details are not so often. It is to these general features that we have to turn, constantly remembering as much as is necessary for the most general movement of thought about the subject, and for the utmost accuracy of details, that is, having well mastered and memorized the most basic features. Indeed, the main sign of perfect and complete knowledge is the ability to quickly use the throws of thought [and this happens when everything] comes down to simple foundations and words. For whoever cannot grasp in short words everything that is studied in parts, he cannot know the thickness of everything covered. And so, since such a path is useful for all who have become accustomed to the study of nature, I, who devoted my constant efforts to the study of nature and reached the world of life primarily thanks to it, have also compiled for you the following review, which contains the foundations of the whole doctrine.

So, first of all, Herodotus, one should understand what is behind the words, so that all our opinions, searches, perplexities can be reduced to them for discussion, so that in endless explanations they do not remain undiscussed, and the words are not empty. In fact, if we only want to reduce our searches, perplexities, opinions to something, then we need to see in each word its first meaning, which does not need proof. And then we must hold on to sensations in everything, hold on to the current throws of thought or any other criterion, hold on to the sufferings we experience - and this will give us the means to judge what is waiting and unclear. And having already dealt with this, one should proceed to the consideration of the unclear.

First of all: nothing arises from the non-existent, otherwise everything would arise from everything, without needing any seeds. And if the disappearing were destroyed into the non-existent, everything would have perished long ago, for what comes from the destruction would not exist. What the Universe is now, such it has always been and will always be, because there is nothing for it to change into – for, apart from the Universe, there is nothing that could enter into it, making a change.

Further //he says this both at the beginning of the "Big Review", and in Book I "On Nature"//, the Universe is [bodies and emptiness] . That there are bodies, this everywhere confirms our sensation, on which, as said, our reasoning about the obscure must inevitably rely; and if there were not what we call emptiness, space, or intangible nature, then bodies would have no where to move and through which to move, while it is obvious that they move. Apart from bodies and emptiness, neither comprehension nor comparison with what is comprehended can conceive of any other independent nature, but only accidental or non-random properties of such.

Further //he repeats this both in I, XIV and XV books "On Nature", and in the "Great Review"//, some of the bodies are complex, and others are those of which complex ones are composed. These latter are atoms, indivisible and unchangeable. In fact, not everything that exists will have to collapse into non-existence: something else is so strong that it will withstand the decomposition of complexities due to its natural density and because it has nothing to decompose and it is impossible. Therefore, principles by their nature can only be corporeal and indivisible.

Further, the Universe is infinite. Indeed, what has a limit has an edge; and the edge is what you can look at from the side; therefore, the universe has no edge, and therefore has no limit. And what has no limit is infinite and unlimited.

The Universe is boundless both in the multitude of bodies and in the vastness of the void. Indeed, if the emptiness were infinite, and the multitude of bodies was limitless, then they would not stay in one place, but would rush scattered around the boundless emptiness, having neither restraint nor rebuff; and if the void were limiting, there would be nowhere for an infinite multitude of bodies to exist in it.

In addition, the atoms of bodies, indivisible and solid, from which everything complex is composed and into which everything complex is decomposed, are immensely diverse in appearance - for it cannot be that so many differences arose from a vast number of the same species. In each species, the number of such atoms is completely unlimited, but the number of different types is not completely unlimited, but only immense. //After all, he says below that internal division does not take place to infinity: he makes such a reservation so that they do not think that since the qualities of things are changeable, then atoms differ in size from perfect infinity.//

Atoms move continuously and forever / / and with equal speed, as he says below, - for in the void it is equally easy to move both for light and for heavy / /: some - at a distance from each other, and others - oscillating in place, if they accidentally will interlock or be embraced by linked atoms. This oscillation occurs because the nature of the void that separates the atoms is unable to resist them; and the hardness inherent in the atoms makes them rebound when they collide, as far as the cohesion of the atoms around the collision gives them space. There was no beginning for this, because both atoms and emptiness exist forever.

Further, in relation to infinity, the words "top" and "bottom" cannot be used in the meaning of "the highest" and "the lowest". However, we know that from where we stand, we can continue space up to infinity, and from any conceivable place down to infinity, and yet it will never seem to us both below and above the same place, because it is impossible to think. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine only one conceivable movement up to infinity, and only one - down to infinity, even if the movement from our heads upwards comes ten thousand times to the feet of those above, and the movement from us downwards to the heads of those below. In fact, the movement as a whole does not lose the opposites of its direction, even being thought in infinity.

Further, when the atoms rush through the void without encountering resistance, they must move at the same speed. Neither heavy atoms will move faster than small and light ones, if nothing stands in their way, nor small ones faster than large ones, if a commensurate passage is open to them everywhere and there is no resistance; this applies both to moving up or sideways from collisions, and to moving down from its own gravity. In fact, when a body has this or that movement, it will move quickly, like a thought, until the force of the push meets resistance either outside, or in the body's own gravity. True, it may be objected that although the atoms move with the same speed, however, complex bodies move some faster, others slower. But this is because the atoms collected in bodies tend to one place only during the smallest continuous intervals of time; but already in intelligible intervals of time this place will be different - atoms are constantly colliding, and from this, in the end, movement becomes accessible to feeling. And the conjectures will be wrong, that among invisible particles and in intelligible intervals of time continuous movement is possible: after all, only that which is accessible to observation or caught by a throw of thought is true.

Further, relying on our sensations and sufferings (for this is the surest support for judgments), it is necessary to see that the soul is a body of fine particles, scattered throughout our composition (athroisma); it is similar to the wind, to which heat is mixed, and in some ways it is more similar to the wind, and in some ways to heat; but there is also a [third] part in it, consisting of still finer particles and therefore interacting even more closely with the rest of the composition of our body. Evidence of all this is our spiritual abilities, patience, excitability, the movement of thought, and everything without which we perish. At the same time, it should be assumed that it is the soul that is the main cause of sensations; but she would not have them if she were not closed in the rest of the composition of our body. And this composition, having allowed the soul to become such a cause, acquires such a property from it, but not all the properties that it has. Therefore, having lost his soul, he also loses his senses, since the ability to feel was not in himself; he only delivered this ability to something else, born with him, and this latter, having developed this ability with the help of movement, immediately and in itself produced the property of sensitivity, and communicated to his body through its contiguity and interaction with him, as I I said. Therefore, as long as the soul is contained in the body, it does not lose sensitivity even with the loss of any member: with the destruction of its cover, complete or partial, the particles of the soul also perish, but as long as something remains of it, it will have sensations. The rest of our composition, remaining in whole or in part, after the removal of that arbitrarily small number of atoms, which constitutes the nature of the soul, will no longer have sensations. Finally, when our entire composition is destroyed, the soul dissipates and no longer has either the former forces or movements, and likewise sensations. For it is impossible to imagine that it retained sensations otherwise than in its present warehouse, and that it retained present movements when the surrounding cover is no longer the one in which they are now performed.

// In other places he also says that the soul consists of the most smooth and round atoms, very different even from the atoms of fire; that part of it is irrational and scattered throughout the body, while the rational part is in the chest, which is evident from the feeling of fear and joy; that sleep comes from the fact that the particles of the soul, scattered throughout the composition, flow or spread, and then stray from shocks; and that semen is collected from all parts of the body.//

Indeed, we must not forget that the so-called "incorporeal" in ordinary usage is that which can be thought of as something independent; but nothing incorporeal can be conceived as independent, except only emptiness; emptiness can neither act nor experience an effect, it only allows the movement of bodies through itself. Therefore, those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking nonsense: if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon, while we clearly see that both these properties are inherent in the soul. So, if we reduce all our reasoning about the soul to sensations and sufferings (remembering what we said at the beginning.), then it will be clear that here they are outlined with sufficient clarity so that in the future, using these outlines, it would be possible to confidently refine the details.

Further, the form, color, size, weight, and everything else that is listed as a property of bodies (all or only visible) and is known by the sensations corresponding to them, should not be thought of as original natures (this is unimaginable), should not be thought of as non-existent, not must be conceived as something incorporeal, inherent in the body, not as a part of this body; no, the permanent nature of the whole body consists of all these properties, but not as if they were all put together, as dense particles are put together into larger compounds, or small parts into larger ones, but simply, as I said, the permanent nature of the whole body consists of all these properties. All these properties are captured and distinguished each in its own way, but always accompanied by the whole and never apart from it; it is from this collective concept that the body derives its name.

Further, bodies are often accompanied by impermanent properties, which also cannot be called either invisible or incorporeal. Calling such properties accidental according to the usual usage of words, we clearly assert that they do not have the property of that whole, which in the aggregate is called the body, and do not have the nature of those permanent qualities of it, without which the body is unthinkable. Each of them can receive such a name, since in a mental throw it accompanies the body, but only when it is really seen, because these properties are not constantly accompanying. This evidence should not be considered non-existent simply because it does not have the nature of that whole (called the body) in which it is seen, or any constantly accompanying property of this whole; one should not, however, consider it to have an independent existence (this is just as unthinkable for random properties as for constants); but one should consider them, as they seem, as accidental properties of bodies, and not constantly accompanying properties of bodies and not having the position of independent natures; they are considered precisely in their originality, which is revealed by sensation.

Further, we must firmly adhere to the following position: time is not amenable to such investigation as all other properties of objects that we investigate, reducing them to anticipations seen in ourselves - no, we must proceed from that immediate evidence that makes us speak about long or short time, and express it accordingly. At the same time, one should not choose special words, as if they were better, but one should use common expressions about the subject; Nor should we ascribe to other objects the same essence that exists in our uniqueness (although others do this), but we must pay attention only to what we associate our object with and how we measure it. Indeed, there is no need to prove, but only need to pay attention to the fact that we associate it with such things as day and night, parts of day and night, excitement and rest, movement and stillness, and, highlighting the mind in these things special random property, we call it time. // He says the same thing in the II book "On Nature" and in the "Great Review".//

Further, in addition to all that has been said, it should be assumed that the worlds and in general any limited complex body of the same kind as objects that we observe all the time - all originated from infinity, standing out from separate clots, large and small; and they all decompose again from one cause or another, some more quickly, others more slowly. //From this it is clear that he considers worlds subject to destruction, because parts of them are subject to change. Elsewhere he says that the earth rests on air. // At the same time, one should not think that all worlds must necessarily have the same shape: // on the contrary, he himself says in the XII book "On Nature" that some of them are spherical, others are ovoid, others have other types, however not all. In the same way, animals are not denied infinity; / / indeed, it is impossible to prove that in such and such a world those seeds that make up animals, plants and everything else that we see could or could not be contained, but in this is not possible in another world. // The same can be said about food for them. The earthly world should be discussed in the same way.//

Further, it should be assumed that compelling circumstances taught our nature many and varied things, and then the mind improved what it received from nature and supplemented it with new discoveries - sometimes faster, sometimes more slowly, sometimes more, sometimes less. That is why the names of things were at first given by no means by agreement: human nature itself in each nation, experiencing special feelings and receiving special impressions, emitted air in a special way under the influence of each of these feelings and impressions, in different ways depending on different places where peoples lived; only then did each people establish common names for themselves, so that there would be less ambiguity in the explanations and so that they would be shorter. And introducing some objects not yet seen, people familiar with them also introduced sounds for them: others - pronouncing as necessary, others - choosing according to understanding where there were stronger grounds for such and such an expression.

More about movement celestial bodies, solstices, eclipses, sunrises, sunsets, and the like, one should not think that some being disposes of them and puts or has put them in order; and one should not think that at the same time it enjoys perfect bliss and immortality, because orders, worries, anger, mercy are incompatible with bliss, but arise from weakness, fear and need for others; and one should not think that it is the clots of heavenly fire themselves that are endowed with bliss and voluntarily assume their movements. No, greatness must be observed in all words for these concepts, so that they do not evoke opinions inconsistent with such greatness, from which the greatest confusion in souls can arise. Therefore, it must be assumed that this rigorous cycle takes place due to the fact that when the world arose, such clots were originally part of its composition.

Further, it must be assumed that the task of studying nature is to investigate the cause of the most important things, and that it is precisely in this that the blessedness of the knowledge of nature, observed in celestial phenomena, and everything that contributes to the immediate achievement of this goal, consists. At the same time, in such matters it is impossible to admit a variety of reasons and think that things can be otherwise; no, in an immortal and blissful nature there can be nothing that allows for heterogeneity or restlessness - that this is exactly so is not difficult to comprehend by thought. On the other hand, the mere narration of sunsets, sunrises, solstices, eclipses, and the like, has nothing to do with the bliss of knowledge: whoever is versed in these phenomena, but does not know what their nature and their main causes, feels the same fears as if he would be completely ignorant, and perhaps even greater, because his amazement at all this information cannot be resolved and understand the structure of the most important thing. Therefore, even if we find several causes of solstices, sunsets, sunrises, eclipses, and the like, as was the case in our reasoning about individual phenomena, then we should not consider such accuracy of research insufficient for achieving our serenity and bliss. It is necessary to note in how many ways similar phenomena occur around us, and then to discuss the causes of celestial phenomena and all other ambiguities; and one can only despise those who do not understand the difference between what happens or arises in one way only, and what happens different ways who does not take into account the ideas that arise at a long distance, and who does not know at all under what conditions it is possible and in what it is impossible to maintain the serenity of the spirit. If we, realizing that such and such a phenomenon can occur in many ways, accept that it occurs in such and such a way, then we will maintain the same serenity of spirit, as if we knew for sure that it occurs in this way.

Finally, in general, one must firmly adhere to the following view: the most important confusion in human souls arises from the fact that the same natures are considered blessed and immortal and at the same time, on the contrary, endowed with will, actions, motives; because people always expect and fear eternal horrors, as they are described in fables, and are afraid even of posthumous insensibility, as if it were evil for them; because, finally, they experience all this not even from empty opinions, but from some kind of unreasonable perversion, and if they do not put an end to their fear, then they experience the same or even stronger confusion than those who hold empty opinions. Meanwhile, serenity consists in renouncing all this and only firmly remembering the most general and main thing. Therefore, it is so important to be attentive to immediate sensations and experiences, to general ones in general cases and to particular ones in particular cases, as well as to any immediate evidence given to each of our means of judgment. If we hold to this, then we will properly remove and cancel the causes of confusion and fear, since we will be able to judge the causes of both celestial phenomena and all other events that frighten other people to such an extreme.

Here you are, Herodotus, the most important provisions of the science of nature in the form of an overview; and I think that if this essay lends itself to exact assimilation, then he who has assimilated it will receive an incomparably stronger support than other people, even if he does not happen to get to all the particular details. And he will in many respects clarify the particular details for himself from our full work, and the memory of these provisions will be his constant help. For they are such that anyone who is fully, or at least sufficiently versed in details, will be able to inquire into the nature of everything, reducing them to such considerations; and whoever has not yet reached full perfection, with their help and without words, will be able, with the speed of thought, to fly around everything that is most necessary to achieve peace of mind.

Such is his letter on physics. And his letter about celestial phenomena is as follows:

"Epicurus Pythocles sends greetings.

Cleon brought me a letter from you, in which you express your good feelings for us, worthy of our concern for you, and sincerely try to remember all the reasoning that serves happy life; and to facilitate your memory, you ask me to send you a short and easily visible discussion of celestial phenomena, because what we wrote in other works is given to your memory with difficulty, even though you carry them with you all the time. Such a request is pleasing to us and fills us with good hopes. Therefore, having completed the rest of our writings, we comply with your request, believing that such reasonings will be of no use to others, especially those who have only recently tasted the true knowledge of nature and who, due to everyday cares, have too little leisure. Learn this well, keep it firmly in your memory and go through it along with everything else that we sent in a small review to Herodotus.

First of all, it must be remembered that, like everything else, the science of celestial phenomena, whether taken separately or in connection with others, serves no other purpose than peace of mind and firm confidence. Therefore, it is not necessary here to resort to impossible exaggerations, it is not necessary to fit everything under the same explanation, as we do when discussing the way of life or when highlighting other questions about nature, such as, for example, that everything consists of bodies and intangible, emptiness, or that the basis of everything is indivisible atoms, or something else that allows only one explanation corresponding to phenomena. No, celestial phenomena are not like that: they allow many causes of their occurrence and many judgments about their essence, all of which correspond to sensations. And nature must be investigated not by idle assumptions and statements, but as required by the visible phenomena themselves, because in life we need not unreason and idle thought, but we need a worry-free life; and so, questions that, with due persuasiveness, allow for diverse explanations corresponding to visible phenomena, just leave our peace undisturbed, and whoever accepts one explanation, and rejects another, equally corresponding to the phenomenon, he, on the contrary, obviously slides out of the field of science about nature into the realm of fables.

As indications of what happens in celestial phenomena, we have terrestrial phenomena that are accessible to consideration, while celestial ones are inaccessible and can occur for many reasons. Each appearance should be observed and such signs should be distinguished in it, the diverse flow of which does not contradict what is happening on earth.

The world is the region of the sky, which contains the luminaries, the earth, and all celestial phenomena; if it collapses, everything will be confused. It is separated from infinity and ends with a boundary, which can be either dense or sparse, both rotating and stationary, both round and triangular, or whatever shape you like; all this is equally acceptable, because it equally does not contradict anything in this world, the border of which is inaccessible to us. It is not difficult to understand that there can be an infinite number of such worlds and that such a world can arise both inside another world and in the interworld (as we call the gap between worlds), in a place where there are many emptiness, but not "in a large space, completely empty "as some have argued. The emergence takes place when the seeds necessary for this flow out from some world, or interworld, or several worlds, gradually arriving, dismembering, settling on occasion and irrigating from the sources necessary for this, until such completeness and stability come that the laid foundation can no longer take anything. For it is not sufficient merely that in the void where the world can arise, a cluster of atoms or a whirlwind appear (as is assumed by the opinions of necessity) and that it grows until it collides with another world (as one of the so-called physicists assures ): this contradicts the visible phenomena.

The sun, moon and other luminaries did not arise on their own and did not become part of the world only later - no, they began to form and grow simultaneously with it, through increments and whirlwinds of lighter rocks, similar to wind, fire or both and others; this is exactly what our feelings suggest. The magnitude of the sun and other luminaries for us is what it seems / / so he says in the XI book "On Nature"; and if the magnitude decreased with distance, he says, then the brightness would also decrease even more, because both of them are most appropriately commensurate with the distance//; in itself, it is either greater than the visible, or slightly less, or equal to it. For it is precisely in this way that our senses observe fires on earth that are visible from a distance. ; every objection on this score is easily refuted, if only one is attentive to the evidence, as is shown in our books On Nature.

The rising and setting of the sun, moon, and other luminaries may be due to their kindling and extinction, if the circumstances in those places are such as to allow this to happen: no visible phenomena contradict this. Or maybe this also happens as a result of their appearance above the earth and hiding behind it: no visible phenomena contradict this either. Their movements may be due to the rotation of the entire sky, or they may also be due to the fact that the sky is motionless, and they rotate according to the primordial inevitability that appeared at their sunrise along with the emergence of the world; ... intense heat, because fire always passes, spreading, to adjacent places. The reversals in the motion of the sun and moon are perhaps due to the curvature of the sky, which necessarily occurs from time to time; and perhaps also from air resistance, or from the fact that the always necessary substance is partly already burned, and partly still untouched; or because from the very beginning these luminaries received such a circulation that they went in a spiral. All such and similar explanations do not contradict the evidence, if only we keep to the possible and reduce every particular to consistency with visible phenomena, without being afraid of the slavish contrivances of astronomers.

The damage to the moon and its new growth may result from the rotation of this body, and in the same way it may also from what form the air will take, or perhaps from obscuration, or perhaps in any other way in which terrestrial phenomena can be involved to explain these phases - only if, carried away by one explanation, one does not idly reject all the others, as happens when you do not think about what is knowable for a person and what is not, and therefore you strive to study the inaccessible. In the same way, the light of the moon may be its own, or it may be borrowed from the sun; for even with us one can observe many things that have their own light, and many things that have borrowed light. And no celestial phenomenon will escape explanation, if we remember that there are many such explanations, and if we consider only those assumptions and reasons that fit with these phenomena, and which do not fit, leave them unattended, do not attach imaginary importance to them and do not slip here and there to attempts at a uniform explanation. So the outline of a face on the moon can be caused by the displacement of its parts, and obscuration, and any number of other explanations, as long as they are consistent with visible phenomena. For any celestial phenomena, one should not deviate from this path of research: after all, whoever struggles with the obvious will never be able to achieve true serenity of the spirit. So eclipses of the sun and moon can occur as a result of extinction (because this can also be observed with us), or it can also be due to obscuration by another object, be it the earth or some celestial body. Thus, we must consider various explanations simultaneously, without denying that some of them can act at once. // In the XII book "On Nature" he says the same thing and adds that the sun is eclipsed from the shadow of the moon, and the moon from the shadow of the earth, or, perhaps, from its distance. The same is said by the Epicurean Diogenes in Book I of the Selections.//

The correctness of the movement of celestial bodies should be understood in the same way as the correctness of other phenomena occurring near us; the divine nature should not be attracted to this, but should abide, free from worries and in the fullness of bliss. If this condition is not met, then the whole study of the causes of celestial phenomena will turn out to be empty, as already turned out to be with those who did not adhere to an acceptable method of explanation, but believed only one explanation was possible and rejected all others, falling because of this into absurdities, reaching unthinkable and losing the ability to take into account those phenomena in which one should see the necessary indications.

The duration of night and day changes because the movement of the sun over the earth is sometimes faster, then slower again - either because the length of its path changes, or because it passes faster or slower in other places, as we can observe in our country to by such a similarity to judge celestial phenomena. And those who accept only one explanation struggle against visible phenomena and do not understand what is accessible to human speculation and what is not.

Weather predictions can be made both by coincidence of circumstances (for example, by animals observed with us), and by changes in the air: neither one nor the other contradicts visible phenomena, but it is impossible to know in which cases this or that reason operates.

Clouds can form and gather both from the condensation of air under wind pressure, and from the interweaving of atoms suitable for this, clinging to each other, and from the accumulation of outflows of earth and water; and such compositions can be formed in many other ways. When they are either compressed or reformed, it may rain; they also arise from outflows rising through the air from suitable places, and a stronger shower is formed from such accumulations that are suitable for such outpourings.

Thunder can come from wind blowing in the cavities of clouds, as happens with us in vessels; or from the roar of fire in them blown by the wind; or from the breaking and parting of the clouds; or because the clouds, hardened like ice, rub against each other and break. And here, as elsewhere, visible phenomena tell us to affirm a variety of explanations.

Lightning can also occur in various ways: because during the collision and friction of clouds, a combination [of atoms] slips out, producing fire, and gives rise to lightning; because the winds push out of the clouds such bodies that produce this brilliance, or they are squeezed out by pressure on the clouds - either by the clouds, or by the winds; or because the light of heavenly bodies is scattered through the clouds, and then from the movement of clouds and winds it is driven to one place and breaks out of the clouds; or because the light of the most subtle composition is soaked through the clouds, // therefore the clouds ignite from fire, and thunder occurs / /, and its movement produces lightning; or because the wind is ignited by intense movement and strong rotation; or because the winds tear the clouds apart, and atoms fall out of them, producing fire and visible as lightning. There are many other equally easy ways of examining lightning, you just need to keep to the visible phenomena all the time and be able to compare similar things in them.

Lightning precedes thunder with such a structure of clouds, or because the combination of atoms that produces lightning collapses from clouds simultaneously with a gust of wind, and the rotation of the wind produces noise only later; or because they collapse at the same time, but the lightning rushes towards us with greater speed, and the thunder is delayed, as is sometimes the case with strikes observed from a great distance.

Lightning strikes can occur because many winds accumulate together, rotate with force and ignite, and then some of them come off and collapse down with force, and the breakthrough occurs because everything around is compacted under the pressure of clouds; or else lightning strikes come like thunder from a single revolving fire: when there is a lot of it, it will be strongly filled with wind, break through the cloud and fall down, not being able to go to adjacent places where clouds are constantly piling up. // For the most part, this happens over some high mountain, where lightning strikes most often fall. judge the invisible.

Whirlwinds can occur because the cloud, pushed by the accumulated wind and driven by a strong wind, descends in a column and still receives a lateral push from a side wind; or because the wind comes into a circular motion under the pressure of air; or because the resulting wind stream cannot scatter to the sides due to the condensation of the surrounding air. When whirlwinds descend on land, dry whirlwinds form, depending on how the wind moves them, and when they fall on the sea, water whirlwinds form.

Earthquakes can occur because the wind is enclosed in the earth, interspersed there with small blocks of earth and sets them in continuous motion, which is why the earth oscillates. This wind either enters the earth from outside, or arises from within because the earth collapses in cavernous places and turns the air enclosed in them into wind. Or earthquakes can be due to the very propagation of movement from the fall of earth blocks and back, when these blocks collide with denser places of the earth. And these vibrations of the earth can occur in many other ways.

Winds occur when, from time to time, something foreign gradually and continuously seeps into the air, and also due to an abundant accumulation of water; the rest of the winds are formed because these few fall into many depressions and, being divided, spread.

Hail is formed both with strong freezing of windy particles, when they gather from everywhere and then separate, and with moderate freezing of watery particles with their simultaneous rupture; because both convergence and separation occur at once, they freeze both in parts and in aggregate. And the roundness of the hail, perhaps, comes from the fact that its sharp extremities thaw, or from the fact that during the formation of hail, watery and windy particles are collected, as was said, evenly from all sides.

Snow can occur because fine moisture pours out of clouds through proportional pores under the pressure of a continuous strong wind on these clouds, and then this moisture freezes in its fall, because the surrounding space below the clouds turns out to be much colder. Also, such freezing can take place in evenly rarefied watery clouds lying side by side and pressing on each other, and, falling, snowflakes form hail upon collision, especially in spring. In addition, accumulations of snow can be shaken off by the friction of frozen clouds; Yes, there are other ways to create snow.

Dew is formed, firstly, when such particles are collected in the air that can produce this kind of dampness, and secondly, when these particles from watery and humid places (where there is most dew) rise up, merge together, producing dampness. , and then fall into the lowlands, just as it can often be seen with us. Just like dew, [hoarfrost is also formed] when such particles freeze when they get into cold air.

Ice is formed; when round-shaped particles are forced out of the water, while triangular and acute-angled particles remain in it and spiral more closely, and also when water receives such particles from the outside, and they, when combined, cause the water to freeze, displacing round particles from it.

A rainbow is formed when the sun throws light on moist air, or as a result of a special mixture of light and air, which produces the features of its colors, both together and separately; and the backward reflection communicates each color to the surrounding air, which we see as each part of it is illuminated. The rainbow seems to be circular either because the remoteness of any of its places is perceived by the eye as equal, or because it is precisely such a circular shape that the mixture of atoms that are in the air or have flown away from this air into clouds takes on.

The ring around the moon is formed either because the air from all sides tends to the moon, or because it restrains in a uniform way all the outflows emanating from the moon, so that they are arranged around it in a cloudy ring without the slightest gaps, or because it is air , surrounding the moon, encountering resistance, is evenly located around it in a dense ring. And a partial ring is formed either because the influence of some current from outside intervenes, or because heat intercepts the necessary pores in order to produce it.

Comets arise either because in some places of the sky from time to time, under favorable circumstances, fire is concentrated, or because the sky above us from time to time receives a special movement and opens these luminaries, or because these luminaries themselves from time to time according to some or circumstances are set in motion, descend to our places and become visible; and they disappear for reasons opposite to these.

Some stars revolve in the same place; this can happen not only because this part of the world is stationary, and the rest revolves around it (as some say), but also because air swirls around this place, preventing this movement, or because in adjacent places there is no the substance necessary for them, and where we observe them, it is. This can happen in many other ways, if only one can draw conclusions that agree with visible phenomena.

Some stars wander (if they really do so), and some move differently; this may be because, in their original circular motion, some necessarily follow a uniform rotation, while others are confused by irregularities; and perhaps also because along their path in other places there are correct air tensions, pushing them forward all the time and evenly igniting them, in other places they are wrong, from which the observed deviations occur. But to attribute this to a single cause, when visible phenomena point to many of them, is folly, and the zealots of idle astronomy do not act like that, offering such imaginary causes of certain phenomena that do not in the least relieve the divine nature of the burden.

Some stars, as can be observed, lag behind others in their motion; this happens either because they go around the same circle more slowly, or because they move in the opposite direction and are only pulled back by the general circulation, or because in the general circulation some move in a larger circle, others in a smaller one. And to give all this the simplest explanation is only appropriate for those who want to fool the crowd.

The so-called shooting stars may in some cases mean that the stars rub against each other and their fragments fall, blown away by the wind, as happens with lightning (as said above); or that the atoms, capable of producing fire, gather together and, by their uniformity, generate it, and then move towards where they received an impetus during the collection; or that the wind collects in foggy concentrations, ignites there during rotation, and then breaks out of the environment and rushes where it received a push; there are other ways in which this can be done without any fable.

Weather predictions for some animals occur only by coincidence of circumstances: it cannot be that animals compel the onset of bad weather, and no divine nature is planted to oversee the appearance of animals and then do what they predict - not a single creature in any way prosperous would not have reached such folly, much less a being possessing perfect bliss.

Remember all this, Pythocles, and then you will be able to understand everything that is similar to this, far avoiding fables. But let your main concern be the consideration of the first principles, infinity, and the like, as well as criteria, sufferings, and the goal for which we conduct all our reasoning. Having diligently studied them, you can easily understand the reasons for particulars. And those who do not have a great love for these subjects, they can neither understand them well, nor achieve the goal for which they must be studied.

These are his opinions about celestial phenomena.

As for the way of life and ways of avoiding something else, and preferring something else, he writes about this in the way that we will see now; but first we must dwell on the opinions of him and his disciples about what a sage is.

People offend each other either out of hatred, or out of envy, or out of contempt; but the sage, by reason, rises above that. Once having achieved wisdom, he can no longer fall into the opposite state, even feignedly. More than others, he is accessible to passions, but they do not interfere with his wisdom. However, not with every body and not in every nation is it possible for him to become a sage. Even under torture, the sage is happy. He alone is capable of gratitude, which he expresses in kind words about friends, both present and absent. However, under torture he will groan and groan. Of the women, he will be close only with those with whom the law allows (so writes Diogenes in the "Review of the Epicurean Moral Teachings"). He will not punish slaves, but will pity and forgive those who are zealous. According to their judgment, the sage should not be in love, he will not care about his burial; love is given to people by no means from the gods, as Diogenes says in Book XII. He will not speak beautiful speeches. And carnal fellowship, they say, has never been beneficial; but the good thing is that it did not bring harm. The sage will neither marry nor have children (as Epicurus himself writes in Doubts and in the books On Nature); True, under certain worldly circumstances, he may marry, but he will dissuade others. He will not talk nonsense even drunk (so writes Epicurus in the "Feast"); will not be engaged in state affairs (as he writes in the first book "On the way of life"); will not become a tyrant; he will not live as a cynic (as he writes in Book II of "On the Way of Life") or beg. Even blind, he will not take his own life (it is said there). The wise man is accessible even to grief, as Diogenes says in Book V of the Selections. He will appear in court; he will also leave writings, but not words of praise; he will take care of both his own good and the future. He will enjoy country life. He will be able to resist fate and never leave a friend. He will take care of his good name just enough to avoid contempt. The spectacle will be even more pleasant for him than for the others. He will put up statues according to a vow; and if they erect a statue to him himself, he will take it calmly. The sage alone is able to correctly judge poetry and music, although he himself will not write poetry. One wise man is not wiser than another. Having become impoverished, the sage will also make money, but only by his wisdom; will help the ruler when the opportunity comes; and will be grateful to anyone who corrects it. He will also start a school, but not in such a way as to lead a crowd behind him; will also give readings to the people, but only when asked to. He will hold on to dogmas, not doubts; and even in a dream he will remain himself. And on occasion, he will even die for a friend.

They believe that sin is not equal to sin; that health for others is good, but for others it is indifferent; that courage does not come from nature, but from the calculation of usefulness. Friendship itself is useful; it is necessary, it is true, that something lay the foundation for it (after all, we also throw seeds into the ground), but then it already rests on the fact that all the fullness of pleasure among friends is common. And happiness, according to them, is of two kinds: the highest, like that of the gods, so much so that it can no longer be multiplied, and such that both the addition and subtraction of pleasures allow.

But it's time to move on to writing.

Epicurus sends greetings to Menekey.

Let no one in his youth put off the study of philosophy, and in old age do not tire of the study of philosophy: for the health of the soul, no one can be either immature or overripe. Whoever says that it is too early or too late to engage in philosophy is like the one who says that it is too early or too late to be happy. Therefore, both the young and the old should be engaged in philosophy: the first so that he remains young in old age with good things in good memory of the past, the second so that he is both young and old, not feeling fear of the future. Therefore, we need to think about what constitutes our happiness, because when we have it, then we have everything, and when we do not have it, then we go to any lengths to get it.

So, both in your deeds and in your thoughts, follow my everlasting advice, placing in them the most basic principles of a good life.

First of all, believe that God is an immortal and blessed being, for such is the universal outline of the concept of God; and therefore do not ascribe to him anything that is alien to immortality and uncharacteristic of beatitude, but imagine about him only that by which his immortality and his beatitude are maintained. Yes, the gods exist, for knowledge of them is evidence; but they are not what the crowd supposes them to be, for the crowd does not keep them [in representation] as they think they are. Wicked is not the one who rejects the gods of the crowd, but the one who accepts the opinions of the crowd about the gods - for the statements of the crowd about the gods are not anticipations, but conjectures, and, moreover, false. It is in them that it is asserted that the gods send great harm to bad people, and benefit to good people: after all, people are accustomed to their own merits and treat others like themselves well, and everything that is not like that is considered alien.

Get used to thinking that death is nothing for us: after all, everything, both good and bad, lies in sensation, and death is a deprivation of sensation. Therefore, if we hold on to the correct knowledge that death is nothing for us, then the mortality of life will become gratifying for us: not because the infinity of time will be added to it, but because the thirst for immortality will be taken away from it. Therefore, there is nothing terrible in life to those who truly understand that there is nothing terrible in non-life. Therefore, it is foolish who says that he is afraid of death, not because it will cause suffering when it comes; but because she will cause suffering to those who come; that he does not bother with his presence, it is completely in vain to grieve in advance. Therefore, the most terrible of evils, death, has nothing to do with us; when we are, then death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are no more. Thus, death does not exist either for the living or for the dead, since for some it does not exist itself, while others do not themselves exist for it.

Most people either flee from death as the greatest of evils, or crave it as a respite from the evils of life. And the sage does not shy away from life and is not afraid of unlife, because life does not interfere with him, and unlife does not seem evil. Just as he chooses not the most plentiful food, but the most pleasant one, so he does not enjoy the longest time, but the most pleasant one. Whoever advises a young man to live well and an old man to end his life well is unwise, not only because life is dear to him, but also because the ability to live well and die well is one and the same science. But even worse is the one who said: it is good not to be born. If he was born, go as soon as possible to the abode of Hades.

If he speaks so out of conviction, then why does he not pass away? after all, if it is firmly decided by him, then it is in his power. If he says it in mockery, then it is stupid, because the subject is not at all suitable for this.

It must be remembered that the future is not entirely ours and not entirely not ours, so as not to expect that it will certainly come, and not to despair; that it won't come at all.

Similarly, among our desires, some should be considered natural, others - idle; and among the natural, some are necessary, others are only natural; and among the essentials, some are necessary for happiness, others for the tranquility of the body, and still others simply for life. If this consideration is not to be mistaken, then every preference and every avoidance will lead to bodily health and peace of mind, and this is the ultimate goal of a blissful life. After all, everything that we do, we do in order to have neither pain nor anxiety; and when this is finally achieved, then every storm of the soul dissipates, since the living being no longer needs to go to something, as if to the missing one, and look for something, as if for the fullness of spiritual and bodily blessings. Indeed, we feel the need for pleasure only when we suffer from its absence: and when we do not suffer, we do not feel the need. That is why we say that pleasure is both the beginning and the end of a blessed life; we have come to know it as the first good, akin to us, we begin all preference and avoidance from it, and return to it, using patience as the measure of all good.

Since pleasure is the first and kindred good to us, therefore we do not give preference to every pleasure, but sometimes we bypass many of them if they are followed by more significant troubles; and vice versa, we often prefer pain to pleasure, if, having endured a long pain, we expect a greater pleasure to follow it. Therefore, every pleasure, being by nature akin to us, is good, but not everything deserves preference; likewise, all pain is evil, but not all pain is to be avoided; but it is necessary to judge everything, considering and proportioning the useful and the unprofitable - after all, sometimes we look at the good as evil and, on the contrary, evil as good.

We consider self-satisfaction a great good, but not always with a little, and then to be content with a little when there is not much, sincerely believing that luxury is sweetest to those who need it least, and that all that is required nature, is easily achievable, and everything superfluous is difficult to achieve. The simplest food is no less delightful than a sumptuous table, unless one suffers from what is not; even bread and water provide the greatest of pleasures when given to one who is hungry. Therefore, the habit of simple and inexpensive foods strengthens our health, and encourages us to the vital concerns of life, and when we meet with luxury after a long break, it makes us stronger and allows us not to be afraid of the vicissitudes of fate.

Therefore, when we say that pleasure is the ultimate goal, then. we do not mean at all the pleasures of debauchery or sensuality, as those who do not know, do not share or poorly understand our teaching believe - no, we mean freedom from the sufferings of the body and from the turmoil of the soul. For it is not endless drinking and feasting, not the enjoyment of boys and women, or the fish table and other pleasures of a sumptuous feast, that makes our life sweet, but only sober reasoning, which investigates the causes of our every preference and avoidance, and banishes opinions that place great anxiety in the soul.

The beginning of all this, and the greatest of blessings, is understanding; it is dearer even to philosophy itself, and all the other virtues have come from it. It teaches that one cannot live sweetly without living wisely, well and righteously, and [one cannot live wisely, well and righteously] without living sweetly: after all, all virtues are akin to a sweet life and a sweet life is inseparable from them. Who, in your opinion, is higher than a man who thinks piously about the gods, and is completely free from the fear of death, who by reflection comprehended the ultimate goal of nature, understood that the highest good is easily accomplished and attainable, and the highest evil is either short-lived or not difficult, who laughs at fate, someone called the mistress of everything, [and instead asserts that some things happen by inevitability,] some things happen by chance, and others depend on us - for it is clear that inevitability is irresponsible, chance is wrong, and what depends on us it is not subject to anything else and therefore is subject to both censure and praise. Indeed, it is better to believe in fables about the gods than to submit to the fate invented by physicists, fables give hope to propitiate the gods with reverence, but in fate lies an inexorable inevitability. In the same way, chance for him is not a god, as for a crowd, because the actions of a god are not disorderly; and not an unfounded reason, because he does not believe that chance gives a person good and evil, which determine his blissful life, but considers that chance brings out only the beginnings of great good or evil. Therefore, the sage believes that it is better to be unhappy with reason than to be happy without reason: after all, it is always better that a well-conceived business should not owe success to chance.

Think over these and similar advice day and night, with yourself and with someone who is like you, and confusion will not overtake you either in reality or in a dream, but you will live like a god among people. For whoever lives in the midst of immortal blessings does not resemble mortals in any way."

He denies fortune-telling in his other writings, for example, in "Small Review", he says: "Fortune-telling does not exist, and if it existed, then what is predicted should be considered to be happening apart from us."

These are his opinions about the way of life; in other places he discusses this at greater length.

He differs from the Cyrenaics in his idea of pleasure: they do not recognize pleasure at rest, but only in motion, Epicurus recognizes both pleasures of both the soul and the body, and speaks about this in the books “On Preference and Avoidance”, “On the Ultimate Goal ", in the first book "On the way of life" and in a letter to the Mytilene philosophers. The same is said by Diogenes in the seventeenth book of the "Selections", and by Metrodorus in "Timocrates": "Pleasure is meant both that which is in motion, and that which is at rest." And Epicurus himself in his book "On Preference" writes as follows: "Pleasures in peace are serenity and painlessness, pleasures in motion are joy and pleasure."

Another difference from the Cyrenaics: they believe that bodily pain is worse than mental pain, and therefore criminals are punished by corporal execution; Epicurus, on the other hand, considers mental pain to be the worst, because the body is tormented only by the storms of the present, and the soul - of the past, present, and future. In the same way, the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the body.

As proof that the ultimate goal is pleasure, he pointed out that all living beings from birth rejoice in pleasure and avoid suffering, doing this naturally and without the participation of the mind. Therefore, left to our own devices, we shun pain; even Hercules, devoured by a poisoned tunic, shouts: ... Gnawing and screaming, and responding to groans
Locris mountains and Euboean rocks...

In the same way, the virtues are preferable to us not for their own sake, but for the sake of the pleasure they bring, just as medicine is for the sake of health, - so writes Diogenes in the XXth book of "Selections", calling "education" "entertainment". And Epicurus says that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, while everything else is separable, such as food.

But it is time, so to speak, to draw a line under all this work of mine and under the biography of our philosopher, citing in conclusion "Main Thoughts" so that the end of the book was the beginning of happiness.

A blissful and immortal being has no worries of its own, nor delivers it to others, and therefore is not subject to either anger or favor: all this is characteristic of the weak. // In other places, he says that the gods are cognizable by the mind, some existing in the form of numbers, others in the likeness of a form, arising human-like from the continuous outflow of such appearances, directed to one place.//
Death is nothing to us: what has decayed is insensible, and what is insensible is nothing to us.
The limit of pleasure is the elimination of all pain. Where there is pleasure and as long as it exists, there is neither pain nor suffering, nor both.
Continuous pain for the flesh is short-lived. In the highest degree it lasts the shortest time; in a degree only exceeding bodily pleasure, a few days; and lingering infirmities bring more pleasure to the flesh than pain.
One cannot live sweetly without living wisely, well, and righteously; and one cannot live wisely, well, and righteously without living sweetly. Whoever lacks something to live intelligently, well and righteously, cannot live sweetly.
To live in safety from people, any means are natural goods.
Some want to become famous and be in the public eye, hoping to gain security from the people. If their life is really safe, then they have reached the natural good; if it is not safe, it means that they have not achieved what they naturally aspired to from the very beginning.
No pleasure in itself is evil; but the means of achieving other pleasures are far more troublesome than the pleasures.
If every pleasure were to thicken and in time embrace our entire composition, or even the most important parts of our nature, then the distinctions between pleasures would be lost.
If that which delights libertines dispelled the fears of the mind regarding celestial phenomena, death, suffering, and also taught the limit of desires, then libertines would not deserve any reproach, because pleasures would flow to them from everywhere, and pain and suffering from nowhere, in which there is evil.
If we were not embarrassed by suspicions about whether celestial phenomena or death have anything to do with us, and if we were not embarrassed by ignorance of the limits of suffering and desires, then there would be no need for us even to study nature.
It is impossible to dispel fear about the most important thing without comprehending the nature of the Universe and suspecting that there is something in the fables. Therefore, pure enjoyment cannot be obtained without the study of nature.
It is useless to seek security among people if you maintain fears about what is in the sky, under the earth, and in general in infinity.
Security from people is achieved to some extent with the help of wealth and strength, on which one can rely, but quite - only with the help of peace and distance from the crowd.
The wealth demanded by nature is limited and easily attainable; and the wealth demanded by idle opinions extends to infinity.
Chance has little to do with the wise: the greatest and most important thing has been arranged for him by reason, as it suits and will arrange throughout his life.
The one who is righteous has the least anxiety, the one who is unrighteous is full of the greatest anxiety.
The pleasure of the flesh does not increase, but only diversifies if the pain of lack is eliminated. The pleasure of thought reaches its limit in thinking about those and such things that previously gave thoughts the greatest fear.
Infinite time and finite time contain equal pleasure, if measured by the limits of reason.
For the flesh, the limits of pleasure are infinite, and the time for such pleasure is infinite. And the thought, having comprehended the limits and the ultimate goal of the flesh and dispelling the fears of eternity, thereby already leads to a perfect life and does not need endless time. At the same time, thought does not shy away from pleasures, nor does it act as if something else was not enough for it to be happy when it leaves life.
He who knows the limits of life knows how easy it is to get rid of the pain of a lack, thus making life perfect; therefore, he does not need any action that entails a struggle.
One must keep in mind the real purpose of life and the complete evidence by which opinions are measured, otherwise everything will be full of doubt and confusion.
If you dispute every single sensation, you will have nothing to refer to even when you judge that such and such of them are false.
If you simply discard any sensation, without making a distinction between the opinion still awaiting confirmation and that which is already given to you by sensation, by suffering, and by every figurative throw of thought, then by this idle opinion you will throw all the other senses into disorder, so that you will be left without any criteria. If, on the contrary, you begin to affirm indiscriminately both what is still awaiting confirmation and what is not awaiting confirmation, then you will not avoid error here either, because in this way you will remain in doubt at any judgment about what is right and what's wrong.
If you do not every time reduce each action to a natural final goal, but deviate both in preference and avoidance to something else, then your actions will not correspond to words.
All desires, the dissatisfaction of which does not lead to pain, are not necessary: the impulse to them is easily dispelled by presenting the object of desire as difficult to achieve or harmful.
Of all that wisdom provides for the happiness of a lifetime, the greatest is the acquisition of friendship.
The same conviction that inspired us with courage that evil is not eternal and not lasting, also saw that in our limited circumstances friendship is most reliable.
Desires are: some are natural and necessary; others are natural but not necessary; still others are neither natural nor necessary, but born of idle opinions. // Epicurus considers natural and necessary desires to be those that relieve suffering, such as drinking when thirsty; natural, but not necessary - those that only diversify pleasure, but do not relieve suffering, for example, a luxurious table; not natural and not necessary - for example, wreaths and honorary statues.//
Natural desires, the dissatisfaction of which does not lead to pain, but in which there is an intense desire, come from idle opinions; and if they are dissipated with difficulty, it is not because of their naturalness, but because of human idle thought.
Natural law is a contract of benefit, the purpose of which is not to cause or suffer harm.
In relation to those animals that cannot make contracts so as not to cause or suffer harm, there is neither justice nor injustice, just as it is with respect to those peoples who cannot or do not want to make contracts, not to cause or suffer harm.
Justice does not exist by itself; it is a contract not to cause or suffer harm, concluded in the intercourse of people and always in relation to those places where it is concluded.
Injustice is not evil in itself; it is fear from the suspicion that a person does not remain hidden from those who punish him for such actions.
He who secretly does something about which people have an agreement not to cause or suffer harm, he cannot be sure that he will remain hidden, even if he has succeeded ten thousand times up to now: for it is not known whether he will succeed. remain hidden until death.
On the whole, justice is the same for all, insofar as it is a benefit in the mutual intercourse of people; but when applied to the peculiarities of place and circumstances, justice is not the same for all.
Of those actions that the law recognizes as just, only that is really just, the benefit of which is confirmed by the needs of human communication, whether it will be the same for everyone or not. And if someone makes a law, from which there will be no benefit in human communication, such a law will by nature already be unjust. And even if the benefit contained in justice is lost and only for a while corresponds to our anticipation of it, then during this time it will still remain justice - at least for those who look at the essence of the matter and are not embarrassed by empty words. .
Where, without any change of circumstances, it turns out that laws that are considered just, entail consequences that do not correspond to our anticipation of justice, there they were not just. Where, with a change in circumstances, the previously established justice turns out to be useless, there it was fair while it was useful in the communication of fellow citizens, and then it ceased to be fair, ceasing to be useful.
Whoever is best able to arrange himself against the fear of external circumstances will do what is possible to those close to himself, and what is impossible, at least not hostile, and where even this is impossible, he keeps aloof and moves away as far as it is beneficial.
Those who have been able to achieve complete security from their neighbors, relying on it with confidence, live with each other in the greatest pleasure and, having enjoyed the most complete intimacy, do not mourn, as if pitying, the one who dies before the others.

Division of philosophy. In the exposition of Stoicism by Diogenes Laertius, the general division of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic is most striking (VII 39). But the fact is that almost the same division, or not literally, or even literally, Diogenes found in Plato, in which "instructive dialogues" are divided into theoretical and practical, theoretical - into physical and logical, and practical - into ethical and political (III 49), and in Aristotle, in which practical philosophy is divided into ethics and politics, and theoretical philosophy is also divided into physics and logic (V 28), and in Epicurus, who also has three parts of the philosophy of the canon (the doctrine of criterion and principle ), physics and ethics (X 30). Such a fuzzy division of philosophy among different thinkers in Diogenes does little to understand the specifics of each such division. Most likely, Diogenes Laertius simply has in mind one general division of philosophy and ascribes it, with minor deviations, to absolutely all the main Greek thinkers.
Yes, by the way, Diogenes Laertius himself considers this triple division to be universal (I 18).
Dialectics and its division. Let us turn to Diogenes' exposition of Stoic logic. The division of logic among the Stoics is curious. It not only includes rhetoric and dialectic, but dialectic is understood here, at least among some Stoics, not only as the art of arguing or reasoning, but also as the science of true, false and indifferent to truth and falsehood. Leaving aside the division of rhetoric, which in Diogenes' exposition is more or less technical (VII 42, 43), let us turn our attention to the division of Stoic dialectics.
Here it is immediately clear that for Diogenes Laertius, the dialectic of the Stoics is presented primarily as a doctrine of the word in the manner of other and many other Greek philosophers. Namely, this Stoic dialectic in the eyes of Diogenes Laertius is divided into the "signified" (or, we would say, the "object of designation") and the "domain of sound" (we would say, the "sound language"). As for this signified, according to Diogenes Laertius, literally anything can be allowed here: representation, and the possibility of correct judgments, and subjects, and predicates, and in general there is a mixture of logical and grammatical without any clear classification. In the language, as the Stoics supposedly think of it, Diogenes finds written sounds, parts of speech, questions about incorrect phrases and words, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, etc. ).
Further, Diogenes refers to the well-known Stoic theory of objectively conditioned and objectively unconditioned representations in connection with the theory of judgment and inference (VII 45, 46). Apparently, here we are already talking about the criterion of truth, which, however, was not in the preliminary definition of dialectics. And where, then, did that “neutral” or “indifferent” thing, which was discussed above when dividing dialectics, go? It is curious that when describing the various "virtues" of thinking, dialectics again appears, i.e. it is no longer so verbal (lack of rashness, seriousness, prudence, irrefutability, etc., VII 46 - 47). In the future, for some reason, a representation suddenly comes to the fore, which this time is even a criterion of truth (VII 49-50), and here too the matter is not without confusion, since it turns out that there are sensible representations, and there are extrasensory ones, which themselves Diogenes calls incorporeal. But why do these incorporeal representations continue to bear the name of representations? After all, these are already some purely mental constructions (VIII 51). However, sensual representations, according to Diogenes, expounding the Stoics, are also not always reliable and may also not correspond to sensual objects. As for the representations of the mind, then, judging by the image of Diogenes, this is nothing more than the application of certain logical categories to compare different sensory perceptions. But where these abstract categories of pure mind suddenly came from among the Stoics remains unknown (VII 51-53). True, Diogenes here gives several different Stoic opinions about the criterion of truth and "perceiving ideas", including the opinion of Chrysippus about "anticipations" as about "natural concepts" about the universal (VII 54). How to understand here the term "natural concept" (ennoia physice), is also not explained. Perhaps here we are talking about the innateness of universal concepts (as this term is translated in this edition) or about their a priori? But it seems that this would be a complete refutation of the Stoic dialectics, based on sensory perceptions and their mental processing. It is possible that here we come across the inconsistency of the dialectical teaching of the Stoics themselves. But then it is clear that Diogenes did not understand this inconsistency at all.
Analysis of the content of Stoic dialectics. Later on, up to the end of the exposition of Stoic logic (VII 54-83), we find in Diogenes Laertius - and, moreover, unexpectedly - a rather systematic exposition of the entire content of Stoic dialectics. In advance, however, let us say that this exposition is full of ambiguities, and especially in connection with the term logos. In some cases it is a "speech" (VII 57), in other cases it is a "word" (VII 60), in third cases it is a "grammatical sentence" (VII 56), in fourth cases it is a "proof", "argument" (VII 76-82). For the translator of the treatise Diogenes Laertius and for his commentator, this circumstance presents great difficulties, which can be overcome only after significant logical and philosophical efforts.
The first part of Stoic dialectics, according to Diogenes Laertius, is the doctrine of sounds and their complexes, about the meaning of these sounds and about their correlation or non-correlation with objectively present objectivity (VII 55-62). The complexes of sounds here are understood widely, starting from their elementary coherence and ending with the articulate speech of a person in connection with the construction of speech up to its artistic design.
The second part of the dialectic, which can be noted without much difficulty, is all the reasoning about the so-called lecton (XII 63-70). What is this lecton? This is "the expressed", but not in the sense of objectively present things about which something is expressed, but of a certain kind of representations, i.e. it is still a purely mental act or some kind of conceivable objectivity. Diogenes writes that it is "what is composed in accordance with the mental representation" (VII 63). Diogenes, however, does not understand that this kind of Stoic conception was big news for ancient philosophy. It is characteristic that, considering everything to be corporeal, the Stoics considered precisely the “objects of utterance” to be incorporeal (II 132, 166-170, 331-335 Arn.). Diogenes Laertius cannot understand this purely semantic objectivity, but he undoubtedly heard something about it and even considered it necessary, though very dully, to say about it. And what will be said further about judgments and conclusions, of course, refers primarily to this purely semantic objectivity, although sometimes in his examples Diogenes strays into an objectively material understanding of this "subject of the statement." In this place, first of all, the doctrine of judgment and its subdivisions is given.
The third part of dialectics is the doctrine of the subject of the statement, but already in the sense of the doctrine of inference and proof(VII 71-83). Despite some kind of ambiguity in the expression of Diogenes Laertius, it can be said that this incorporeal "subject of statement" appears here especially clearly, and where truth and falsity are defined, the exposition of Diogenes Laertius comes very close to the definition of these objects in modern mathematical logic, those. truth and falsehood are determined by the nature of the correlation in the very same thought, without reference to sensory experience. And where sensory experience seems to be involved in the proof, as, for example, when discussing the principles of necessity and possibility (VII 75), there is also required a discussion of empirical facts, i.e. again, it is not the facts themselves that testify to the Stoics about the truth of lies, but some kind of logical processing of these facts.
To what extent Diogenes Laertius is, after all, convinced of the universal nature of the Stoic "object of utterance," he shows the end of the entire exposition of dialectics, which says that not only in logic, but even in ethics and natural philosophy, this semantic objectivity turns out to be in the Stoics on foreground (VII 83).
So, the whole of Stoic logic, in comparison with the usual methods of Diogenes Laertius, is expounded by him, it must be said, both in sufficient detail and quite systematically. We are not talking about individual blunders here.
Ethics. Turning to the ethical part of the philosophy of the Stoics, Diogenes Lazrtius differs little from his usual methodology, although, undoubtedly, there are still attempts at a more or less sustained systematization. The Stoic system is given in an integral and non-historical form. There are some indications of differences between individual Stoics, for example, on the issue of the division of virtues (VII 91). Nothing is said about the fact that Stoicism has undergone strong changes during its centuries-old existence, except for a reference to Panetius and Posidonius, who spoke more gently about virtue than the original Stoics (VII 128). It is especially interesting that Diogenes Laertius, who not only lived up to the beginning of Neoplatonism, but also to a large extent his older contemporary, says absolutely nothing about the Stoic Platonism of Posidonius, i.e. about that stage of Stoic philosophy, which is the direct predecessor of Neoplatonism. Enumeration of Stoic teachings in ethics, it seems, is not just an enumeration, but also a kind of sequence, although not everywhere distinct. As for the enumeration of the main ethical problems by Diogenes Laertius himself (VII 84), this enumeration is quite chaotic. But let's see how Diogenes Laertius actually expounds the ethics of the Stoics.
As far as can be judged, the first part of this exposition, devoted to the general principle of Stoic ethics (VII 84-88), treats the problem of what Diogenes Laertius himself calls the hard-to-translate Greek term horme; Strictly speaking, this is the doctrine of the basic impulses of life and being, or, one might say, of "motives" (the latter translation of the said Greek term sounds non-terminological). According to the Stoics, says Diogenes Laertius, the first and main impulse of life is self-preservation, because it is important for every living being to preserve itself, and indeed, "nature is initially dear to itself." Here the Stoics spoke precisely of self-preservation as opposed to the principle of enjoyment (VII 85-86). Further, to live according to impulses means to live according to nature, as in fact all animals live, but man is a rational being, and therefore to live according to nature means for him to live according to reason (VII 86) and virtuously (VII 87), i.e. according to the "general law" or "correct", "all-pervading" "reason" (logos), Zeus (VII 88). Here, Diogenes Laertius quite correctly draws the initial principle of Stoic ethics, although we would still like to know in more detail what these “true logos”, “general law”, “all-permeability”, etc., are.
The second part of Stoic ethics, according to the exposition of Diogenes, is, apparently, the doctrine of virtues(VII 89-93). Here, after the definition of virtue as following both the particular in nature and the whole (with the possibility of deviations) and therefore as happiness (VII 89), the virtues are divided into mental (for example, understanding) and "non-mental" (for example, health), and virtues can be learned (VII 90-91); so is the division of vices (VII 93).
In the third part of the presentation of Stoic ethics, Diogenes Laertius quite rightly expands the problem of virtue and vice to the extent of the doctrine of good and evil in general (VII 94-103). Good for the Stoics, of course, equals both reason and utility (VII 94). After the division of goods and division of evils, mainly according to signs of an external character (VII 95), goods are considered from the point of view of the end and from the point of view of means; so is evil (VII 96-97). In the future, this division is explained with a list of the elements of the good in general: auspiciousness, binding character, profit, convenience, meritoriousness, beauty, benefit, preference, justice (VII 98-99).
Here, of course, Diogenes Laertius does not do without the randomness of the set of indicated elements and not without their confusion. On the one hand, for example, "the perfect good they call beautiful," and on the other hand, the beautiful has just been included in the realm of the elements of the good in general. On the one hand, the beautiful is defined as a numerical proportion, which just makes the good a perfect good; and on the other hand, the beautiful has four types (justice, courage, orderliness, reasonableness), which with equal right could be attributed to the good in general, and these four types of beauty are for some reason taken specifically from the field of human actions, and not about what numerical proportionality is no longer here at all. On the one hand, the beautiful is commendable; and on the other hand, both the meritorious and the beautiful are elements of the good in general (VII 100). However, Diogenes Laertius himself claims, according to the Stoics, that the beautiful is the good, and the good is the beautiful (VII 101). In this case, regarding the aesthetics of the Stoics, as expounded by Diogenes Laertius, one can only shrug. To this we must add, looking ahead, also the fact that in his division of everything into good, evil and indifferent Diogenes Laertius (or, perhaps, indeed the Stoics themselves) relates beauty precisely to the indifferent, i.e. completely takes it out of the bounds of the good in general (VII 102-103).
The fourth part of the exposition of Stoic ethics in Diogenes Laertius we find in an interesting doctrine of indifferent and proper(VII 104-109). It turns out that in addition to good and evil, which have just been described in such detail, the Stoics have some kind of “indifferent”, which includes life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fame, nobility, as well as their opposites (VII 103-104). The indifferent is that which, taken by itself, "does neither good nor harm," although, under appropriate circumstances, it can bring both good and evil. In this Stoic problem of the indifferent, something interesting appears to us, similar to what the Stoics find indifferent in logic. There is hardly anything that is simply neutral here. Judging by the enumeration of examples of the indifferent, this latter, in the eyes of the Stoics, undoubtedly had a certain positive content. Diogenes does not know how to say this more precisely. But some, even if contemplative, value of this indifferent and associated with this value pointless admiration for a certain perfection, as it seems to us now, among the Stoics found, in any case, the most definite place for itself.
This is also proved by the fact that in the further exposition Diogenes draws this stoic indifference with not such absolutely neutral features. It turns out that the stoic indifferent was of two kinds: preferred and avoided (VII 105-107). At the same time, to carry out such a division, the concept of value is introduced. Preferred is what is valuable, and avoided is what is devoid of value. Value, it is true, is not very clearly defined, but the connection between value and natural conformity is put forward quite definitely (VII 105). This means that at least one area of the indifferent has a positive content among the Stoics. True, even here the matter is not without ambiguities. To our complete surprise, Diogenes postulates, in addition to the preferred and avoided, something else, which is neither one nor the other. However, this time Diogenes does not give any examples of this indifference, so to speak in the second degree (VII 106). Hence, by the way, we have doubts about the legitimacy of all these triple divisions, which Diogenes everywhere carries out. Whether the Stoics themselves had such a meticulous division of each category into three smaller categories subordinate to it becomes doubtful.
Later, when discussing good and evil deeds, Diogenes introduces another Stoic category - cathecon (VII 107-108). But here he is completely helpless to explain this subtle category to us. In this case, the Stoics meant the actions of people not in the sense of the unconditional execution or non-execution of laws, but in the sense of the execution of laws, depending on the scope of their application, depending on practical possibilities and depending on the efforts that a person must use to fulfill reasonable requirement of the law. The translation of the corresponding Greek word as “proper”, although it is a tracing paper of the Greek term, does not express the conventionality of the application of laws, without which this “proper” would no longer differ from virtue in general (justice, wisdom, etc.).
Diogenes prevents us from understanding this conditional dependence of a moral act on circumstances by the fact that he sees in this "proper" thing simply a requirement of reason. In addition, he is very uncritically this conditional legality, ie. the application of laws depending on the circumstances, again divides into the unconditional proper and the proper, which depends on the circumstances. This introduces a logical confusion into the entire argument. After all, all this “proper” differs from absolute duty only in that it is an obligation depending on the circumstances. And then the "unconditional proper" simply turns out to be incomprehensible. It can no longer be distinguished from moral duty in general. True, here the Stoics draw a subtle category, which they themselves were not always able to formulate logically and clearly enough. And Diogenes simply confuses the whole matter with his examples (VII 109).
What follows is what we would call the fifth part of the presentation. Generally speaking, this is the doctrine of passions(VII 110-116). Such a mass of terms are used here that our criticism of them would require a special study from us and would lead us too far aside. We will not do this. Let us only point out that the passions are interpreted by the Stoics, according to the exposition of Diogenes Laertius, for the most part intellectualistically, i.e. as a manifestation of reason or folly, knowledge or ignorance. However, this intellectualism is a phenomenon of general antiquity. For the study of the ethics of the Stoics, all these terminological and classificatory (often pseudo-classification) observations of Diogenes Laertius provide quite rich material.
Finally, the sixth, according to our account, and the last part of Stoic ethics is devoted by Diogenes Laertius to the doctrine of sage(VII 117-131). The great place that Diogenes Laertius assigns to this doctrine is in full accordance with what we know about the ethics of the ancient Stoics. The Stoic sage is such a human image that, due to its straightforwardness and inflexibility, went deep into the history of not only ancient culture, but also all subsequent cultures. And Diogenes depicts this firmness, reaching insensibility and soullessness, this straightforwardness, inflexibility, the hard-stone character of the stoic sage in sufficient detail and even systematically, giving, contrary to his custom, a logically consistent concept. As we have already pointed out above, the softer character of ancient Stoicism, which appeared in Panetius and Posidonius (VII 128), also did not hide from Diogenes Laertius. Let us also note that Diogenes draws the most severe sequence of behavior of the stoic sage with hard stone rigidity, and here they formulate, for example, the complete infallibility of the sage, his inability to make any mistakes, his lack of any pity for people, complete impassivity and even the community of wives and children for such kind of sages.
In the conclusion of his analysis of Stoic ethics, Diogenes Laertius (and for some reason too briefly) speaks of the political doctrine of the Stoics, which demanded a mixed state system based on the foundations of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy (what exactly this means is not clear). And also this conclusion emphasizes the presence of many other Stoic teachings that Diogenes did not expound, and emphasizes only the basic and concise nature of the entire presentation (VII 131).
As for our own conclusion, we would say that, as far as one can judge, some sequence of presentation is still observed here, at least sometimes and not without some stretch on our part. Diogenes began his Stoic ethics with principles of the most general nature, namely, with the need to follow nature and reason, naturally moved on to the doctrine of virtue, first absolute, and then relative, and completed with an analysis of a specific image of virtue in the form of a Stoic sage. Such a sequence of presentation, as we have already seen many times, is, generally speaking, difficult to find in the historical and philosophical analyzes usual for Diogenes Laertius. The inconsistency and confusion of presentation common to Diogenes, nevertheless, often remains evident here. The question of what is the difference between Stoic moral rigor and pre-Socratic morality, also extremely strict, Diogenes Laertius, of course, does not even think to raise.
Natural philosophy. Let's move on to the third section of Stoic philosophy, to the so-called physics, more precisely, to natural philosophy (VII 132-160).
At the beginning of this section, Diogenes Laertius lists the main natural-philosophical problems of the Stoics, but, as he constantly happens, in his concrete exposition he either does not adhere to this division of problems at all, or adheres to them approximately, so that here the reader himself has to establish some plan so as not to get confused in understanding the main. It seems that the outline of Stoic natural philosophy boils down to three main problems: the world, the elements, and causes, as Diogenes's general division, which he calls "generic," says. With this, the "species" division is also confused: beginnings, foundations, gods, limits, space, emptiness (VII 132). If we proceed mainly from the "generic" division, then we get the following.
The world is spoken about briefly at the very beginning. Here we have in mind as yet astronomy in general and the fate of the world in time (VII 132-133). Further, bypassing the doctrine of the elements for the time being, Diogenes proceeds to the doctrine of the cause (VII 133), but he expounds this doctrine in this place extremely briefly and incomprehensibly, reducing it now to medical, then to mathematical concepts. As for the third main section, namely the doctrine of the elements, Diogenes does not go to it immediately, but speaks first of all about the beginnings (VII 134). Apparently, he needed to speak here about principles in order to more accurately define the concept of an element. Indeed, his beginnings are, on the one hand, active (logos and god), and on the other hand, passive (substance or matter). As we shall see below, everything consists of the fusion of these two principles. The foundations are opposite to the beginnings (VII 134-137): the first are eternal and incorporeal, while the second are transient and have a material form, including geometric forms (VII 135).
Thanks to the action of "God, mind, fate and Zeus", four basic elements arise in formless matter: earth, water, air and fire (ether), of which the whole world consists, starting from earth and ending with heaven (VII 136-137).
In the future, Diogenes again returns to the world, but he considers it no longer in such a general form as before, but with the help of the categories of cause and elements he achieved (VII 137-160).
At the very beginning of this section, it is as if those main categories that are to be considered here are given, namely, the Stoic cosmos, according to Diogenes, is either God, or the world order, or a combination of both (VII 137-138).
But the actual exposition of the problem of the world in Diogenes hardly obeys these three categories, but is given in a confused form. From this confused presentation it is clear, however, that in the foreground he has not so much God and not so much the world order, but precisely the combination of both. Thus, the Stoic god is defined, according to Diogenes, as a living, rational, world-defining and immortal being (VII 147). But Diogenes has a bad idea that the Stoic doctrine of God is very far from any kind of monotheism. After all, his God is the world, and the world is God.
How, for example, is the world defined by the Stoics? Here are the words of Diogenes himself: "The world is a living being, rational, animated and thinking" (VII 142). What, then, is the difference between the world and God among the Stoics? Judging by the presentation of Diogenes, it is very difficult to understand this. Close to this is also the definition of nature among the Stoics, although they have it as an outflow from God of his "seed logoi" (VII 148). And although Diogenes undoubtedly has a tendency to essentially separate God from the world, when a completely special and extra-worldly quality is attributed to God (VII 138), nevertheless, this quality still turns out to be nothing other than the quality of the world itself. The deity spreads throughout the world with warm breath, being basically some kind of "artistic primary fire"; so that “Zeno considers the whole world and the sky to be the essence of God”, so are Chrysippus and Posidonius, and according to Antipater it is air and according to Boef it is the circle of fixed stars (VII 147-148).
Therefore, the pantheism of the Stoics is quite undoubted: and if the features of theism slip through here, then Diogenes Laertius, in any case, cannot figure it out, giving, for example, the definition of fate is almost the same as that of God (VII 149).
Diogenes Laertius also has a hint of the Stoic doctrine of matter, which determines the existence of all concrete things, but, taken in an independent form, there is only infinite divisibility up to complete continuity (VII 150). It is a pity that the Stoic doctrine of matter is presented by Diogenes so fluently and fragmentarily and not at all in the most important place in which this matter should have been analyzed. With all the materialism of the Stoics (which, however, Diogenes also outlines very vaguely), something like the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine of matter flashes here. But to compare the Stoics with Plato and Aristotle - Diogenes Laertius, again, is completely beyond his strength to do this. We also note great attention to the problems of Stoic astronomy, both in the broad and narrow sense of the word (VII 140-146, especially 144-146).
This general doctrine of the Stoics about the structure of the world-god (VII 137-151) is later joined by meteorology (VII 151-154) and climatology (VII 155-156) and a rather pronounced materialistic psychology with physiology (VII 156-159).
The presentation of Stoicism in this general form in Diogenes Laertius ends with brief information about the Stoics Ariston (VII 160-164), Eryl (VII 165-166), Dionysius the Defector (VII 166-167), Cleanthes (VII 168-176), Sphere (VII 177-178) and Chrysippe (VII 179-201). In this enumeration, attention is drawn to the fact that Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the former founders of the Stoic school, together with Zeno of China, for some reason, are placed at the very end of the whole discussion about the Stoics. At the same time, Diogenes himself considers Cleanthes the head of the Stoic school after Zeno (VII 174), and Diogenes does not expound any of his teachings.
As for Chrysippus, Diogenes Laertius again says that he was a student of Zeno of Citia and Cleanthes, but that later he seemed to separate from them (VII 179). Nevertheless, both ancient and modern scientists consider Chrysippus one of the founders of Stoicism, attributing to him very subtle logico-mathematical teachings. Indeed, one list of the works of Chrysippus, cited by Diogenes Laertius (VII 189-202), strikes us even now with the depth, originality and versatile character of the philosophy of Chrysippus, from which Diogenes Laertius managed to say only one thing, that Chrysippus was a great dialectician and that if the gods reasoned dialectically, they would reason according to Chrysippus (VII 180). But what kind of dialectics it was - Diogenes Laertius does not say a single word about this.

Diogenes Laertius on Skeptics

Academicians. We usually distinguish between academic skeptics and Pyrrho. Surprisingly, Diogenes Laertius managed to say absolutely nothing about academic skepticism. The text dedicated to Arcesilaus (IV 28-45) is replete with all sorts of trifles, sometimes more, sometimes less important; we read a lot about the high moral character of Arcesilaus (IV 37-39), about his homosexuality (IV 40), about his death in a drunken state (IV 44). But as far as skepticism is concerned, then, apart from fluent phrases, we find nothing here. Arcesilaus, for example, refrained from speaking because of the inconsistency of his judgments (IV 28, cf. 32). An epigram is given that Arcesilaus is Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, and Diodorus Kronos in the middle. About the founder of the non-academic skepticism of Pyrrho, Diogenes Laertius will have a whole discussion further on. But who is Diodor Kronos and what are his judgments, about this are only some obscure phrases that say nothing about skepticism (II, 111). The fact that Arcesilaus, expressing his opinion, pointed out the possibility of some other opinion (IV 36), this also does not say anything significant about skepticism. Diogenes Laertius said nothing more about Arcesilaus in the sense of skepticism. As for the founder of late skepticism, the head of the New Academy of Carneades (IV 62-66), Diogenes Laertius says anything about him, but not a word about Carneades' skepticism.
Needless to say, it never occurred to Diogenes Laertius to pay attention to the strange and incomprehensible emergence of skepticism in the depths of such an objectivist philosophy as was preached at the Academy. What do Platonism and Skepticism have in common? This question is not so easy to answer. But it would seem easier for Diogenes Laertius to answer it than for us at the present time, since the written materials and oral traditions of the Platonic Academy, of course, could be better known to him than to us. However, the very question of the relationship between skepticism and Platonism does not arise in him. And this is all the more strange because, according to the epigram cited by him, Arcesilaus was in front of Plato, and behind Pyrrho. This means that some correlation between Platonism and the skeptic Pyrrho nevertheless flickered in the minds of Diogenes Laertius when he spoke about skepticism in the Platonic Academy. And what does this “front” and this “behind” mean, one can only guess about this, but Diogenes Laertius does not contain any positive materials for resolving such a question.
Pyrrho and his basic principle. In contrast to the Academicians, Diogenes Laertius says quite a lot about this Pyrrho of Elis. About him, Diogenes Laertius, of course, first of all, provides various and very interesting biographical data. Various traits of his personality are reported (IX 62-64). From this information of Diogenes Laertius, only two interesting circumstances can be noted. The first is that Pyrrho seems to have met Indian gymnosophists and magicians, and that from them he seems to have borrowed his doctrine of ignorance and refraining from judgment (IX 61). Another circumstance is even more unexpected for us. Namely, it turns out that the inhabitants of Pyrrho's native Elis, for the sake of respect for him and for his honor, made him the high priest (IX 64). True, one of the sources of Diogenes Laertius (as he says, the only one), Numenius, argued that Pyrrho could not do without "dogmas", i.e. without positive teachings (IX 68). However, a lot of all kinds of skeptical judgments attributed by Diogenes Laertius to Pyrrho speak of his unconditional skepticism, the rejection of all judgments, both positive and negative, of the existence of any "yes" necessarily some kind of "no".
Of course, for Diogenes Laertius, again, there does not exist that sharp contradiction that, at least from our present point of view, exists between Greek skepticism and Greek religion, especially cult. But for us it is certainly the kind of subject that makes one wonder about the nature of Greek philosophical skepticism. One way or another, it remains an unconditional fact that a principled skeptic who rejects not only any philosophical concept, but even the use of certain philosophical categories, could well be a religious figure, recognize a cult and even be one of its high-ranking representatives. We need to think about this, but this, of course, is not the problem of our present study, for which it is only important that Diogenes Laertius again does not raise the question of the compatibility of Greek philosophical skepticism and Greek cult religion.
On the other hand, the basic principle of Pyrrho's philosophy is outlined by Diogenes Laertius quite clearly and well (though without any system). Since everything flows and changes, then, according to the teachings of skeptics, nothing can be said about anything at all. Everyone does not talk about what really is, but only about what it seems to them, from which comes the general inconsistency of judgments, which prevents us from recognizing anything as truth and anything as a lie. Diogenes Laertius talks about this in some detail, with constant repetition of the same thing (IX 61, 74-79, 102-108).
Some of the messages of Diogenes Laertius are not without significance. It is said, for example, that Aenesidemus understood Pyrrho's skepticism only purely theoretically, while in his practical life Pyrrho seemed not to be a skeptic at all (IX 62). Examples are given from his personal life(IX 66). As an example of the serene calm necessary for correct skepticism, Pyrrho pointed to a pig calmly eating its food on a ship during a dangerous storm, when all passengers were unusually worried and feared a catastrophe (IX 68). In one place, Diogenes Laertius, contrary to his usual indifference to the philosophers expounded by him, calls the philosophy of Pyrrho "worthy" (IX 61). If desired, a modern researcher can understand the worldview of Diogenes Laertius himself as skeptical. However, there are no grounds for such a conclusion, just as one cannot draw any conclusions about the skepticism of Diogenes Laertius from the vastness of the information he gives about Pyrrho. Information about the disciples and followers of Pyrrho in Diogenes Laertius does not contain a single, even the smallest, philosophical phrase (IX 68-69), not even excluding the famous Timon of Phlius (IX 109-115) with his students (IX 115-116) .
Some components. We will not go into these details here, because they are too monotonous. All of them are built on what we now call school formal logic with a negative intonation: "A" and "not-A" in no way, in anything and never can form something whole out of themselves, some kind of integral community, in relation to which they were only individual elements. Based on this formal-logical principle, Diogenes Laertius expounds the teaching of Pyrrho about the impossibility of any proof at all (IX 90-91), about the impossibility of proceeding from a true assumption (IX 91-93), about the impossibility of trust and persuasiveness (IX 93-94), the criterion of truth (IX 94-95), the sign (IX 96-97), the cause (IX 97-99), movement, study, emergence (IX 100) and good and evil from nature (IX 101).
At the same time, we must, however, note that Diogenes Laertius himself has no idea that all the skepticism of Pyrrho he expounds grows on a school formal-logical basis and is devoid of the slightest features of dialectical thinking. This is our present conclusion, but Diogenes Laertius himself expresses all this skepticism with amazing calmness and completely childish naivety.
Skeptical trails. Among the ancient skeptics, their arguments against any "dogmatic" philosophy were usually divided into so-called "tropes", i.e. for some of the most common ways refutation of all dogmatism. The number of these paths in different sources is called different. As for Diogenes Laertius, he first points out ten main skeptical tropes (IX 79-88), to which he immediately adds five tropes of the followers of a certain skeptic Agrippa (he is mentioned only once, and no information about him is reported IX 88-89 ).
The ten skeptical tropes are laid out by Diogenes Laertius randomly and without any analysis. However, a more critical approach to these tropes forces one to recognize that some sort of logical system was at work in their construction among the skeptics.
The first trope proves the impossibility of judgment and the need to refrain from it on the basis of the sensory-cognitive discord that exists in animals in general (IX 79-80).
This can be contrasted with the tropes, which, according to Diogenes Laertius, relate specifically to man: on human nature and personal characteristics of a person - tropes 2 (IX 80-81); on the difference of channels in our sense organs tropes 3 (IX 81); about predispositions and general changes in human life - tropes 4 (IX 82); about education, laws, faith in traditions, folk customs and learned prejudices tropes 5 (IX 83-84).
The third group of tropes no longer refers specifically to either humans or animals in general, but rather to the general features of material reality: about distances, positions, places and the objects that occupy them - tropes 7 (IX 85-86); about the quantities and qualities of things - tropes 8 (IX 86); about the constancy, unusualness, rarity of phenomena - tropes 9 (IX 87).
And finally, the fourth group of these ten tropes is rather logical in nature: about the unknowability of individual things due to their constant connections and interactions - tropes 6 (IX 84-85); and the same impossibility, but on the basis of the general correlation of things in tropes 10 (IX 87-88).
Five tropes from the school of Agrippa prove the impossibility of knowledge: due to the diversity of opinions, due to the need to find the reasons for going to infinity, due to the impossibility of thinking a separate thing without its connections with other things, due to the heterogeneity of the allowed starting points of the proof, and, finally, due to the need to prove which some thesis on the basis of another thesis, which itself depends on the first thesis (IX 88-89).
Conclusion. In conclusion, it must be said that the presentation of Pyrrho by Diogenes Laertius is not at all so bad. Here it turns out to be quite clear both the general initial principle and the details based on it, and the possible connection with previous philosophers and poets, and the attempt to enumerate Pyrrho's arguments in their systematic coherence. It is only necessary to say that it is precisely this very systematic coherence that Diogenes Laertius fails to achieve, just as he almost nowhere succeeds in it at all. But this negative feature of the presentation of Diogenes Laertius, perhaps, is already of secondary importance, if we bear in mind that the basic principle of Pyrrho's skepticism and its main details are nevertheless given in an understandable and clear form.

Diogenes Laertius on Epicurus

Canonica Epicurus is expounded in Diogenes right there, as required by the indicated division of philosophy; however, in the future, Diogenes Laertius puts some three alleged messages of Epicurus to his friends - Herodotus, Pythocles and Menekey. For a modern researcher, these three letters are the subject of the most difficult analysis, since they are full of all sorts of contradictions and understatements. But first let us see how Diogenes Laertius expounds the canon of Epicurus.
First of all, Epicureanism denies dialectics, seeing it as a useless science. And since all knowledge is based only on sensory sensations, the main subject for philosophy is physical nature (X 31). Since, however, the meaninglessness of pure sensation is clear even to Epicurus, such concepts as "anticipation" and "enduring" immediately arise. The criterion of truth lies in sensory sensations that are experienced, it is not yet said by whom or by what (and it will later turn out that this is the "soul"), accumulated and remembered, forming those anticipations, or apperceptions, which in the future will be necessary for a person for ascertaining the existence of certain things. However, this kind of apperception is still not enough.
The Epicureans, says Diogenes, exhibited another moment of the activity of mental representations (X 31). What are these mental representations, especially if we are talking about their epibole, i.e. about "throwing", "throwing", or, simply speaking, the active activity of thought (dianoias)? Where these mental representations came from, and even their activity, is not said. However, Epicurus himself, according to Diogenes, argued that sensory sensation, taken in itself, is "irrational and independent of memory." How, in this case, our concepts and representations are created from these irrational sensations, is also not said, but perhaps something even unexpected is said: when sensations in one way or another are united or separated and our concepts and representations arise from this, then "reason (logismos ) only contributes to this" (X 32). The question is, where did this reason come from, if the inviolability and irrefutability of bare sensual sensations is declared? In addition, great importance is attached to this area of apperception in the sense that if we have not seen a horse or a cow before and have not remembered them, then in the event of a new appearance of a horse or cow, we cannot determine where the horse is and where the cow is. But the question is: how did we, in the very first case of perceiving a horse or a cow, determine where the horse and where the cow are? But Epicurus, who prefers in the presentation of Diogenes Laertius to deal only with individual sensations and construct everything from them human knowledge, in this state of affairs, it is deprived of the opportunity to ascertain the presence of one or another community already at the very first perception of a sensual object.
All these generic concepts necessary for knowledge are helplessly characterized only by the presence of memory in man (X 33). That such subjectivism fundamentally contradicts the original objectivism of Epicurus is clear. But Diogenes Laertius does not understand this at all, just as obscure is all this psychologism in general, which attracts such concepts as “waiting” for epistemology, which is discussed right there. The presentation of the canon of Epicurus ends with a phrase about the affects of pleasure and pain, and also speaks of a search in the field of words and in the field of objects themselves (X 34). What this has to do with the canon as a doctrine of the criterion of truth and of the most general principles, again remains without explanation. One must think that Epicurus himself reasoned much more logically than his incompetent exponent Diogenes Laertius.
Further, in complete violation of the system formulated at the beginning, there are, as said, three letters from Epicurus to his friends. Diogenes Laertius undoubtedly borrowed these letters from somewhere; and it is possible that the absurdities and confusions in which they differ belong neither to Diogenes Laertius nor to Epicurus. However, this is an intractable question; where did Diogenes Laertius get these letters from, did they rewrite them in their entirety or make some corrections, or perhaps he simply composed them himself? To clarify the essence of Epicureanism, it is not at all necessary to resolve these issues. However, since they occupy such a central place in the exposition of Diogenes Laertius, then there is nothing left for us but to analyze these letters according to their essence. Let us dwell on the first letter, namely the letter to Herodotus.
Physics. The main theme of this letter (X 35-83) is "physics", since Epicurus, according to Diogenes Laertius, wants to limit himself to one material, i.e. the sensible world. What is to be understood by this matter in Epicurus?
Epicurus himself is inclined to understand by matter simply the totality of separate sensually perceived things. However, the author - and at the same time it is not known whether Epicurus himself or only his exponent Diogenes Laertius - is by no means limited to only sensually perceived things.
It turns out that sensible things are complex bodies consisting of atoms, i.e. indivisible particles (X 41), which, although they are declared material, nevertheless do not lend themselves to sensory perception at all, but are only intelligible objects (X 44, 56). Since they are real, they are characterized by a certain size, shape, arrangement and even weight (X 54). Here, however, it remains unclear where the atoms get their weight from, i.e. have heaviness, while we can understand weight and heaviness only in connection with the gravitation of objects to the earth, and there is still no talk of the earth here. Since the atoms are real, they are in constant motion at a constant speed (X 43). But who and what drives them is not said; but it is said that they move by themselves, i.e. that they themselves are the source and cause of movement. In their motion, the atoms come into contact, remaining in the closest spatial connection between themselves and repulsing each other and bouncing off at one or another distance. But atoms are not only material. They are also geometric, i.e. they are characterized by eternal existence (since it would be senseless to apply the measures of time or movement to ideal geometric figures or bodies), they are indestructible and not even subject to any outside influence. Apparently, if we are to believe this letter from Epicurus to Herodotus, then Epicurus has not yet reached the distinction between physics and geometry, which is why it is difficult to say whether Epicurus's atoms are only material and material or only ideal geometric.
However, reducing everything to sensory perceptions, which are completely fluid and elusive, Epicurus, on the other hand, still had to find something stable and indestructible, something regular and objectively inevitable, without which science itself could not exist. Therefore, it was necessary to absolutize matter, at the price, however, of bringing to the forefront not the sensibility, but the intelligibility of atoms. In addition, Epicurus was undoubtedly guided by a sense of individual originality and uniqueness of the foundations of being. When at the beginning of the letter it is said that "nothing arises from the non-existent", then this is motivated by the fact that each thing has its own and unique "seed", i.e., we would say, its own original meaning. This meaning of a thing, of course, cannot be deduced from another thing, if one does not fall into the evil infinity of the transformation of one thing into another. In other words, true being, from the point of view of Epicurus, can neither arise nor perish, as is usually said by all philosophers (and, moreover, by idealists) about such being, which is presented as primordial. Consequently, in the exposition of Diogenes Laertius, the primacy of sensory perception undoubtedly suffers a complete collapse, and instead of sensory fluidity, non-fluid atoms, not subject to any changes, indestructible and eternal, possessing throughout all eternity one and the same completely unique form or appearance, one and the same the same (also probably infinite) density and the same weight. Epicurus still does not understand our modern formula about the ratio of volume, density and mass of a body. If an atom is indeed absolutely dense, then its mass, and hence its weight, must be the same infinity. Nevertheless, the weight and gravity of the Epicurean atoms, as can be assumed, are different everywhere, just as the speed of the movement of atoms is thought to be either finite or infinite, and, in any case, the speed of atomic outflows is infinite (X 46-47). However, it is not necessary to attribute to Epicurus something that, according to the conditions of his time, he could not know. The only important thing here is that atoms are both material and geometric, and that they lie in the intelligible foundations of all fluid and sensuous-material being. However, even that “emptiness”, the assumption of which Epicurus considers necessary for giving the atoms the opportunity to move, is also an intelligible void for Epicurus. He speaks of the "intangible nature" of this void (X-40). Epicurus has a very deep reasoning about the indivisibility of atoms precisely in order to protect their individual integrity against going into the bad infinity of fragmentation (X 56-59).
Very interesting fact is that Epicurus does not find it possible to apply this sense of individual uniqueness to the world as a whole. It would seem that if everything basic is individual and unique, then the world arising from here should have the same properties. But this wholeness of the world flashes only once in a letter to Herodotus as the unity of the Universe, which cannot be opposed to anything else, because nothing else can exist (X 39). In general, however, the Universe is conceived by Epicurus as infinite, in the sense of a bad infinity, i.e. in the sense that nowhere can one find its borders, or edges, of its limits (X 41, 60). In addition, atoms can form an infinite variety of structures, each of which is a special world, but these worlds are again an infinite and unlimited number (X 45). Commenting on this idea of Epicurus (as expounded by Diogenes), we would say that here Epicurus does not yet completely part with his inherent sense of individual uniqueness, but only recognizes an infinite number of such uniquely integral worlds. This infinity, as we would say now, is "not actual", but only "potential".
Very original and not very clear is the teaching of Epicurus about the so-called outflows from atoms (X 46-53). These atomic outflows can never become intelligible to us as long as we believe Epicurus that such an impenetrable abyss lies between intelligible atoms and sensible things. Undoubtedly, Epicurus himself felt this dualism, which was very unfavorable for him, and now an attempt is being made to fill this abyss with something. It is filled with some kind of "vidiks" (cidola is a diminutive term from eidos, which is already characteristic of the atoms themselves). These "vidics" or "appearances" flow out of the atoms for some reason at the highest speed (why, in this case, the atoms themselves do not move at an infinite speed?), get into our organs of sensory perception and create our idea of things. But it remains unknown why a sensual sensation suddenly arises in a person, because he also consists of the same soulless and unthinking atoms that Epicurus put together with emptiness as the basis of being in general.
Either in Epicurus himself, or only in the presentation of Diogenes Laertius, but here, in any case, we are at a dead end in front of a whole system of different statements, which is difficult to logically analyze. On the one hand, the atoms, taken by themselves, move with the same speed and this speed is maximum. At the same time, it would be better to say that the speed of the free movement of atoms is not just the greatest, but precisely infinite, since the body, taken by itself, moves, Epicurus (or Diogenes Laertius) thinks, "at the speed of thought." On the other hand, however, sensory sensations do not at all testify to the same and not at all to the infinite speed of the movement of bodies, but these speeds can be arbitrarily large or small. This is explained in such a way that the mental speed of the atom is delayed by one or another resistance, and the resistance can be caused not only by other bodies, but also by the own weight of the body itself. How is it so? All atoms and throughout the world move at the same speed, and the bodies that have arisen from them move at different speeds. It is clear that the mere presence everywhere of the same movement of atoms in a vacuum does not explain anything in those actually diverse velocities that are characteristic of complex bodies. To avoid this contradiction, Epicurus (or Diogenes Laertius) suddenly resorts to the theory of speculation, according to which it is said that "only that which is comprehended by speculation or a throw of thought" is true (X 61-62). What is the speculation here? After all, it has already been declared that all atoms have for us only a speculative existence and are not accessible to sensory sensations. Apparently, some ill-conceived theory of infinitesimals flickers here in a very vague form: atoms move with the same speed only in the smallest individual moments of their movement; and if we take the whole curve of a given motion, then it is not at all obliged to testify to the same motion of the atoms, so that the curve is only one or another function of the argument, changing with infinite speed. This very confusing passage in the letter to Herodotus cannot by any means be analyzed in a clear form to the end. To apply the theory of infinitesimals to such rough of the proposed theory of atomic motion, of course, would be a completely anti-historical experiment for us. Just as Epicurus could not explain the emergence of complex bodies of different quality from atoms of the same quality, so he could not explain the various speeds of bodies on the basis of the doctrine of the same speed of atoms.
In the future, the analyzed letter passes to the doctrine of soul(X 63-68). Epicurus, as we have seen before, rejected the dialectic, considering it a completely useless enterprise. Let's try to take his point of view and critically formulate what he says about the soul. It is clear and in advance that if everything consists of atoms and emptiness, and atoms are devoid of life and consciousness, then everything complex that comes out of them must also be devoid of life and consciousness, and even any slightest sensitivity. In other words, the soul is the same, i.e. it has no life, no sensations, no receptivity or sensitivity at all. In fact, the atoms of the soul differ from other atoms only in that they are more subtle (X 63). Below, Diogenes Laertius adds to this that "the soul consists of the most smooth and round atoms, very different even from the atoms of fire" (X 66). So, the atoms of the soul are only distinguished by great subtlety, great smoothness and great roundness. It must be said that this teaching, after what Greek philosophy had done before Epicurus, is too helpless. Here, probably, dialectics would have helped Epicurus, but dialectical materialism was still completely inaccessible to him; but without dialectics, i.e. without a dialectical leap, it is absolutely impossible to distinguish mental activity from soulless atoms, in no way sensitive, in no way sentient, and devoid of any consciousness. Here we have one of the weakest and most insignificant sides of ancient Epicureanism, which, perhaps, could somehow get its rightful place in the Epicurean system, but Diogenes Laertius has no data for this.
Why such a dialectic would be possible for Epicurus, we can judge this on the basis of the Epicurean theory of wholeness. We mentioned this wholeness above when we spoke about the unique originality of each atom, due to which it was thought by Epicurus not accessible to any further fragmentation and not even accessible to any external influence. And here, too, in this doctrine of the soul, we find the reasoning that the shape, color, size, weight, and all the other basic properties of the body should be thought "not as if they are all put together, as particles are put together into larger complex bodies. or small parts into large ones, but simply, as I said, the permanent nature of the whole body consists of all these properties. "All these properties are captured and distinguished each in their own way, but always accompanied by the whole and never apart from it; according to this cumulative concept, the body receives its name" (X 68-69). Simply put, according to Epicurus, the whole is such a new quality, such a "nature" of a thing, which is not divided into its constituent elements, but, on the contrary, determines the significance of each such element. This applies both to the primary properties of a thing and to its random features (X 70-71). But this can be understood only if, and here one could see a hint of dialectics, only if Epicurus did not press with such fierce obstinacy that there is nothing in the world but soulless atoms and emptiness. This is also evidenced by a brief discussion about time, which we find in the letter right there (X 72-73) and which is reduced to the simplest creeping empiricism.
In the future, and until the very end of the letter, Epicurus touches on issues of a secondary nature, arising or recognized by him as arising from the basic doctrine of atoms. The number of worlds is infinitely varied (X 73-74). The correct concepts of being, depending on the circumstances, all people had one or the other content (X 75). The names of things did not arise among people as a result of a rational agreement, but as a result of a more or less correct understanding of the phenomena of nature (X 76). The astronomical or meteorological order is not determined by any individual beings, by which Epicurus understands here, of course, the gods. However, complete atheism is not visible here, but rather, some kind of deism peeps through, according to which the gods are blessed because they do not deal with any world of things (X 76-77). But even for a man this serenity of the spirit is necessary, nevertheless it is possible only as a result of the complete overcoming of all mythological fears and only on the basis of studying nature in its immediate givenness (X 78-82). But here, too, Epicurus managed to become in complete contradiction with himself, since he himself eliminated this immediate evidence with his doctrine of the intelligible nature of atoms. The very end of the letter is a confidential appeal to its addressee (X 83).
It seems to us that the above contradictions and absurdities of Epicurus, contained in this letter to Herodotus, do not at all go beyond our characterization of the basic manner of Diogenes Laertius to consider the philosophical systems of the past. Incredible terminological confusion, constant thoughtlessness and understatement, unmotivated jumping from one subject to another and complete indifference to the logical structure of the philosophical systems expounded - we find all this in the letter of Epicurus to Herodotus analyzed by us, as we find in all other places in Diogenes Laertius. It is possible that the author of this letter is not Diogenes Laertius himself and not Epicurus himself, but some other or many other sources. But that doesn't make it any easier. Separate phrases from this letter, taken by themselves, with a few minor exceptions, can be considered quite clear and understandable. But the combination of these phrases into one or another philosophical concept almost always leads to logical difficulties and annoying incomprehensibility.
We will not analyze here two other letters of Epicurus, cited by Diogenes Laertius, - to Pythocles on celestial phenomena (X 122-135) and to Menekey about the way of life (X 122-135), as well - and also cited from Diogenes " The main thinkers" of Epicurus (X 139-154). A detailed analysis of all this material would add little to the general and quite bleak historical and philosophical picture of Diogenes Laertius, which we have now received on the basis of an examination of Epicurus's letter to Herodotus.
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We will only note that the detail of Diogenes Laertius' presentation of the philosophy of Epicurus, as well as, for example, the Stoics or Skeptics, does not at all indicate that Diogenes Laertius himself was an Epicurean, or a Stoic, or a Skeptic. Otherwise, one would have to consider him also a Platonist, on the grounds that he gives an even more detailed exposition of the philosophy of Plato. And in general, what was the worldview of Diogenes Laertius, this can be judged much better not on the basis of the philosophical analyzes he offers, but rather on the basis of various other sources, which should be discussed in a special study.

Diogenes Laertes: biography, works, quotes. Life, teachings and sayings of famous philosophers

1.2. Philosophical and historical background of ancient skepticism

Diogenes Laertius on Skeptics

Diogenes Laertius on Epicurus

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