Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine
Mariupol Electromechanical College
on the topic: "Greek philosophy in the biographies of Diogenes Laertius"
in the subject "Philosophy"
Performed:
student of group K-10-1/11z
Zhiteneva N.S.
Checked:
teacher
Medvedev A.A.
Mariupol, 2011
1. Introduction
The judgments of Diogenes Laertius on the origin of Greek philosophy
Philosophers and their schools
Bibliography
1. Introduction
General information about Diogenes Laeres
Greek writer of the 3rd century AD Diogenes Laertius became widely known for his treatise of ten books on the life, teachings and sayings of ancient philosophers. It is devoted to the history of Greek philosophy, but Greek philosophy itself, with some minor exceptions, is presented in it without proper chronology and not in a strict historical sequence, overflowing with seemingly irrelevant biographical information, anecdotes, sharp words, deviations to the side. off topic. Despite the absence of any strictly thought-out system in the content of this book, it is a remarkable monument of ancient literature in general, and it is regrettable how boring the modern European exponents of ancient philosophy are and far from the very spirit and style of ancient thinking, although, of course, they surpass the ancients. in the methods of sequential-historical or systematic-logical exposition of philosophy.
Let us first try at least one, namely the historical-philosophical side of the treatise of Diogenes Laerius to present in more detail.
First of all, it is completely unknown what kind of name this is - Diogenes Laertius, where that Diogenes Laertius lived and wrote, what is the dating of his life and even what is the exact title of his work.
As far as can be judged from the information of the most learned Stephen of Byzantium, who owns the first mention of Diogenes Laertius (VI century), the word "Laertius" should indicate some city of Laerta, which would be natural, since the names of Greek figures are usually accompanied by an indication of that city where they come from (Diogenes of Apollonia, Democritus of Abdera, etc.). However, it is impossible to find the cities of Laertes in any dictionaries and sources, so the question arises whether such a city actually existed.
It has been suggested that "Laertius" is a nickname similar to those sometimes given in Greece to famous figures who bore a too common and common name. Here we recall that, according to Homer, Laertes was the father of Odysseus, and that therefore Odysseus himself is sometimes called "Laertiades". In addition, this "Laertiad" is sometimes accompanied by Homer's epithet diogenes - "God-begotten", "Zeus-born". The assumption of borrowing the name "Diogenes Laertius" from Homer has a probability, but a very weak one.
Some read the author's name not "Diogenes Laertius" but "Laertius Diogenes" or simply "Laertius". The only reason for such a reading is the spelling, which is very rare in ancient literature, which is found (in the form of "Laertius Diogenes") in Photius and Eustathius, and in Stefan of Byzantium and one way or another.
Some modern scholars have seized on "Laertia" and call it that. However, the state of the sources on this issue is very confused, so that the question of the true name of Diogenes Laertius still remains unresolved.
It seems that little more can be said about the years of the life of Diogenes Laertius. The fact is that he calls Saturnin Cyfen the last philosopher. A Saturninus is a student of Sextus Empiricus, who lived and acted around 200 AD. In addition, Diogenes Laertius does not mention in a word - Neoplatonic figures, and the founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus, lived in the years 203-269. . n. e., especially since Plotinus, as is known, began to write down his lectures only after 250 BC.
Further, as already mentioned, there is no exact title of the book of Diogenes Laertius. In the Parisian manuscript of 1759 it reads as follows: "Diogenes Laertius, the biography and thoughts of those who became famous in philosophy, and in a brief summary of the views of each teaching." Sopater simply calls the book of Diogenes Laertius "Lives of the Philosophers". In Stephen of Byzantium, it is literally called the "History of the Philosopher", which R. Hicks understands as the "Philosophical History". Eustathius also briefly: "Biographies of the Sophists", where the word "sophist", as it is often found in Greek literature, is understood simply as "sage" or "practical sage". At the end of the best manuscripts is more precisely: "Laertius Diogenes summary of the lives of philosophers and their teachings in 10 books."
Let us also add to this the fact that Diogenes Laertius also had a collection of epigrams on various philosophers, about which he himself spoke and from which all the numerous epigrams of Diogenes Laertius to each philosopher in his book are probably taken.
Since there is no reliable information about the name of Diogenes Laertius and the title of his treatise, in the future we will conditionally call the author of the treatise Diogenes Laertius, and his treatise will also conditionally be called the “History of Philosophy”.
There is another very important question that naturally arises in every researcher of Diogenes Laertius and in every reader of him - this is the question of the worldview of Diogenes Laertius himself. Indeed, it would seem to write about such a number of different philosophers and somehow understand their teachings - this would mean the author himself to have some definite philosophical point of view. But, oddly enough, our author does not have any own philosophical point of view. His exposition is so scattered and chaotic, so descriptive and accidental, that it never occurs to him to criticize philosophers in any way and thereby reveal his own philosophical position.
In the old literature on Diogenes Laertius, and even then not very decisively, the view was expressed that, about which of the philosophers he writes in more detail, he sympathizes more with him. This view, of course, has a basis, but it is very weak and has not gained popularity in science. After all, if we estimate the size of the information presented about the philosophers, it turns out that Diogenes Laertius tells the most about Plato, the Stoics, skeptics and Epicureans. But everyone will say that these philosophical schools are too different from each other for the author writing about them to belong to all these schools at the same time.
It is clear that by this method there is no way to determine Diogenes Laertius' own worldview. The presentation of the positions of the ancient philosophers by Diogenes Laertius is so descriptive and not interested in any worldview that it is impossible to demand from this author an explanation of his own theoretical views. So, to all the obscurities that surround the treatise of Diogenes Laertius, and even his very name, it is necessary to add the impossibility of understanding his own theoretical positions.
The disinterested descriptiveness that characterizes the historical-philosophical method of Diogenes often comes to the point that on a given historical-philosophical issue or on a purely biographical issue, he cites several different opinions that are authoritative for him, which are difficult to reconcile due to their inconsistency. At the same time, he himself is so immersed in this elementary descriptiveness that sometimes he does not even raise the question of which of his opinions is more correct or how to harmonize these conflicting references to different sources. The latter makes the book of Diogenes Laertius very learned. But from such scholarship, the confusion of his treatise rather only increases. And this is very good, since it is here that the main method and style of his historical-philosophical narration becomes clear. Only one should not demand the impossible from Diogenes Laertius, but one should take all the freedom and carelessness of his style.
After this information about Diogenes Laertius, let us also touch briefly on the content of his book, after which it will be possible to begin a review of individual problems that arise in connection with the historical and philosophical analysis of the treatise.
Let us note that among the chaotic mass of materials cited by Diogenes Laertius, there are also such judgments that, with the most rigorous criticism of the ancient primary sources, must be considered correct or close to correct. All such positive conclusions from the treatise of Diogenes, of course, also require the most serious attention from us, and they should not be obscured from us by any of his free and carefree style.
It must be said right away that both modern philology and the entire philology of the last century are very critical of the historical and philosophical materials of Diogenes Laertius. The next philological examination of the text of Diogenes Laertius forces us to really critically assess not only individual problems of this author, but decisively his entire method of considering the history of philosophy. This criticism of Diogenes Laertius as a primary source for constructing the history of ancient philosophy must also be carried out by us, and not only on the basis of numerous works in world philological science, but mainly on the basis of our own philological observations and our own understanding of the general method of criticizing Greek primary sources. But first, let us say a few words about the treatise of Diogenes Laertius in general.
Although Diogenes Laertius gives many different kind information about the history of ancient philosophy, for starters, you just need to forget that we are dealing here with a treatise on philosophy. In this treatise, you can read anything you like about the Greeks, including, of course, about Greek thinkers, about entire epochs of cultural development, about the poetry of many Greek authors, about the nature and life of ancient Greece.
Very often, Diogenes Laertius is not interested in this thinker as such, but his biography, and even biographies, are often full of various curiosities, unusual combinations of various circumstances, various kinds of anecdotes, witty sayings and descriptions of irrelevant random incidents. Of particular interest to Diogenes Laertius are various kinds of juicy details from people's lives, often reaching curiosities.
All the stories of Diogenes Laertius about philosophers and thinkers are literally full of anecdotes. He expounds the teachings of many thinkers only in the form of some one thesis, without any development and without any proof of this latter. And sometimes he simply mentions only a name and nothing more, so that it remains unknown what is the attitude of this person to philosophy. But, we repeat, one should not be too condescending to Diogenes Laertius for his free handling of facts. On the contrary, this is what makes his treatise a remarkably interesting ancient book, which has never lost and still does not lose its significance.
We are here confronted by an unconstrained Greek who feels cheerful and at ease not only in spite of the absence of a coherent system and a more or less accurately recounted history, but rather precisely because of this circumstance. At the same time, one should not think that we are facing some kind of amateur or ignoramus. Diogenes Laertius read a great deal, and no doubt read a considerable part of the philosophical treatises which he considers. In any case, he confirms any insignificant trifle with a reference to some source, and these sources are very authoritative for her, such as, for example, the same Aristotle.
But it is clear that by no means did he read all the philosophers about whom Diogenes Laertius writes, and due to the low prevalence and inaccessibility of many philosophical works at that time, he could not even read them. It is clear that in these cases Diogenes Laertius expounds the works of Greek philosophy only by hearsay, only from second or third hands. Hence the mass of all kinds of contradictions and ambiguities, which, apparently, confuse him very little. This cheerful and carefree Greek literally tumbles in an unbounded multitude of philosophical works, names and all sorts of life facts, even those that have nothing to do with philosophy.
To reject Diogenes Laertius for these historico-philosophical liberties would be very imprudent on our part. How many absurdities, absurdities, and sometimes even ugliness are found in Homer? Is that why Homer cannot be read, translated and provided with philological or cultural-historical commentaries? Why, all ancient literature is like that. No one now believes in either Apollo, or Erinyes, or Pallas Athena. Nevertheless, the trilogy of Aeschylus "Oresteia", in which these gods play a decisive role, is a monument of world literature, translated into all languages, commented in every possible way and serves as a valuable primary source for the historian, and for the literary critic, and for the linguist, and for the historian of philosophy. , including the history of moral and aesthetic ideas.
Why, all of a sudden, should we not read and translate Diogenes Laertius just because his historical and philosophical views are confused, contradictory and do not correspond to our modern philological criticism of ancient Greek primary sources?
Reading the treatise of Diogenes Laertius, marveling at his naivety and randomness, we not only enjoy this cheerful "floundering" of Diogenes in hundreds and thousands of unverified and unreliable facts. Thus, we also plunge into these cheerful expanses of ancient historiography and begin to understand to what extent the ancient Greek could feel carefree in such a serious area as the history of philosophy.
Finally, the point here is not just the literary pleasure that the modern reader receives from this treatise, which came to us from a long-dead civilization, as well as from a rather alien cultural atmosphere for us. We would like the criticism of Diogenes Laertius as a historical and philosophical source, which we will deal with in the future, to serve as at least one of the possible examples of criticism of Greek primary sources in general. We will not only feel at every step in the atmosphere of ancient Greek civilization, but at the same time we will consider the views of Diogenes Laertius in essence and with full seriousness.
It seems that for our young historians of philosophy and for all readers, the criticism we offer will be, if not instructive, then, presumably, interesting in relation to all this complex Greek source study problems.
In view of this peculiar nature of the work of Diogenes Laertius, it is necessary first to analyze it from a purely historical and philosophical point of view, including also a review of the sources he used.
2. Judgments of Diogenes Laertius on the origin of Greek philosophy
All these judgments of Diogenes Laertius are characterized by rather great confusion, and the judgment of Greek philosophy as a whole, one might say, is almost absent.
The beginning of philosophy. At the beginning of his book, Diogenes Laertius talks quite a lot about the development of philosophy among the barbarians and refers to those who begin the history of philosophy precisely with the barbarians. Diogenes Laertius himself not only considers philosophy an invention of the Greeks, but also understands the entire human race in its origin as Greek. However, what we find in Diogenes Laertius' exposition of "barbarian" philosophy coincides almost entirely with what we find in his exposition of Greek philosophy. The Persians had, as he says, magicians. However, despite the great discrepancy between the Greek philosophers and these magicians, Diogenes Laertius nevertheless claims that the magicians made sacrifices to the gods, "discussed about the nature and origin of the gods", "considered fire, earth and water to be gods", "they composed works on justice ", considered the gods of the sun and the sea. Diogenes Laertius himself finds all such teachings among many Greek philosophers.
Further, Diogenes Laertius reports that the Babylonians and Assyrians had Chaldeans. The Indians had gymnosophists, the Celts and Gauls had druids and semnofei, but the Chaldeans, for example, were engaged in astronomy and predictions, and the Indian gymnosophists and Gallic druids taught to honor the gods, despise death, do no evil and exercise courage. Even closer to the Greek philosophers is what Diogenes Laertius says about the Egyptians. He reports that the latter reasoned "about the gods and justice", that "they consider the sun and the moon to be gods", that, according to their teaching, "the beginning of everything is matter" (hyle, in fact, "matter"), from which "exude four elements, and finally, all kinds of living beings are created." For the Egyptians, "the world is spherical, had a beginning, and will have an end." They attributed the cosmic creative principle to fire, and also taught about the transmigration of souls. All such "barbaric" teachings are to some extent typical of many Greek philosophers. And so, judging by the reports of Diogenes Laertius, the Greeks had no priority at all in inventing philosophy. Perhaps only in the exposition of the philosophy of Democritus, Diogenes Laertius consciously connects it with the "barbarians." Democritus of Abdera - a student of magicians and Chaldeans under King Xerxes. Democritus, according to the same Diogenes, traveled to Egypt, Persia, the Red Sea, India and Ethiopia.
It is possible that the appearance of the well-known teaching of Democritus about the demonic actions of atomic outflows is connected with this. But Diogenes Laertius also says nothing about this. Thus, what the Greeks borrowed from the "barbarians" and what they did not borrow from them is completely impossible to judge from Diogenes Laertius. Nevertheless, the literal coincidences of Greek philosophy with many "barbarian" teachings on the basis of the materials of Diogenes Laertius himself are quite undoubted. But in view of the partial divergence of the Greeks and the "barbarians" in philosophy, it is also impossible to definitively judge the beginning of philosophy among the Greeks on the basis of the materials of Diogenes. And since Diogenes Laertius nowhere indicates where Greek philosophy flourished and where it fell into decline, it turns out that it is necessary to assert that Diogenes Laertius himself had absolutely no idea about Greek philosophy as a whole, and even more so had no idea about its specificity.
division of Greek philosophy. It would be natural to expect from Diogenes Laertius a historical exposition of Greek philosophy. And in some places, though very rarely, it flashes through this author. In the main, his exposition is not at all historical, but. rather systematic, that is, he tries to divide Greek philosophy into schools. However, even here Diogenes Laertius has a lot of unintelligible things. At the end of Book I, he begins to speak of his intention to treat the Greek philosophers as distinct from the mere sages, to whom much of Book I was devoted. Nevertheless, he ranks Thales among the sages, contrary to the general opinion of both ancient and post-antique observers, who consider him to be the first philosopher. Diogenes Laertius himself in another place also considers him the first philosopher, the teacher of Anaximander. In addition, he also calls "barbarian" views philosophical. Therefore, the difference between a simple sage and a philosopher in Diogenes Laertius is not very clear. As for those whom Diogenes Laertius calls philosophers, they receive from him too uneven and very dubious division. As for the chronology, despite the very frequent reduction of dates, he, in fact, does not have any chronology. In expounding one school, he sometimes reaches a very late time, and in expounding other schools, he finishes them very early, not paying any attention to the fact that many philosophers of different schools acted simultaneously. Therefore, the whole book of Diogenes Laertius in the chronological, and even more so in the historical sense, is very difficult to understand, although with a very careful study, one could speak of chronology in the absolute sense on the basis of Diogenes Laertius. Let us touch, however, on the general division of philosophy into schools by Diogenes Laertius. Already in Book I he divides all the Greek schools into Italic and Ionian, that is, into Eastern Greek and Western Greek; at the same time, in the Ionian school, he identifies three directions, one of which ends with the academician Cleitomachus, the other with the Stoic Chrysippus, and the third with Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle. Meanwhile, if by Ionians we mean natural philosophers, then this natural philosophy, according to Diogenes Laertius himself, continued for a very long time after Clytomachus, Chrysippus and Theophrastus. At least, according to Diogenes Laertius himself, such natural philosophers were Pythagoras and, in any case, Epicurus, whom he also, contrary to popular opinion, considers a Pythagorean; however, it is impossible to find anything Pythagorean in the worldview of Epicurus, to whom the entire tenth book is devoted. Let us, however, be aware of how Diogenes Laertius imagines each such school. Diogenes Laertius represents the first school, the Ionian, in such a way that, in addition to Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, he also includes Socrates, the Socrates, and among them Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Crantor and Crates, Arcesilaus, Lacidas, Carneades and Clytomachus. The Cynics Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates, as well as the Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus belong to the second direction in the Ionian school. To the third - Aristotle and Theophrastus. It turns out, therefore, that he confuses the ancient Ionian natural philosophy with the teachings of such antagonists as Socrates and the Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the entire Ancient, as well as the Middle and New, academies, where skepticism flourished altogether, having little in common with Plato and quite the opposite of the ancient Ionian natural philosophy. From our modern point of view, it does sound wild.
As for the second main school of Greek philosophy, which Diogenes Laertius calls Italian, then, on the one hand, he considers Pythagoras to be its founder, and on the other hand, Pythagoras himself is declared by him to be a student of Pherekides of Syria. Diogenes immediately has another confusion: sharply separating the “wise men” and “philosophers” and referring the first of them to an earlier time, he calls Pythagoras either a student of the “sage” Pherekides (“wise”, according to Pythagoras, only one god), and sometimes directly as a philosopher, and even as the person who for the first time began to call himself a "philosopher" for the first time. One way or another, but, according to Diogenes Laertius, it is Pythagoras who has to be considered the founder of the Italian school. It is curious, however, what philosophers, besides Pythagoras, he refers to the Italic school. First of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea are named here in an amazing way. In other words, all the chief Eleatics turn out in Diogenes Laertius to be none other than the followers of the Pythagoreans. Immediately, to the complete surprise of every historian of philosophy, Leucippus and Democritus are named, that is, the Italian school, according to Diogenes, is continued for some reason suddenly by atomists, and, moreover, by the most important ones. Finally, the Italian direction ends with Epicurus. True, in Epicurus he sees a swindler who, being a student of Democritus, passed off the latter's doctrine of atoms, as well as Aristippus's doctrine of pleasures, as his own, so that in the end Diogenes Laertius himself is confused about whether Epicurus was the finalist of the Italian trend, or , as Diogenes says, he was "scattered", that is, independent and original, a philosopher and even the founder of his own school. It is difficult to imagine how to combine together, even in the order of historical development, the natural philosopher Pythagoras, the deniers of natural philosophy as a science of the Eleatics, the principled atomists and the hermit-hedonistic Epicureanism into one whole. It is possible that Diogenes Laertius was guided here not so much by the development of philosophical ideas as by the geographical location of the philosophers, uniting them according to the cities where they lived. Perhaps this also explains the division of all Greek philosophy by Diogenes into Ionian and Italic.
After all, although the founder of the Italian direction, according to Diogenes, was the Italian Pythagoras, and the Eleatics lived and taught in the southern Italian city of Elea, but the Eleatus Xenophanes, for example, was born in Colophon, that is, in Ionia. Diogenes also reckoned Leucippus and Democritus to the Italian direction, but if nothing definite is known about the origin of Leucippus, then the Pythagorean Democritus is already in any case from Abdera, that is, an Ionian. True, these Leucippus and Democritus, together with Heraclitus of Ephesus, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno of Elea, Protagoras of Abdera, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaxarchus of Abdera, Pyrrho of Elis, and Epicurus of Samos himself (born in Samos) were suddenly declared by the philosophers to be “disparate”. Here, however, it should be noted that, according to Diogenes, Heraclitus is self-taught and did not belong to any school, and Diogenes also calls many of the philosophers just listed Pythagoreans. Some attempt to divide ancient Greek philosophy can be found in Diogenes in those places where he outlines three directions of this philosophy, which he still does not stop calling Ionian. The first direction is philosophy from Thales or Anaximander to Clytomachus, but, according to Diogenes, there is another direction: Socrates (who, however, is also ranked among the natural philosophers), Antisthenes, Cynic Diogenes, Crates of Thebes, Zeno of China, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. The confusion here lies in the fact that not only Antisthenes and the Cynics were students of Socrates, but also a number of schools that are not so poorly known to us. But why exactly the Cynics are mentioned here, and even the Stoics (who have very little in common with Socrates, partly even his direct antagonists), is again unknown.
Diogenes presents the third Ionian line as follows: Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus. In other words, Diogenes separates Plato from Socrates, and ends the Peripatetics with only one of the first chronologically disciples of Aristotle, Theophrastus, although the Peripatetics existed for several more centuries. So, Diogenes Laertius presents the whole history of Greek philosophy in a very confused way. And if you follow his divisions, it is very difficult to figure out who was whose student, what philosophical schools existed, when they began and ended, and which of them was really a representative of this school, and who was an independent thinker and founded his own school. This must be said at least of the chief philosophers. What were the schools founded by Socrates, who was a student of Plato and Aristotle - it is very difficult to understand this, not to mention the earlier philosophers, who, although divided into Ionians and Italians, nevertheless their teachings are not formulated in any way in their specificity, why and the thinkers who followed them remain unclear.
The beginning of Greek philosophy. If we now turn to individual eras and schools of Greek philosophy, according to Diogenes, then, despite the complete identification of "wise men", "sophists" and "poets", semi-mythical and semi-historical Musaeus and Linus, he still considers the founders of Greek philosophy, who solved the same problems as the first Greek philosophers, according to generally accepted teaching. Thus, Musei taught about the One as the beginning and end of everything, and Lin was engaged in astronomy quite in the spirit of pre-Socratic philosophy. Consequently, in contrast to philosophy from mythology, and even more so in the problem of the origin of philosophy from mythology, Diogenes not only does not understand, but this very issue does not even occur to him. As for the famous singer Orpheus, whom many also considered the first Greek philosopher, Diogenes Laertius refutes this with nothing more than low moral character Orpheus, who portrayed the gods with all the low human passions (as if Homer did not have the same thing) and was torn to pieces by the Bacchantes or died from lightning. The modern history of Greek philosophy, far from considering Musaeus, Linus and Orpheus in the true sense of the word, as historical figures, nevertheless, attributes the beginnings of Greek philosophy to them, or, in any case, to those who served as real historical prototypes for them. Very well, Diogenes Laertius, at least in principle, distinguishes the Greek philosophers from the Greek sages who preceded them by the fact that by philosophy he understands not wisdom as such, but only "attraction to wisdom." Nevertheless, these "wise men", who, in his own opinion, are not philosophers, Diogenes Laertius expounds at some length; and although he traditionally counts them as seven, in fact their number increases with him, and it remains unknown what to do with this traditional number "seven".
At first he really speaks of the seven wise men: Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilo, Byant, Pittacus. However, he immediately adds that these seven wise men also included Anacharsis of Scythia, Mison of Heneia, Pherekides of Syria, Epimenides of Crete, and even the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus. However, this is not enough. So, according to Diogenes, Dicaearchus reports that there are no disagreements about only four wise men: Thales, Biant, Pittacus, Solon. Concerning the other three, there are, according to Diogenes, the most diverse opinions. Dicaearchus names here Aristodemus, Pamphilus, Chilo of Lacedaemon, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, Periander. Some, according to Diogenes, add Acusilaus of Argos; as for Hermippus, he lists as many as 17 names, of which "different people choose seven in different ways." Hippobotes lists 12 wise men, including Pythagoras. Thus, since Diogenes Laertius does not express his opinion about the seven primordial sages, it is necessary to think that he himself did not have such a firm idea of who, in fact, should be considered the seven most ancient sages. If we turn to the content of the information that Diogenes Laertius reports about the seven sages indicated by him at the beginning, then this content is either overflowing with astronomical and meteorological information, or contains the shortest, completely random and not motivated in any way. philosophical teachings, and not even teachings, but rather only brief theses or sayings. For no apparent reason, among the natural science information about Thales, the phrase that the soul is “immortal” suddenly flashes by.
However, it is extremely doubtful that Thales already had a doctrine about the soul, and even about the immortal. The statement of Diogenes Laertius sounds just as strange, and, moreover, again random, among the many natural-scientific materials about Thales, that "he considered water to be the beginning of everything, and considered the world to be animated and full of deities." That the world turned out to be animated and full of deities in Thales, there is nothing philosophical in this, but this is typical and primordial mythological representation. But what does water have to do with it, and why is it a “beginning”, and how to understand this water, and, moreover, how to understand its “beginning”, - Diogenes Laertius does not say a word about this in the presentation of Thales. This "unexpected" Thalesian water surprises every historian of philosophy who reads the treatise. Probably, if Thales taught about water, then he still had some kind of, albeit naive, argument for this. But again, Diogenes does not say a word about any such argumentation. Of more interest are the individual sayings of Thales listed by Diogenes Laertius. One such saying says that "the most ancient of all things is God: for he was not created." Everyone knows that the uncreatedness of God is not a pagan idea, but a Christian one; and Diogenes Laertius, who wrote in the 3rd century, of course, could not have been unaware of this. In this case, the opposition between the creator and the creature is clearly formulated by Diogenes Laertius quite uncritically. Further, "the most beautiful of all is the world: for it is the creation of God." This is an even more uncritical Christianization of ancient paganism. The remaining sayings of Thales, cited by Diogenes Laertius, have either a moral sense, and not a philosophical one, or are based on a logical error idem per idem, or beat wit. It makes one wonder what Thales in Diogenes teaches about the need for self-knowledge. Such a concept blurs the difference between pre-Socratic philosophy and Socrates. This is not only doubtful in itself, but also contradicts the words of Diogenes, who divides ancient philosophy into physics, ethics and dialectics, and again Socrates is placed at the head of ethics. Other sages of the seven that Diogenes first cites are depicted either with the help of various kinds of everyday pictures, or exercising in unchanging wit, or are generally presented very confusedly. The sage Mison is depicted either as a really sage, or as an ordinary misanthrope. Pherecydes was suddenly declared a listener of Pittacus, contrary to the chronology known to everyone here. But at the same time, he is declared the teacher of Pythagoras, which is also a chronological confusion. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Diogenes uncritically cites the opinion about the existence of different Pherekids.
It is absolutely impossible to make sense of the ten "ethical" schools that Diogenes gives along with his main division, which is already rather confusing. He begins by pointing to the academic school, of which Plato is rightly called the founder. But did Plato and the Ancient Academy deal with only one ethics? After all, they dealt with absolutely all philosophical disciplines, as did Aristotle with all his successors, the Peripatetics. And Diogenes himself, in the biography of Plato's successor Speusippus, tells all sorts of trifles, but does not say a word about his philosophy. As for his behavior, then, judging by this presentation of Diogenes, Speusippus was a rather immoral person. Xenocrates, the deputy of Speusippus, who possessed great independence and incorruptibility, Plato called "donkey" during his lifetime. And with the first hetero that broke into his house, Xenocrates immediately shared the bed, although she, leaving him, said that she was dealing not with a man, but with an idol. Thus, among the "academic" ethics there were not only people with any ethical or philosophical convictions in general, but in their behavior they were quite far from high morality.
The Cyrenian school of Aristippus, mentioned further in Diogenes, since the latter taught about pleasure as a basic moral principle, as well as the cynic school (Antisthenes), can perhaps still be called "ethical" schools. But nothing ethical, if by this we understand the basic principle of the school, can be found either in the Elisian, or in the Megarian, or in the Eretrian schools. Finally, moralism among the Stoics and Epicureans is indeed very vividly represented. But how many other teachings they have besides morality! Why are Stoicism and Epicureanism suddenly called by Diogenes only ethical schools? Thus, the enumeration of ten ethical schools by Diogenes is based on a complete confusion of historical and philosophical concepts. And besides, it is not yet known how this division of the ten ethical schools can be combined with the exposition of a number of other schools, like the Eleatic one, which are presented by Diogenes completely separately or, in their place, are not called ethical at all. Neither in the special exposition of the philosophy of Xenophanes of Colophon, nor in the same exposition of Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Melissa, exactly one ethical idea is contained. What, then, does Diogenes understand by the ethics of the Eleatic school, whose representatives are listed by him? To all this it must be added that, speaking of Pyrrho, Diogenes generally hesitates whether he had any school or not. And he himself calls Potamon of Alexandria an eclecticist, citing his really contradictory opinions of various kinds, and refuses to admit what trend this Potamon was a representative of. Diogenes also has a division of philosophers "into dogmatists and skeptics." Diogenes claims that dogmatists reason about those objects which they consider to be knowable, while skeptics are those who refrain from judgment, considering objects to be unknowable. However, if, according to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho did not have a school, then one must conclude that all Greek skepticism must be associated only with the Academy.
Thus, the beginning of Greek philosophy, as well as its division into separate schools, seems to Diogenes Laertius so vague that we can use only a few small messages from it; but no complete idea of all this according to Diogenes Laertius can be obtained in any way.
3. Philosophers and their schools
Heraclitus, Democritus and Cyrenaica
There are very few philosophers and schools considered by Diogenes Laertius, since most of the information he reports is random. You will not have time to focus on one, as it is already told about the other. This other is just as fleetingly followed by a third, a fourth, and so on. This is quite the opposite of the systematic method of presentation in our present understanding of it. Nevertheless, the habit of looking at everything cursorily leaves its very distinct stamp on all examples of this systematic analysis in Diogenes. In the entire treatise, for some reason, the Cyrenaics are subjected to such a systematic review for the first time, as if there were no philosophers of much greater significance before them. At the same time, it is not Aristippus himself, the founder of the Cyrenian school, who is analyzed, but only his followers.
Heraclitus. However, before talking about the Cyrenaics, we involuntarily feel curiosity about what Diogenes Laertius tells us about such major figures of ancient natural philosophy as Heraclitus and Democritus. Surprisingly, it is precisely these two colossal figures of the entire ancient world that are presented least of all systematically and least of all in detail. From our present point of view, the exposition of any individual element and its transformation into other elements is generally a feature of the entire pre-Socratic natural philosophy, so here, in fact, Diogenes does not report anything original about Heraclitus, especially since there were many other philosophers, also taught about the primacy of fire. Among the many different kinds of astronomical, meteorological, and in general physical judgments of Heraclitus, here and there flash through Diogenes and, as it were, some kind of philosophical theses. Thus, it is mentioned, and, moreover, extremely briefly, about the significance of the idea of opposition for the philosophy of Heraclitus. It only says: "Everything arises from opposites and with its wholeness flows like a river." Here it is not entirely clear why war and discord are necessary, and why universal agreement is achieved only during a period of world fire. The famous Heraclitean "way up" and "way down" is depicted in Diogenes extremely naively and does not go beyond the doctrine of evaporation. This meteorology, like the whole astronomy of Heraclitus, is expounded in Diogenes to the last degree naively and obscurely. Along with such information, and also, as if by accident and in a completely cursory form, an opinion is given about the soul, namely that it is impossible to find its limits, no matter what paths one takes, since such is its logos. How to understand the "logos" here, if everything is made of fire and vapors, it is impossible to imagine. That the Heraclitean logos is universal is not mentioned in Diogenes. And about the fact that Heraclitus still rises above the universal fluidity of a certain independent unity - about this, too, not a word. The question now is: what did we learn from Diogenes Laertius about such a famous philosopher as Heraclitus? It seems to us, now, that almost nothing. And the whole passage devoted to the teachings of Heraclitus is extremely insignificant even in size, although several times more space is allocated to all kinds of third-rate subjects associated with Heraclitus. Diogenes Laertius cannot say exactly whether Heraclitus wrote clearly or obscurely. In one place he says that it is clear, and in another that it is intentionally dark. Surely Diogenes Laertius never read Heraclitus himself, but knew about him only from third or tenth hands, and knew him poorly.
Democritus. The situation is even worse in Diogenes Laertius with Democritus, except for a large number of various kinds of secondary and completely non-philosophical information, and if we do not count the huge list of Democritus' works. As for the actual Democritanian natural philosophy, Diogenes quite correctly points to the doctrine of atoms and emptiness, of the world whirlwind of atoms, from which complex bodies and entire worlds are formed, and of the ethical doctrine of peace of mind and peace. It's all". But I have to say thank you for this, too, since Diogenes indicated this quite correctly. And the fact that Democritus had, in addition, an even more complex theory of the universe, man and gods, and many other (by the way, the most subtle) concepts - this remains with Diogenes Laertius completely without any attention, and it was hardly accessible to him. analysis. To top it off, Diogenes Laertius suddenly connects Democritus with Pythagoreanism. This is either an absurd assumption of Diogenes himself, or indeed some kind of historical truth, but Diogenes did not explain it in any way. It must be added, however, that the opinions cited by Diogenes about the Pythagoreanism of Democritus are contradictory, and therefore the opinion of Diogenes himself about this remains very uncertain.
Thus, about the two colossal figures of ancient natural philosophy - Heraclitus and Democritus - we will draw from Diogenes Laertius information only of a cursory and insignificant nature. After the ancient natural philosophers, we would naturally like to move on to Socrates. But Socrates in Diogenes is presented so scattered that it is impossible even to understand where the biography of Socrates is here, and where his views are. Let's move on to the Cyrenaics.
Cyrenaica. First of all, what is striking here, in this supposedly systematic analysis, is the extremely strong tendency towards simple description and the lack of interest in the logical sequence in the teaching of the school expounded. Pleasure and pain are declared by the Cyrenaics to be purely physical states. But this physicalism is violated at every step in Diogenes by other, deeper experiences, both of a mental and spiritual nature. Pleasure is defined as "light" and pain as "sharp" mental experience. What is “lightness” or “sharpness” is not difficult to understand, since these terms in the presentation of Diogenes do not go beyond the scope of ordinary conversations and quite everyday speech. But what does the “soul” have to do with it, and how can this “soul” be understood in general, according to the Cyrenai teaching, - Diogenes does not say a word about this. On the contrary, judging by the subsequent, however, very confused, exposition, the Cyrenaics especially followed this principle of pleasure. Physical pleasure is directly declared as an unconditional principle, which is so unconditional that it despises all morality in general. It is quite natural and given to man by nature. No natural philosophy and no wisdom is needed, which would not be reduced to ordinary and single physical pleasure. Even friends we love for profit, just as we care for the body and its parts only for our own benefit. Especially in such an assessment of moral goods, the supporters of Hegesias, also a Cyrenaic, as well as supporters of Theodore, a student of the Cyrenaic Annikerides, became famous. This Theodore, in the most impudent form, and, moreover, in the form of supposedly syllogistic accuracy, preached love in the most naked form. The Cyrenaics distinguished between happiness as the totality of all pleasures and individual pleasures. And since happiness, according to the Cyrenaics, is impossible, it remains, therefore, to recognize only single acts of pleasure. Pleasure has the highest activity; here the Cyrenaics argue with Epicurus, who recognized pleasure only as the absence of pain. All pleasures are absolutely equal to one another, and in comparison with this universal human pleasure, such states as the feeling of justice or the sense of beauty and ugliness are completely relative, conditional and optional. And here again the Feodorovites went further than others. It would seem that the question is clear. Enjoy and don't care about anything else. However, surprisingly, and at the same time, not noticing any contradiction with himself, Diogenes Laertius immediately, in a disorderly and random form, very significantly limits the general Cyrenai principle. It suddenly turns out that often pleasures give rise to “anxiety that is opposite to them”, that pleasure comes not only from sight and hearing, but also as a result of love for the motherland, that the Cyrenaic Annikerides “although allowed in life friendship, and gratitude, and reverence for parents, and service to the community." Like Aristotle, the Cyrenaics recognized the pleasure that we derive from funeral lamentation, although real lamentation is completely unpleasant for us. After all, aesthetic pleasure is already clearly preached here, in no way reducible to direct and blind life sensations. And the similarity of all Cyrenaic pleasures also contradicts the statement of Diogenes that the Cyrenaic pleasures of the body are much higher than those of the soul. Now let us ask ourselves: how, after all, does Diogenes Laertius understand the Cyrenai pleasure principle? Can this pleasure be considered only physical, or are there other pleasures: moral, aesthetic, patriotic? And what is the Kirenai sage? Is he absorbed only in his selfish pleasures, or are these pleasures not always selfish, not always crudely practical, and not always antisocial? There is no way to answer all these questions based on the materials of Diogenes Laertius. True, it is not excluded that such striking contradictions in the Cyrenaic theory of pleasure belong not only to Diogenes Laertius, but also to the Cyrenaics themselves. This is, of course, quite possible. But then it is still necessary to admit that Diogenes Laertius did not find these contradictions among the Cyrenaians, that he set them out very descriptively, and not critically, and that, in fact, he does not give any analysis of the basic Cyrenaic principle. Obviously, it is up to the readers of Diogenes Laertius to establish whether the Cyrenaians are entangled in logical contradictions, or whether these logical contradictions are only the result of the lack of historical criticism in Diogenes Laertius.
If we are accustomed, on the basis of the previous presentation, to find in Diogenes Laertius predominantly only disorderly chaos, poorly or completely unrelated messages, we will probably be pleasantly surprised that in relation to Plato, Diogenes Laertius is not at all so chaotic, he really tries to outline philosophical system of Plato and even plunges into very valuable terminological differences, usually completely absent in Diogenes in relation to the philosophers discussed above.
Historical and philosophical place of Plato. It is true that even in this book III, dedicated to Plato, far from everything has been thought out, far from everything is given in a consistent logical order, and quite a lot remains unclear. Nevertheless, the method of systematization is brought here to a very high level, so that it is certainly easier to understand Diogenes Laertius here, and to present him, to analyze him. First of all, the historical and philosophical place of Plato is established, and it is established quite correctly. Namely, Diogenes claims that in Greek philosophy the physical method initially dominated - and this was before Socrates - then the ethical, led by Socrates, and, finally, the dialectical, led by Plato, emphasizing Plato's priority both in dialectics in general and , in particular, and in the method of reasoning with the help of questions and answers. True, in this division of ancient Greek philosophy into three stages, as we now think, not everything is so clear and precise. Heraclitus, for example, was a principled dialectician, although he acted before Socrates. Socrates was by no means only a moralist, but also the creator of the theory of searching for and defining general concepts instead of being limited to only single observations. Plato was not only a dialectician; and what Diogenes Laertius later expounds on Plato is in no way connected with Plato's dialectic, and the reader of Diogenes from these numerous and very valuable messages of the treatise has to recreate Plato's dialectical constructions himself. Nevertheless, this threefold division of ancient Greek philosophy is, generally speaking, very valuable, although it requires clarifications that Diogenes lacks.
Dialectical method. The fact that, according to Diogenes, the dialectical method was indeed very important for Plato, is already clear from the fact that Diogenes' entire exposition of Platonic philosophy begins precisely with dialectics and even with attempts to give it a precise definition, and this, as we saw above, Far from being in the spirit of Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes defines Plato's dialectic as "the art of reasoning, which serves to confirm or refute in the questions and answers of the interlocutors." In this regard, Plato's dialogue is also defined as "a speech consisting of questions and answers about a philosophical or state subject, observing the fidelity of the derived characters and the choice of words." We read about the connection between dialectics and speech below. Anyone who has studied Plato will say that such a definition of dialectic is too narrow for Plato. Here the speech construction of reasoning in the form of questions and answers is correctly emphasized, but the ontological significance of dialectics for Plato is not brought to the fore. But in his division of sciences, Plato puts dialectics above all sciences, including arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music (by music, Plato understands in this case the cosmological structure). However, even for such a narrow definition of the Platonic dialectic one has to highly appreciate the judgment of Diogenes, since for many even such a narrow dialectic does not seem particularly significant. In any case, this or that definition of dialectics plays an important role, if only as an introduction to the analysis of Platonic philosophy.
Description of Plato's dialogues. Another - and also very important from the point of view of the system of Platonism - introduction is Diogenes' analysis of the general content of Plato's dialogues according to the types of reasoning contained in them, as well as the corresponding designation of all dialogues belonging to Plato, according to the proposed general division. Information is given that Plato himself published his dialogues on tetralogy, in the manner of Greek tragedies, which in the early period were also composed of three tragedies dedicated to the same plot, with the addition of the so-called satyr drama. We immediately learn that Thrasilus also divided Plato's dialogues into tetralogy, while the well-known grammarian Aristophanes of Byzantium - into trilogy. Diogenes Laertius shows here even criticism that is not at all characteristic of him when he gives a list of inauthentic dialogues of Plato and when he declares various interpretations of dialogues legitimate and necessary. Apparently, Diogenes Laertius personally studied the manuscripts of Plato, because he lists the various proofreading marks that remained in these manuscripts after their numerous editors and publishers. Of course, in our small study there is no way to critically evaluate the interpretation of individual dialogues of Plato by Diogenes Laertius and raise the question of the correctness or incorrectness of the problems he raised about the authenticity of the dialogues. Let's just say that all these judgments of Diogenes Laertius are undoubtedly valuable in the hands of a fairly experienced historian of ancient philosophy. But the impossibility of taking all the judgments of Diogenes Laertius seriously follows, for example, from the mere fact that, in his opinion, the "State" of Plato "is almost entirely contained in the" Contradictions "of Protagoras." True, Diogenes Laertius refers to Favorinus. Since, however, he himself here does not in the least object to Favorin, it must be admitted that he himself had the same opinion. But it would be sheer absurdity to reduce the objective idealism of Plato to the subjective-sophistical declamations of Protagoras. Probably, Diogenes Laertius (or Favorinus) was embarrassed by the fact that in the first book of the "State" we are talking about the origin of human society and the principle of need in the evolution of the state and human life. But this is only the beginning of a huge dialogue of Plato. And in this dialogue there are so many anti-sophistical statements, II above all the doctrine of ideas and the primordial one, that there can be no talk of any significant connections between the “State” and Protagoras, even if individual historical facts in Plato were distinguished by one or another proximity to Protagoras. As for, finally, those dialogues of Plato, which seem to Diogenes unconditionally genuine, then on our part, of course, it would not be very smart to demand from a writer of the 3rd century. those most precise philological studies that we have in science over the past century and a half. There are many contentious issues here that continue to this day.
Method of "induction". Turning to the presentation of the essence of the Platonic teaching, Diogenes Laertius asks, first of all, the question of the philosophical method in Plato. This method he strangely calls induction. First of all, by induction, Diogenes Laertius means what we would most likely call deduction, since for him induction is "reasoning that properly deduces from some truths a new similar truth." This question is further confused because Diogenes first sets forth one type of induction, namely, by contrast, and illustrates this type with obvious sophisms. The question is not resolved, but only becomes still more obscure, when Diogenes ascribes to Plato yet another kind of induction, namely, induction on "consequence" (acoloythia) with two subspecies: from the particular to the particular and from the general to the particular. Diogenes calls the first subspecies "rhetorical", and the second - "dialectical". All this is exceedingly obscure: dialectics is confused here with induction, and with deduction, and even with the theory of sophistical refutations. If desired, all such conclusions, of course, can be found in Plato, and in all other ancient philosophers. But was this the theory of Plato himself? At least, in the definition of dialectics that Diogenes gave for Plato at the very beginning of his exposition, there is not a single word, neither about sophistry, nor about the transition from the particular to the particular, nor about the transition from the general to the particular. In concluding this section on method, it is necessary to recall what Diogenes said above, by way of slovenliness. Namely, he raised the question of whether Plato was a "dogmatist" or not. On this, according to Diogenes, there are different opinions. He himself. seems to adhere to the first view, that is, that Plato was engaged not only in refutation, but also in positive statements. According to Diogenes, one must distinguish between the object of an opinion and the opinion itself. The first requires a special objectifying act (protasis), that is, the assumption of an objectively present object, while the second requires its own concept (hypolepsis) of the object being affirmed. Apparently, according to Diogenes Laertius, Plato both asserted the existence of real objects and expressed his concepts about them. This was probably said by Diogenes Laertius in order to supplement his overly rhetorical definition of Platonic dialectics and to put forward an ontological element in it as well. If so, then it would be convenient to add such an argument of Diogenes Laertius to his muddled argument about Platonic "induction". Such is the philosophical method of Plato as expounded by Diogenes. It is not distinguished by clarity, and its constituent phrases should have been written in a completely different order, without leaving these difficult theses without a concluding summary.
general cosmological system. From Plato's method, let us now move on to the systematic content of his philosophy, as presented by Diogenes. The Platonic system is expounded in Diogenes in only one of the possible ways, but it would be absolutely impossible to demand from Diogenes all the various ways. Diogenes proceeds from one Platonic concept, which in fact is central for Plato and which Diogenes presents to us mainly according to Plato's Timaeus. Quite rightly (if we stand on the point of view of the Diogenesian presentation of Plato's philosophy), the speech begins here with the doctrine of the immortal soul, its numerical nature and the geometrism of the body. It is correct to speak of the self-movement of the soul, and correctly Diogenes immediately proceeds to the doctrine of the cosmic soul, of the circles of identity and difference, and connects with this the Platonic doctrine of the difference between knowledge and opinion. It speaks quite clearly about the relationship between God and the world according to Plato, as well as about the two world-forming principles, ideas-reasons and formless, idealess matter. Here we read about time and eternity. Diogenes does not forget to mention the universal animation according to Plato, and the primary living being, by imitation of which the whole living world is created. This general system of Plato ends with the doctrine of active wisdom up to legislation and demonology. Already from the proposed summary of Diogenes' thoughts on the Platonic system, it is clear that Diogenes, having chosen one of the possible methods of analysis, gave a rather harmonious picture, though limiting himself only to Plato's Timaeus. But after all, Plato's Timaeus is, in fact, the only systematic essay on Plato's worldview as a whole. We have enough objections to individual points. In Diogenes, things are not without contradictions and without repetitions (as, for example, about the three abilities of the soul in. Diogenes Laertius even reaches the realization of the mythological side of Plato's philosophy. But, as always, he touches on this colossal subject too fluently, without understanding the logical side of the issue and motivating the entire Platonic philosophy solely by the moral intentions of the philosopher to protect a person from possible punishment after death.
Classification and terminological observations in Diogenes over Plato. However, having received a certain kind of satisfactory impression of the holistic way of presenting the Platonic system in Diogenes, we will no longer find fault with individual trifles here. In contrast to this, the presentation of the detailed moments of the Platonic system again suffers from Diogenes and inconsistency, and repetition, and the frequent appearance of terms that are not very accurately presented. This detailed content of Plato's philosophy is given, generally speaking, in a very original way. We would call this way of presenting the content classification-terminological. Here various terms are taken, characteristic, according to Diogenes, for Plato, and various meanings are listed, which are allegedly contained in various texts of Plato. It turns out the following, now detailed content of Plato's philosophy. Diogenes Laertius speaks of:
three kinds of good
about three types of human community,
about the five types of state power,
about the three kinds of righteousness,
about the three kinds of science,
about the five types of healing,
about two types of law,
about the five types of speech,
about three kinds of music,
about the four kinds of nobility,
about three kinds of beauty,
about the three powers of the soul,
about the four kinds of perfect virtue,
about the five types of power,
about the six types of eloquence,
about the four types of correctness of speech,
four types of services
about the four types of the end of the case,
about the four kinds of possibilities,
about the three types of courtesy,
about the five types of happiness,
about three types of crafts,
about the four kinds of good,
about the three types of existence,
about the three causes of order in the state,
about three kinds of opposites,
about the three kinds of goods,
about three types of advice,
about two kinds of sounds and about their further subdivision,
about different kinds of things.
No one will say that the classificatory-terminological method used here by Diogenes Laertius has no meaning or is weakly connected with the system of Platonism. On the contrary, our modern philological science considers terminology and, in general, historical-semasiological research to be one of its most important problems. In this sense, the indicated method of Diogenes Laertius is very close to us, very valuable and requires from us the most careful study, and, if possible, even use. Unfortunately, the chaotic and inconsistent presentation common to the entire treatise, as well as the ambiguity and terminological confusion, continue to be evident here and therefore require the most careful analysis from us. First of all, one can notice the complete inconsistency in the promotion of different terms and the complete confusion of their arrangement. It would seem that if Diogenes Laertius seriously intended to present Platonism in his system, then he would have to observe this system, either starting with the most general terms and ending with partial ones, or starting with these partial and singular terms and ending with the most general ones, or using some some other principle of division of concepts, but still consistent and logically clear. Nevertheless, in Diogenes Laertius, absolutely everything that is characteristic, and sometimes even uncharacteristic of Plato, is dumped here in one common heap. Here the semantics of such general categories for Plato as "good", "beauty", " state structure", and categories that characterize the subjective-psychological area. But there are also such terms of little importance for Plato as "courtesy", questions of human communication, some kind of "advice" and even human "speech", and not only in general view, but also the “sounds” that make it up. Where it is said about indivisibility or divisibility, about homogeneity or heterogeneity of the divisible, about independence or relativity, this term has a general philosophical meaning, and it is good to translate it as “existing”. However, in another place, where it is said about good, bad and indifferent and this is illustrated by everyday examples, the general term can no longer be translated as "existing", but rather "existing".
The situation is logically unfavorable with the terms "beautiful" and "beauty". Even before this terminological list, Diogenes Laertius, for no apparent reason, had already started talking about the beautiful in Plato. Moreover, what he said here about the beautiful is indeed very significant and interesting. That the beautiful in Plato has shades of laudable, reasonable, useful, appropriate, consonant, this is not only correctly said, but even with a kind of philological insight. It is only a pity that Diogenes Laertius did not extend beyond the enumeration of these shades of beauty in Plato. And the philosopher has extremely many shades of these. But thank you for this listing. In the latter case, it is only necessary to add that justice in the "State" does not stand on the same plane with other virtues, but is their general harmony. The aesthetics of Plato also did not go unnoticed by Diogenes in his terminological list. Music, for example, is of three kinds: generated by the lips (singing), generated by the lips and hands (singing with accompaniment), and created only by the hands (cytharist). A more formalistic and more superficial division of types of music is hard to imagine. As for speech and eloquence, the term “speech” is given, although without observing the unity of the principle of division, but nevertheless for Plato to some extent objectively, since it speaks of five types of speech: political, rhetorical, colloquial, dialectical and technical. The varieties of correct speech, and even eloquence itself, are listed in the same logically inconsistent way. The division of the three kinds of crafts is also distinguished by a similar character. But in this list, which we are now analyzing, there are also such terms that already have no specific relation to Plato at all, but are applicable in general to any Greek writer. These are the terms: “services”, “end of business”, “opportunities”, “compliance”, “happiness”, “advice”, “human communication”, “righteousness”, “healing”, “nobility”. A critical study of all this Platonic terminology in Diogenes reveals with full clarity both the positive side of this list and the negative side. Positive is, as we said above, the very attempt to study individual terms and reveal the semantics of each of them. There is also no doubt that Diogenes Laertius was guided here by the desire not only to give the terminology of Plato, but also to present it in the form of a kind of logical classification. However, negative sides This attempt by Diogenes is also very numerous, and at every step they are directly striking. The whole logical side of Plato's idealism remains almost untouched. The socio-political terminology of Plato is presented more or less in detail. But all other terms are given in the form of a confused and inconsistent conglomerate: and there are many such terms that are not specifically related to Plato's philosophy. Even such a term as "happiness". presented by no means in the Platonic, but rather in some naive and ordinary sense. It is especially noticeable that Diogenes Laertius completely passed over the entire logical, dialectical and proper-ontological aspects of Platonism. Needless to say, none of the terms given here is supported by any reference to Plato's text. For all that, it must be noted that Diogenes Laertius undoubtedly has a critical tendency to understand Platonic terms. He directly says that Plato "uses the same words in different meanings." For example, Plato understood "wisdom" as intelligible knowledge, peculiar only to "God and the soul separated from the body." But by "wisdom," says Diogenes, Plato also understood philosophy, since "it instills a desire for divine wisdom." But "wisdom" in Plato - and in general any empirical knowledge or skill, as, for example, in an artisan. "Simple" in Plato, according to Diogenes, is more often "simple", but sometimes "bad" or "petty". Plato, according to Diogenes Laertius, is also characterized by another way of using terms, that is, "he uses different words to denote the same thing." But here the most surprising thing is that Diogenes, as a cursory example, cites something that, for Plato, is not at all cursory, but of the most significant and fundamental significance. "Idea" he calls both "image", and "kind", and "sample", and "beginning", and "cause". The fact that the term "idea" and its synonyms are given by Diogenes only as a cursory example, instead of which one could indicate dozens of other examples that are completely insignificant for Plato, indicates that Diogenes still did not attach any essential value. Plato, according to Diogenes, also uses opposite expressions for the definition of "sensible", which he calls "existent" and "non-existent". Thus, those judgments and classifications that we find in the list of Platonic terms in Diogenes are not always the result of only his careless and inconsistent attitude towards logic. It can be seen that even Diogenes himself came across terminological contradictions in Plato and in some places even knew how to recognize them quite clearly.
Four positive results of the analysis of Plato's philosophy. In general, however, the exposition of Plato's philosophy by Diogenes Laertius is undoubtedly an attempt to give its systematic outline. Let this presentation be naive and confused, but the following four points in it justice compels us to note as essential and necessary. An introduction to Plato's philosophy: defining the dialectic by its form and content, considering Plato's dialogues with an attempt to determine the main tendency of each of them and classify them. The formal structure of Plato's philosophy is "induction" with its many subdivisions. The main content of Plato's philosophy is the doctrine of the cosmic soul, of the emergence of the cosmos from it, of God and matter, mainly according to Plato's Timaeus. An overview of Plato's terminology, detailing the semantics of each term. In this form, one could present the methods of Diogenes Laertius, applied by him to the philosophical system of Plato. In addition to Plato, Diogenes Laertius also makes attempts to give a systematic analysis in relation to Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicureans and skeptics. Let us dwell on the analysis of Diogenes Laertius' exposition of Aristotle's system.
Aristotle
Breadth of view on Aristotle. Aristotle is stated by Diogenes Laertius too concisely and briefly, in some places unintelligible. However, the undoubted merits of Diogenes Laertius include the fact that in Aristotle he found not only the theory of truth, but also the theory of probability, and he placed both of these problems on the same plane, without subordinating one to the other. Diogenes finds it necessary to mention even the Topic, which seems to be no less important to him than the Metaphysics. Diogenes Laertius also correctly noted that in Aristotle the contemplative life is preferable to other forms of life, active and delightful. Diogenes also did not pass by that variegation and that diversity of life that Aristotle contemplates and causes deep satisfaction in Aristotle, although this is not so easily combined with the primacy of contemplation.
Inaccuracy of individual statements. The remaining phrases with which Diogenes Laertius characterizes Aristotle are not very precise and too brief. In the Aristotelian god, for example, Diogenes Laertius finds only incorporeality, immobility and providence. Here, apparently, Diogenes has in mind Aristotle's teaching about the cosmic mind, but then the signs indicated for him are extremely one-sided, remain unexplained and do not reflect Aristotle's view, at least in some form adequately. Ether as the fifth element is indicated by Diogenes correctly, but why Aristotle attributes circular motion to the ether - nothing is said about this. For some reason, Diogenes pays special attention to the development of physics in Aristotle. This, of course, is not true, since Aristotle set forth metaphysics, ethics, logic and biology in much more detail than purely physical teaching. Diogenes Laertius even reached such a difficult category in Aristotle as entelechy. However, to the characterization of entelechy, he only says that it is characteristic of the "incorporeal eidos". But in the Aristotelian entelechy, as is known, there is much more besides the "incorporeal eidos". Diogenes does not say anything about this. Thus, the presentation of the teachings of Aristotle by Diogenes concerns something that is characteristic of Aristotle, but Diogenes Laertius did not imagine the very essence of Aristotelianism.
Diogenes Laerian Greek Philosophy
4. Conclusion
We got acquainted with the presentation of the history of Greek philosophy of the preclassical and classical periods by Diogenes Laertius, which made us stop at Aristotle. One could also talk about the attitude of Diogenes to the Stoics, skeptics and Epicureans. However, we consider it appropriate to speak of this in the appropriate places in the commentary to the entire treatise. Now, after considering Aristotle, let's make a general conclusion. Our previous presentation, it seems to us, proved several very important theses. The first thesis boils down to the fact that the method of Diogenes Laertius is very far from both a strict system and strict historicism. The analysis of the history of Greek philosophy, which he offers us, is notable for its considerable carelessness, is not afraid of any contradictions, and pursues common life and general cultural moments of philosophical development rather than purely philosophical moments. Secondly, as we said at the very beginning, Diogenes Laertius is least of all an amateur, and the most lofty contemporary philologist cannot call him an ignoramus. Diogenes constantly refers to sources, to authorities, to various other people's opinions, which, at least from his point of view, deserve full recognition. For all the chaotic carelessness of this treatise, in any case it is a scientific work and is downright striking in its constant desire to rely on authoritative opinions and unconditionally reliable facts. Such, at least, is the subjective orientation of Diogenes Laertius, and it would be very arrogant and imprudent on our part to treat it with disdain. This man certainly valued facts. But a certain kind of light-heartedness and a free descriptive approach to these facts undoubtedly prevent Diogenes Laertius from writing a critical history of Greek philosophy. And indeed, was such historical-philosophical research possible at that time, which we now consider scientific and critical? There is no need to demand the impossible from ancient people. Thirdly, and finally, it cannot be said at all that Diogenes Laertius hits the target exactly nowhere. He understands many things, formulates many things correctly, and many of his historical and philosophical observations are certainly instructive. Many of the ancient Greek philosophical texts cited by him are now included in modern summaries of texts and occupy an honorable place in them. The scientific significance of Diogenes is quite undoubted, but one must be able to understand it in the totality of all his uncritical and often overly carefree methodology. In general, the value of the treatise of Diogenes Laertius lies not at all in the historical-philosophical analysis. His treatise is a most curious and interesting ancient mixture of everything important and unimportant, primary and secondary, everything serious and funny. In any case, the modern reader of Diogenes Laertius, after reading his treatise, will undoubtedly plunge into the boundless sea of ancient thought and for some time "breathe the air" of a genuine ancient civilization. And to demand anything more from even the most serious ancient treatise would be both anti-scientific and anti-historical.
5. References
1. Diogenes Laertius. About the life, teachings and sayings of famous philosophers. M., 1979.
A.F. Losev. Diogenes Laertius - historian of ancient philosophy. M., 1981.
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Further, he wrote in letters to Leontiya: "Vladyka Apollo! What noise we were full of, dear Leontiya, reading your letter!" And to Themista, Leontey's wife: "If you never get out to me, really, I myself am ready to roll a ball, wherever you, Themista and Leontey, call me." And to Pythokles, the blooming boy: "Well, I will sit and wait for your arrival, desired and divine!" And also to Themis - about what instructions were between them (as Theodore writes in the IV book of "Against Epicurus"). And he wrote letters to other getters, but most of all - to Leontia, with whom Metrodorus was also in love. And in the essay "On the Ultimate Goal" he writes as follows: "I do not know what to think good, if not the pleasure of eating, from love, from what you hear, and from the beauty that you see." And in a letter to Pythocles: "From all upbringing, my joy, save yourself at full sail!"
Epictetus calls him a lecher and scolds him with his last words. Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who himself studied with Epicurus, but then left him, says in a book entitled "Recreations" that Epicurus vomited twice a day from overfeeding and that he himself barely managed to evade Epicurean philosophy of the night and from initiation into everything its mysteries; he also says that Epicurus was very ignorant in reasoning, and even more so in life, that his body was stunted and for many years he could not even get up from a stretcher, that he spent a mine a day on gluttony (as he himself writes in letters to Leontius and the Mytilenian philosophers) that other hetaerae - Mammaria, Gedea, Erotia, Nikidia - were confused with him and Metrodorus - and that in his 37 books "On Nature" he repeats a lot and endlessly recounts other philosophers, especially Nafsifana; here are his own words: "Well, them! indeed, from his lips, even in agony, sophistical swagger sounded, like many such lackeys." And here are the words in the letters of Epicurus himself about Navsifan: "He has reached such a frenzy that he reviles me and calls me a schoolboy-teacher!" He called this Navsifan a slug, an ignoramus, a rogue and a woman; disciples of Plato - Dionysian sycophants; Plato himself - a gold-plated sage; Aristotle - a spendthrift who drank his father's good and went to hire and fool people; Protagora as a wood-carrier, Democritus scribe and village literate; Heraclitus as a water mutant; Democritus - Void Crit; Antidora by Vertidore; cynics - the scourge of all Hellas; dialecticians - pests; Pyrrho - ignorant and ignorant.
But everyone who writes like that is just crazy. This man has enough witnesses of his incomparable goodwill to all: the fatherland, which honored him with copper statues, and so many friends that their number cannot be measured by whole cities, and all the students chained to his teaching like the songs of the Sirens (except only Metrodorus of Stratonikeia , who defected to Carneades almost because he was weary of the immeasurable kindness of his mentor), and the succession of his successors, eternally maintained in the continuous change of students, while almost all other schools have already died out, and his gratitude to his parents, and beneficence to the brothers, and meekness towards the slaves (which is visible both from his will and from the fact that they were engaged in philosophy with him, and the aforementioned Mies is most famous of all), and all his humanity in general towards anyone. His piety before the gods and his love for the fatherland are inexpressible. His modesty reached such an extreme that he did not even touch state affairs. And although his times were very difficult for Hellas, he lived in it all his life, only two or three times going to Ionia to visit friends. Friends themselves came to him from everywhere and lived with him in his garden (as Apollodorus also writes); this garden was bought for 80 minutes. And this life was modest and unpretentious, as Diocles declares in book III of the Review; "Mugs of weak wine were quite enough for them, but usually they drank water." At the same time, Epicurus did not believe that good should be owned together, according to the Pythagorean word, that friends have everything in common - this would mean distrust, and whoever does not trust is not a friend. - He himself writes in letters that water and simple bread are enough for him; "Send me a pot of cheese," he writes, "so that I can luxuriate whenever I feel like it." Such was the man who taught that the ultimate goal is pleasure! And Athenaeus in his poem sings of him like this: People, you work in vain in your insatiable self-interest,
Again and again starting quarrels, and scolding, and war.
A narrow limit is set for everything that is given by nature.
But the ways of human idle judgments are endless.
The sage Epicurus, son of Neocles, heard these speeches from the Muses,
Or their tripod was opened by the holy Pythian god.
Of the ancient philosophers, Anaxagoras was closest to him, although he did not agree with him in some ways (says Diocles), as well as Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates; According to Diocles, he forced his neighbors to memorize his compositions for exercise.
Apollodorus in the Chronology says that Epicurus was a student of Nausifan and Praxifan, but Epicurus himself (in a letter to Eurylochus) renounces this and calls himself self-taught. He likewise denies (as does Hermarchus) that there was a philosopher, Leucippus, whom others (and even the Epicurean Apollodorus) regard as the teacher of Democritus. And Demetrius of Magnesia says that he even listened to Xenocrates.
He called all objects by their proper names, which the grammarian Aristophanes considers a reprehensible feature of his style. His clarity was such that in his work "On Rhetoric" he does not consider it necessary to demand anything but clarity. And in his letters he does not address "I want to rejoice," but "I wish well-being" or "I wish you well."
Ariston in the "Biography of Epicurus" assures that he wrote off his "Canon" from the "Tripod" of Navsifan, especially since he was even a listener of this Navsifan, as well as the Platonist Pamphilus on Samos. And he began to study philosophy at the age of 12 and started school at the age of 32.
He was born (according to Apollodorus in the "Chronology") in the third year of the 109th Olympiad, under the archon Sosigene, on the seventh day of the month of gamelion, seven years after the death of Plato. At the age of 32, he founded his school, first in Mytilene and Lampsacus, and five years later he moved with her to Athens. He died in the second year of the 127th Olympiad, under Archon Pifarat, at the age of seventy-two; the Mytilenian Hermarchus, the son of Agemort, took over the school from him. His death happened from a kidney stone, and he had been ill for fourteen days before (this same Hermarch says in his letters). Hermippus says that he lay down in a copper bath with hot water, asked for undiluted wine, drank it, wished his friends not to forget his teachings, and so died. Our verses about him are as follows: Be happy, friends, and remember our teachings! -
So, dying, Epicurus said to his dear friends,
He lay down in the hot pool and got drunk with pure wine,
And through this he entered the eternally cold Hades.
That's what life was like, and that's what death was like for this man.
He left this will:
“I leave all my property to Aminomachus, the son of Philocrates, from Bata, and Timocrates, the son of Demetrius, from Potam, according to the donation recorded in the Metroon in the name of both, and with the condition that they provide the garden and everything belonging to it to Germarchus son of Agemort, a Mytilenian, with fellow students of philosophy, and then to those whom Hermarchus leaves as successors in philosophy, so that they spend their time there as befits philosophers. heirs in arranging the garden and living in it, so that those heirs will tend the garden in the surest way on an equal footing with those to whom our successors in philosophy entrust this. Hermarch is alive.
And from the income that we bequeathed to Aminomachus and Timocrates, let them, with the knowledge of Hermarchus, devote a part to sacrifices for my father, mother, and brothers, and for myself at the usual celebration of my birthday every year on the 10th day of the gamelion and on then, on the 20th day of each month, schoolmates should gather in the prescribed manner in memory of me and Metrodorus. Let them also celebrate the day of my brethren in the month of Posideon, and the day of Useful in the month of Metagythnion, as has been done hitherto with us.
And let Aminomachus and Timocrates take care of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and the son of Polienus, while they study philosophy and live under Hermarchus. In the same way, let them take care of the daughter of Metrodorus, if she is well-behaved and obedient to Hermarchus, and when she comes of age, then let her give her to whom Hermarchus will indicate among his comrades in philosophy, and let them appoint so many , how much they and Hermarch will honor for what they need. Let them put Hermarchus next to them as guardian of revenues, so that nothing can be done without the one who has grown old with me in philosophy and left behind me the leader of my comrades in philosophy. Even as a dowry for the girl, when she enters her age, Aminomachus and Timocrates will take from the presence as much as they deem necessary, with the knowledge of Hermarch. Let them take care of Nicanor, as we took care of him, so that none of our comrades in philosophy, rendering us services in business, showing all kinds of benevolence and growing old with me in philosophy, should not remain needy through my fault after that.
The books that we have should be given to Hermarch. But if something happens to Hermarchus before the children of Metrodores come of age, and if they are well-behaved, then let Aminomachus and Timocrates give out of the income left by us, as much as possible, so that they do not know the need for anything. And let them take care of everything else, as I have ordered, so that everything can be done that will be possible. Of my slaves, I release Misa, Nikias and Lycon, and of the slaves Phaedria.
And already dying, he writes the following letter to Idomeneo:
“I wrote this to you on my blessed and my last day. My pains from diarrhea and from urination are already so great that they can no longer become; but in everything they are opposed by my spiritual joy at the recollection of the conversations that were between us. how from an early age you treated me and philosophy, it is fitting for you to take care of Metrodor's children."
This was his last will.
He had many students, and the most famous of them are as follows:
Metrodorus of Lampsacus, son of Athenaeus (or Timocrates) and Sanda; recognizing Epicurus, he no longer parted with him and only once for six months went to his homeland and returned. He was good to everyone, as Epicurus himself testifies in his introductory notes and in Book III of Timocrates. He gave his sister Batis to Idomeneo, and took Leontia, an Attic hetaera, as his concubine. Before all sorts of worries and death itself, he was inflexible, as Epicurus says in the first book of Metrodorus. He died, they say, at the age of 53, seven years before Epicurus, who, in his above-mentioned will, himself clearly speaks of him as dead and takes care of the guardianship of his children. He had a brother Timocrates, a small man, whom we have already mentioned. The works of Metrodorus are as follows: "Against Doctors" - 3 books, "On the Feelings", "Against Timocrates", "On the Greatness of the Spirit", "On Epicurean Help", "Against the Dialectics", "Against the Sophists" - 9 books, "On the Road to wisdom", "On change", "On wealth", "Against Democritus", "On nobility".
Further, Hermarch of Mytilene, the successor of Epicurus, the son of a poor father, at first engaged in rhetoric. Such excellent books of his are known: "Letters on Empedocles" - 22 books, "On Knowledge", "Against Plato", "Against Aristotle". He died of paralysis, showing himself to be a capable man.
Further, Leontey Lampsaksky and his wife Themista to whom Epicurus wrote letters; Further, stab and Idomeneo, also from Lampsak, famous people; so is polystratus, successor of Hermarchus; and he was replaced Dionysius, and that - Basilid. Also known Apollodorus, nicknamed the Garden Tyrant, the writer of more than four hundred books, and two Ptolemaic Alexandrian, Black and White; and Zeno Sidonsky, the listener of Apollodorus, the great scribbler; and Demetrius nicknamed the Laconian; and Diogenes Tarssky, compiler of Selected Lessons, and Orion, and others whom the real Epicureans call sophists.
There were three other Epicurians: the first was the son of Leonteus and Themista, the second was from Magnesia, and the third was a teacher of sword fighting.
Epicurus was the most abundant writer and surpassed everyone in the multitude of his books: they make up about 300 scrolls. In them there is not a single extract from the outside, but everywhere the voice of Epicurus himself. Chrysippus competed with him in the abundance of what was written, but it’s not for nothing that Carneades calls him a freeloader of the Epicurean writings: on everything that was written by Epicurus, Chrysippus wrote exactly the same amount out of rivalry, and therefore he repeated himself often, and wrote whatever he wrote, and did not check what was written, and he has so many extracts from outside that they alone can fill entire books, as happens with Zeno and Aristotle. Here are how many and what are the writings of Epicurus, and the best of them are the following:
"On Nature" 37 books, "On Atoms and Emptiness", "On Love", "Short Objections to Physicists", "Against Megariks", "Doubts", "Main Thoughts", "On Preference and Avoidance", "On the Ultimate goals", "On the criteria, or Canon", "Heredem", "On the gods", "On goodness", "Hegesianakt", "On the way of life" 4 books, "On justice", "Neocle", to Themis, " Feast", "Eurilochus", to Metrodorus, "On Sight", "On Angles in Atoms", "On Touch", "On Destiny", "Opinions on Suffering", to Timocrates, "Foresight", "Encouragement", " On Appearances", "On Ideas", "Aristobulus", "On Music", "On Justice and Other Virtues", "On Gifts and Gratitude", "Polymedes", "Timocrates" - 3 books, "Metrodor" - 5 books , "Antidore" - 2 books, "Opinions on diseases", to Mitra, "Kallistol", "On royal power", "Anaksimen", "Letters".
I will try to present his opinions expressed in these books by citing three of his epistles, in which his whole philosophy is briefly surveyed; I will also add his "Main Thoughts" and what else seems worthy of selection, so that this man can be fully known and properly appreciated. The first epistle is written to Herodotus [and speaks of physics; the second - to Pythocles], about celestial phenomena; the third to Menekey, on the way of life. We will begin with the first, but first we will say briefly about the division of his philosophy.
His philosophy is divided into three parts: canonics, physics and ethics. The canonica is an approach to the subject and is contained in a book called "Canon". Physics is all speculation about nature and is contained in 37 books "On Nature", and in its main features - in letters. Ethics speaks of preference and avoidance; it is contained in the books "On the Way of Life", in letters and in the essay "On the Ultimate Goal". Usually, however, canonics is considered together with physics: canonics is the science of criteria and beginnings in their very foundations, and physics is the science of emergence and destruction and nature; ethics, on the other hand, is the science of what is preferred and avoided, about the way of life and the ultimate goal.
They reject dialectics as a superfluous science - in physics, they say, it is enough to use words corresponding to objects. So, in the "Canon" Epicurus says that the criteria of truth are sensations (aistheseis), anticipation (prolepseis) and suffering (pathe), and the Epicureans also add a figurative throw of thought (phantasticai epibolai tes dianoias). He says the same thing in the epistle to Herodotus, and in the Main Thoughts. Any sensation, he says, is unreasonable and independent of memory: neither by itself, nor from a third-party shock, can it add anything to itself, or subtract anything. It is also impossible to refute it: a kindred sensation cannot be refuted by kindred, because they are equivalent, and unkind - by unkind, because they do not judge the same thing; reason cannot refute sensations, because it itself relies entirely on sensations; and one sensation cannot refute another, because we trust each of them. The very existence of perceptions serves as confirmation of the truth of feelings. After all, we actually see, hear, experience pain; from here, starting from the obvious, one must also conclude about the meaning of what is not so clear. For all our thoughts arise from sensations by virtue of their coincidence, proportionality, similarity or comparison, and reason only contributes to this. The visions of madmen and sleepers are also true, because they set [the senses] in motion, and the non-existent is incapable of this.
They call anticipation something like a comprehension, or a correct opinion, or a concept, or a general thought embedded in us, that is, remembering what often appeared to us from outside, for example: "This is a man." In fact, as soon as we say "man", anticipation evokes in our thought its impression, the forerunner of which was sensations. In the same way, for any word, its primary underlying basis becomes clear; and we could not even begin the search if we did not know in advance what we are looking for. So, to ask: "Who is standing there at a distance, a horse or a cow?" - you need to know in advance, thanks to anticipation, the appearance of both. After all, we could not even name an object if, by virtue of anticipation, we did not know in advance its imprint. Therefore, anticipations have the power of evidence.
The object of opinion also proceeds from something primary-visible, and in our proposals we go back precisely to this basis, for example: "How do we know that this is a person?" The opinion itself, according to them, is also a conjecture, and it can be both true and false: if it is confirmed and not refuted by the evidence of sensations, then it is true, if it is not confirmed and refuted, then it is false. That is why the concept of "waiting" (prosmenon) is introduced; for example, to wait to get closer to the tower and find out what it is like up close.
Of suffering, they say, there are two pleasures and pains; they arise in every living being, and the first of them is close to us, and the second is alien; this determines what we prefer and what we avoid.
Research can be conducted either about objects or about pure words.
Such, in the form of a list, is his doctrine of division and criterion. Now let's move on to writing.
Epicurus sends greetings to Herodotus.
Those who cannot, Herodotus, carefully study everything that we have written about nature, and delve into our more extensive writings, for those I have already compiled an overview of the whole subject, sufficient to keep in memory at least the most important thing. I wanted it to help you in important cases whenever you have to take up the study of nature. Yes, and those who have already achieved success in considering the whole should remember the main features of the appearance of the whole object: the general movement of thought is often necessary for us, but the details are not so often. It is to these general features that we have to turn, constantly remembering as much as is necessary for the most general movement of thought about the subject, and for the utmost accuracy of details, that is, having well mastered and memorized the most basic features. In fact, the main sign of perfect and complete knowledge is the ability to quickly use the throws of thought [and this happens when everything] comes down to simple foundations and words. For whoever cannot grasp in short words everything that is studied in parts, he cannot know the thickness of everything covered. And so, since such a path is useful for all who have become accustomed to the study of nature, I, who have devoted my constant efforts to the study of nature and reached the world of life primarily thanks to it, have compiled for you the following review, which contains the foundations of the whole doctrine.
So, first of all, Herodotus, one should understand what is behind the words, so that all our opinions, searches, perplexities can be reduced to them for discussion, so that in endless explanations they do not remain undiscussed, and the words are not empty. In fact, if we only want to reduce our searches, perplexities, opinions to something, then we need to see in each word its first meaning, which does not need proof. And then we must hold on to sensations in everything, hold on to the current throws of thought or any other criterion, hold on to the sufferings we experience - and this will give us the means to judge what is waiting and unclear. And having already dealt with this, one should proceed to the consideration of the unclear.
First of all: nothing arises from the non-existent, otherwise everything would arise from everything, without needing any seeds. And if the disappearing were destroyed into the non-existent, everything would have perished long ago, for what comes from the destruction would not exist. What the Universe is now, such it has always been and will always be, because there is nothing for it to change into – for, apart from the Universe, there is nothing that could enter into it, making a change.
Further //he says this both at the beginning of the "Big Review", and in Book I "On Nature"//, the Universe is [bodies and emptiness] . That there are bodies, this everywhere confirms our sensation, on which, as said, our reasoning about the obscure must inevitably rely; and if there were not what we call emptiness, space, or intangible nature, then bodies would have no where to move and through which to move, while it is obvious that they move. Apart from bodies and emptiness, neither comprehension nor comparison with what is comprehended can conceive of any other independent nature, but only accidental or non-random properties of such.
Further //he repeats this both in I, XIV and XV books "On Nature", and in the "Great Review"//, some of the bodies are complex, and others are those of which complex ones are composed. These latter are atoms, indivisible and unchangeable. In fact, not everything that exists will have to collapse into non-existence: something else is so strong that it will withstand the decomposition of complexities due to its natural density and because it has nothing to decompose and it is impossible. Therefore, principles by their nature can only be corporeal and indivisible.
Further, the Universe is infinite. Indeed, what has a limit has an edge; and the edge is what you can look at from the side; therefore, the universe has no edge, and therefore has no limit. And what has no limit is infinite and unlimited.
The Universe is boundless both in the multitude of bodies and in the vastness of the void. Indeed, if the emptiness were infinite, and the multitude of bodies was limitless, then they would not stay in one place, but would rush scattered around the boundless emptiness, having neither restraint nor rebuff; and if the void were limiting, there would be nowhere for an infinite multitude of bodies to exist in it.
In addition, the atoms of bodies, indivisible and solid, from which everything complex is composed and into which everything complex is decomposed, are immensely diverse in appearance - for it cannot be that so many differences arose from a vast number of the same species. In each species, the number of such atoms is completely unlimited, but the number of different types is not completely unlimited, but only immense. //After all, he says below that internal division does not take place to infinity: he makes such a reservation so that they do not think that since the qualities of things are changeable, then atoms differ in size from perfect infinity.//
Atoms move continuously and forever / / and with equal speed, as he says below, - for in the void it is equally easy to move both for light and for heavy / /: some - at a distance from each other, and others - oscillating in place, if they accidentally will interlock or be embraced by linked atoms. This oscillation occurs because the nature of the void that separates the atoms is unable to resist them; and the hardness inherent in the atoms makes them rebound when they collide, as far as the cohesion of the atoms around the collision gives them space. There was no beginning for this, because both atoms and emptiness exist forever.
Further, in relation to infinity, the words "top" and "bottom" cannot be used in the meaning of "the highest" and "the lowest". However, we know that from where we stand, we can continue space up to infinity, and from any conceivable place down to infinity, and yet it will never seem to us both below and above the same place, because it is impossible to think. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine only one conceivable movement up to infinity, and only one - down to infinity, even if the movement from our heads upwards comes ten thousand times to the feet of those above, and the movement from us downwards to the heads of those below. In fact, the movement as a whole does not lose the opposites of its direction, even being thought in infinity.
Further, when the atoms rush through the void without encountering resistance, they must move at the same speed. Neither heavy atoms will move faster than small and light ones, if nothing stands in their way, nor small ones faster than large ones, if a commensurate passage is open to them everywhere and there is no resistance; this applies both to moving up or sideways from collisions, and to moving down from its own gravity. In fact, when a body has this or that movement, it will move quickly, like a thought, until the force of the push meets resistance either outside, or in the body's own gravity. True, it may be objected that although the atoms move with the same speed, however, complex bodies move some faster, others slower. But this is because the atoms collected in bodies tend to one place only during the smallest continuous intervals of time; but already in intelligible intervals of time this place will be different - atoms are constantly colliding, and from this, in the end, movement becomes accessible to feeling. And the conjectures will be wrong, that among invisible particles and in intelligible intervals of time continuous movement is possible: after all, only that which is accessible to observation or caught by a throw of thought is true.
Further, relying on our sensations and sufferings (for this is the surest support for judgments), it is necessary to see that the soul is a body of fine particles, scattered throughout our composition (athroisma); it is similar to the wind, to which heat is mixed, and in some ways it is more similar to the wind, and in some ways to heat; but there is also a [third] part in it, consisting of still finer particles and therefore interacting even more closely with the rest of the composition of our body. Evidence of all this is our spiritual abilities, patience, excitability, the movement of thought, and everything without which we perish. At the same time, it should be assumed that it is the soul that is the main cause of sensations; but she would not have them if she were not closed in the rest of the composition of our body. And this composition, having allowed the soul to become such a cause, acquires such a property from it, but not all the properties that it has. Therefore, having lost his soul, he also loses his senses, since the ability to feel was not in himself; he only delivered this ability to something else, born with him, and this latter, having developed this ability with the help of movement, immediately and in itself produced the property of sensitivity, and communicated to his body through its contiguity and interaction with him, as I I said. Therefore, as long as the soul is contained in the body, it does not lose sensitivity even with the loss of any member: with the destruction of its cover, complete or partial, the particles of the soul also perish, but as long as something remains of it, it will have sensations. The rest of our composition, remaining in whole or in part, after the removal of that arbitrarily small number of atoms, which constitutes the nature of the soul, will no longer have sensations. Finally, when our entire composition is destroyed, the soul dissipates and no longer has either the former forces or movements, and likewise sensations. For it is impossible to imagine that it retained sensations otherwise than in its present warehouse, and that it retained present movements when the surrounding cover is no longer the one in which they are now performed.
// In other places he also says that the soul consists of the most smooth and round atoms, very different even from the atoms of fire; that part of it is irrational and scattered throughout the body, while the rational part is in the chest, which is evident from the feeling of fear and joy; that sleep comes from the fact that the particles of the soul, scattered throughout the composition, flow or spread, and then stray from shocks; and that semen is collected from all parts of the body.//
Indeed, we must not forget that the so-called "incorporeal" in ordinary usage is that which can be thought of as something independent; but nothing incorporeal can be conceived as independent, except only emptiness; emptiness can neither act nor experience an effect, it only allows the movement of bodies through itself. Therefore, those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking nonsense: if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon, while we clearly see that both these properties are inherent in the soul. So, if we reduce all our reasoning about the soul to sensations and sufferings (remembering what we said at the beginning.), then it will be clear that here they are outlined with sufficient clarity so that in the future, using these outlines, it would be possible to confidently refine the details.
Further, the form, color, size, weight, and everything else that is listed as a property of bodies (all or only visible) and is known by the sensations corresponding to them, should not be thought of as original natures (this is unimaginable), should not be thought of as non-existent, not must be conceived as something incorporeal, inherent in the body, not as a part of this body; no, the permanent nature of the whole body consists of all these properties, but not as if they were all put together, as dense particles are put together into larger compounds, or small parts into larger ones, but simply, as I said, the permanent nature of the whole body consists of all these properties. All these properties are captured and distinguished each in its own way, but always accompanied by the whole and never apart from it; it is from this collective concept that the body derives its name.
Further, bodies are often accompanied by impermanent properties, which also cannot be called either invisible or incorporeal. Calling such properties accidental according to the usual usage of words, we clearly assert that they do not have the property of that whole, which in the aggregate is called the body, and do not have the nature of those permanent qualities of it, without which the body is unthinkable. Each of them can receive such a name, since in a mental throw it accompanies the body, but only when it is really seen, because these properties are not constantly accompanying. This evidence should not be considered non-existent simply because it does not have the nature of that whole (called the body) in which it is seen, or any constantly accompanying property of this whole; one should not, however, consider it to have an independent existence (this is just as unthinkable for random properties as for constants); but one should consider them, as they seem, as accidental properties of bodies, and not constantly accompanying properties of bodies and not having the position of independent natures; they are considered precisely in their originality, which is revealed by sensation.
Further, we must firmly adhere to the following position: time is not amenable to such investigation as all other properties of objects that we investigate, reducing them to anticipations seen in ourselves - no, we must proceed from that immediate evidence that makes us speak about long or short time, and express it accordingly. At the same time, one should not choose special words, as if they were better, but one should use common expressions about the subject; Nor should we ascribe to other objects the same essence that exists in our uniqueness (although others do this), but we must pay attention only to what we associate our object with and how we measure it. Indeed, there is no need to prove, but only need to pay attention to the fact that we associate it with such things as day and night, parts of day and night, excitement and rest, movement and stillness, and, highlighting the mind in these things special random property, we call it time. // He says the same thing in the II book "On Nature" and in the "Great Review".//
Further, in addition to all that has been said, it should be assumed that the worlds and in general any limited complex body of the same kind as objects that we observe all the time - all originated from infinity, standing out from separate clots, large and small; and they all decompose again from one cause or another, some more quickly, others more slowly. //From this it is clear that he considers worlds subject to destruction, because parts of them are subject to change. Elsewhere he says that the earth rests on air. // At the same time, one should not think that all worlds must necessarily have the same shape: // on the contrary, he himself says in the XII book "On Nature" that some of them are spherical, others are ovoid, others have other types, however not all. In the same way, animals are not denied infinity; / / indeed, it is impossible to prove that in such and such a world those seeds that make up animals, plants and everything else that we see could or could not be contained, but in this is not possible in another world. // The same can be said about food for them. The earthly world should be discussed in the same way.//
Further, it should be assumed that compelling circumstances taught our nature many and varied things, and then the mind improved what it received from nature and supplemented it with new discoveries - sometimes faster, sometimes more slowly, sometimes more, sometimes less. That is why the names of things were at first given by no means by agreement: human nature itself in each nation, experiencing special feelings and receiving special impressions, emitted air in a special way under the influence of each of these feelings and impressions, in different ways depending on different places where peoples lived; only then did each people establish common names for themselves, so that there would be less ambiguity in the explanations and so that they would be shorter. And introducing some objects not yet seen, people familiar with them also introduced sounds for them: others - pronouncing as necessary, others - choosing according to understanding where there were stronger grounds for such and such an expression.
Further, concerning the movements of the celestial bodies, solstices, eclipses, sunrises, sunsets, and the like, one should not think that any being disposes of them and sets or has put them in order; and one should not think that at the same time it enjoys perfect bliss and immortality, because orders, worries, anger, mercy are incompatible with bliss, but arise from weakness, fear and need for others; and one should not think that it is the clots of heavenly fire themselves that are endowed with bliss and voluntarily assume their movements. No, greatness must be observed in all words for these concepts, so that they do not evoke opinions inconsistent with such greatness, from which the greatest confusion in souls can arise. Therefore, it must be assumed that this rigorous cycle takes place due to the fact that when the world arose, such clots were originally part of its composition.
Further, it must be assumed that the task of studying nature is to investigate the cause of the most important things, and that precisely in this lies the bliss of knowing nature, observed in celestial phenomena, and everything that contributes to the immediate achievement of this goal. At the same time, in such matters it is impossible to admit a variety of reasons and think that things can be otherwise; no, in an immortal and blissful nature there can be nothing that allows for heterogeneity or restlessness - that this is exactly so is not difficult to comprehend by thought. On the other hand, the mere narration of sunsets, sunrises, solstices, eclipses, and the like, has nothing to do with the bliss of knowledge: whoever is versed in these phenomena, but does not know what their nature and their main causes, feels the same fears as if he would be completely ignorant, and perhaps even greater, because his amazement at all this information cannot be resolved and understand the structure of the most important thing. Therefore, even if we find several causes of solstices, sunsets, sunrises, eclipses, and the like, as was the case in our reasoning about individual phenomena, then we should not consider such accuracy of research insufficient for achieving our serenity and bliss. It is necessary to note in how many ways similar phenomena occur around us, and then to discuss the causes of celestial phenomena and all other ambiguities; and one can only despise those who do not understand the difference between what happens or arises in one way only, and what happens in different ways, who does not take into account the ideas that arise at a great distance, and who does not know at all under what conditions one can and in which it is impossible to maintain serenity of spirit. If we, realizing that such and such a phenomenon can occur in many ways, accept that it occurs in such and such a way, then we will maintain the same serenity of spirit, as if we knew for sure that it occurs in this way.
Finally, in general, one must firmly adhere to the following view: the most important confusion in human souls arises from the fact that the same natures are considered blessed and immortal and at the same time, on the contrary, endowed with will, actions, motives; because people always expect and fear eternal horrors, as they are described in fables, and are afraid even of posthumous insensibility, as if it were evil for them; because, finally, they experience all this not even from empty opinions, but from some kind of unreasonable perversion, and if they do not put an end to their fear, they experience the same or even more severe confusion than those who hold empty opinions. Meanwhile, serenity consists in renouncing all this and only firmly remembering the most general and main thing. Therefore, it is so important to be attentive to immediate sensations and experiences, to general ones in general cases and to particular ones in particular cases, as well as to any immediate evidence given to each of our means of judgment. If we hold to this, then we will correctly remove and cancel the causes of confusion and fear, since we will be able to judge the causes of both celestial phenomena and all other events that frighten other people to such an extreme.
Here you are, Herodotus, the most important provisions of the science of nature in the form of an overview; and I think that if this essay lends itself to exact assimilation, then he who has assimilated it will receive an incomparably stronger support than other people, even if he does not happen to get to all the particular details. And he will in many respects clarify the particular details for himself from our full work, and the memory of these provisions will be his constant help. For they are such that anyone who is fully, or at least sufficiently versed in details, will be able to inquire into the nature of everything, reducing them to such considerations; and whoever has not yet reached full perfection, with their help and without words, will be able, with the speed of thought, to fly around everything that is most necessary to achieve peace of mind.
Such is his letter on physics. And his letter about celestial phenomena is as follows:
"Epicurus Pythocles sends greetings.
Cleon brought me a letter from you, in which you express your good feelings for us, worthy of our concern for you, and sincerely try to remember all the reasoning that serves a happy life; and to facilitate your memory, you ask me to send you a short and easily visible discussion of celestial phenomena, because what we wrote in other works is given to your memory with difficulty, even though you carry them with you all the time. Such a request is pleasing to us and fills us with good hopes. Therefore, having completed the rest of our writings, we comply with your request, believing that such reasonings will be of no use to others, especially those who have only recently tasted the true knowledge of nature and who, due to everyday cares, have too little leisure. Learn this well, keep it firmly in your memory and go through it along with everything else that we sent in a small review to Herodotus.
First of all, it must be remembered that, like everything else, the science of celestial phenomena, whether taken separately or in connection with others, serves no other purpose than peace of mind and firm confidence. Therefore, it is not necessary here to resort to impossible exaggerations, it is not necessary to fit everything under the same explanation, as we do when discussing the way of life or when highlighting other questions about nature, such as, for example, that everything consists of bodies and intangible, emptiness, or that the basis of everything is indivisible atoms, or something else that allows only one explanation corresponding to phenomena. No, celestial phenomena are not like that: they allow many causes of their occurrence and many judgments about their essence, all of which correspond to sensations. And nature must be investigated not by idle assumptions and statements, but as required by the visible phenomena themselves, because in life we need not unreason and idle thought, but we need a trouble-free life; and so, questions that, with due persuasiveness, allow for diverse explanations corresponding to visible phenomena, just leave our peace undisturbed, and whoever accepts one explanation, and rejects another, equally corresponding to the phenomenon, he, on the contrary, obviously slides out of the field of science about nature into the realm of fables.
As indications of what happens in celestial phenomena, we have terrestrial phenomena that are accessible to consideration, while celestial ones are inaccessible and can occur for many reasons. Each appearance should be observed and such signs should be distinguished in it, the diverse flow of which does not contradict what is happening on earth.
The world is the region of the sky, which contains the luminaries, the earth, and all celestial phenomena; if it collapses, everything will be confused. It is separated from infinity and ends with a boundary, which can be either dense or sparse, both rotating and stationary, both round and triangular, or whatever shape you like; all this is equally acceptable, because it equally does not contradict anything in this world, the border of which is inaccessible to us. It is not difficult to understand that there can be an infinite number of such worlds and that such a world can arise both inside another world and in the interworld (as we call the gap between worlds), in a place where there are many emptiness, but not "in a large space, completely empty "as some have argued. The emergence takes place when the seeds necessary for this flow out from some world, or interworld, or several worlds, gradually arriving, dismembering, settling on occasion and irrigating from the sources necessary for this, until such completeness and stability come that the laid foundation can no longer take anything. For it is not sufficient merely that in the void where the world can arise, a cluster of atoms or a whirlwind appear (as is assumed by the opinions of necessity) and that it grows until it collides with another world (as one of the so-called physicists assures ): this contradicts the visible phenomena.
The sun, moon and other luminaries did not arise on their own and did not become part of the world only later - no, they began to form and grow simultaneously with it, through increments and whirlwinds of lighter rocks, similar to wind, fire or both and others; this is exactly what our feelings suggest. The magnitude of the sun and other luminaries for us is what it seems / / so he says in the XI book "On Nature"; and if the magnitude decreased with distance, he says, then the brightness would also decrease even more, because both of them are most appropriately commensurate with the distance//; in itself, it is either greater than the visible, or slightly less, or equal to it. For it is precisely in this way that our senses observe fires on earth that are visible from a distance. ; every objection on this score is easily refuted, if only one is attentive to the evidence, as is shown in our books On Nature.
The rising and setting of the sun, moon, and other luminaries may be due to their kindling and extinction, if the circumstances in those places are such as to allow this to happen: no visible phenomena contradict this. Or maybe this also happens as a result of their appearance above the earth and hiding behind it: no visible phenomena contradict this either. Their movements may be due to the rotation of the entire sky, or they may also be due to the fact that the sky is motionless, and they rotate according to the primordial inevitability that appeared at their sunrise along with the emergence of the world; ... intense heat, because fire always passes, spreading, to adjacent places. The reversals in the motion of the sun and moon are perhaps due to the curvature of the sky, which necessarily occurs from time to time; and perhaps also from air resistance, or from the fact that the always necessary substance is partly already burned, and partly still untouched; or because from the very beginning these luminaries received such a circulation that they went in a spiral. All such and similar explanations do not contradict evidence, if only we keep to the possible and reduce every particular to consistency with visible phenomena, without being afraid of the slavish contrivances of astronomers.
The damage to the moon and its new growth may result from the rotation of this body, and in the same way it may also from what form the air will take, or perhaps from obscuration, or perhaps in any other way in which terrestrial phenomena can be involved to explain these phases - only if, carried away by one explanation, one does not idly reject all the others, as happens when you do not think about what is knowable for a person and what is not, and therefore you strive to study the inaccessible. In the same way, the light of the moon may be its own, or it may be borrowed from the sun; for even with us one can observe many things that have their own light, and many things that have borrowed light. And no celestial phenomenon will escape explanation, if we remember that there are many such explanations, and if we consider only those assumptions and reasons that fit with these phenomena, and which do not fit, leave them unattended, do not attach imaginary importance to them and do not slip here and there to attempts at a uniform explanation. So the outline of a face on the moon can be caused by the displacement of its parts, and obscuration, and any number of other explanations, as long as they are consistent with visible phenomena. For any celestial phenomena, one should not deviate from this path of research: after all, whoever struggles with the obvious will never be able to achieve true serenity of the spirit. So eclipses of the sun and moon can occur as a result of extinction (because this can also be observed with us), or it can also be due to obscuration by another object, be it the earth or some celestial body. Thus, we must consider various explanations simultaneously, without denying that some of them can act at once. // In the XII book "On Nature" he says the same thing and adds that the sun is eclipsed from the shadow of the moon, and the moon from the shadow of the earth, or, perhaps, from its distance. The same is said by the Epicurean Diogenes in Book I of the Selections.//
The correctness of the movement of celestial bodies should be understood in the same way as the correctness of other phenomena occurring near us; the divine nature should not be attracted to this, but should abide, free from worries and in the fullness of bliss. If this condition is not met, then the whole study of the causes of celestial phenomena will turn out to be empty, as already turned out to be with those who did not adhere to an acceptable method of explanation, but believed only one explanation was possible and rejected all others, falling because of this into absurdities, reaching unthinkable and losing the ability to take into account those phenomena in which one should see the necessary indications.
The duration of night and day changes because the movement of the sun over the earth is sometimes faster, then slower again - either because the length of its path changes, or because it passes other places faster or slower, as we can observe in our country, so that by such a similarity to judge celestial phenomena. And those who accept only one explanation struggle against visible phenomena and do not understand what is accessible to human speculation and what is not.
Weather predictions can be made both by coincidence of circumstances (for example, by animals observed with us), and by changes in the air: neither one nor the other contradicts visible phenomena, but it is impossible to know in which cases this or that reason operates.
Clouds can form and gather both from the condensation of air under wind pressure, and from the interweaving of atoms suitable for this, clinging to each other, and from the accumulation of outflows of earth and water; and such compositions can be formed in many other ways. When they are either compressed or reformed, it may rain; they also arise from outflows rising through the air from suitable places, and a stronger downpour is formed from such accumulations that are suitable for such outpourings.
Thunder can come from wind blowing in the cavities of clouds, as happens with us in vessels; or from the roar of fire in them blown by the wind; or from the breaking and parting of the clouds; or because the clouds, hardened like ice, rub against each other and break. And here, as elsewhere, visible phenomena tell us to affirm a variety of explanations.
Lightning can also occur in various ways: because during the collision and friction of clouds, a combination [of atoms] slips out, producing fire, and gives rise to lightning; because the winds push out of the clouds such bodies that produce this brilliance, or they are squeezed out by pressure on the clouds - either by the clouds, or by the winds; or because the light of heavenly bodies is scattered through the clouds, and then from the movement of clouds and winds it is driven to one place and breaks out of the clouds; or because the light of the most subtle composition is soaked through the clouds, // therefore the clouds ignite from fire, and thunder occurs / /, and its movement produces lightning; or because the wind is ignited by intense movement and strong rotation; or because the winds tear the clouds apart, and atoms fall out of them, producing fire and visible as lightning. There are many other equally easy ways of examining lightning, you just need to keep to the visible phenomena all the time and be able to compare similarities in them.
Lightning precedes thunder with such a structure of clouds, or because the combination of atoms that produces lightning collapses from clouds simultaneously with a gust of wind, and the rotation of the wind produces noise only later; or because they collapse at the same time, but the lightning rushes towards us with greater speed, and the thunder is delayed, as is sometimes the case with strikes observed from a great distance.
Lightning strikes can occur because many winds accumulate together, rotate with force and ignite, and then part of them breaks off and collapses down with force, and the breakthrough occurs because everything around is compacted under the pressure of clouds; or else lightning strikes come like thunder from a single revolving fire: when there is a lot of it, it will be strongly filled with wind, break through the cloud and fall down, not being able to go to adjacent places where clouds are constantly piling up. // For the most part, this happens over some high mountain, where lightning strikes most often fall. judge the invisible.
Whirlwinds can occur because the cloud, pushed by the accumulated wind and driven by a strong wind, descends in a column and still receives a lateral push from a side wind; or because the wind comes into a circular motion under the pressure of air; or because the resulting wind stream cannot scatter to the sides due to the condensation of the surrounding air. When whirlwinds descend on land, dry whirlwinds form, depending on how the wind moves them, and when they fall on the sea, water whirlwinds form.
Earthquakes can occur because the wind is enclosed in the earth, interspersed there with small blocks of earth and sets them in continuous motion, which is why the earth oscillates. This wind either enters the earth from outside, or arises from within because the earth collapses in cavernous places and turns the air enclosed in them into wind. Or earthquakes can be due to the very propagation of movement from the fall of earth blocks and back, when these blocks collide with denser places of the earth. And these vibrations of the earth can occur in many other ways.
Winds occur when, from time to time, something foreign gradually and continuously seeps into the air, and also due to an abundant accumulation of water; the rest of the winds are due to the fact that these few fall into many depressions and, dividing, spread.
Hail is formed both with strong freezing of windy particles, when they gather from everywhere and then separate, and with moderate freezing of watery particles with their simultaneous rupture; because both convergence and separation occur at once, they freeze both in parts and in aggregate. And the roundness of the hail, perhaps, comes from the fact that its sharp extremities thaw, or from the fact that during the formation of hail, watery and windy particles are collected, as was said, evenly from all sides.
Snow can occur because fine moisture pours out of clouds through proportional pores under the pressure of continuous strong wind on these clouds, and then this moisture freezes in its fall, because the surrounding space below the clouds turns out to be much colder. Also, such freezing can take place in evenly rarefied watery clouds lying side by side and pressing on each other, and, falling, snowflakes form hail upon collision, especially in spring. In addition, accumulations of snow can be shaken off by the friction of frozen clouds; Yes, there are other ways to create snow.
Dew is formed, firstly, when such particles are collected in the air that can produce this kind of dampness, and secondly, when these particles from watery and humid places (where there is most dew) rise up, merge together, producing dampness. , and then fall into the lowlands, just as it can often be seen with us. Just like dew, [hoarfrost is also formed] when such particles freeze when they get into cold air.
Ice is formed; when round-shaped particles are forced out of the water, while triangular and acute-angled particles remain in it and spiral more closely, and also when water receives such particles from the outside, and they, when combined, cause the water to freeze, displacing round particles from it.
A rainbow is formed when the sun casts light on moist air, or as a result of a special mixture of light and air, which produces the features of its colors, both together and separately; and the backward reflection communicates each color to the surrounding air, which we see as each part of it is illuminated. The rainbow seems to be circular either because the remoteness of any of its places is perceived by the eye as equal, or because it is precisely such a circular shape that the mixture of atoms that are in the air or have flown away from this air into clouds takes on.
The ring around the moon is formed either because the air from all sides tends to the moon, or because it restrains in a uniform way all the outflows emanating from the moon, so that they are arranged around it in a cloudy ring without the slightest gaps, or because it is air , surrounding the moon, encountering resistance, is evenly located around it in a dense ring. And a partial ring is formed either because the influence of some flow from outside intervenes, or because heat intercepts the necessary pores in order to produce it.
Comets arise either because in some places of the sky from time to time, under favorable circumstances, fire is concentrated, or because the sky above us from time to time receives a special movement and opens these luminaries, or because these luminaries themselves from time to time according to some or circumstances are set in motion, descend to our places and become visible; and they disappear for reasons opposite to these.
Some stars revolve in the same place; this can happen not only because this part of the world is stationary, and the rest revolves around it (as some say), but also because air swirls around this place, preventing this movement, or because in adjacent places there is no the substance necessary for them, and where we observe them, it is. This can happen in many other ways, if only one can draw conclusions that agree with visible phenomena.
Some stars wander (if they really do so), and some move differently; this may be because, in their original circular motion, some necessarily follow a uniform rotation, while others are confused by irregularities; and perhaps also because along their path in other places there are correct air tensions, pushing them forward all the time and evenly igniting them, in other places they are wrong, from which the observed deviations occur. But to attribute this to a single cause, when visible phenomena point to many of them, is folly, and the zealots of idle astronomy do not act like that, offering such imaginary causes of certain phenomena that do not in the least relieve the divine nature of the burden.
Some stars, as can be observed, lag behind others in their motion; this happens either because they go around the same circle more slowly, or because they move in the opposite direction and are only pulled back by the general circulation, or because in the general circulation some move in a larger circle, others in a smaller one. And to give all this the simplest explanation is only appropriate for those who want to fool the crowd.
The so-called shooting stars may in some cases mean that the stars rub against each other and their fragments fall, blown away by the wind, as happens with lightning (as said above); or that the atoms, capable of producing fire, gather together and, by their uniformity, generate it, and then move towards where they received an impetus during the collection; or that the wind collects in foggy concentrations, ignites there during rotation, and then breaks out of the environment and rushes where it received a push; there are other ways in which this can be done without any fable.
Weather forecasts for some animals occur only by coincidence of circumstances: after all, it cannot be that animals compel the onset of bad weather, and no divine nature is planted to oversee the appearance of animals and then do what they predict - not a single creature in any way prosperous would not have reached such folly, much less a being possessing perfect bliss.
Remember all this, Pythocles, and then you will be able to understand everything that is similar to this, far avoiding fables. But let your main concern be the consideration of the first principles, infinity, and the like, as well as criteria, sufferings, and the goal for which we conduct all our reasoning. Having diligently studied them, you can easily understand the reasons for particulars. And those who do not have a great love for these subjects, they can neither understand them well, nor achieve the goal for which they must be studied.
These are his opinions about celestial phenomena.
As for the way of life and ways of avoiding something else, and preferring something else, he writes about this in the way that we will see now; but first we must dwell on the opinions of him and his disciples about what a sage is.
People offend each other either out of hatred, or out of envy, or out of contempt; but the sage, by reason, rises above that. Once having achieved wisdom, he can no longer fall into the opposite state, even feignedly. More than others, he is accessible to passions, but they do not interfere with his wisdom. However, not with every body and not in every nation is it possible for him to become a sage. Even under torture, the sage is happy. He alone is capable of gratitude, which he expresses in kind words about friends, both present and absent. However, under torture he will groan and groan. Of the women, he will be close only with those with whom the law allows (so writes Diogenes in the "Review of the Epicurean Moral Teachings"). He will not punish slaves, but will pity and forgive those who are zealous. According to their judgment, the sage should not be in love, he will not care about his burial; love is given to people by no means from the gods, as Diogenes says in Book XII. He will not speak beautiful speeches. And carnal fellowship, they say, has never been beneficial; but the good thing is that it did not bring harm. The sage will neither marry nor have children (as Epicurus himself writes in Doubts and in the books On Nature); True, under certain worldly circumstances, he may marry, but he will dissuade others. He will not talk nonsense even drunk (so writes Epicurus in the "Feast"); will not be engaged in state affairs (as he writes in the first book "On the way of life"); will not become a tyrant; he will not live as a cynic (as he writes in Book II of "On the Way of Life") or beg. Even blind, he will not take his own life (it is said there). The wise man is accessible even to grief, as Diogenes says in Book V of the Selections. He will appear in court; he will also leave writings, but not words of praise; he will take care of both his own good and the future. He will enjoy country life. He will be able to resist fate and never leave a friend. He will take care of his good name just enough to avoid contempt. The spectacle will be even more pleasant for him than for the others. He will put up statues according to a vow; and if they erect a statue to him himself, he will take it calmly. The sage alone is able to correctly judge poetry and music, although he himself will not write poetry. One wise man is not wiser than another. Having become impoverished, the sage will also make money, but only by his wisdom; will help the ruler when the opportunity comes; and will be grateful to anyone who corrects it. He will also start a school, but not in such a way as to lead a crowd behind him; will also give readings to the people, but only when asked to. He will hold on to dogmas, not doubts; and even in a dream he will remain himself. And on occasion, he will even die for a friend.
They believe that sin is not equal to sin; that health for others is good, but for others it is indifferent; that courage does not come from nature, but from the calculation of usefulness. Friendship itself is useful; it is necessary, it is true, that something lay the foundation for it (after all, we also throw seeds into the ground), but then it already rests on the fact that all the fullness of pleasure among friends is common. And happiness, according to them, is of two kinds: the highest, like that of the gods, so much so that it can no longer be multiplied, and such that both the addition and subtraction of pleasures allow.
But it's time to move on to writing.
Epicurus sends greetings to Menekey.
Let no one in his youth put off the study of philosophy, and in old age do not tire of the study of philosophy: for for the health of the soul no one can be either immature or overripe. Whoever says that it is too early or too late to engage in philosophy is like the one who says that it is too early or too late to be happy. Therefore, both the young and the old should be engaged in philosophy: the first so that he remains young in old age with good things in good memory of the past, the second so that he is both young and old, not feeling fear of the future. Therefore, we need to think about what constitutes our happiness, because when we have it, then we have everything, and when we do not have it, then we go to any lengths to get it.
So, both in your deeds and in your thoughts, follow my everlasting advice, placing in them the most basic principles of a good life.
First of all, believe that God is an immortal and blessed being, for such is the universal outline of the concept of God; and therefore do not ascribe to him anything that is alien to immortality and uncharacteristic of beatitude, but imagine about him only that by which his immortality and his beatitude are maintained. Yes, the gods exist, for knowledge of them is evidence; but they are not what the crowd supposes them to be, for the crowd does not keep them [in representation] as they think they are. Wicked is not the one who rejects the gods of the crowd, but the one who accepts the opinions of the crowd about the gods - for the statements of the crowd about the gods are not anticipations, but conjectures, and, moreover, false. It is in them that it is asserted that the gods send bad people great harm, but benefit to the good: after all, people are accustomed to their own merits and treat others like themselves well, and everything that is not such is considered alien.
Get used to thinking that death is nothing for us: after all, everything, both good and bad, lies in sensation, and death is a deprivation of sensation. Therefore, if we hold on to the correct knowledge that death is nothing for us, then the mortality of life will become gratifying for us: not because the infinity of time will be added to it, but because the thirst for immortality will be taken away from it. Therefore, there is nothing terrible in life to those who truly understand that there is nothing terrible in non-life. Therefore, it is foolish who says that he is afraid of death, not because it will cause suffering when it comes; but because she will cause suffering to those who come; that he does not bother with his presence, it is completely in vain to grieve in advance. Therefore, the most terrible of evils, death, has nothing to do with us; when we are, then death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are no more. Thus, death does not exist either for the living or for the dead, since for some it does not exist itself, while others do not themselves exist for it.
Most people either flee from death as the greatest of evils, or crave it as a respite from the evils of life. And the sage does not shy away from life and is not afraid of unlife, because life does not interfere with him, and unlife does not seem evil. Just as he chooses not the most plentiful food, but the most pleasant one, so he does not enjoy the longest time, but the most pleasant one. Whoever advises a young man to live well and an old man to end his life well is unwise, not only because life is dear to him, but also because the ability to live well and die well is one and the same science. But even worse is the one who said: it is good not to be born. If he was born, go as soon as possible to the abode of Hades.
If he speaks so out of conviction, then why does he not pass away? after all, if it is firmly decided by him, then it is in his power. If he says it in mockery, then it is stupid, because the subject is not at all suitable for this.
It must be remembered that the future is not entirely ours and not entirely not ours, so as not to expect that it will certainly come, and not to despair; that it won't come at all.
Similarly, among our desires, some should be considered natural, others - idle; and among the natural, some are necessary, others are only natural; and among the essentials, some are necessary for happiness, others for the tranquility of the body, and still others simply for life. If this consideration is not to be mistaken, then every preference and every avoidance will lead to bodily health and peace of mind, and this is the ultimate goal of a blissful life. After all, everything that we do, we do in order to have neither pain nor anxiety; and when this is finally achieved, then every storm of the soul dissipates, since the living being no longer needs to go to something, as if to the missing one, and look for something, as if for the fullness of spiritual and bodily blessings. Indeed, we feel the need for pleasure only when we suffer from its absence: and when we do not suffer, we do not feel the need. That is why we say that pleasure is both the beginning and the end of a blessed life; we have come to know it as the first good, akin to us, we begin all preference and avoidance from it, and return to it, using patience as the measure of all good.
Since pleasure is the first and kindred good to us, therefore we do not give preference to every pleasure, but sometimes we bypass many of them if they are followed by more significant troubles; and vice versa, we often prefer pain to pleasure, if, having endured a long pain, we expect a greater pleasure to follow it. Therefore, every pleasure, being by nature akin to us, is good, but not everything deserves preference; likewise, all pain is evil, but not all pain is to be avoided; but it is necessary to judge everything, considering and proportioning the useful and the unprofitable - after all, sometimes we look at the good as evil and, on the contrary, evil as good.
We consider self-satisfaction a great good, but not always with a little, and then to be content with a little when there is not much, sincerely believing that luxury is sweetest to those who need it least, and that all that is required nature, is easily achievable, and everything superfluous is difficult to achieve. The simplest food is no less delightful than a sumptuous table, unless one suffers from what is not; even bread and water provide the greatest of pleasures when given to one who is hungry. Therefore, the habit of simple and inexpensive foods strengthens our health, and encourages us to the vital concerns of life, and when we meet with luxury after a long break, it makes us stronger and allows us not to be afraid of the vicissitudes of fate.
Therefore, when we say that pleasure is the ultimate goal, then. we do not mean at all the pleasures of debauchery or sensuality, as those who do not know, do not share or poorly understand our teaching think - no, we mean freedom from the sufferings of the body and from the turmoil of the soul. For it is not endless drinking and feasting, not the enjoyment of boys and women, or the fish table and other pleasures of a sumptuous feast, that makes our life sweet, but only sober reasoning, which investigates the causes of our every preference and avoidance, and banishes opinions that place great anxiety in the soul.
The beginning of all this, and the greatest of blessings, is understanding; it is dearer even to philosophy itself, and all the other virtues have come from it. It teaches that one cannot live sweetly without living wisely, well and righteously, and [one cannot live wisely, well and righteously] without living sweetly: after all, all virtues are akin to a sweet life and a sweet life is inseparable from them. Who, in your opinion, is higher than man, who thinks piously about the gods, and is completely free from the fear of death, who by reflection comprehended the ultimate goal of nature, understood that highest good is easily accomplished and achievable, and the highest evil is either short-lived or not difficult, which laughs at fate, someone called the mistress of everything, [and instead claims that something else happens by inevitability,] something else by chance, and something else depends on us, - for it is clear that inevitability is irresponsible, chance is wrong, and that which depends on us is not subject to anything else and therefore is subject to both censure and praise. Indeed, it is better to believe in fables about the gods than to submit to the fate invented by physicists, fables give hope to propitiate the gods with reverence, but in fate lies an inexorable inevitability. In the same way, chance for him is not a god, as for a crowd, because the actions of a god are not disorderly; and not an unfounded reason, because he does not believe that chance gives a person good and evil, which determine his blissful life, but considers that chance brings out only the beginnings of great good or evil. Therefore, the sage believes that it is better to be unhappy with reason than to be happy without reason: after all, it is always better that a well-conceived business should not owe success to chance.
Think over these and similar advice day and night, with yourself and with someone who is like you, and confusion will not overtake you either in reality or in a dream, but you will live like a god among people. For whoever lives in the midst of immortal blessings does not resemble mortals in any way."
He denies fortune-telling in his other writings, for example, in "Small Review", he says: "Fortune-telling does not exist, and if it existed, then what is predicted should be considered to be happening apart from us."
These are his opinions about the way of life; in other places he discusses this at greater length.
He differs from the Cyrenaics in his idea of pleasure: they do not recognize pleasure at rest, but only in motion, Epicurus recognizes both pleasures of both the soul and the body, and speaks about this in the books “On Preference and Avoidance”, “On the Ultimate Goal ", in the first book "On the way of life" and in a letter to the Mytilene philosophers. The same is said by Diogenes in the seventeenth book of the "Selections", and by Metrodorus in "Timocrates": "Pleasure is meant both that which is in motion, and that which is at rest." And Epicurus himself in his book "On Preference" writes as follows: "Pleasures in peace are serenity and painlessness, pleasures in motion are joy and pleasure."
Another difference from the Cyrenaics: they believe that bodily pain is worse than mental pain, and therefore criminals are punished by corporal execution; Epicurus, on the other hand, considers mental pain to be the worst, because the body is tormented only by the storms of the present, and the soul - of the past, present, and future. In the same way, the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the body.
As proof that the ultimate goal is pleasure, he pointed out that all living beings from birth rejoice in pleasure and avoid suffering, doing this naturally and without the participation of the mind. Therefore, left to our own devices, we shun pain; even Hercules, devoured by a poisoned tunic, shouts: ... Gnawing and screaming, and responding to groans
Locris mountains and Euboean rocks...
In the same way, the virtues are preferable to us not for their own sake, but for the sake of the pleasure they bring, just as medicine is for the sake of health, - so writes Diogenes in the XXth book of "Selections", calling "education" "entertainment". And Epicurus says that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, while everything else is separable, such as food.
But it is time, so to speak, to draw a line under all this work of mine and under the biography of our philosopher, citing in conclusion "Main Thoughts" so that the end of the book was the beginning of happiness.
- A blissful and immortal being has no worries of its own, nor delivers it to others, and therefore is not subject to either anger or favor: all this is characteristic of the weak. // In other places, he says that the gods are cognizable by the mind, some existing in the form of numbers, others in the likeness of a form, arising human-like from the continuous outflow of such appearances, directed to one place.//
- Death is nothing to us: what has decayed is insensible, and what is insensible is nothing to us.
- The limit of pleasure is the elimination of all pain. Where there is pleasure and as long as it exists, there is neither pain nor suffering, nor both.
- Continuous pain for the flesh is short-lived. In the highest degree it lasts shortest time; in a degree only exceeding bodily pleasure, a few days; and lingering infirmities bring more pleasure to the flesh than pain.
- One cannot live sweetly without living wisely, well, and righteously; and one cannot live wisely, well, and righteously without living sweetly. Whoever lacks something to live intelligently, well and righteously, cannot live sweetly.
- To live in safety from people, any means are natural goods.
- Some want to become famous and be in the public eye, hoping to gain security from the people. If their life is really safe, then they have reached the natural good; if it is not safe, it means that they have not achieved what they naturally aspired to from the very beginning.
- No pleasure in itself is evil; but the means of achieving other pleasures are far more troublesome than the pleasures.
- If every pleasure were to thicken and in time embrace our entire composition, or even the most important parts of our nature, then the distinctions between pleasures would be lost.
- If that which delights libertines dispelled the fears of the mind regarding celestial phenomena, death, suffering, and also taught the limit of desires, then libertines would not deserve any reproach, because pleasures would flow to them from everywhere, and pain and suffering from nowhere, in which there is evil.
- If we were not embarrassed by suspicions whether celestial phenomena or death have anything to do with us, and if we were not embarrassed by ignorance of the limits of suffering and desires, then there would be no need for us even to study nature.
- It is impossible to dispel fear about the most important thing without comprehending the nature of the Universe and suspecting that there is something in the fables. Therefore, pure enjoyment cannot be obtained without the study of nature.
- It is useless to seek security among people if you maintain fears about what is in the sky, under the earth, and in general in infinity.
- Security from people is achieved to some extent with the help of wealth and strength, on which one can rely, but quite - only with the help of peace and distance from the crowd.
- The wealth demanded by nature is limited and easily attainable; and the wealth demanded by idle opinions extends to infinity.
- Chance has little to do with the wise: the greatest and most important thing has been arranged for him by reason, as it suits and will arrange throughout his life.
- The one who is righteous has the least anxiety, the one who is unrighteous is full of the greatest anxiety.
- The pleasure of the flesh does not increase, but only diversifies if the pain of lack is eliminated. The pleasure of thought reaches its limit in thinking about those and such things that previously gave thoughts the greatest fear.
- Infinite time and finite time contain equal pleasure, if measured by the limits of reason.
- For the flesh, the limits of pleasure are infinite, and the time for such pleasure is infinite. And the thought, having comprehended the limits and the ultimate goal of the flesh and dispelling the fears of eternity, thereby already leads to a perfect life and does not need endless time. At the same time, thought does not shy away from pleasures, nor does it act as if something else was not enough for it to be happy when it leaves life.
- He who knows the limits of life knows how easy it is to get rid of the pain of a lack, thus making life perfect; therefore, he does not need any action that entails a struggle.
- One must keep in mind the real purpose of life and the complete evidence by which opinions are measured, otherwise everything will be full of doubt and confusion.
- If you dispute every single sensation, you will have nothing to refer to even when you judge that such and such of them are false.
- If you simply discard any sensation, without making a distinction between the opinion still awaiting confirmation and that which is already given to you by sensation, by suffering, and by every figurative throw of thought, then by this idle opinion you will throw all the other senses into disorder, so that you will be left without any criteria. If, on the contrary, you begin to affirm indiscriminately both what is still awaiting confirmation and what is not awaiting confirmation, then you will not avoid error here either, because in this way you will remain in doubt at any judgment about what is right and what is wrong.
- If you do not every time reduce each action to a natural final goal, but deviate both in preference and avoidance to something else, then your actions will not correspond to words.
- All desires, the dissatisfaction of which does not lead to pain, are not necessary: the impulse to them is easily dispelled by presenting the object of desire as difficult to achieve or harmful.
- Of all that wisdom provides for the happiness of a lifetime, the greatest is the acquisition of friendship.
- The same conviction that inspired us with courage that evil is not eternal and not lasting, also saw that in our limited circumstances friendship is most reliable.
- Desires are: some are natural and necessary; others are natural but not necessary; still others are neither natural nor necessary, but born of idle opinions. // Epicurus considers natural and necessary desires to be those that relieve suffering, such as drinking when thirsty; natural, but not necessary - those that only diversify pleasure, but do not relieve suffering, for example, a luxurious table; not natural and not necessary - for example, wreaths and honorary statues.//
- Natural desires, the dissatisfaction of which does not lead to pain, but in which there is an intense desire, come from idle opinions; and if they are dissipated with difficulty, it is not because of their naturalness, but because of human idle thought.
- Natural law is a contract of benefit, the purpose of which is not to cause or suffer harm.
- In relation to those animals that cannot make contracts so as not to cause or suffer harm, there is neither justice nor injustice, just as it is with respect to those peoples who cannot or do not want to make contracts, not to cause or suffer harm.
- Justice does not exist by itself; it is a contract not to cause or suffer harm, concluded in the intercourse of people and always in relation to those places where it is concluded.
- Injustice is not evil in itself; it is fear from the suspicion that a person does not remain hidden from those who punish him for such actions.
- He who secretly does something about which people have an agreement not to cause or suffer harm, he cannot be sure that he will remain hidden, even if he has succeeded ten thousand times up to now: for it is not known whether he will succeed. remain hidden until death.
- On the whole, justice is the same for all, insofar as it is a benefit in the mutual intercourse of people; but when applied to the peculiarities of place and circumstances, justice is not the same for all.
- Of those actions that the law recognizes as just, only that is really just, the benefit of which is confirmed by the needs of human communication, whether it will be the same for everyone or not. And if someone makes a law, from which there will be no benefit in human communication, such a law will by nature already be unjust. And even if the benefit contained in justice is lost and only for a while corresponds to our anticipation of it, then during this time it will still remain justice - at least for those who look at the essence of the matter and are not embarrassed by empty words. .
- Where, without any change of circumstances, it turns out that laws that are considered just, entail consequences that do not correspond to our anticipation of justice, there they were not just. Where, with a change in circumstances, the previously established justice turns out to be useless, there it was fair while it was useful in the communication of fellow citizens, and then it ceased to be fair, ceasing to be useful.
- Whoever is best able to arrange himself against the fear of external circumstances will do what is possible to those close to himself, and what is impossible, at least not hostile, and where even this is impossible, he keeps aloof and moves away as far as it is beneficial.
- Those who have been able to achieve complete security from their neighbors, relying on it with confidence, live with each other in the greatest pleasure and, having enjoyed the most complete intimacy, do not mourn, as if pitying, the one who dies before the others.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ANCIENT SKEPTICISM
YES. Gusev
Department of Philosophy Moscow Pedagogical State University pr-t Vernadskogo, 88, Moscow State Pedagogical University, Moscow, Russia, 117571
The ancestor of the ancient skeptical school is considered to be the Greek philosopher Pyrrho of Elis (around the 3rd century BC), but skeptical elements were present in Greek philosophy long before Pyrrho. This article is devoted to the consideration of skeptical elements in Greek pre-Pyrrhonian philosophy; At the same time, the author's attention is focused on the analytical and evaluative characteristics of the signs of skepticism of the previous philosophy as a prerequisite and condition for the possibility of the formation of skepticism as a philosophical direction.
Skeptical tendencies were present to a greater or lesser extent in Greek philosophy long before the formation of an independent skeptical school in it. Some ancient sources speak of a very ancient origin of skepticism and spread its influence quite widely. So, for example, the famous historian of ancient philosophy, Diogenes Laertes, reports that Homer is often called the founder of the skeptical school: “Some say that this school was founded by Homer, because he, like no one else, spoke about the same thing in different places in different places and not at all. did not strive for dogmatic certainty in his statements. Skeptical also, Diogenes reports, consider the sayings of the seven wise men, such as "Nothing too much" and "Bail is retribution." In addition, skepticism is attributed, according to Diogenes Laertius, to Archilochus, Euripides, Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, Democritus, Heraclitus and Hippocrates ^onf.: Diog. L.IX. 71-73]. Cicero lists Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, Metrodorus of Chios, the Stoics and Cyrenaics among the supporters of skepticism ^onf.: Cic. Acad. II. 5, 23]. According to Cicero, pre-Socratic philosophers, in spite of all, at first glance, their "non-skepticism", may well be considered as the forerunners of skepticism, since they, in despair from the difficulties of cognition, "exclaimed like crazy that nothing can be known" .
Raul Richter explains this kind of evidence by the desire of ancient authors to find support for the views that appeal to them in the teachings of their great predecessors, to attribute these views to immutable authorities, appealing to which has always been an unspoken rule and almost an obligation. However, the skeptics themselves did not follow this trend. Thus, Menodotus and Aenesidemus did not consider Plato a skeptic [Сonf.: Sext Emp. Pyrrh. I. 222-223], and Sextus Empiricus took special care to delimit skeptical philosophy from views that are related or intersect with it in one point or another [^n£: Sext Emp. 210-241].
In this case, it should be noted that partial or methodological skepticism is not alien to any philosophical construction, since a view that asserts something, precisely for the purpose of this assertion, must deny the opposite or doubt it, i.e. be skeptical about it. Therefore, it is not surprising that skepticism, or rather, its elements, are somehow contained in any philosophical construction. No system of views, as a rule, can do without relative skepticism. It is not surprising, therefore, that authors who sympathize with skepticism see it almost everywhere, and this, as we have just shown, is not only justified, but necessary. It is also understandable that the skeptics themselves decisively distinguished the partial skepticism of any philosophy from their absolute skepticism, which was an end in itself for them, emphasizing the fundamental difference and even opposition of the two types of skepticism: the first was ultimately only an element of positive dogmatism (according to the skeptics), the second same - self-sufficient doubt.
However, skeptics still referred to the thinkers of the pre-Socratic and classical periods, not as their immediate predecessors, but as philosophers who developed some arguments acceptable to skeptics. The English researcher D. Sedley notes: “Of the early philosophers, to whose authority the skeptics of the Hellenistic era often appeal, some deserve respect not so much for their lack of dogmatism, but because they put forward arguments that were useful to skeptics. Heraclitus, the Eleatics, Anaxagoras and Protagoras are notable examples. Others, such as Xenophanes, Empedocles, Democritus, and Socrates, have won respect from the skeptics by admitting, at least in moments of despondency, that knowledge is unattainable or has not yet been achieved by people.
The Milesian philosophers were looking for the beginning of the world in something material or material, finding it in water (Thales), in air (Anaximenes), infinite (Anaximander). However, with no less reason, one could see the beginning in something ideal (form, concept, idea), which Pythagoras did when he declared number to be the world beginning. The skeptical tendency among the Milesians lies in the departure from popular religion and mythology, and in Pythagoras - in his famous assertion that wisdom cannot be possessed, that one can only love it, strive for it. In addition, in the person of the Milesian philosophers and Pythagoras, ancient thought received two contradictory
worldviews, the very opposition and antagonism of which inevitably gave rise to doubt in each of them.
Any change, the impossibility of which the Eleatic philosophers argued, is always the emergence, the formation of something from nothing, which is unthinkable. Therefore, any change, movement and multiplicity, due to inconceivability, do not exist, being an illusion, a deception. Existing is that which can be clearly thought - motionless, boundless, single, eternal being. Elea-tam is opposed by Heraclitus, who believed that the whole world is a continuous process of passing and becoming, universal fluidity: "Everything flows and nothing becomes." The Eleatics and Heraclitus show an even greater departure from popular religion and mythology. The founder of the Eleatic school, Xenophanes, made a brilliant critique of the Olympian religion, and Heraclitus countered popular polytheism with his philosophical monism. In addition, the Eleatics came to the conclusion that sensory knowledge is deceptive, since the senses constantly testify to change and multiplicity. To substantiate their conceivable being, they subtly proved the impossibility of obvious things (movement and divisibility), thus laying the foundation for “dialectics” - the art of challenging the obvious and proving that any position can be affirmed and denied with equal grounds. In confirmation of the presence of skeptical elements in Eleatic philosophy, we note that, firstly, Gorgias derived his skeptical positions from the basic Eleatic principles, and secondly, Timon, ridiculing all philosophers, respected only Pyrrho and the Eleatics. As for their conceivable being, it appeared, according to the fair remark of A.F. Losev, "only the result of the first passion from the disclosure of the difference between sensation and thinking." Losev also notes that "... this principle of unknowable and indivisible being, or unity, saved Eleatic natural philosophy from skepticism very little."
The skeptical tendency is undoubtedly represented in the relativism of Heraclitus: is it possible to have reliable knowledge of the world, which is an eternally fluid chaos. Hence - distrust of sensory knowledge in the teachings of Heraclitus. However, the latter is still far from skepticism, since in his philosophy, along with chaos, there is logos - the world law, the manifestation and expression of which is chaos (behind the general disorder is an absolute and unshakable order, the eternal and indestructible principle of the world). However, some students of Heraclitus drew extremely relativistic conclusions from his teachings. So, for example, Cratyl believed that “... one should not [even] say anything, but only move his finger and reproach Heraclitus with his words that you cannot enter the same water twice. Namely, he himself thought that [this cannot be done] even once.
There are clearly expressed skeptical elements in Democritus' system. The Abder thinker argued that the bearer of being can be
only an indivisible particle (atom), which, never falling apart, exists forever. According to Democritus, atoms move in the void and their combination leads to the formation of things, and their separation leads to the death of things. Thus, the latter are just a temporary combination of atoms, due to which both the things themselves and their properties are not so much a being as its illusion. And the knowledge of the sensible world, therefore, is unreliable, since no one can discover the true reality - atoms and emptiness. “According to established custom, sweet and customary bitter, customary warm, customary cold, customary colored,” says Democritus, “in reality, atoms and emptiness.” Honey in itself is neither sweet nor bitter - it's just a complex of atoms, it is "no more" than anything else ^onf.: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. I. 213-214]. In the ethical sphere, Democritus proclaimed the same life ideal of ataraxia (equanimity), which was also preached by skeptics. There is even a point of view, expressed by Hirzel, that the Democritanian doctrine was the only source of Pyrrho's skepticism. Richter considers and criticizes this view in detail.
Skeptical elements in the teachings of Democritus were developed by his students. So, Met-rodor of Chios stated: “we know nothing; and we don't even know that we don't know anything." Anaxarchus and Monim compared existence with a theatrical scenery and considered it similar to what happens during dreams or insanity.
Sooner or later, due to philosophical heterogeneity, the question of the possibilities and limits of human cognition had to arise. It is legitimate to assert that the elements of epistemological problems arose in pre-Socratic philosophy. However, the sophists began to pay closer attention to it. They certainly stood much closer to skepticism than their predecessors. The famous statement of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things that exist, that they exist, that they do not exist, that they do not exist", in fact the only evidence of an outstanding sophist that has come down to us, was interpreted differently. According to Richter, Grot, Laas, Gomperz, Halbfas and others argued that the protagoraean thesis refers to the entire human race, and not to an individual, and therefore it has not an individual, but a general meaning. This is refuted, Richter notes, by the evidence of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Sextus, and at the present time by Zeller, Natorp, Meyer.
Apparently, this position of Protagoras is a thesis that lies in the philosophical mainstream of subjectivism: what is true for every person is what appears, seems or is so to him. In addition, Protagoras denied all knowledge, except for sensory: "beyond what our sensations give us, our soul is nothing." From what has been said, one can draw a twofold conclusion: perhaps, Losev suggests, Pro-
Tagore about man as the measure of all things should be understood as a statement that everything is true and there is nothing false, or vice versa [See: 12. p. 11].
Or it is possible to recognize in the thesis of Protagoras a complete doubt. In any case, we clearly see in Protagoras a subjectivist tendency, and, consequently, the possibility of affirming and denying any thesis with the same reason, i.e. the principle of isosthenia (laoaGsvsia), which is, as will be discussed later, one of the cornerstones of skepticism. The principle of isosthenia was first proclaimed by Protagoras, who, according to Diogenes Laertes, "for the first time said that two statements opposing each other can be made about any thing." Protagoras' isosthenic positions are well illustrated by his statement about the gods: “About the gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist; many things prevent me from recognizing this, and above all, the darkness of the subject and the brevity of human life.
According to Sextus Empiricus, Gorgias in his work “On Non-Existent, or On Nature” originally formulated the sophistic doctrine, arranging three chapters in succession: the first - that nothing exists; the second - that even if it exists, it is incomprehensible to man; and the third - that if it is comprehensible, then in any case it is inexpressible and inexplicable for another. As for the first two theses, Gorgias does not assert them dogmatically, assuming the opposite (as evidenced by the implicative construction of the second and third thesis - "if ..., then"). Therefore, in general, his position is isostenic.
Since the sophists were, for the most part, paid teachers of wisdom, philosophizing for them, apparently, was not an end in itself. Perhaps that is why the significant skeptical charge of Greek sophistry did not turn into proper philosophical skepticism. V. Brochard notes that in sophistry youthful activity prevails, in Pyrrhonism - senile fatigue. McCall also emphasizes that the Sophists lived, unlike the Pyrrhonics, not from love of happiness, but from love of truth ("not from love of happiness but from love of truth"). (Here, apparently, it should be noted that we are talking about the truth according to which there is no single and generally accepted truth.)
The Socratic opposition to the subjectivism and relativism of the Sophists lies, first of all, in the assertion that, despite all the subjective characteristics of people, there must certainly be something common for everyone, which rises above the differences between people and unites the latter, and that the goal of philosophy is to once the finding and justification of this common. However, the heuristic method by which Socrates went to this goal contained a significant skeptical element: after all, each person, according to Socrates, should not blindly follow an authoritative judgment, but independently, through doubts, contradictions, bewilderment and disappointment, seek the truth. It is for this methodical, instrumental skepticism that contemporaries
and they accused the eminent philosopher of wickedness (aaspsia), allegedly expressed in disrespect for state laws and corrupting youth.
The teachings of Plato and Aristotle, despite all their objectivism, were not alien to distinctly expressed skeptical tendencies. So, for example, in the Timaeus dialogue, Plato emphasizes that there is nothing surprising in the fact that “... we, considering many things in many respects, such as the gods and the birth of the Universe, will not achieve complete accuracy and consistency in our reasoning. . On the contrary, we should rejoice if our reasoning turns out to be no less plausible than any other, and, moreover, remember that I, the reasoner, and you, my judges, are only people, and therefore we have to be content in such matters with a plausible myth, not demanding more"; and in another place he says that: "our investigation must proceed in such a way as to achieve the greatest degree of probability." Skeptical elements in the teachings of such non-skeptical philosophers as Plato and Aristotle are explained by the fact that in their systems, in addition to absolute being (ideas and forms), there is also matter, which is interpreted either as non-being, bearing, or as other being. And if Plato's ideas and Aristotle's forms are the guarantor of the stability and unconditionality of the world, then they use matter as a source of its uncertainty and instability. She is just a “receiver” of being and therefore “... about what only reproduces the prototype and is only a semblance of the real image, and one can speak no more than plausibly. For as being is related to birth, so truth is related to faith. As a result of this instability, Plato notes, any thing can be completely different from what it is to us at one time or another ^onf.: Plat. Tim. 48e - 50a], which means that our judgments about these transient things can only be of a probabilistic nature ^onf.: Plat. Tim. 56c]. In the teachings of Aristotle, discussions about the instability and relativity of things are contained in the treatise "Topeka", which is devoted to the interpretation of reality as a structure that is constantly becoming and therefore, to a certain extent, unpredictable. An innumerable number of different facets, sides or nuances (topoi) of the universe gives it an infinite qualitative diversity. In addition, the eternal interaction and movement of these nuances determines the probabilistic and transient nature of the entire cosmos.
So, with all the positiveness that is generally characteristic of the various teachings of Greek philosophy in all its periods, the Hellenic thinkers also spoke about such aspects of being that made them understand it not only as something stable, harmonious, absolute and unconditional, but also as a process of becoming and change, as something unstable, relative, to some extent even random, and therefore largely conditional and unpredictable. As you can see, long before the appearance of the skeptical school in Hellenic philosophy, among others, the idea of the universe as something unstable and difficult to understand was fully formed. The skeptics remained to focus
focus our attention precisely on such a worldview, comprehensively substantiate and develop it.
In addition, the very historical context of the end of the 4th - 3rd centuries. BC e. favored the emergence of skepticism as an independent philosophical trend. The Hellenistic era, which began with Alexander's campaign to the East, was characterized by extreme instability of both economic, political, social, and cultural realities. Historical life and individual existence were characterized at that time, first of all, by gloomy unpredictability and the loss of all previous guarantees and guidelines. The centuries-old measured and calm course of life was destroyed within a few years, and a person from a quiet and peaceful abode of the policy was thrown into the whirlpool of the raging Hellenistic elements, where the unprotected could disappear forever without a trace.
Such historical conditions have contributed to the emergence of skepticism in two ways. Firstly, the general relativity and instability of life naturally caused pessimism, unbelief, doubt, that is, they gave rise to the so-called everyday skepticism or mood skepticism. And any state or mood inevitably begins to create a theoretical justification and confirmation for itself. Thus, mood skepticism, provoked by a specific historical situation, gave rise to or stimulated philosophical skepticism. Secondly, the already known historical realities, in the ethical sphere, characterized by the loss of any external, generally significant foundations, guidelines, principles and guarantees for the individual, inevitably forced him to look for postulates no longer outside, but within himself, turned human thought, mainly towards ethical problematics, bringing to life the need for a theoretical substantiation of subjectivism, the ethical and philosophical search for individual happiness. The philosophical schools that appeared at that time went in different ways to the same cherished goal. Self-sufficient happiness (eudaimonia) among the Epicureans is the result of deviation from the world, among the Stoics, on the contrary, it is the result of following it, among the skeptics - neither one nor the other, but a decisive doubt in everything.
So, ancient skepticism, on the one hand, was a definite result of individual, more or less pronounced, skeptical tendencies in the development of Greek philosophy from the pre-Socratic to the Hellenistic period; on the other hand, it represents a kind of intellectual reaction to the emergence of the philosophical priority of the unconditional eudemonistic orientation of Hellenism, which found its expression in the philosophical constructions of not only skeptics, but also Epicureans, Stoics, Cynics, Cyrenaics and was largely due to the socio-economic and political instability and, as a result, the emotional and psychological disorder characteristic of this era. In pre-Pyrrhonian philosophy, skepticism, although it existed in the form of separate fragments, nevertheless, as a whole, was an essential stream in ancient philosophizing, which largely determined its type and specifics.
LITERATURE
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Aristoteles. Topica // Opera. tom. I. - P. 258-422. Aristotle. Topeka. Per. M.I. Itkin // Aristotle. Works in 4 volumes. - T. 2. - M., 1978. - S. 347-531.
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Diels H. Die Fragmente der Vorsocraticer. Griechish and Deutsch. - Berlin, 1903; Makovelsky A.O. Presocratics. - Kazan, 1914. - Part I; 1915. - Part II; 1919. - Part III; Makovelsky A.O. Ancient Greek atomists. - Baku, 1940; Fragments of early Greek philosophers. - Part I. From epic theocosmogony to the emergence of atomism. Per. A.V. Lebedev. - M.: Nauka, 1989.
Diogenes Laertius. De vitis, dogmatis et apophthegmatis clarorum philosophorum libri X. Vol. I-II. - Lipsiae, 1828-1831. Diogenes Laertes. About the life, teachings and sayings of famous philosophers. Per. M. L. Gasparova. - M.: Thought, 1979.
Plato. Cratylus // Platonis Dialogi. Vol. I. - Lipsiae, 1873. - P. 157-236; Plato. Kra-til. Per. T.V. Vasilyeva // Plato. Works in 3 volumes. T. 1. - M.: Thought. 1968. - S. 413-491.
Plato. Theaetetus // Platonis Dialogi. Vol. I. P. 237-338. Plato. Theaetetus. Per. T.V. Vasilyeva // Plato. Works ... T. 2. - M., 1970. - S. 223-317.
Plato. Timaeus // Platonis Dialogi. Vol. IV. P. 319-406. Plato. Timaeus. Per. S.S. Averintseva // Platon. Works ... T. 3. Part 1. - M., 1971. - S. 455-541.
Sextus Empiricus. Adversus mathematicos sive disciplinarum professores libri VI et Adversus philosophos libri V // Sextus Empiricus. Opera Graece et Latine. Tom II. - Lipsiae, 1841; Sextus Empiric. against scientists. Per. A.F. Loseva // Sextus Empiric. Works in 2 volumes. - M.: Thought, 1976. - S. 7-204.
Sextus Empiricus. Pyrrhoniarum institutionum Libri III // Sextus Empiricus. Opera... Tom. I. Lipsiae, 1840. Sextus Empiricus. Three books of Pyrrhonian provisions. Per. N.V. Bryullova-Shaskolskaya // Sextus Empiric. Works. - T. 2. - S. 205-380.
Losev A.F. History of ancient aesthetics: Early Hellenism. - M.: Art, 1979.
Losev A.F. Cultural and historical significance of ancient skepticism and the activities of Sextus Empiricus // Sextus Empiricus. Works in 2 volumes. - T. 1. - M.: Thought, 1976. - S. 5-58.
Richter R. Skepticism in Philosophy. - T. 1. Per. V. Bazarov, B. Stolpner. - St. Petersburg: Rosehip, 1910.
Semushkin A.V. ancient skepticism. Lecture 1. Pyrrhonism // Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series "Philosophy". - M., 1997. - No. 1. - S. 176-187.
Semushkin A.V. ancient skepticism. Lecture 2. The evolution of Pyrrhonism. Neo-Pyrrhonism // Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series "Philosophy". - M., 1998. - No. 1. - S. 66-73.
Sokolskaya M.M. Infinite approximation to the truth // Cicero M.T. academic teaching. Per. ON THE. Fedorov. - M.: Indrik, 2004. - S. 4-48.
DeLacy Ph. Oi ^aXXov and the antecedents of ancient skepticism // Phronesis. - 1958. - Vol. 3. - No. 1. - P. 59-71.
Frede M. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. - Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
Maccoll N. The Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho to Sextus. - London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1869.
The Skeptical Tradition. Ed. By Burnyeat M. - Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983.
Sedley D. The Motivation of Greek Skepticism // The Skeptical Tradition. - 1983.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ATECEDENTS OF ANCIENT GREEK SKEPTICISM
Moscow teachers-training state university subfaculty of philosophy
Vernadskogopr., 88, Moscow, Russia, 117571
The founder of ancient sceptical trend is considered greek philosopher Pyrrho from Elith (about III c. B.C.), but sceptical elements had also circulation in Greek philosophy before Pyrrho. These elements are analyzed by the author of the article.
The philosophy of ancient skepticism existed for quite a long time and was the most influential trend in philosophy for many, many centuries - from the 4th century. BC according to III-IV centuries. after R.Kh. According to tradition, the founder of ancient skepticism is the philosopher Pyrrho, together with his student Timon. In the future, the skepticism of the Pyrrhonian type fades somewhat, and the so-called academic skepticism appears in the Platonic Academy with such representatives as Carneades and Arcesilaus - this is the 2nd century BC. BC Pyrrhonian skepticism (what later became known as Pyrrhonism) is revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa (the works of these philosophers have not survived to this day). A representative of late ancient skepticism is the philosopher and physician Sextus Empiricus, who lived in the 2nd century BC. after R.Kh. In the III-IV centuries. the school still exists, and elements of skepticism can be found in the physician Galen.
A few words about the life of the founder of ancient skepticism - Pyrrho. He was born in Elis in 360 B.C. and lived for 90 years. Pyrrho belongs to those philosophers who did not write philosophical treatises, like Socrates, showing with his life the philosophy that he developed. We know about him from the book of Diogenes Laertes. The chapter on Pyrrho in it is the main source of information about Pyrrhonism. From it we learn that he refrained from any judgment, i.e. he had doubts about the knowability of the world. And Pyrrho, being a consistent philosopher, strove throughout his life to be a supporter of this doctrine. As Diogenes Laertes points out, Pyrrho did not move away from anything, shunned nothing, did not avoid any danger, whether it be a cart, a pile or a dog, without being exposed to a sense of danger in anything; he was saved by his friends who followed him. This is a rather bold statement, because it contradicts the essence of skeptical philosophy. Further, Diogenes reports that at first Pyrrho was engaged in painting, a picture written rather mediocre has been preserved. He lived in seclusion, rarely appearing even at home. The inhabitants of Elis respected him for his intelligence and elected him high priest. This raises some questions. Again, it is not clear how a person, being an extravagant and convinced skeptic, could become a high priest. Moreover, for his sake they decided to free all philosophers from taxes. More than once he left the house without saying anything to anyone, and wandered around with anyone. One day his friend Anaxarchus fell into a swamp, Pyrrho passed by without shaking his hand. Everyone scolded him, but Anaxarchus praised him. He lived with his sister, a midwife, carried chickens and piglets to the market to sell.
A famous incident is mentioned by Diogenes Laertes: when Pyrrho was sailing on a ship and, together with his companions, fell into a storm, everyone began to panic, only Pyrrho, pointing to the ship’s pig, which serenely slurped from its trough, said that this is how the true philosopher.
Little is known about Pyrrho's disciple Timon: only that he was a poet and expounded his teaching in the form of verses, syl. In the future, skeptical ideas began to develop in the Platonic Academy. The disciples of Plato developed the teachings of Plato in their own way. Carneades and Arcesilaus, considering themselves true Platonists, began to develop the theme of criticism of sensationalism and came to the conclusion that truth is unknowable. Nothing has come down to us from Carneades and Arcesilaus either. The supporter of academic skepticism is the ancient Roman orator and philosopher Cicero. He has a number of works where he sets out his point of view on academic skeptics. We can also get acquainted with academic skepticism in the work of Blessed. Augustine "Against the Academicians", where he criticizes their teaching.
In the future, Pyrrhonism is revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa, and then already by Sextus Empiricus, the systematizer and, perhaps, the most talented deceiver of Pyrrhonism. Sextus Empiricus wrote 2 works - "Three Books of Pyrrho's Provisions" and "Against the Scholars".
Ancient skepticism, like all Hellenistic philosophy, posed primarily ethical questions, considering the main solution to the problem of how to live in this world, how to achieve a happy life. It is usually believed that skepticism is primarily a doubt about the cognizability of truth, and they reduce skepticism only to the theory of knowledge. However, with regard to Pyrrhonism, this is not at all the case. Sextus Empiricus divides all philosophical schools into 2 classes: dogmatic and skeptical. He also divides dogmatists into proper dogmatists and academicians. Dogmatists and academicians believe that they have already decided the question of truth: dogmatists, i.e. the followers of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and others, claim that they have found the truth, while the academicians claim (also dogmatically) that it is impossible to find the truth. Only skeptics seek the truth. Hence, as Sextus Empiricus says, there are three main kinds of philosophy: dogmatic, academic, and skeptical. Diogenes Laertes writes that, in addition to the name "skeptics" - from the word "to look out", they were also called aporetics (from the word "aporia"), zetics (from the word "search") and effectiki (that is, doubters).
As Sextus Empiricus pointed out, the essence of skeptical philosophy boils down to the following: “The skeptical ability is that which opposes in any possible way the phenomenon to the conceivable, hence, due to the equivalence in opposite things and speeches, we come first to refraining from judgment, and then to equanimity.” I note that Sextus speaks of a skeptical ability, and never of a dogmatic one, showing that being a skeptic is natural for a person, while being a dogmatist is unnatural. At first, skeptics try to consider all phenomena and everything conceivable, find out that these phenomena and concepts can be perceived in different ways, including the opposite, they prove that in this way everyone will contradict each other, so that one judgment will balance another judgment. Due to the equivalence of judgments in opposite things and speeches, the skeptic decides to abstain from judging anything, and then comes to equanimity - ataraxia, i.e. to what the Stoics were looking for. And each of these stages was carefully developed by skeptics. Refraining from judgment is also called the term "epoch".
So the first task of a Pyrrhonician is to set everything against each other in whatever way possible. Therefore, the skeptic opposes everything: the phenomenon against the phenomenon, the phenomenon against the conceivable, the conceivable against the conceivable. For these purposes, Enesidemus developed ten trails, and Agrippa five more. Often these paths limit the consideration of skepticism, and there are good reasons for this. Here, indeed, are the foundations of ancient Pyrrhonism. But before considering the paths, let's try to understand whether it is really possible to live following the philosophy of ancient skepticism?
The dispute about this philosophy arose during the lifetime of the skeptics themselves, they were reproached for the fact that their philosophy was not viable, that it had no life guide. Because in order to live, you have to take something for the truth. If you doubt everything, then, as Aristotle said, a person going to Megara will never reach it, because one must be sure at least that Megara exists.
Skepticism was reproached for such sins by Pascal, Arno, Nicole, Hume and other philosophers of modern times. However, Sextus Empiricus writes something completely opposite - that the skeptic accepts his philosophy in order not to remain inactive, because it is dogmatic philosophy that leads a person to inactivity, only skepticism can serve as a guide in life and activity. The skeptic focuses primarily on phenomena, refuses to know the essence of things, because he is not sure of this, he is looking for it. What is certain for him is a phenomenon. As Pyrrho said: that honey seems sweet to me, I am sure of this, but I refrain from judging that it is sweet by nature.
The dogmatist, on the other hand, affirms certain propositions about the essence of things, and they may be erroneous, which shows the difference between dogmatic schools. And what happens if a person begins to act in accordance with an erroneous philosophy? This will lead to sad consequences. If we rely in our philosophy only on phenomena, only on what we undoubtedly know, then all our activity will have a solid foundation.
This position of Sextus Empiricus has other roots. In the 1st century after R.Kh. in Greece there were three medical schools: methodical, dogmatic and empirical. The doctor Sextus belonged to the school of empiricists, hence his name "Empiricist". The doctor Galen belonged to the same school. These doctors argued that one should not search for the origins of diseases, one should not determine what is more in a person: earth or fire, one should not bring all four elements into harmony, but one should look at the symptoms and rid the patient of these symptoms. In the treatment of patients, this method gave good results, but empiricists wanted to treat not only the body, but also the soul. The main diseases of the soul are dogmatism and academicism, because they prevent a person from achieving happiness, and dogmatism must be cured. A person must be cured of what he is mistaken in, and he is mistaken in that it is possible to know the essence of things. It is necessary to show him that this is erroneous, to show that the truth is sought by trusting the phenomenon. In the chapter "Why Does a Skeptic Make Weak Arguments?" Sextus Empiricus writes about this. Indeed, when we read his works, we often see weak arguments, sometimes even funny ones. Sextus Empiricus himself knows this and says that skeptics deliberately do this - they say, one can be convinced with a weak argument, for the other one needs to build a solid philosophical system. The main thing is the goal, the achievement of happiness. However, for the sake of fairness, it must be said that skeptics have very few weak arguments.
So let's look at the skeptical arguments put forward by Sextus Empiricus. First, about the paths of Enisidem. There are ten of them, they mainly cover the sensual side of knowledge, and the five paths of Agrippa - the rational.
The first trope is based on the diversity of living beings and reads as follows. Philosophers argue that the criterion of truth is a person, i.e. he is the measure of all things (Protagoras) and he alone can know the truth. The skeptic rightly asks, why, in fact, a person? After all, a person learns the world around him through the senses. But the diversity of the animal world shows that animals also have sense organs and are different from humans. Why do we believe that the human senses give a truer picture of the world than the senses of animals? How can those with a narrow ear and those with a wide ear, those with hairy ears and those with smooth ears, hear equally? And we have no right to consider ourselves a criterion of truth. Therefore, we must refrain from judging, because we do not know whose sense organs can be trusted.
The second trope: the philosopher makes an assumption (narrowing the question): let's say that a person is a criterion of truth. But there are many people, and they are different. There are Scythians, Greeks, Indians. They tolerate cold and heat in different ways, food for some is healthy, for others it is harmful. People are diverse, and therefore it is impossible to say which person is the criterion of truth.
The third trope further narrows the field of study. The skeptic suggests that we have found a person who is the criterion of truth. But he has many sense organs that can give a picture of the world around him in different ways: honey tastes sweet, but is unpleasant to look at, rainwater is good for the eyes, and the respiratory tract becomes rough from it, etc. - this also implies abstinence judgments about the environment.
The fourth trope is about circumstances. Suppose there is a sense organ that we can trust the most, but there are always some circumstances: there are tears in the eyes that more or less affect the idea of a visible object, or an uneven state of mind: for a woman in love, a woman seems beautiful, for another - nothing special. Wine seems sour if you eat dates before it, and if you eat nuts or peas, then sweet, etc. This also results in refraining from judgment.
The fifth trope is about dependence on position, distances and places. For example, a tower seems small from a distance, but large up close. The same lamp flame is dim in the sun and bright in the dark. Coral is soft in the sea and hard in the air. The facts again force us to refrain from judging what the subject is in essence.
The sixth trope depends on impurities, writes Sextus. We never perceive any phenomenon in itself, but only in conjunction with something. It is always air or water or some other medium. One and the same sound is different in rare air or in dense air, aromas intoxicate in a bath more than in ordinary air, etc. Same conclusion as before.
The seventh trope concerns the size and structure of the underlying objects. The same object may look different depending on whether it is large or small, whether it is broken into its component parts or is whole. For example, filings of silver themselves appear black, but together as a whole they appear white; wine, consumed in moderation, strengthens us, and with excess, it relaxes the body, etc.
The eighth trope is about attitude towards something. It echoes the sixth. The skeptic claims that since everything exists in relation to something, we will refrain from saying what it is in isolation in its nature.
The ninth trope concerns the constantly or rarely encountered. The sun should strike us, of course, more, writes Sextus Empiricus, but since we see it constantly, and the comet is rare, we are amazed at the comet in such a way that we consider it a divine sign, and we are not surprised at all by the sun. What is less common surprises us, even if the event itself is very ordinary.
The tenth trope is connected with the issue of morality and depends on the beliefs and dogmatic positions of different peoples, their customs. Sextus gives examples where he shows that different peoples have their own ideas about good and evil. Some Ethiopians tattoo small children, but we don't. The Persians consider it proper to wear long multicolored clothes, but we do not, and so on.
The first trope is about heterogeneity. It shows that there is a huge variety philosophical systems, people cannot agree and find the truth, it follows that if there is still no agreement, then it is necessary to refrain from judgment for the time being.
The second trope is about moving away to infinity. Based on it, the skeptic argues: in order to prove something, one must be based on a statement that must also be proved, it must be proved on the basis of some other statement, which in turn must also be proved, and so on. - we go to infinity, i.e. we don't know where to start justifying, and so we refrain from judging.
The third trope is called “relative to what,” in which the underlying thing seems to be this or that in relation to the one who judges or contemplates the subject. He who judges an object is at the same time the subject and the object of knowledge. When we judge something, we intervene in the process of cognition, therefore we cannot judge the object in itself, since it does not exist by itself, but exists only for us.
The fourth trope is about supposition. If a philosopher wants to avoid going to infinity, then he dogmatically assumes that some proposition is true in itself. But the skeptic does not agree to such a concession, believing that this is precisely a concession, the position is accepted without proof and therefore cannot claim the truth.
The fifth trope is on mutual provability, which says that in order to avoid infinity in a proof, philosophers often fall into the errors of mutual provability. One proposition is justified with the help of another, which in turn is justified with the help of the first.
All these tropes are used by skeptics when considering any philosophical question.
Skeptics argued with their contemporaries, the main opponents for them were the Stoics. In the books of Sextus Empiricus, there are objections to ethics, rhetoricians, geometers, astrologers (arguments from this book will be found in the works of the Church Fathers). Take, for example, the issue of causality. In particular, Sextus Empiricus considers the question, does a cause exist or not? First he proves that there is a cause, for it is difficult to suppose that there is any effect without its cause, then everything would be in complete disorder. But even with no less persuasiveness, he proves that there is no reason. For before we think of any effect, we must know that there is a cause that produces this effect, and in order to know that this is a cause, we must know that it is the cause of an effect, i.e. we can neither think the cause nor the effect separately, i.e. they are relative to each other. Therefore, in order to think the cause, one must first know the action, and in order to know the action, one must first know the cause. It follows from this mutual evidence that we cannot know either the cause or the effect.
A few words about how ancient skepticism interacted with nascent Christianity. Can we say that skepticism hindered or helped the spread of Christianity? Most historians of philosophy believe that ancient skepticism prepared the way for the seed of Christianity to fall on fertile ground through the preaching of the apostles. Skeptical views in the first years after A.D. were so common among ancient thinkers that any statement could be perceived as quite reliable and worthy. And skepticism prepared the ancient world to say: "I believe, because it is absurd." Therefore, we can say that skepticism played a preparatory role for the spread of Christianity in Europe.
Skepticism was developed in the writings of Lactantius, who considered skepticism a good introduction to Christianity. After all, skepticism shows the futility and weakness of our mind, it proves that the mind cannot know the truth on its own, this requires revelation. On the other hand, bliss. Augustine shows another way of dealing with skepticism Christian - the way to overcome it. In his writings, he proves that skepticism is not true philosophy. According to Augustine, skepticism destroys faith in truth, and since God is truth, skepticism leads to atheism. Therefore, every Christian must wage an uncompromising struggle against skepticism.
Who is Diogenes Laertes? What is his biography, and how long ago did this person live? What works survived after his death? The answers to all these questions can be found in this article.
Biography of Diogenes Laertes
Unfortunately, first of all, it should be said that today Diogenes Laertes remains a mysterious person. His biography does not contain a single reliable fact.
Based on the opinions of scientists, we can conclude that he was born in the Cilician city of Laerta. Diogenes Laertes was born (the photo of his bust is presented first) presumably at the end of the second century AD and lived until the third century AD.
And scientists, in turn, were able to draw such a conclusion based on the fact that the philosopher in one of his writings mentions the name of Sextus Empiricus, who was his contemporary.
As for the name of Diogenes, there is also no reliable information as to whether this is a real name, or a pseudonym, a nickname.
Works of Diogenes
This philosopher is also called the historian of philosophy. His hand belongs to a treatise, which consists of 10 books and describes the life and work of many ancient Greek thinkers.
It is also worth noting that in this treatise, a total of 84 philosophers are mentioned, about a thousand statements of more than 250 different authors are quoted.
The same treatise, authored by Diogenes Laertes, has several different names, more precisely, different sources convey it differently. As a rule, the main ones are: "History of Philosophy", "Life and Opinions of Famous Philosophers", as well as "Biographies of the Sophists".
Composition of a treatise on philosophers
- A book about Thales, Solo, Byant and other philosophers from the four "seven" who lived in the 7th-6th centuries BC.
- The second book describes the adherents of the Ionian school. Separate sections are devoted to Socrates and many of his followers. Euclid and Aristippus are also mentioned in this book.
- The third book contains the life and deeds of Plato. His works are described.
- A book about Polemon, Carneades and other philosophers who were students of Plato's academy.
- This book describes the life and work of Aristotle, as well as his students Theophastus, Heraclides, and Demetrius.
- The sixth book conveys the postulates of the teachings of the Cynic school, provides information about its founder Antisthenes and his students - Diogenes of Sinop, Crates with his wife Hipparchia, Metrocles, Onesicrite and others.
- Diogenes Laertes dedicated this book to the Stoic philosophical school. Names such as Chrysippus, Ariston of Chios, Zeno of China and others are mentioned here.
- The eighth book is entirely devoted to the life and teachings of Pythagoras, mentioning the names of Empedocles, Eudoxus, Philolaus and other Pythagoreans.
- This book also describes its representatives - Heraclitus of Ephesus, Xenophanes, Parmenides, as well as the followers of philosophy - Democritus, Leucippe. The book also mentions the names of the sophist Protagoras and the skeptics Piron and Timon.
- The last book of the treatise is dedicated to the philosopher Epicurus.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is worth saying: despite the fact that Diogenes Laertes was a biographer, there are practically no facts about his life and work. Conclusions about the character and temperament can only be drawn from his surviving heritage and rare mentions of scientists.
- Diogenes begged for alms from the sculpture, and when he was asked why he was doing this, the answer was: "To accustom yourself to failure."
- “There are a lot of people, but there are very few people in the world”
- “And where to wash those who washed here?” asked a philosopher once, speaking of an untidy bathhouse.
- in one of the books the following quote is given: “Euripides gave Socrates the work of Heraclitus and asked his opinion; he replied: “What I understood is fine; what I didn’t understand, probably, too.”
- “The slanderer is the most fierce of wild animals, and the flatterer is the most dangerous of tame animals”
It is also important to say that Diogenes Laertes is not the philosopher whom the legend associates with Sinopsky, he arranged a dwelling for himself in a barrel and behaved extremely shockingly. But Diogenes Laertes, at least judging by the archives, was not seen in this.
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