In the liberal media, they scream about the terrible and insidious detachments in the Red Army, which shot retreating soldiers from machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created with the aim of discrediting the Stalinist period in Russian history. In this analytical article you will find figures and facts from state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as memories of the participants of past battles in the Second World War on the topic of the actions of barrage detachments in relation to their own army.

The famous NPO order No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which immediately became known among the soldiers as “Not a Step Back”, among other very tough measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, also prescribed the creation of the so-called. defensive squads. In this order, Stalin demanded:

B) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland; ...

And somehow immediately the information about these units went into the shadows. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war years or in the post-war years. Even at the time of the "exposure of Stalin's personality cult," they tried to bypass the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply hushed up, or they were deafly blamed on the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.

After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the subject of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people do not have any information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, who especially prefer to receive a fee in dollars from various foreign "democracy support funds", began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that the Red Army soldiers were driven into battle exclusively by commissars and machine guns of the detachments. That hundreds of thousands of ruined lives are on the conscience of the detachments, that, instead of fighting at the front themselves, the detachments mowed down entire divisions with machine-gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.

Moreover, again, without any evidence, documents, and increasingly referring to the "memoirs" of very dubious personalities.

One of the most terrible myths of World War II is associated with the existence of detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern war serials you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in the blue caps of the NKVD troops, machine-gunning wounded soldiers leaving the battlefield. By showing this, the authors take on the soul a great sin. None of the researchers managed to find a single fact in the archives to confirm this.

What happened?

Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by military counterintelligence, firstly represented by the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, and from July 17, 1941, by the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

As the main tasks of the special departments for the period of the war, the decision of the State Defense Committee defined "a decisive struggle against espionage and treason in the Red Army units and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line." They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.

To ensure operational activities in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. By July 25, 1941, Beria were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrier service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Each detained commander, Red Army soldier, Red Navy soldier was checked. If he was recognized as having fled from the battlefield, then he was subjected to immediate arrest, and an operational (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be tried by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the duty to carry out the sentences of military tribunals, including before the ranks. In “particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to be taken to immediately restore order at the front,” the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (navy). Servicemen who lagged behind the unit for an objective reason, in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, were sent to the headquarters of the nearest division.

The flow of servicemen who lagged behind their units in a kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was huge. Only from the beginning of the war until October 10, 1941, the operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. The German agents were easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of scouts neutralized in the winter-spring of 1942 had the task of physically liquidating the command of the Western and Kalinin fronts, including the commanding generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev.

Special departments could hardly cope with such a volume of cases. The situation required the creation of special units that would be directly involved in preventing unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, returning stragglers to their units and subunits, and detaining deserters.

The first initiative of this kind was shown by the military command. After the appeal of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in "unstable" divisions, where there were repeated cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to the rifle divisions of the entire Red Army.

These barrage detachments (numbering up to a battalion) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops, they acted as part of the rifle divisions of the Red Army, were recruited at the expense of their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were detachments formed either by military special departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which, by order of the State Defense Committee, took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow from the west and south along the line Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks from October 15 to October 28, 1941, more than 75,000 servicemen were detained in the Moscow zone.

From the very beginning, the barrage formations, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not oriented by the leadership towards general executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today in the press one has to deal with such accusations; detachments are sometimes called punishers. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand military personnel detained by October 10, 1941, after checking, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among which special departments were: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, spreaders of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10,201 people were shot, including 3,321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number - more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the barrage formations were curtailed without permission. Order No. 227 gave her a new impetus.

The detachments of up to 200 people created in accordance with it consisted of fighters and commanders of the Red Army, who did not differ in form or weapons from the rest of the Red Army soldiers. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was not subordinate to the command of the division, behind the battle formations of which it was located, but to the command of the army through the NKVD OO. The detachment was led by a state security officer.

In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments functioned in parts of the active army. First of all, the Stalinist order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - were formed in the Stalingrad direction.

Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, barrage detachments were charged with the duty to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs in which they were engaged turned out to be wider.

“The barrage detachments,” recalled General of the Army P. N. Lashchenko, who was deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army at the time of the publication of order No. , unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

Here is a document from the FSB archives. He is not able to illuminate the whole real picture of the barrage detachments, but he can lead to certain reflections. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Departments to the leadership of the NKVD. It is not dated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. It can be seen from this that these are only the first results of the actions of the detachments.

In accordance with the order of NPO No. 227, in units operating in the Red Army, as of October 15, 193 barrage detachments were formed.

Of these, in parts of the Stalingrad Front, 16 and the Don Front were formed - 25, and a total of 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD of the armies.

From the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 of this year), barrage detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line.

Of those detained: 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

15,649 people were detained along the Stalingrad Front, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

It should be noted that the barrage detachments, and especially the detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to the special departments of the NKVD armies), during the period of fierce battles with the enemy, played a positive role in restoring order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, the return of a significant number soldiers on the front line.

August 29 this year the headquarters of the 29th division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control in a panic, retreated to the rear. The detachment detachment operating behind the battle formations of the division units (the detachment chief, lieutenant of state security Filatov), ​​having taken drastic measures, stopped the military personnel retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines.
In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

September 14 this year the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th division of the 62nd army, which carried the defense of the city of Stalingrad. The fighters and commanders of the 396th and 472nd divisions of the regiments began to retreat in a panic, leaving the lines. The head of the detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Elman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and after 2 hours the regiments occupied the former lines of their defense.

September 20 this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal to another line. By the actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces, order was restored in the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, at the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, when support was needed to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully held back his onslaught and inflicted losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd army, led by the head of the detachment (state security lieutenant Khlystov), ​​took up defensive positions on the outskirts of an important height. For 4 days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy submachine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units.

September 15-16 this year The detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for 2 days against superior enemy forces in the area of ​​the railway. railway station in Stalingrad. Despite its small size, the detachment not only repelled enemy attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th page of the division came to replace it.

A number of facts were noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of detachments were sent into battle along with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization and the barrier service was not carried out.
September 19 p. The command of the 240th division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove from a group of German machine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 people were killed.

The barrage detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being operationally subordinate to the commander of the 246th division division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army of the 2nd Barrage Detachment on September 4th. 174 divisions were attached to the division and put into battle. As a result, the detachments lost up to 70% of their personnel in battle, the remaining fighters of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 of this year. was placed on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, on the orders of the army commander Chistyakov 59 and a member of the Military Council Abramov 60, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Military Council of the front on the transfer of 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not carried out.

Signature (Kazakevich)

Army General Hero of the Soviet Union P. N. Lashchenko:
Yes, there were guards. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own, at least on our sector of the front. Already now I requested archival documents on this subject, such documents were not found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, they covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, they detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up during the Soviet era. We were all brought up on the postulates of a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, the selfless devotion of the Soviet people to their homeland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.

These ideological attitudes somehow begin to be eroded when you read in this document that only within the Stalingrad Front by mid-October 1942, detachments detained more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front, and along the entire line of the Soviet-German front more than 140 thousand, i. e. by the number of more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that by no means all those who fled from the front were detained. At best, half.

One can only be surprised that such detachments were not created back in the 41st. After all, before my eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie) in its structure, which, having professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying simulators and crossbows, restoring order in the rear, clearing rear units from redundant soldiers.

Getting acquainted with the figures of the report, one comes to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of detachments was a necessary and much belated measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party entourage, instead of harsh disciplinary measures, fully justified in the conditions of war, led to attempts to use indoctrination and, in fact, to persuade soldiers with the help of an outrageously bloated and extremely inefficient political apparatus, and led us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if instead of reviving the institution of military commissars in the summer of 1941, detachments would have been created, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.

Note that soon after the creation of detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.

Like it or not, but associations arise: there are commissars - there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.

More interesting numbers. Of the 140,755 detained servicemen, only 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people (i.e. soldiers and sergeants) were sent to penal companies, 185 people (i.e. officers) were sent to penal battalions, returned to their units and to transit points 131094 person. A very soft attitude towards those who fled from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand out of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.

Well, if it was necessary, then the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.

As many participants in the war testify, detachments did not exist everywhere. According to the Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, they were generally absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.

Do not stand up to criticism and the version that the detachments "guarded" penal units. The company commander of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired colonel A.V. Pyltsyn, who fought from 1943 until the very Victory, states: “Our battalion under no circumstances had any detachments, no other deterrent measures. It's just that it's never been needed."

Famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of detachments behind the battle formations of their unit.

In reality, the outposts of the army detachment were located at a distance of 1.5–2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in fines, but checked and detained everyone whose stay outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their combat activities is sometimes highly speculative.

The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed in one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer-autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 servicemen who "escaped from the front line." Of these: arrested - 3980, shot - 1189, sent to penal companies - 2776, to penal battalions - 185, the vast majority of detainees - 131094 people were returned to their units and to transit points. The above statistics show that the vast majority of military personnel, who had previously left the front line for various reasons - more than 91%, got the opportunity to continue fighting without any loss of rights.

Participant of the war Levin Mikhail Borisovich:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary ...

This order “sobered up” many, forced them to come to their senses ...
And as for the detachments, I only once encountered their "activities" at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank faltered and ran, so the detachment opened fire, where it cut across, where it was right on the fleeing ... After that, I never saw a detachment near the advanced detachment. If a critical situation arose in battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of the detachment guards - to stop those who were scurrying in a panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of submachine gunners.

Memory book. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. WWII hero. Project I Remember

Participant of the war A. Dergaev:
Now there is a lot of talk about detachments. We were in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I did not see them. That is, they must have been somewhere, perhaps even further behind us. But we didn't meet them. A few years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which the following words: “... we dug a trench to its full height. The German hits us right in the forehead, and behind the detachment ... ". I was sitting on the balcony and, unable to stand it, I jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed it. During a break, I tell them: “They are bullying you, but you are silent.” He still sings these songs. In general, just as we did not see women at the front, so did the NKVD.

Memory book. - Artillerymen. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. WWII hero

As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This applied to deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, self-shooters. It happened - and they shot in front of the ranks. But the decision to enforce this extreme measure was made not by the commander of the detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (not lower) or, in separate, prearranged cases, by the head of the special department of the army.

In exceptional situations, the soldiers of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could take place: endurance could change the fighters and commanders of detachments in a difficult situation. But to assert that such was the daily practice - there are no grounds. Cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation on an individual basis. Punishment, as a rule, is only the initiators of panic and flight.

Here are some typical examples from the history of the battle on the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. When the fighters and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic, the head of the detachment, Junior Lieutenant of State Security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On October 15, in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division, as well as three (115th, 124th and 149th) separate rifle brigades, from the main forces of the 62nd Army. Having succumbed to panic, a number of military personnel, including commanders of various degrees, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. In order to prevent this, the task force under the leadership of senior detective lieutenant of state security Ignatenko, created by a special department of the 62nd army, put up a barrier. In 15 days, up to 800 privates and officers were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the ranks. The detachments acted similarly later.

Here, as the documents testify, the guard detachments had to repeatedly prop up the trembling, retreating units and units, intervene in the course of the battle themselves in order to make a turn in it. The replenishment arriving at the front was, of course, unfired, and in this situation, the barrage detachments, formed from staunch, fired, commanders and fighters with strong front-line hardening, provided a reliable shoulder for the line units.

So, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through. The detachment not only stopped the military personnel departing in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was pushed back.

On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division withdrew from the occupied line under pressure from the enemy, the 62nd Army detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took up the defense. For several days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, until the approaching units stood up for defense. So it was in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles more and more turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a pre-determined decision of the command. The commanders tried to use the detachments left without "work" with maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.

Facts of this kind were reported to Moscow in mid-October 1942 by State Security Major V.M. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh Front, by order of the military council of the 6th Army, two barrage detachments were attached to the 174th Rifle Division and put into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of their personnel, the soldiers remaining in the ranks were transferred to replenish the named division, and the detachments had to be disbanded. As a linear part, the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, in whose operational subordination the detachment was, used a detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it had to be re-formed.

The reasons for the objections from the special departments are understandable. But, it seems, it was no coincidence that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to the military counterintelligence agencies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, had in mind that the barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for the retreating units, but also as the most important reserve for the direct conduct of hostilities.

As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transition to the Red Army of the strategic initiative and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the occupiers from the territory of the USSR, the need for detachments began to decline sharply. Order "Not a step back!" completely lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order acknowledging that "due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared." By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish rifle divisions.

Thus, the barrier detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented the penetration of deserters, alarmists, German agents into the rear, not only returned to the forefront of servicemen who lagged behind their units, but also conducted direct combat operations with the enemy, contributing to the achievement of victory over fascist Germany.

The Great Mission of the NKVD Sever Alexander

"Detachments"

"Detachments"

Another popular myth - Lavrenty Beria allegedly proposed using units of internal troops as barrage detachments. Joseph Stalin liked this idea. As a result, punishers from the "NKVD detachments" machine-gunned a huge number of fighters and commanders of the Red Army.

Separate unscrupulous historians and journalists recorded in these mythical units separate rifle platoons, companies and battalions, created, respectively, under the Special Departments of Corps, Armies and Fronts on July 19, 1941 by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00 941.

Let's make a reservation right away - this idea did not belong to Lavrenty Beria, but to the military and political leadership of the country, headed by Joseph Stalin. Recall that by the decision of the State Defense Committee, dated July 17, 1941, the bodies of the Third Directorate (military counterintelligence) of the People's Commissariat of Defense were transformed into special departments of the NKVD of the USSR. The latter, citing the decision of the State Defense Committee, were to "resolutely fight against espionage and treachery in the Red Army units and the elimination of desertion directly in the front line."

To accomplish this task, the NKVD had to "give them armed detachments."

How were these "armed units" used? Once again, we will disappoint those who have already imagined a vivid picture in their minds: well-fed, well-armed, eternally drunken soldiers of these companies are located in the villages of the frontline zone and machine guns shoot Red Army soldiers wandering along the country roads, exhausted from many days of battles, swollen from hunger and falling down from fatigue.

Firstly, the number of these "armed detachments" would simply not be physically enough to block the retreat path for several regiments or divisions of the Red Army. And by the time they were formed on the Western Front, and in fact this happened not earlier than the beginning of August 1941, the chaotic retreat of the Red Army troops almost stopped. Yes, the troops went east, but only after the appropriate order.

Secondly, "the main task of the special departments and military units of the NKVD is to quickly establish a firm revolutionary order in the rear of divisions, corps, armies and the front and in a decisive fight against deserters, alarmists and cowards." This is a quote from the "Instructions for the special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists."

The fourth paragraph of this document talks about how to solve this problem.

“Special departments of the division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:

a) organize a barrier service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, roads of movement of refugees and other routes of movement, in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who arbitrarily left their combat positions;

b) carefully check each detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled the battlefield;

c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and an investigation is conducted to bring them to trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within a 12-hour period;

d) all servicemen who stray from the unit are organized by platoon (port) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a bearer of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;

e) in especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires the adoption of thorough measures for the immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to execute deserters on the spot.

On each such case, the head of the special department informs the special department of the army and the front;

f) carry out the sentence of the military tribunal on the spot, if necessary, before the formation;

g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent, including keeping a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) report daily to the special department of the army and the special department of the front on the number of detainees, arrests, convicted, as well as on the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and materiel transferred to the unit.

So there were no machine gunners from the NKVD troops behind the backs of the active army fighters ...

The sixth paragraph of this document specifically emphasized: “The use of military units of operational groups for other purposes not provided for by this instruction is strictly prohibited and can be allowed in exceptional cases with the permission of the head of the special department of the army.”

And Lavrenty Beria taught his subordinates to strictly follow any orders.

Thirdly, they also participated in combat operations. For example, in February 1942: “The forces of the Red Army company of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 56th Army, platoons under the OO divisions and Red Army soldiers of the 89th battalion of the internal troops of the NKVD” attacked two “German-Romanian garrisons” stationed on the shores of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov . 470 Chekists participated in the operation.

If we talk about the operational activities of the "barriers of the Special Departments" and "barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear", then from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941, they "detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front." Of these, 25,978 people were arrested, and the rest "632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front." Of those arrested, "according to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line."

Detachments really existed, but they had nothing to do with the NKVD. The first to express the idea of ​​​​creating such formations was ... the future marshal of the Soviet Union (he was awarded this title in 1955), and then the commander of the Bryansk Front, Colonel General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko.

"one. in each rifle division to have a barrage detachment of reliable fighters no larger than a battalion.

The justification for the need for these tough measures was as follows: “The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicked and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and start shouting: “We are surrounded!” - and drag the rest of the fighters with them. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to leave the forest. There are similar phenomena on all fronts ... The trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars ... "

In practice, Red Army soldiers with front-line experience were sent to barrage detachments, very often after being wounded and shell-shocked. Army barrier detachments wore the same field uniform as the entire active army. The Germans were well aware of this, but for some reason the creators of the domestic television series "Penal Battalion" were not aware. The barrage detachments were abolished in the fall of 1944.

The above example of the "bloodthirstiness" of the commander of the Bryansk Front is not the only one. Here, for example, is a quote from the order to the troops of the Western Front No. 0346 of October 13, 1941: “Given the particular importance of the fortified [leny] line (meaning the defensive lines prepared in engineering terms on the near approaches to Moscow. - Auth.) to the entire command staff, up to and including the detachment, about a categorical prohibition to withdraw from the line. All those who retreated without a written order from the Military Council of the front and the army are to be shot.”

And here is the order signed by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, no later than October 20, 1941: “The commander [of the front] ordered - to transfer to the Military Council that if these groups (meaning scattered groups of units and formations of the 5th Army, retreating in the Mozhaisk direction after If the enemy breaks through the defense front - Auth.) arbitrarily left the front, then ruthlessly shoot the guilty, not stopping before the complete annihilation of all those who abandoned the front. To the Military Council to detain all those departing, to look into this matter and to carry out the instructions of the commander. You need to send reconnaissance to Semikukhovo and establish the actual situation in this direction. Is it clear? Give answer".

We will not touch on the fate of "separate groups" of servicemen from the 5th Army who became victims of the execution of this order by Georgy Zhukov, but will touch on those who were detained by servicemen of the internal troops. To do this, we will quote another document - "Report of the head of the Mozhaisk security sector of the Moscow zone on the detention of military personnel."

“The Mozhaisk sector of the Protection of the Moscow zone, created by the decision of the State Defense Committee, during its work from 10.15 to 10.18.41, detained 23,064 people. soldiers of the Red Army. Of this number of detainees, 2164 people. are persons in command.

All servicemen, both individuals and groups, who retreated from the front line to the rear and did not have the appropriate documents, were detained.

By terms, the detainees are distributed as follows:

On 10/15/41 3291 people were detained. ], of which 117 command personnel [persons]

On 10/16/41, 5418 people were detained. ], of which 582 command personnel [persons]

On 10/17/41 2861 people were detained. ], of which 280 command personnel [persons]

10/18/41 4033 people were detained ], of which 170 command personnel [persons]

On 10/19/41 7461 people were detained. ], of which 1015 command personnel [persons]

All the detainees, with the exception of the obvious deserters identified at the assembly points at the barrier outposts, were sent to the points of formations and military commandants.

Over the past period, the detainees surrendered to the following points: Zvenigorod, Istra (formation points), Dorokhove (representative of the 5th Army), Ruza (military commander).

Due to the large number of detainees and the significant distance of the formation points from the places of detention, I would consider it expedient to organize a formation point within the boundaries of the sector, which would make it possible to expedite the delivery of detainees along the main roads.

It is desirable to form such a point in the area of ​​the Borovik-Odintsovo road. In addition, it would be expedient to have representatives of the Military Council of the front at the points of assembly at the borders of the barrier outposts, who, having daily data on the required number of people in one formation or another, would organize the dispatch of detainees, weapons and transport there.

Please let me know about your decision."

Few people know, but the possibility of imposing a death sentence under a simplified scheme appeared at the command of the Red Army ... on the first day of the war, when the "Regulations on military tribunals in areas declared under martial law and in areas of military operations" came into force. We will not retell in detail all the provisions of this document, we will note only a few important points.

Firstly, military tribunals were created from the division and above.

Secondly, "the military tribunals are given the right to consider cases within 24 hours after the service of the indictment." And the fate of the accused was decided by the chairman and two members of the tribunal.

And the most important:

"…15. The military councils of the districts, fronts and armies, fleets, flotillas, as well as the commanders of the fronts, armies and districts, fleets, flotillas, have the right to suspend the execution of a sentence with the capital punishment of "shooting" with a simultaneous telegraph message to the Chairman of the Military, Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and To the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Red Army and the Chief Prosecutor of the Navy of the USSR according to his own opinion on this for further direction of the case.

16. The military tribunal immediately informs the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Red Army and the Chief Prosecutor of the Navy of the USSR according to their affiliation about each verdict that imposes the highest penalty of "execution", the military tribunal immediately informs by telegraph.

In case of non-receipt within 72 hours from the date of delivery of the telegram to the addressee of the telegraph message. A request from the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Red Army or the Chief Prosecutor of the Navy of the USSR to suspend the sentence shall be carried out.

The remaining sentences of the military tribunals come into force from the moment of their pronouncement and are immediately carried out.

Everyone now knows what happened in the first months of the war. Much has been written about this. Including the lack of communication between headquarters at various levels. Therefore, in life, death sentences were passed without the consent of Moscow. It is clear that military lawyers (according to the Regulations, it was they who staffed the tribunals) did not themselves shoot the convicts. This, on their orders, was usually performed by the fighters of the commandant's platoon or company, the same Red Army soldiers as their victims.

(ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE NORTH-WESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1941)

The purpose, history of the formation and actions of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of operations in 1941 are considered.

One of the little-studied pages of the history of the Great Patriotic War is the activity of barrage detachments. In Soviet times, this issue was covered with a veil of secrecy. According to the "Rules for the preservation of military secrets in the press of the Red Army (for wartime)", approved by the order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky No. 034 dated February 15, 1944:

14. All information about the barrage detachments, penal battalions and companies "

This arrangement continued even after the end of the war. It is not surprising that with the beginning of perestroika "revelations" in public opinion, a certain ominous image of "executioners from the NKVD" was formed, who shot retreating Red Army soldiers from machine guns.

In the last decade, a number of publications have been published with an attempt to analyze the history of barrage detachments based on archival documents (for example). However, the issue remains understudied. Thus, the erroneous opinion is widespread that the barrage detachments appeared only after the release of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.

Due to the vastness of the topic, it is impossible to consider it within the framework of one publication. In this article, we will limit ourselves to the history of the creation and use of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of operations in 1941. Thus, the scope of the study includes:

Northwestern Front, formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the administration and troops of the Baltic Special Military District.

Northern Front, formed on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the administration and troops of the Leningrad Military District. By Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001199 of August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.

The Baltic Fleet, which was operationally subordinate to the Northern Front from June 28, 1941, and from August 30, 1941, was operationally subordinate to the Leningrad Front.

Volkhov Front, formed on December 17, 1941, i.e. two weeks before the end of the period under review is outside the scope of this article.

In early February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD proper and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy of the USSR, where the Third Directorates of the USSR NKO and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.

On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issued Directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. Among other things, it provided for “the organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion in their composition of operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks of:

a) detention of deserters;

b) detaining the entire suspicious element that has penetrated the front line;

c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operatives of the Third Directorate of the NPO (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material along with the detainees under jurisdiction.

In pursuance of this directive, already on June 28, a control and barrage detachment of the NKVD troops was created on the North-Western Front to guard the rear of the Army in the Field. On July 2, 1941, it was disbanded, and instead, the 1st barrage detachment of the NKVD troops was created to guard the rear of the Active Army.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB united. On July 17, 1941, by the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NPO were transformed into special departments and also transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. This contributed to the establishment of a closer relationship between them and the territorial bodies of state security. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.

The next day, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his directive No. 169, explained the tasks of special departments as follows: “The meaning of transforming the organs of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, traitors, saboteurs , deserters and all sorts of alarmists and disorganizers.

The merciless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and discredit the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage.

To ensure operational activities, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed with special departments of divisions and corps, with special departments of the armies - separate rifle companies, with special departments of fronts - separate rifle battalions, staffed by personnel of the NKVD troops .

In carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, put up barrage detachments in the rear of our troops, as evidenced, for example, by the “Instruction for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front on combating deserters, cowards and alarmists”:

Special departments of the division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:

a) organize a barrier service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, roads of movement of refugees and other routes of movement in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who arbitrarily left their combat positions;

b) carefully check each detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled the battlefield;

c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and an investigation is conducted to bring them to trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within a 12-hour period;

d) all servicemen who stray from the unit are organized by platoon (port) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;

e) in particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires the adoption of decisive measures for the immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to execute deserters on the spot. On each such case, the head of the special department informs the special department of the army and the front;

f) carry out the sentence of the military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, before the formation;

g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to units and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) report daily to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrests, convicted, as well as about the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and materiel transferred to the unit.

The next document is the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 dated July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line. In it, in particular, it says:

“One of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all military personnel, without exception, who make their way from the front to the front line in an unorganized manner, as well as military personnel who enter other units in groups or alone.

However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is still insufficiently organized, the checks of detainees are carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.

In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in the Red Army, I propose:

1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose allocate experienced operational workers to the detachments. To establish, as a rule, that the questioning of all detainees without exception should be carried out only by security officers.

2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments, and identified by undercover and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity.

If the investigation does not obtain data on their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons should be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, establishing constant monitoring of them both by the organs of the special department and by the commissar of the unit.

The memorandum of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Divisional Commissar Lebedev No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941 to the Military Council of the KBF gives an idea of ​​​​the daily work of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war. The barrage detachment under the 3rd division of the Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a mobile company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd department, two home-made armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.

Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were put up on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that moment passed far enough, there were few cases of desertion in the area of ​​​​responsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the detachment and the group of operational workers attached to it were aimed at fighting the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps. A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Defense League organization, operated on highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel.

As a result of the work of the detachment in the first days of the war, six bandits were caught in the Loksa area, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence data, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding bandits.

Practice has shown that in areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens in small towns, since bandit groups from time to time had to buy food, matches, cartridges, etc., sending their representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the detachment. Despite the numerical superiority, the latter tried to detain them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, while the fourth, although, as it turned out, he was the Estonian running champion in the past, failed to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd Division.

The raids carried out by the detachment, combing the area, secrets and outposts significantly hampered the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in those areas that the detachment controlled were sharply reduced.

When the Virtsu Peninsula was liberated as a result of a counterattack by the 8th Army in mid-July 1941, a detachment platoon and a group of operational workers went to this area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons who were hostile to the Soviet regime and assisted the Nazis. On the way to Virtsu, a platoon of a detachment suddenly crashed into a German outpost, located at the fork in the Virtsu-Pärnu roads, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by rifle-machine-gun and mortar fire of the enemy, dismounted and accepted the battle. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving an anti-tank gun, a machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The losses of the detachment amounted to 6 people killed and 2 wounded.

Having handed over the defense of the recaptured area to regular units, the platoon of the detachment arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately launched work, as a result of which the head of the local organization “Kaitseliit”, two former members of this organization who were in the “self-defense” formation created by the German command, the owner of a local restaurant, who was used by the Germans as an interpreter, and also a provocateur who betrayed the fascist authorities, were detained two agents of our border guard. Among the population of Virtsu, 6 informants were recruited.

In the same period, an operation was carried out to clear the gangs of m. Varbla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovo County. Two platoons of the detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with the fighter battalion, captured the indicated settlements in battle, defeating the “self-defense” headquarters and capturing an easel machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephone sets, several hunting rifles and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded, captured 4 bandits were shot on the spot. Our losses - 1 killed.

In Tallinn, a detachment of detachments uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary organization engaged in recruiting the local population into gangs. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.

In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the detachment launched work to send our agents to the German rear. Of the abandoned three agents, two returned. Having penetrated into the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military installations. Using this information, the aircraft of the Baltic Fleet successfully bombed enemy targets. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the invaders from among the Estonian nationalists.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned to the front the retreating, but also held defensive lines. A particularly difficult situation developed on the afternoon of August 27. Separate units of the 8th Army, having lost their leadership, leaving the last line of defense, took to flight. To restore order, not only the detachment was thrown, but the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. Retreating under the threat of weapons, they stopped and as a result of a counterattack they threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.

The fact that the NKVD soldiers did not hide behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses incurred by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.

Arriving in Kronstadt, the detachment immediately began to resupply and on September 7, 1941, sent one platoon with two operatives to serve on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and by September 18, the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The mouth was fully serviced by the detachment.

In total, from the beginning of the war to November 22, 1941. Over 900 people were detained by the detachment, of which 77 were arrested and convicted. At the same time, 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the formation.

Their "ground" colleagues operating in the vicinity of the Baltic Fleet detachment also fought against the Estonian nationalists. From the special message of the special department of the NKVD of the Northern Front No. 131142 dated July 24, 1941 to the Military Council of the Front about the activities of the special department of the NKVD of the 8th Army to eliminate bandit groups in Estonia: “On July 15, 1941, two spy from the local population, who informed the enemy about the location of our units. The spies were shot on the spot.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, granted the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko: “The headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of flight, stop them, using weapons if necessary.

A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. "Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 to the commander of the troops of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions" read:

The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are quite a few panicky and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and start shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters with them. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to leave the forest. Similar phenomena take place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.

In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. In each rifle division, have a barrage detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculated as 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.

2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.

3. To oblige employees of special departments and political staff of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.

4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.

5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the troops of the fronts and armies.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

I.Stalin

B. Shaposhnikov ".

Unlike the barrage detachments that continued to exist under special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on detaining deserters and suspicious elements, army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (a battalion per division instead of a platoon), and their personnel were recruited not from NKVD soldiers, but from ordinary Red Army soldiers. So, according to the staff of the barrage battalion of the 10th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front, it should have 342 people (commanding staff - 24, junior commanding staff - 26, enlisted personnel - 292). However, the actual number of detachment battalions, as a rule, was much lower.

Table 1

The number of barrage battalions of rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front and their equipment with automatic weapons

	Reporting date	The number of personnel	Machine guns
			No information

As can be seen from Table. 1, only in one of the nine divisions the size of the barrage battalion corresponded to the regular one. A very indicative example is the 43rd division, which suffered heavy losses in the December battles (as of January 1, 1942, its personnel numbered only 1165 people). It is obvious that the division's defensive battalion, whose number fell to 64 people, did not escape serious combat losses.

Simultaneously with the creation of defensive battalions of divisions, a resolution of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 “On intensifying the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad” was issued. In this document, signed by the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and members of the military council of the front, 1st secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city committee of the CPSU (b) A.A. Zhdanov and 2nd Secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in particular, ordered:

"5. To the head of the OVT (Protection of the military rear. - I.P.) of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Stepanov to organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all servicemen detained without documents.

The head of the rear of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Mordvinov to organize nutrition points at these barrage detachments. And indeed, these four barrage detachments were immediately created.

Now it is often asserted that the detachments were only engaged in shooting at their own. In this case, it is completely incomprehensible why they organize nutrient points with them? To feed those who were shot before execution?

In October 1941, the Northwestern Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, thwarted the plan of the enemy command to bypass Moscow from the north. At the same time, according to a special report by the head of the special department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front, the commissar of state security of the 3rd rank V.M. Bochkov dated October 23, 1941 in the name of the head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank V.S. Abakumov, during the fighting near the village of Lobanovo, a number of servicemen fled from the battlefield. During October 21, 27 people were detained by the detachment. In another area near the village of Lobanovo, the detachment detained 100 people, including 5 junior commanders. Malicious deserters were arrested, one was shot in front of the ranks.

According to a note prepared by Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank S.R. Milshtein for the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, “from the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front.

Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.

Of the detainees, 25,878 people were arrested by the Special Departments, the remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and sent back to the front.

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line.

On the fronts, this data is distributed:

Leningrad: arrested - 1044 shot - 854 shot in front of the line - 430 Karelian: arrested - 468 shot - 263 shot in front of the line - 132 Northern: arrested - 1683 shot - 933 shot before the line - 280 North-West: arrested - 3440 shot - 1600 shot before the formation - 730 ... ”As we can see, the vast majority of servicemen detained by special departments and barrage detachments were not subjected to repressions, but were sent to the front. Only about 4% of them were arrested, including 1.5% were shot.

Thus, under the name "protective detachment" in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, formations of different subordination operated. Barrage detachments detained deserters and a suspicious element in the rear, and stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves engaged in battle with the Germans, often suffering heavy losses in the process.

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Soviet partisans are an integral part of the anti-fascist movement of the Soviet people who fought with the methods of partisan war against Germany and its allies in the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.

From the very first days of the war, the Communist Party gave the partisan movement a purposeful and organized character. The directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 1941 required: “In areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to incite partisan war everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, arson of warehouses, etc. “. The main goal of the guerrilla war was to undermine the front in the German rear - the disruption of communications and communications, the work of its road and rail communications, set out in

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops."

Considering the deployment of the partisan movement one of the most important conditions for the defeat of the fascist invaders, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks obliged the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics, regional, regional and district party committees to lead the organization of the partisan struggle. For the leadership of the partisan masses in the occupied areas, it was proposed to allocate experienced, combative comrades who were completely devoted to the Party and proven in practice. The struggle of Soviet patriots was led by 565 secretaries of regional, city and district committees of the party, 204 chairmen of regional, city and district executive committees of working people's deputies, 104 secretaries of the regional committee, city committee and district committee of the Komsomol, as well as hundreds of other leaders. Already in 1941, the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines was led by 18 underground regional committees, more than 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other underground organizations and groups, in which there were 65,500 communists.

The 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, created in 1941 under the leadership of P. Sudoplatov, played an important role in the deployment of the partisan movement. The Separate motorized rifle brigade of special purpose of the NKVD of the USSR was subordinate to him, from which reconnaissance and sabotage detachments were formed, thrown behind enemy lines. As a rule, they then turned into large partisan detachments. By the end of 1941, more than 2,000 partisan detachments and sabotage groups were operating in the territories occupied by the enemy, with a total number of over 90,000 partisans. In order to coordinate the combat activities of the partisans and organize their interaction with the troops of the Red Army, special bodies were created.

P.A. Sudoplatov

A vivid example of the actions of special forces was the destruction of the headquarters of the 59th division of the Wehrmacht, together with the head of the garrison in Kharkov, Lieutenant General Georg von Braun. Mansion at st. Dzerzhinsky d. No. 17 was mined by a radio-controlled land mine by a group under the command of I.G. Starinov and blown up by radio signal in October 1941. Later, Lieutenant General Beineker was also destroyed by a mine. . I.G. Starinov

Mines and non-recoverable land mines designed by I.G. Starinov were widely used for sabotage operations during the Second World War.

radio-controlled mine I.G. Starinov

To lead the partisan war, republican, regional and regional headquarters of the partisan movement were created. They were headed by secretaries or members of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, regional committees and regional committees: Ukrainian Headquarters - T.A. Strokach, Belarusian - P.Z. Kalinin, Lithuanian - A.Yu. Snechkus, Latvian - A.K. Sprogis, Estonian - N.T. Karotamm, Karelsky - S.Ya. Vershinin, Leningradsky - M.N. Nikitin. The Oryol Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was headed by A.P. Matveev, Smolensky - D.M. Popov, Krasnodar - P.I. Seleznev, Stavropolsky - M.A. Suslov, Krymsky - V.S. Bulatov. The VLKSM made a great contribution to the organization of the guerrilla war. Its governing bodies in the occupied territory included M.V. Zimyanin, K.T. Mazurov, P.M. Masherov and others.

By a GKO resolution of May 30, 1942, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD, Chief of Staff - Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko) was organized at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The activities carried out by the party made it possible to significantly improve the leadership of partisan detachments, supply them with the necessary material resources, and ensure clearer interaction between the partisans and the Red Army.

at the partisan airfield.

W and during its existence, the TsSHPD sent 59,960 rifles and carbines, 34,320 machine guns, 4,210 light machine guns, 2,556 anti-tank rifles, 2,184 50-mm and 82-mm mortars, 539,570 hand-held anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades, a large amount of ammunition, explosives, medicines, food and other essentials. The central and republican schools of the partisan movement trained and sent behind enemy lines more than 22,000 various specialists, of which 75% were demolition workers, 9% were organizers of the underground and the partisan movement, 8% were radio operators, and 7% were scouts.

The main organizational and combat unit of the partisan forces was a detachment, which usually consisted of squads, platoons and companies, numbering several dozen people, and later - up to 200 or more fighters. During the course of the war, many detachments united into partisan brigades and partisan divisions of up to several thousand fighters. The armament was dominated by light weapons (both Soviet and captured), but many detachments and formations had mortars, and some even artillery. All persons who joined the partisan formations took the partisan oath, as a rule, strict military discipline was established in the detachments. Party and Komsomol organizations were created in the detachments. The actions of the partisans were combined with other forms of nationwide struggle behind enemy lines - the actions of the underground in cities and towns, sabotage at enterprises and transport, disruption of political and military measures carried out by the enemy.

at the headquarters of the partisan brigade

group of partisans

partisan with a gun

Physical and geographical conditions influenced the forms of organization of partisan forces and the methods of their actions. Vast forests, swamps, mountains were the main bases for partisan forces. Partisan regions and zones arose here, where various methods of struggle could be widely used, including open battles with the enemy. In the steppe regions, however, large formations operated successfully only during raids. The small detachments and groups that were constantly here usually avoided open clashes with the enemy and inflicted damage on him mainly by sabotage.

In the tactics of guerrilla operations, the following elements can be distinguished:

Subversive activities, destruction of enemy infrastructure in any form (rail war, destruction of communication lines, high-voltage lines, destruction of bridges, water pipelines, etc.);

Intelligence activities, including undercover;

Political activity and Bolshevik propaganda;

Destruction of manpower and equipment of the Nazis;

Elimination of collaborators and heads of the Nazi administration;

Restoration and preservation of elements of Soviet power in the occupied territory;

The mobilization of the combat-ready population remaining in the occupied territories, and the unification of the encircled military units.

V.Z. Korzh

On June 28, 1941, in the area of ​​the village of Posenichi, the first battle was fought by a partisan detachment under the command of V.Z. Korzha. To protect the city of Pinsk from the north side, a group of partisans was put up on the road Pinsk - Logoshin. A partisan detachment commanded by Korzh was ambushed by 2 German tanks with motorcyclists. It was reconnaissance of the 293rd Wehrmacht Infantry Division. The partisans opened fire and destroyed one tank. During the battle, the partisans captured two Nazis. It was the first partisan battle of the first partisan detachment in the history of the Great Patriotic War!

On July 4, 1941, Korzh's detachment met with a German cavalry squadron 4 km from Pinsk. The partisans let the Germans close and opened accurate fire. Dozens of Nazi cavalry died on the battlefield. In total, by June 1944, the Pinsk partisan unit under the command of V.Z. Korzh defeated 60 German garrisons in battles, derailed 478 railway echelons, and blew up 62 railways. bridge, destroyed 86 tanks, 29 guns, disabled 519 km of communication lines. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 15, 1944, for the exemplary performance of command assignments in the fight against the Nazi invaders behind enemy lines and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Vasily Zakharovich Korzh was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Medal. Star “for No. 4448.

In August 1941, 231 partisan detachments were already operating on the territory of Belarus. Leaders of the Belarusian partisan detachment

“Red October” - commander Fyodor Pavlovsky and commissar Tikhon Bumazhkov - on August 6, 1941, the first of the partisans were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the Bryansk region, Soviet partisans controlled vast territories in the German rear. In the summer of 1942, they actually controlled the territory of 14,000 square kilometers. The Bryansk partisan republic was formed.

guerrilla ambush

In the second period of the Second World War (autumn 1942 - the end of 1943), the partisan movement expanded deep behind enemy lines. Transferring their base from the Bryansk forests to the west, the partisan formations crossed the Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, and Pripyat rivers and began to strike at the enemy's most important communications in his rear. The blows of the partisans rendered great assistance to the Red Army, diverting the large forces of the fascists. In the midst of the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943, the actions of partisan detachments and formations to a large extent disrupted the supply of enemy reserves and military equipment to the front. The actions of the partisans turned out to be so effective that the fascist German command sent against them in the summer and autumn of 1942 144 police battalions, 27 police regiments, 8 infantry regiments, 10 security police and punitive divisions of the SS, 2 security corps, 72 special units, up to 15 infantry German and 5 infantry divisions of their satellites, thereby weakening their forces at the front. Despite this, the partisans managed to organize during this period more than 3,000 crashes of enemy echelons, blew up 3,500 railway and highway bridges, destroyed 15,000 vehicles, about 900 bases and depots with ammunition and weapons, up to 1,200 tanks, 467 aircraft, 378 guns.

punishers and policemen

partisan region

partisans on the march

By the end of the summer of 1942, the partisan movement had become a significant force, organizational work was completed. The total number of partisans was up to 200,000 people. In August 1942, the most famous of the partisan commanders were summoned to Moscow to participate in a general meeting.

Commanders of partisan formations: M.I. Duka, M.P. Voloshin, D.V. emlyutin, S.A. Kovpak, A.N. Saburov

(from left to right)

Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet leadership, the partisan movement turned into a carefully organized, well-managed and united military and political force under a single command. Chief of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement at Headquarters, Lieutenant General P.K. Ponomarenko became a member of the General Staff Red Army.

PC. Ponomarenko

TsShPD - on the left P.K. Ponomarenko

The partisan detachments operating in the front line came under the direct subordination of the command of the corresponding army that occupied this sector of the front. The detachments operating in the deep rear of the German troops were subordinate to the headquarters in Moscow. The officers and rank and file of the regular army were sent to partisan units as instructors for the training of specialists.

partisan movement management structure

In August - September 1943, according to the plan of the TsShPD, 541 detachments of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian partisans simultaneously took part in the first operation to destroy the enemy's railway communications in"rail war".

The purpose of the operation was to disorganize the work of the railway by massive and simultaneous destruction of the rails. transport, than to disrupt the supply of German troops, evacuation and regrouping, and thus assist the Red Army in completing the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk in 1943 and deploying a general offensive on the Soviet-German front. The leadership of the ‘rail war’ was carried out by the TsSHPD at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The plan called for the destruction of 200,000 rails in the rear areas of Army Groups Center and North. To carry out the operation, 167 partisan detachments from Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol regions, numbering up to 100,000 people, were involved.

The operation was preceded by careful preparation. The sections of the railway planned for destruction were distributed among partisan formations and detachments. From June 15 to July 1, 1943 alone, 150 tons of special-profile heavy projectiles, 156,000 m of Fickford cord, 28,000 m and a hemp wick, 595,000 detonator caps, 35,000 fuses, a lot of weapons, ammunition and medicines were thrown at partisan bases. Instructors-miners were sent to the partisan detachments.

peacekeeping of the railway canvases

The “rail war” began on the night of August 3, just at the time when the enemy was forced to intensively maneuver his reserves in connection with the unfolding counteroffensive of the Soviet troops and its development into a general offensive along the entire front. In one night, over 42,000 rails were blown up in depth over a vast territory of 1,000 km along the front and from the front line to the western borders of the USSR. Simultaneously with the “Rail War”, active operations on the communications of the enemy were launched by partisans of Ukraine, who, according to the plan for the spring-summer period of 1943, were tasked with paralyzing the work of 26 largest railways. nodes in the rear of Army Group "South", including Shepetovsky, Kovelsky, Zdolbunovsky, Korostensky, Sarnensky.

train station attack

In the following days, the actions of the partisans in the operation intensified even more. By September 15, 215,000 rails were destroyed, which amounted to 1342 km of a single-track railway. way. On some railways On the roads, traffic was delayed for 3-15 days, and the highways Mogilev-Krichev, Polotsk-Dvinsk, Mogilev-Zhlobin did not work during August 1943. Only Belarusian partisans during the operation blew up 836 military echelons, including 3 armored trains, disabled 690 steam locomotives, 6343 wagons and platforms, 18 water pumps, destroyed 184 railroads. bridges and 556 bridges on dirt and highway roads, destroyed 119 tanks and 1429 vehicles, defeated 44 German garrisons. The experience of the “Rail War” was used by the headquarters of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter period of 1943/1944 in the operations “Concert” and in the summer of 1944 during the offensive of the Red Army in Belarus.

blown up railway compound

Operation "Concert" was carried out by Soviet partisans from September 19 to the end of October 1943. The purpose of the operation is to impede the operational transportation of Nazi troops by the mass disabling of large sections of railways; was a continuation of Operation Rail War; was carried out according to the plan of the TsSHPD at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and was closely connected with the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops in the Smolensk and Gomel directions and the battle for the Dnieper. 293 partisan formations and detachments from Belarus, the Baltic States, Karelia, Crimea, Leningrad and Kalinin regions were involved in the operation, in total over 120,000 partisans; it was planned to undermine more than 272,000 rails. In Belarus, 90,000 partisans were involved in the operation; they were to blow up 140,000 rails. The TsSHPD planned to throw 120 tons of explosives and other cargo to the partisans of Belarus, and 20 tons each to the Kalinin and Leningrad partisans. Due to the sharply deteriorating weather conditions, only 50% of the planned plan was transferred to the partisans by the beginning of the operation, and therefore it was decided to start mass sabotage on September 25. However, part of the partisan detachments, which, according to the previous order, went to their starting lines, could no longer take into account the changes in the timing of the operation, and on September 19 they began to carry it out. On the night of September 25, widespread actions were carried out according to the plan“Concert”, covering the front of 900 km and a depth of 400 km. The partisans of Belarus on the night of September 19 blew up 19903 rails and on the night of September 25 another 15809 rails. As a result, 148557 rails were blown up. Operation "Concert" intensified the struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders in the occupied territories. In the course of it, the influx of the local population into partisan detachments increased.

partisan operation “Concert”

An important form of partisan actions were raids by partisan formations in the rear of the fascist invaders. The main goal of these raids was to increase the scope and activity of popular resistance to the occupiers in new areas, as well as to strike at major railways. nodes and important military-industrial facilities of the enemy, intelligence, rendering fraternal assistance to the peoples of neighboring countries in their liberation struggle against fascism. Only on the instructions of the headquarters of the partisan movement, more than 40 raids were carried out, in which more than 100 large partisan formations participated. In 1944, 7 formations and 26 separate large detachments of Soviet partisans operated in the occupied territory of Poland, and 20 formations and detachments operated in Czechoslovakia. The raids of partisan formations under the command of V.A. Andreeva, I.N. Banova, P.P. Vershigory, A.V. Germana, S.V. Grishina, F.F. Cabbage, V.A. Karaseva, S.A. Kovpak, V.I. Kozlova, V.Z. Korzha, M.I. Naumova, N.A. Prokopyuk, V.V. Razumova, A.N. Saburova, V.P. Samson, A.F. Fedorova, A.K. Flegontova, V.P. Chepigi, M.I. Shukaeva and others.

The Putivl partisan detachment (commander S.A. Kovpvk, commissar S.V. Rudnev, chief of staff G.Ya. Bazyma), which operated in the occupied territory of several regions of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus in 1941-1944, was created on October 18, 1941 in the Spadshchansky forest of the Sumy region. The first weeks of the occupation, the detachments of Kovpak and Rudnev, numbering two or three dozen people, acted independently and had no communication with each other. By the beginning of autumn, Rudnev followed Kovpak's first sabotage, met with him and offered to merge both detachments. Already on October 19-20, 1941, the detachment repelled the offensive of the punitive battalion with 5 tanks, on November 18-19 - the second offensive of the punishers, and on December 1 broke through the blockade ring around the Spadshchansky forest and made the first raid into the Khinel forests. By this time, the united detachment had already grown to 500 people.

Sidor Artemievich Kovpak

Semyon Vasilievich Rudnev

In February 1942, the S.A. Kovpak, transformed into the Sumy partisan formation (Connection of partisan detachments of the Sumy region), returned to the Spadshchansky forest and from here undertook a series of raids, as a result of which an extensive partisan region was created in the northern regions of the Sumy region and in the adjacent territory of the RSFSR and the BSSR. By the summer of 1942, 24 detachments and 127 groups (about 18,000 partisans) were operating on its territory.

dugout at a partisan base

Interior view of the dugout

The Sumy partisan formation included four detachments: Putivl, Glukhovsky, Shalyginsky and Krolevetsky (according to the names of the districts of the Sumy region where they were organized). For conspiracy, the unit was called military unit 00117, and the detachments were called battalions. Historically, the units had unequal numbers. As of January 1943, while based in Polesie, the first battalion(Putivl detachment) consisted of up to 800 partisans, the other three - 250-300 partisans each. The first battalion consisted of ten companies, the rest - 3-4 companies each. Companies did not arise immediately, but were formed gradually, like partisan groups, and often arose on a territorial basis. Gradually, with the departure from their native places, the groups grew into companies and acquired a new character. During the raid, the companies were no longer distributed on a territorial basis, but on military expediency. So in the first battalion there were several rifle companies, two companies of submachine gunners, two companies of heavy weapons (with 45-mm anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns, battalion mortars), a reconnaissance company, a company of miners, a platoon of sappers, a communication center and the main economic unit.

partisan cart

In 1941-1942, Kovpak's unit carried out raids behind enemy lines in the Sumy, Kursk, Oryol and Bryansk regions, in 1942-1943 - a raid from the Bryansk forests on the Right-Bank Ukraine in the Gomel, Pinsk, Volyn, Rivne, Zhitomir and Kiev regions. The Sumy partisan formation under the command of Kovpak fought over 10,000 km in the rear of the Nazi troops, defeated the enemy garrisons in 39 settlements. Reid S.A. Kovpak played a big role in the deployment of the partisan movement against the German invaders.

guerrilla raid

"Partisan Bears"

On June 12, 1943, the partisan formation of S.A. Kovpak went on a military campaign in the Carpathian region. By the time they entered the Carpathian raid, the unit numbered 2,000 partisans. They were armed with 130 machine guns, 380 machine guns, 9 guns, 30 mortars, 30 anti-tank rifles. During the raid, the partisans fought 2,000 km, destroyed 3,800 Nazis, blew up 19 military trains, 52 bridges, 51 warehouses with property and weapons, disabled power plants and oil fields near Bitkov and Yablonov. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR No.On January 4, 1944, for the successful implementation of the Carpathian raid, Major General Kovpak Sidor Artemyevich was awarded the second Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

The partisans participated in the liberation of the cities of Vileyka, Yelsk, Znamenka, Luninets, Pavlograd, Rechitsa, Rostov-on-Don, Simferopol, Stavropol, Cherkassy, ​​Yalta and many others.

The activities of clandestine combat groups in cities and towns caused great damage to the enemy. Underground groups and organizations in Minsk, Kiev, Mogilev, Odessa, Vitebsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Smolensk, Kaunas, Krasnodar, Krasnodon, Pskov, Gomel, Orsha, as well as other cities and towns showed examples of selfless struggle against the fascist invaders. Sabotage, the covert struggle to disrupt the political, economic, and military measures of the enemy, were the most widespread forms of mass resistance against the occupiers by millions of Soviet people.

Soviet intelligence officers and underground workers committed hundreds of acts of sabotage, the purpose of which were representatives of the German occupation authorities. Only with the direct participation of special detachments of the NKVD, 87 actions of retribution were carried out against the Nazi executioners responsible for carrying out the extermination policy in the east. On February 17, 1943, the Chekists killed the regional gebitskommissar Friedrich Fentz. In July of the same year, the scouts liquidated Gebitskommissar Ludwig Ehrenleitner. The most famous and significant of them is considered to be the liquidation of the General Commissioner of Belarus Wilhelm Kube. In July 1941, Cuba was appointed General Commissar of Belarus. Gauleiter Kube was especially cruel. By direct order of the Gauleiter, a Jewish ghetto was created in Minsk and a concentration camp in the village of Trostenets, where 206,500 people were exterminated. For the first time, soldiers of the NKGB sabotage and reconnaissance group of Kirill Orlovsky tried to destroy him. Having received information that Cuba was going to hunt on February 17, 1943 in the Mashukovsky forests, Orlovsky organized an ambush. In a hot and short-lived battle, the scouts destroyed the Gebitskommissar Fentz, 10 officers and 30 soldiers of the SS troops. But Cuba was not among those killed (at the last moment he did not go hunting). And yet, on September 22, 1943, at 4.00 am, the underground workers managed to destroy the General Commissar of Belarus Wilhelm Kube with a bomb explosion (the bomb was placed under the bed of Cuba by the Soviet underground worker Elena Grigorievna Mazanik).

E.G. Mazanik

The legendary career intelligence officer Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov (pseudonym - Grachev) with the beginning of the Second World War, at his personal request, was enlisted in the Special Group of the NKVD. In August 1942, N.I. Kuznetsov was sent behind enemy lines to the partisan detachment “Winners” (commander D.M. Medvedev), which operated on the territory of Ukraine. Appearing in the occupied city of Rovno under the guise of a German officer - Lieutenant Paul Siebert, Kuznetsov was able to quickly make the necessary acquaintances.

N.I. Kuznetsov N.I. Kuznetsov - Paul Siebert

Using the trust of fascist officers, he learned the places of deployment of enemy units, the direction of their movement. He managed to get information about the German missiles "FAU-1" and "FAU-2", reveal the location of A. Hitler's headquarters "Werwolf" ("Werewolf") near the city of Vinnitsa, warn the Soviet command about the upcoming offensive of the Nazi troops in the Kursk region (operation “Citadel”), about the impending assassination attempt on the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (I.V. Stalin, D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill) in Tehran. In the fight against the Nazi invaders, N.I. Kuznetsov showed extraordinary courage and ingenuity. He acted as a people's avenger. He committed acts of retaliation against many fascist generals and senior officers, endowed with great powers of the Third Reich. They were destroyed - the chief judge of Ukraine Funk, the imperial adviser to the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine Gall and his secretary Winter, the vice-governor of Galicia Bauer, generals Knut and Dargel, kidnapped and brought to the partisan detachment the commander of the punitive forces in Ukraine, General Ilgen. March 9, 1944 N.I. Kuznetsov died when he was surrounded by Ukrainian nationalists-Bendera in the village of Boryatyn, Brody district, Lviv region. Species that he could not break through, he blew himself up and the Bendera people surrounding him with the last grenade. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 5, 1944, Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exceptional courage and courage in carrying out command assignments.

monument to N.I. Kuznetsov

grave of N.I. Kuznetsova

The underground Komsomol organization “Young Guard”, which operated during the Second World War in the city of Krasnodon, Voroshilovgrad region of Ukraine, temporarily occupied by Nazi troops, will forever remain in the memory of the Soviet people (do not identify it with the modern “well done” from “M.G.” have nothing to do with the dead heroes). “Young Guard” was created under the leadership of the party underground headed by F.P. Lyutikov. After the occupation of Krasnodon (July 20, 1942), several anti-fascist groups arose in the city and its environs, led by Komsomol members I.V. Turkevich (commander), I.A. Zemnukhov, O.V. Koshevoy (commissioner), V.I. Levashov, S.G. Tyulenev, A.Z. Eliseenko, V.A. Zhdanov, N.S. Sumy, U.M. Gromova, L.G. Shevtsova, A.V. Popov, M.K. Petlivanov.

young guards

In total, more than 100 underground workers united in the underground organization, of which 20 were communists. Despite the harsh terror, the “Young Guard” created an extensive network of combat groups and cells throughout the Krasnodon region. The Young Guards issued 5,000 anti-fascist leaflets of 30 titles; released about 100 prisoners of war who were in a concentration camp; burned the labor exchange, where lists of people scheduled for export to Germany were stored, as a result of which 2000 Krasnodon residents were saved from being stolen into Nazi slavery, destroyed vehicles with soldiers, ammunition, fuel and food, prepared an uprising in order to defeat the German garrison and meet the advancing parts of the Red Army. But the betrayal of the provocateur G. Pochentsov interrupted this preparation. At the beginning of January 1943, the arrests of members of the “Young Guard” began. They courageously withstood all the tortures in the fascist dungeons. During January 15, 16, 31, the Nazis threw 71 people alive and dead into the pit of coal mine No. 5 with a depth of 53 m. On February 9, 1943, O.V. Koshevoy, L.G. Shevtsova, S.M. Ostapenko, D.U. Ogurtsov, V.F. Subbotin after brutal torture were shot in the Rattlesnake forest near the town of Rovenka. Only 11 underground workers managed to escape from the persecution of the gendarmerie. By decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of September 13, 1943, U.M. Gromova, M.A. Zemnukhov, O.V. Koshevoy, S, G. Tyulenev and L.G. Shevtsova was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

monument to the Young Guard

The list of heroes of the partisan struggle and the partisan underground is endless, so on the night of June 30, 1943, the Komsomol underground member F. Krylovich blew up the railway at the Osipovichi station. fuel train. As a result of the explosion and the resulting fire, four military echelons were destroyed, including the train with the Tiger tanks. The invaders lost that night at st. Osipovichi 30 "Tigers".

monument to underground workers in Melitopol

The selfless and selfless activities of the partisans and underground workers received nationwide recognition and high appraisal from the CPSU and the Soviet government. Over 127,000 partisans were awarded the medal"Partisan of the Patriotic War" 1st and 2nd degree. Over 184,000 partisans and underground fighters were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union, and 248 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War"

Since the time of the Khrushchev “thaw”, some historians have carefully cultivated and “cultivate” to this day one “terrible and terrible” myth. about how a barrage detachment, originally created with a well-defined, reasonable and decent goal, has now turned into a horror movie.

What it is?

The very concept of this military formation is very vague, it says, in particular, about "performing certain tasks on a certain sector of the front." This can even be understood as the formation of a separate platoon. Both the composition and the number and tasks of the barrier detachments throughout the war changed repeatedly. When did the first defensive detachment appear?

History of occurrence

It should be remembered that in 1941 the legendary NKVD was divided into two diverse objects: the committee of internal affairs and the department of state security (NKGB). Counterintelligence, from which the detachments went, was separated from the composition of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. At the end of July 1941, a special directive was issued on work in wartime, after which the formation of special units began.

It was then that the very first barrage detachment was created, the task of which was to detain deserters and "suspicious elements" in the front line. These formations did not have any "execution right", they could only detain the "element" with its subsequent escort to the authorities.

Again, when both departments were merged again, the barrage detachment came under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. But even then, no special “relaxations” were made: members of the formations could arrest deserters. In special cases, which included only episodes of armed resistance, they had the right to be shot. In addition, special detachments had to fight traitors, cowards, alarmists. The order of the NKVD No. 00941 of 07/19/1941 is known. It was then that special companies and battalions were created, staffed by the NKVD troops.

What function did they perform?

It was these barrage units that played the most significant role in the Second World War. Again, there were no “mass executions” under their jurisdiction: these units were supposed to create defensive lines to protect against German counterattacks and detain (!) Deserters with their transfer to the investigating authorities over the next 12 hours.

If a person simply fell behind his unit (which was normal in 1941), again, no one shot him. In this case, there were two options: either the serviceman was sent to the same unit, or (more often) they were reinforced by the nearest military unit.

In addition, in the Second World War, the barrage detachments played the role of a “filter” through which people who had escaped from German captivity, and those individuals in the front line whose testimony was in doubt, were passed. There is a case when such a detachment caught a group of German spies ... by paper clips! The commandants noticed that the “seconded Soviet servicemen” had brand new stainless metal clips on their documents (ideal, by the way)! So do not consider the fighters as murderers and sadists. But this is exactly how they are portrayed by many modern sources ...

The fight against banditry and the role of the 33rd detachment

One of the tasks that some categories of historians for some reason "forget" about was the fight against banditry, which in some regions took frankly menacing proportions. So, for example, the 33rd barrage detachment (North-Western Front) showed itself.

Especially a company detached from the Baltic Fleet. Even several armored cars were "seconded" to it. This detachment operated in the Estonian forests. The situation in those parts was serious: there was practically no desertion in the local units, but the local Nazi units really interfered with the army. Small gangs constantly attacked small detachments of military personnel and civilians.

Estonian events

As soon as the “narrow specialists” from the NKVD entered the game, the perky mood of the bandits quickly faded away. In July 1941, it was the barrage detachments that took part in the cleansing of Virtsu Island, recaptured as a result of a counterattack by the Red Army. Also along the way, the discovered German outpost was completely destroyed. Many bandits were neutralized, the pro-fascist organization in Tallinn was crushed. Barrage detachments also participated in reconnaissance activities. The formation we have already mentioned, acting “on behalf of” the Baltic Fleet, directed its own aircraft at the discovered positions of the Germans.

During the battle for Tallinn, the same detachment participated in the most difficult battle, covering (and not shooting) the retreating soldiers and repelling German counterattacks. On August 27, there was a terrible battle, during which our people repeatedly threw back a stubborn enemy. It was only through their heroism that an organized retreat became possible.

During these battles, more than 60% of the entire personnel of the barrage detachment, including commanders, were killed. Agree, this is not very similar to the image of the "cowardly commandant", hiding behind the backs of his soldiers. Subsequently, the same formation participated in the fight against the bandits of Kronstadt.

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of September 1941

Why did the barrage units have such a bad reputation? The thing is that September 1941 was marked by an extremely difficult situation at the front. The formation of special detachments was allowed in those units that managed to establish themselves as "unstable". Just a week later, this practice spread to the entire front. And what, there are barrage detachments of thousands of innocent soldiers? Of course not!

These detachments obeyed were armed with transport and heavy equipment. The main task is to maintain order, help the command of the units. Members of the barrage detachments had the right to use military weapons in cases where it was necessary to urgently stop the retreat or eliminate the most malicious alarmists. But that rarely happened.

Varieties

Thus, there were two categories of detachments: one consisted of NKVD soldiers and caught deserters, and the second prevented the willful abandonment of positions. The latter had a much larger staff, since they consisted of Red Army soldiers, and not fighters of internal troops. And even in this case, their members had the right only to shoot individual alarmists! No one has ever shot their own soldiers en masse! Moreover, if there was a counterattack, it was the “animals from the barrage detachments” who took the whole blow, allowing the fighters to retreat in an organized manner.

Results of the work

Judging by 1941, these units (the 33rd barrage detachment especially distinguished themselves) detained about 657,364 people. 25,878 people have been officially arrested. 10,201 people were shot by the verdict of the military field court. All others were sent back to the front.

The barrage detachments played a significant role in the defense of Moscow. Since there was simply a catastrophic lack of combat-ready units to defend the city itself, the regular NKVD soldiers were literally worth their weight in gold, they organized competent defensive lines. In some cases, barrage detachments were created on the local initiative of the authorities and internal affairs bodies.

On July 28, 1942, the Stavka issues the notorious order No. 227 of the NPO. He ordered the creation of separate detachments in the rear of unstable units. As in the previous case, the fighters had the right to shoot only individual alarmists and cowards who arbitrarily left their positions in battle. The detachments were provided with all the necessary transport, and the most capable commanders were put at their head. There were also separate barrage battalions at the divisional level.

The results of the hostilities of the 63rd detachment

By mid-October 1942, 193 army detachments had been created. By this time, they managed to detain 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 of them were arrested, 1189 servicemen were shot. All the rest were sent to the penal unit. The Don and Stalingrad directions were the most difficult; an increased number of arrests and detentions was recorded here. But these are "little things". It is much more important that such units provided real assistance to their colleagues at the most critical moments of the battle.

This is how the 63rd barrage detachment (53rd army) showed itself, coming to the aid of its unit, to which it was “seconded”. He forced the Germans to stop the counteroffensive. What conclusions follow from this? Pretty simple.

The role of these formations in restoring order was very great, they also managed to return a considerable number of military personnel back to the front. So, one day the 29th Infantry Division, in whose flank the advancing German tanks managed to break through, began to retreat in a panic. Lieutenant of the NKVD Filatov, at the head of his squad, stopped the fleeing, together with them going to combat positions.

In an even more difficult situation, the barrage unit under the command of the same Filatov made it possible for the fighters of a badly battered rifle division to retreat, while she herself began a battle with an enemy breaking through, forcing him to retreat.

Who were they?

In critical situations, the fighters did not shoot their own, but competently organized the defense and led the offensive themselves. Thus, there is a known case when the 112th Rifle Division, having lost almost 70% (!) of its personnel in the most difficult battles, received an order to retreat. Instead of them, a barrage detachment of Lieutenant Khlystov took over the position, which held the position for four days, doing this until reinforcements arrived.

A similar case is the defense of the Stalingrad railway station by the “dogs of the NKVD”. Despite their numbers, which were significantly inferior to the German one, they held their positions for several days and waited for the approach of the 10th Infantry Division.

Thus, barrage detachments are "last chance" detachments. If the fighters of the line unit leave their positions unmotivated, the members of the barrage battalion will stop them. If a military unit suffers the heaviest losses in a battle with a superior enemy, the "frontiers" give them the opportunity to retreat and continue the battle themselves. Simply put, barrage detachments are military units of the USSR that play the role of defensive "bastions" during the battle. Units made up of NKVD troops, among other things, could be engaged in identifying German agents and catching deserters. When was their work completed?

End of work

By order of October 29, 1944, the barrage detachments in the Red Army were disbanded. If the personnel were recruited from ordinary linear units, similar formations were formed from them. The NKVD soldiers were sent to special "flying detachments", whose activities consisted in the targeted capture of bandits. There were practically no deserters by that time. Since the personnel of many detachments were recruited from the best (!) Fighters of their units, these people were also often sent for further study, forming a new backbone of the Soviet Army.

Thus, the “bloodthirstiness” of such units is nothing more than a stupid and dangerous myth that offends the memory of people who liberated the countries captured by the Nazi troops.