Reports of the People's Commissar of Defense on the state of affairs in the Red Army in 1939
These documents should not be read, but studied. Study by spreading a bunch of reference books around you, armed with a pencil, paper, maps. And even so, these reports by themselves will tell a person who is not very well versed in military affairs, who is not familiar with the state of affairs in the field of military affairs in Germany, the Soviet Union at that time, very little will be said. I bring these documents with two purposes: the first is to give information to people who are inquisitive and really looking for answers in the field of “why it happened in the 41st”, the second is to show that the openness of the archives does not yet answer all the questions and dark sides of that war.
Nevertheless, I would like to give some explanations to these reports.
The first report was dated August 22, 1939, i.e. just 9 days before the start of the Second World War, when it was already clear to everyone that Europe was on the verge of major military upheavals and that Soviet Union not to avoid being drawn into these events. The second report, more detailed, is dated October 23, 1939, when Poland fell under the blows of the Wehrmacht in a month and everyone was shocked by such a rapid loss of the war by the Polish army, which was considered quite strong. Obviously, under the impression of the events of September 1939, Stalin was alarmed and demanded a more detailed report.
It should be recalled that after the end of the Civil War, the Red Army was reduced to about 500 thousand people. The basis of military development in the 1920s and 1930s was a system in which the army had several personnel divisions, while the rest of the divisions were territorial. In personnel divisions, personnel, weapons were completely available (but according to the states, not military, but peacetime, i.e., from 25% to 75% of the wartime strength), and in territorial divisions only a small part of the command staff was available (less than 10% ), small arms and other weapons in warehouses. Horses and vehicles are assigned from the national economy and will enter the divisions only after mobilization. The bulk of the officers and rank and file work in the national economy and are periodically called up for training camps and undergo retraining. The fighting qualities of the territorial divisions were close to zero.
In the 70s, such divisions (most of the Soviet Army in the post-war years also consisted of such divisions, although the name was different - framed, framed) officers aptly called "wooden" or "plywood".
On September 1, 1939, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On universal military duty and the complete transfer of the armed forces to a personnel position" was issued. It can be said that, in fact, from that time the revival of the army began, and less than two years remained before the war.
I must say - military theory says that it takes 2-3 years to train a soldier of average quality, 8-12 years for a competent company commander. In order to create a combat-ready division from trained soldiers and competent commanders, it takes another one and a half to two years. This theory has been repeatedly confirmed in practice by many armies and countries.
Germany, on the other hand, officially and actively took up the creation of the Wehrmacht from March 1935, already having 100% covertly trained officers and non-commissioned officers and having a clear unambiguous attitude to prepare for an offensive war.
A superficial reading of these reports makes it clear that by September 1939, the Red Army was in dire need of even half of the rifles, more than half of the machine guns were missing, there were not always machine guns and anti-tank rifles, and there were no mortars of small and large calibers at all, 45-mm anti-tank the army was equipped with guns by one third, 76-mm guns and 122-mm howitzers by half, there was not a single small-caliber or large-caliber anti-aircraft gun, and two-thirds of 76-mm anti-aircraft guns were missing.
This is in peacetime states! The missing weapons still needed to be manufactured, supplied to the army and trained personnel to use them.
Of the 173 rifle divisions of the Red Army, only 46 divisions in the 39-40s will be deployed to full peacetime staff, and they can be considered normal divisions, another 64 divisions will have half the strength, and the rest will have a quarter of the personnel.
For the transition to wartime states, each of the deployed 46 divisions needs to call up about 5 thousand more people, and from 10 to 14 thousand people for the rest. However, these divisions still need to be trained.
And by September 1939, the Wehrmacht had all the infantry divisions of a full wartime staff and began combat training of divisions in the form of direct military operations, gaining invaluable combat experience (Poland, Norway, France, Belgium ...).
Is the formula “Wehrmacht division = Red Army division” correct in the light of this information by the summer of 1941?
Voroshilov writes directly in the report that there is a catastrophic shortage of cars and will be missed even if the industry fulfills the NPO order in full.
Judging by the October report, the situation in aviation is no better. By September 1939, the fighter fleet of the Air Force of our army consisted of 2.5 thousand I-16s, 1.5 thousand I-15s and 192 I-153s. By 1939, all these machines were hopelessly outdated morally, which was clearly shown by air battles in Spain.
And German fighter aviation had more than a thousand of the most modern Bf-109s, about a hundred new twin-engine Bf-110 fighters, and only 33 fighters of our I-15 class - Ar-68.
But there were 25 cavalry divisions in the Red Army, plus 1 brigade and 6 separate regiments. The Germans have only 1 cavalry division and (let me be silly) it seems that they themselves were perplexed - why they need it. After all, the cavalry sang its swan song back in the First World War.
In the report for October 1939, the reader will find Voroshilov's famous proposal to disband the mechanized corps due to the cumbersome management of these associations (in his opinion). Voroshilov is usually reproached for this statement and the decision to disband them is considered a tragic mistake. However, the mechanized corps of that time were indeed extremely bulky, poorly managed formations. Mechanized corps were needed, but much more compact.
Of course, Voroshilov was not up to par, and he is largely to blame for the unpreparedness of the army for a big war, but is he the only one to blame? And where is the guarantee that if Tukhachevsky or Blucher had been in his place, the situation would have been completely different? For some reason, not one of the famous brigade commanders, divisional commanders or commanders of the Civil War showed himself in any way during the Great Patriotic War. It was a different war and required different abilities.
But I must remind you that, frankly, the deplorable state of the Red Army at the time of the outbreak of the war, in my opinion, is 90% a consequence of the events that swept the country from 1914 to 1924, and a consequence of the state of all of Russia at the beginning of the First World War . I am not sure that without the revolution and the Civil War, the state of the country and the army would have been better.
Below are the written reports of the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the state of affairs in the Red Army and the prospects for the further development of the army, made by him in August and October 1939. To some extent, this was done, and in what state the Red Army met the war will be shown below. In any case, in the act of transferring the post of People's Commissar of Defense to Marshal Timoshenko, Voroshilov noted that by May 1940, very little had been done.
Owls. secret
People's Commissar
Defense of the USSR
Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Stalin
Council of People's Commissars of the USSR comrade. Molotov
To meet the need for weapons, military equipment for organizational events of the Red Army for rifle divisions, auto regiments and directorates of rifle corps, I would consider it necessary to turn:
a) the existing weapons and military equipment of rifle divisions according to the existing peacetime scheme;
b) weapons and military equipment supplied by industry according to the 1939 order plan;
c) emergency reserves of rifle divisions deployed according to the scheme before the reorganization of the Red Army;
d) the sale of weapons and military equipment on an additional order from industry.
Meeting the demand for the main nomenclatures of weapons and military equipment is characterized by the following data:
1. ARTILLERY WEAPONS
Meeting the needs of organizational events with artillery weapons is provided in the following sizes.
The need for reorganized rifle divisions remains unmet in 1939:
For anti-tank guns - due to the lack of an approved sample in 1939, due to which the order may be issued only in 1940;
For small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, which were put into service in 1939, but have not yet mastered production;
For 12.7-mm machine guns - due to the insufficiency of their production in 1939, which, however, the industry cannot increase.
Shortage of 152-mm howitzers can be covered at the expense of nep. (inviolable - Yu.V.) stock for howitzer regiments ARGC.
The full provision of divisions with 50, 107 and 120-mm mortars is transferred to 1940 due to the slow pace of mastering the production of mortars in 1939.
For the rest of the main items of artillery weapons, organizational events are provided in peacetime states in full.
2. ARMORED ARMOR
The provision of new formations with the main types of armored weapons is characterized by the following data.
The great underfunding of trucks, cars and, especially, special vehicles cannot be eliminated even if the industry fulfills the plan of NPO orders in full.
Due to the large shortage, and also taking into account the organization of new ten automobile regiments, which will be insignificantly provided with a motor vehicle fleet, additional funding by vehicles of the NPO of the USSR at the expense of other consumers is necessary, with the full implementation of the NPO order plan for 1939.
4. WEAPONS OF COMMUNICATIONS Considering the poor fulfillment of the order of 1939 by the industry and satisfaction from the planned reserve of the Center of the First Armgroup and ZabVO, I would consider it expedient to staff the formations with communications equipment at the expense of non-violable. - Yu.V.) Stock parts according to the following:
To cover the lack of communication equipment of the formations in the first quarter of 1940.
In reporting this, please:
a) to permit the NPO of the USSR to supply armaments and military equipment from emergency stocks in accordance with the attached calculations;
b) oblige the industrial people's commissariats to fully fulfill the NPO order plan for 1939;
c) allow to make an additional order for armored vehicles in the amount indicated in the attached statement.
Marshal of the Soviet Union
(signature) K. VOROSHILOV
next document.
Top secret
Of particular importance
People's Commissar
Defense of the USSR
No. 81229 ss/s
Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union / b / comrade. Stalin I.V.
SNK of the USSR Comrade. Molotov V. M.
By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated September 2, 1939, No. 1335-279SS, in order to strengthen the rifle troops, a plan was approved for the reorganization of the Land Armed Forces of the USSR for 1939-1940.
The reorganization was based on:
1. Transfer rifle divisions of triple deployment to ordinary ones and have 173 rifle divisions in the Red Army, of which:
17 rifle divisions of 14,000 people;
1 rifle division 12,000 people;
33 rifle divisions of 8,900 people each;
76 rifle divisions of 6,000 people each;
33 rifle divisions of 3,000 men each;
13 mountain rifle divisions of 4,000 men each;
2. Strengthening the strike force of the infantry core in rifle divisions, both in peacetime and in wartime.
3. Qualitative and quantitative increase in corps artillery and artillery of the reserve of the High Command. Transfer of ARGC regiments from triple to double deployment.
4. Disbandment of four cavalry divisions and two separate cavalry brigades.
5. Disbandment in the tank troops of rifle and machine gun brigades in corps and rifle and machine gun battalions in brigades.
6. Reducing the number of service and rear units and institutions.
For the implementation of these measures, the strength of the Red Army in peacetime was determined at 2,265,000 people.
The events that unfolded in September in the West made it impossible to carry out the reorganization approved and outlined above. The Red Army was forced to deploy in seven districts according to the wartime states according to the old organization.
At present, in connection with the establishment of a new border and the entry of our troops into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it has become necessary to make changes to the previously outlined plan for the reorganization of the Red Army.
These changes are caused by the need to maintain in the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as the troops introduced into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in a reinforced composition and the impossibility at this time to carry out the planned disbandment of four cavalry divisions.
Accordingly, it is proposed:
1. RIFLE TROOPS
In peacetime, the Red Army should have 173 rifle divisions, including instead of the previously planned 33 divisions of 8,900 people each. each to maintain on the western border 27 rifle divisions of 14,000 people each, including 3 rifle divisions introduced into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
In order to avoid a large increase in the size of the Red Army in peacetime, reduce the number of divisions to 6,000 people. and have them 54 instead of the established 76, and increase the number of divisions of 3,000 people. up to 60 divisions instead of the established 33.
In this case, the rifle troops will consist of:
a) 43 reinforced rifle divisions of 14,000 people each, of which:
In the west of the USSR - 24th division;
In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, one sd each - 3 sd;
In the east of the USSR - 16th division;
b) 3 rifle divisions in the Mongolian People's Republic, 12,000 people each.
A total of 46 reinforced divisions. All these 46 rifle divisions will have tank battalions of 54 tanks each;
c) 54 rifle divisions of 6,000 men each, of which 24 divisions with two-company tank battalions, 30 tanks per battalion;
d) 60 rifle divisions of 3,000 people each. without tank battalions;
e) 13 mountain rifle divisions, each with 4,000 men;
f) 3 separate rifle brigades of 6,100 people. each (1 OKA).
The divisions are divided into districts:
* Three rifle divisions with motorized rears of 12,000 people each. each.
Of the 48 corps directorates in peacetime, 29 have an anti-aircraft artillery division, of which 22 divisions in wartime will be double-deployed.
In total, in wartime there will be 58 corps directorates and 51 separate anti-aircraft divisions.
A wartime division should have a strength of 19,350 people (with a tank battalion) and weapons:
rifles:
Self-loading rifles - 750;
Rifles - 11,309;
Anti-tank rifles - 60; machine guns:
Heavy machine guns - 18;
Anti-aircraft machine guns - 15;
Machine guns - 162;
Light machine guns - 578; mortars:
Mortars 120 mm - 12;
Mortars 62-mm - 36;
Mortars 50 mm - 81; artillery:
Howitzers 152-mm - 12;
Howitzers 122 mm - 28;
Divisional guns 76 mm - 20;
Regimental guns 76-mm - 18;
Anti-aircraft guns 76 mm - 4;
Anti-aircraft guns 37-mm - 8;
45-mm anti-tank guns - 54;
T-26 tanks for 46 divisions - 54 each;
For 24 pages of divisions - 30 each;
Rifle squad from 11 people brought to 14 people.
In 173 rifle divisions in wartime there will be artillery:
76-mm regimental - 2592;
76 mm mountain - 756;
76-mm divisional - 3222.
Total guns - 6570;
122 mm howitzers - 4640;
152 mm howitzers - 1920.
Total howitzers - 6560.
In total, rifle divisions have 13,130 medium-caliber guns.
The total regular strength of rifle troops in peacetime is 1,271,050 people, which gives an increase of 56,850 people.
2. TROOPS OF FORTIFIED AREAS
Special directorates of fortified regions and military units for 1940 remain only for the Far East, the Karelian fortified region of the LVO and fortified regions on the Dniester, while the rest are reduced.
In total there will be:
1) departments of fortified areas - 14;
2) separate machine-gun battalions - 34;
3) separate artillery divisions - 20;
4) separate machine-gun companies - 13;
5) caponier artillery platoons - 187;
6) regiments of fortified areas 1 and 2 OKA - 4.
The total authorized strength of the troops of the fortified regions for 1940 is determined at 48,000 people, i.e., reduced by 26,000 people.
In 1941, additional formation of parts of fortified areas will be required to fortify the new border in the west.
3. TANK TROOPS
Service units are being reduced in existing tank brigades. Machine-gun and rifle brigades and machine-gun and rifle battalions of tank units are being disbanded.
Mechanized corps, like bulky connections for control, are subject to disbandment, and therefore 4 directorates of mechanized corps are disbanded.
The number of tank brigades will be:
16 BT tank brigades, each with 238 tanks, of which: 13 brigades with 2,562 men each. and 3 brigades of 2,907 people each;
16 tank brigades T-26 RGK, each with 238 tanks, of which: 13 brigades with 1,610 men each. and 3 brigades of 2,217 people each;
3 tank brigades T-28 RGK, each with 117 T-28 tanks and 39 BT tanks with 1,979 men each;
1 tank brigade T-35 RGK of 32 T-35 tanks and 85 T-28 tanks, 117 in total with 2,156 people;
10 light tank regiments numbering: 8 regiments of 1,050 people each. and 2 regiments (SAVO and ZakVO) numbering 425 people each;
4 motorcycle battalions of 600 people. each.
In wartime there will be tank brigades: a) BT - 17; b) T-26 - 25; c) T-28 - 3; d) T-35 - 1.
In total, in the combat composition of the tank units of the Red Army in peacetime there will be 8201 linear tanks, of which 3925 are of the BT type and 3808 of the T-26 type.
For wartime, there will be 11,085 tanks, of which 4,367 are of the BT type and 6,250 of the T-26 type, with tanks of rifle and cavalry divisions there will be 15,421 tanks.
The total regular strength of the armored forces in peacetime is determined at 105,086 people.
4. ARTILLERY
A. Corpus
In all corps of the western border districts, the plan provides for 2 corps regiments, each with 36 guns, of which 12 guns of 107 and 122-mm cannons and 24 guns of 152-mm howitzers mod. 34/37, and in the first regiment to have an AIR division, the staffing of this regiment is determined at 1,250 people. The second regiment - without the AIR division, staffing - 900 people.
A total of 40 regiments, of which 20 regiments, located in the immediate area of the western border, will be supported by reinforced states.
9 corps of the Far East have one regiment each without additional deployment in wartime, consisting of 48 guns, of which 24 guns of 107 and 122 mm cannons and 24 guns of 152-mm howitzers of the 34/37 model. The regular strength of the regiment is 1,535 people.
In peacetime, 13 corps of internal districts have one regiment each consisting of 48 guns, of which 24 guns of 107 and 122-mm cannons and 24 guns of 152-mm howitzers of the 34/37 model. The number of the regiment is 1535 people.
In wartime, 26 regiments of 36 guns each are deployed from these 13 regiments, of which 12 guns are 107 and 122-mm cannons and 24 guns are 152-mm howitzers of the 34/37 model.
In total, in wartime there will be 75 corps regiments, of which:
a) 9 regiments of the Far East, 48 guns each, of which 24 guns of 107 and 122-mm cannons and 24 guns of 152-mm howitzers mod. 34/37;
b) 66 regiments of 36 guns each, of which 12 guns of 107 and 122-mm cannons and 24 guns of 152-mm howitzers of the 34/37 model.
In corps artillery, guns will be
203-mm howitzers, which are now part of 12 corps regiments, are excluded from corps artillery and transferred to the RGK artillery.
B. High Command Reserve Artillery In order to improve the combat readiness of the RGK artillery, its regiments are being transferred from triple to double deployment, while the RGK regiments located in the Far East remain ordinary.
After the reorganization, the RGK artillery will consist of:
12 howitzer regiments of 152-mm howitzers of the 09/30 model, 48 guns each, the strength of the regiment is 1,361 people. of these 12 regiments, 9 regiments have a double deployment;
4 cannon regiments, each with 48 guns of 122 and 152 mm cannons, the strength of the regiment is 1,535 people;
17 regiments of 36 203-mm howitzer guns, the number of regiments is 1,374 people, of these 17 regiments, 13 regiments have a double deployment;
1 regiment of high power, 36 guns of 152-mm guns BR-2, the strength of the regiment is 1,579 people, the regiment has a double deployment;
1 separate division of 152-mm howitzers (in Transcaucasia), deployed in wartime in the regiment, with a long deployment period, the number of divisions is 325 people;
3 separate battalions of 280-mm howitzers, 6 guns per battalion, 454 people in the battalion;
5 separate divisions of 305-mm howitzers, 8 guns each, the number of divisions is 478 people.
The total staffing of artillery - corps and RGK - 135,756 people, of which RGK artillery - 51,660 people. Increase by 19,800 people
In wartime, artillery regiments of the RGK will:
Howitzer regiments of 152-mm howitzers of the 09/30 model - 23;
Cannon regiments of 122 and 152 mm cannons - 8;
Howitzer regiments of 203-mm howitzers - 30;
Regiments BR-2 152-mm guns - 2;
Divisions of 280-mm howitzers - 3;
Divisions of 305-mm howitzers - 5.
The total number of guns in the RGK artillery will be
The need for guns for the ARGC regiments in peacetime is fully covered. The need for wartime is not covered for 152 mm 34/37 howitzers in 493 guns, guns - 26 guns, 203 mm howitzers - 571 guns and 46 guns of 152 mm guns BR-2. All this need can only be covered by an order from industry in 1940. The total number of guns in rifle divisions, corps artillery and ARGC (without anti-aircraft artillery): in peacetime - 15,386, in wartime - 17,291, of which:
5. cavalry
The plan provides:
1. Reinforcement of cavalry divisions with small-caliber artillery and reinforcement of a saber squadron.
2. The existing anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the corps and anti-aircraft machine-gun squadrons are disbanded, and due to this, the cavalry divisions are reinforced with anti-aircraft artillery.
3. The existing 2 separate cavalry brigades in the North Caucasus Military District and ZabVO are being disbanded.
4. Abandonment of 4 cavalry divisions and 1 command of the cavalry corps, previously planned to be disbanded.
5. An independent cavalry regiment of the NPO is deployed into a separate cavalry brigade.
At the end of the reorganization in peacetime, the cavalry will have:
Directorates of cavalry corps for 440 people. each - 5;
Cav. divisions of 6,560 people. each - 18;
Cav. divisions reduced. composition of 3,490 people. - 2;
Cav. mountain divisions of 2,950 people. each - 5;
Separate cavalry brigade NPO - 1;
Spare cav. regiments of 720 people. every 6.
In wartime, the number of cavalry corps and cavalry divisions remains the same as in peacetime. The total number of cavalry is 149,342 people.
6. SPARE PARTS
In order to ensure the replenishment of units and for the retraining of non-military personnel, it was planned to form 14 reserve rifle regiments, 1 reserve artillery regiment and 1 reserve anti-aircraft regiment.
At present, due to an increase in the total number of divisions of 14,000 personnel, the number of reserve rifle regiments is being reduced and will be:
5 spare page regiments of 1,200 people each. each;
1 spare art. regiment (2,000 people);
1 spare anti-aircraft regiment (1,500 people).
The total number of reserve regiments is determined at 9,500 people. Reduction - by 10,800 people.
7. AIR FORCE
The existing air force remains in the same size and organization, and in 1940 will be re-equipped with a new materiel.
Currently, the Red Army Air Force consists of: 48 air brigade directorates, 55 fighter regiments, 40 SB regiments, 13 DB-3 regiments, 4 TB-3 regiments, 5 light bomber regiments, 13 light assault regiments, 6 mixed regiments, 93 air bases .
The total staff strength of the air force, including universities, is determined at 230,000 people.
Aircraft consists of combat units (without universities and auxiliary units):
8. LAND SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES The total number of existing schools and academies (without the Air Force) is determined at 145,120 permanent and variable staff. The plan of ongoing activities provides for a staff increase in schools by 30,000 people. In addition, due to the shortage of command personnel, which will take place in 1940, it is planned to produce in 1939-1940. additional admission to schools and academies of 30,000 people without increasing the total staffing of the Red Army.
9. AIR DEFENSE TROOPS
In connection with the need to cover with active anti-aircraft artillery a number of economic and political centers of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus additional formations of air defense forces.
Form:
a) 4 air defense regiments - 240 guns;
b) 10 divisions of the RGK - 120;
c) 6 divisions of the Air Force - 72.
The total number of air defense troops is determined at 75,000 people.
Anti-aircraft guns in wartime we will have:
1) points. funds - 1808 guns;
2) the reserve of the High Command - 552;
3) anti-aircraft. air force divisions - 192;
4) anti-aircraft. divisional warehouses - 364;
5) anti-aircraft. means of divisions and corps - 1288.
A total of 76 mm guns - 4204.
10. CAR PARTS
The existing number of automobile units is ... people, the plan provides for an increase by ... people due to the new formation of 8 auto regiments of 1600 people each, of which 6 regiments will be formed on the basis of 6 automobile brigades raised by mobilization.
The total number of auto parts is 28,920 people.
11. ENGINEERING TROOPS
In connection with the increased motorization of the army, the urgent need for the reorganization and strengthening of the engineering units of the reserve of the High Command is revealed.
Engineer troops from the existing number of 13,314 people are increased to 25,000 people.
12. TOPOGRAPHICAL PARTS The topographical units with a total number of 3031 people are increasing due to the intensification of work on the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine to 3500 people.
13. OTHER PARTS Communication units in the amount of 24,000 people. Chemical troops in the amount of 10,470 people remain in the existing organization and strength.
14. LOGISTIC INSTITUTIONS, DISTRICT DEPARTMENTS AND THE CENTRAL APPARATUS The existing number of rear institutions, district administrations and the central office - 64,615 people - remains unchanged.
15. LOCAL RIFLE TROOPS In connection with the need to create a number of new warehouses on the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, local rifle troops are being brought from 36,810 people to 42,810 people.
16. QUESTIONS OF CARRYING OUT COLLECTIONS AND BATTLE ROLLING OF TROOPS
For the combat cohesion of military units and formations as a whole in the summer period, it is necessary to have combat units staffed by 75% in relation to the wartime staff at training camps, including the composition of the cadre. Logistic units and institutions are called for training, based on the characteristics of each rear unit and institution, as needed. The total collection period is set:
1. For enlisted personnel - 1.5 months.
2. For junior commanders and commanding staff, the collection period to keep the existing one is 3 months.
Determine for each type of divisions the following number of drafts for summer training camps:
For 54 sd (6,000) - 8,000 people each, a total of 432,000 people;
For 60 sd (3,000) - 11,000 people each, a total of 660,000 people;
For 13 sd (mountain) - 3,500 people each, a total of 45,500 people.
In total - 1,137,500 people.
In divisions of 14,000, meetings should be carried out only to the extent of the actual need for training or retraining of specialists lacking in wartime.
In addition, annually call for:
For body parts - 25,000 people;
For fortified areas - 20,000 people;
For tank units - 20,000 people;
For RGK artillery - 80,000 people;
For reduced cavalry divisions - 6,000 people;
For the Air Force (air bases) - 40,000 people;
For air defense - 45,000 people;
Sapper and engineering units - 50,000 people;
Other parts - 47,000 people;
Retraining of commanders - 100,000 people;
Rear services (army and military) - 50,000 people;
Total - 483,000 people.
In total, 1,620,500 people are subject to conscription. Of these, 350,000 are junior and middle command personnel.
Food rations will be required:
a) for the rank and file, called for 1.5 months - 158,800 annual rations;
b) for junior and middle command personnel called up for three months - 87,500 annual rations.
Total: 245,300 annual rations.
Please approve:
a) the regular strength of the Red Army in peacetime is 2,408,583 people. An increase in the number against the previously planned - 143,683 people;
b) call for collections in 1940 1,620,500 people, instead of 1,400,000 people established in 1939.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union (signature) K. VOROSHILOV
And here is another small but interesting document. He won’t say anything to someone, and someone, having read it, will take his head: “Is it really so lousy things were that the Politburo decided to touch the untouchable strategic reserve? I can not believe it!"
And in the meantime, that's exactly what happened. NZ is spent in the most extreme cases, when the question arises - either spend NZ or die, that is, the chances are zero.
To be returned within 24 hours to the secret part of the special sector of the Central Committee
Top secret
Not subject to copying and reproduction
ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) CENTRAL COMMITTEE
October 1939
Voroshilov, Safonov
Extract from the protocol No. 8 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee
dated _____________ 193___
135. On the permission of NCOs to use emergency stocks of weapons and military equipment
Approve the following draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:
“In connection with the organizing events held by the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR for rifle divisions, corps directorates and auto regiments, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:
1) to allow the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR to supply weapons and military equipment for organizational events in 1939 from emergency stocks and the reserve of the Central Warehouses of the Red Army in quantities for individual types of weapons in accordance with Annexes No. 1, 2, 3 and 4; 2), further accumulation of nepr. to produce stocks of weapons and military equipment up to the established norms at the expense of receipts according to the plan of orders in 1940.
Secretary of the Central Committee
On September 17, 1939, the Polish campaign of the Red Army began. Officially, in the days of the USSR (and in some sources even now), this military conflict was called the "Liberation campaign in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine." The official pretext was quite interesting - "to protect the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." The reason for the invasion sounds simply ridiculous, given that it was from this population that the Soviet authorities took all their property, and very many also their lives.
On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, its troops successfully and fairly quickly moved deep into Polish territory. Not so long ago, a very interesting historical fact- already on September 1, the USSR provided the radio station in Minsk to the German Air Force as a special radio beacon, which carried out coordinate referencing using radio compasses. This lighthouse was used by the Luftwaffe to bombard Warsaw and some other cities. thus, from the very beginning, the USSR made no secret of its intentions. On September 4, partial mobilization began in the Soviet Union. On September 11, on the basis of the Belorussian and Kiev military districts, two fronts were created - the Belorussian and Ukrainian. The main blow was to be delivered precisely by the Romanian front, because. Polish troops retreated to the Romanian border, from there a counteroffensive against German troops was planned.
Soviet troops launched a massive attack on the eastern Polish territories. 620 thousand soldiers, 4700 tanks and 3300 aircraft were thrown into the attack, that is, twice as many as the Wehrmacht had, which attacked Poland on the first of September.
The Polish government, having given the troops an incomprehensible order not to engage in battle with the Red Army, fled from their country to Romania.
By that time, there were no regular military units on the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus. Battalions of the people's militia were formed without heavy weapons. The incomprehensible order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief disorientated the commanders on the ground. In some cities, the Red Army was greeted as allies, in some cases the troops evaded clashes with the Red Army, there were also attempts at resistance and stubborn battles. But the forces were not equal, and most of the Polish generals and senior officers behaved extremely cowardly and passively, preferring to flee to neutral Lithuania. The Polish units on the territory of Western Belarus were finally defeated on September 24, 1939.
Already in the first days after the Red Army's invasion of Poland, war crimes began. First, they affected the Polish soldiers and officers. The orders of the Soviet troops abounded with appeals addressed to the Polish civilian population: they agitated to destroy the Polish military, portraying them as enemies. Ordinary soldiers were encouraged to kill their officers. Such orders were given, for example, by the commander of the Ukrainian Front, Semyon Timoshenko. This war was fought against international law and all military conventions.
For example, in the Polesye Voivodeship, the Soviet military shot an entire captured company of the battalion of the Sarny Border Guard Corps - 280 people. A brutal murder also took place in the Great Bridges of the Lviv province. Soviet soldiers drove the cadets of the local School of Police Officers to the square, listened to the report of the school commandant and shot all those present from machine guns placed around. No one survived. From one Polish detachment that fought in the vicinity of Vilnius and laid down their arms in exchange for a promise to let the soldiers go home, all the officers were withdrawn, who were immediately executed. The same thing happened in Grodno, taking which the Soviet troops killed about 300 Polish defenders of the city. On the night of September 26-27, Soviet detachments entered Nemiruvek in the Chelm region, where several dozen cadets spent the night. They were taken prisoner, tied with barbed wire and bombarded with grants. The policemen who defended Lviv were shot on the highway leading to Vinniki. Similar executions took place in Novogrudok, Ternopil, Volkovysk, Oshmyany, Svisloch, Molodechno, Khodorov, Zolochev, Stry. Separate and massacres of captured Polish soldiers were committed in hundreds of other cities in the eastern regions of Poland. The Soviet military also mocked the wounded. So it was, for example, during the battle near Vytychno, when several dozen wounded prisoners were placed in the building of the People's House in Vlodava and locked up there without any help. Two days later, almost all died from their wounds, their bodies were burned at the stake.
Sometimes the Soviet military used deception, treacherously promising Polish soldiers freedom, and sometimes even pretending to be Polish allies in the war with Hitler. This happened, for example, on September 22 in Vinniki near Lvov. General Vladislav Langer, who led the defense of the city, signed with the Soviet commanders a protocol for the transfer of the city to the Red Army, according to which Polish officers were promised an unhindered exit in the direction of Romania and Hungary. The agreement was violated almost immediately: the officers were arrested and taken to a camp in Starobilsk. In the Zalishchiki region on the border with Romania, the Russians decorated tanks with Soviet and Polish flags to pose as allies, and then surround the Polish detachments, disarm and arrest the soldiers. They often took off their uniforms and shoes from the prisoners and let them go on without clothes, shooting at them with undisguised joy. In general, as the Moscow press reported, in September 1939, Soviet army about 250 thousand Polish soldiers and officers were hit. For the latter, real hell began later. The denouement took place in the Katyn forest and the basements of the NKVD in Tver and Kharkov.
Terror and killings of the civilian population took on a special scale in Grodno, where at least 300 people were killed, including scouts who took part in the defense of the city. Twelve-year-old Tadzik Yasinsky soviet soldiers tied to a tank, and then dragged along the pavement. Arrested civilians were shot at Dog Mountain. Witnesses of these events recall that piles of corpses lay in the center of the city. Among those arrested were, in particular, the director of the gymnasium Vaclav Myslicki, the head of the women's gymnasium Janina Nedzwiecka and the deputy of the Seimas Constanta Terlikovsky.
All of them soon died in Soviet prisons. The wounded had to hide from the Soviet soldiers, because if they were found, they would be immediately shot.
The Red Army soldiers especially actively poured out their hatred on the Polish intellectuals, landowners, officials and schoolchildren. In the village of Bolshiye Eismonty in the Bialystok region, Kazimierz Bisping, a member of the Union of Landowners and Senator, was tortured, who later died in one of the Soviet camps. Arrest and torture also awaited the engineer Oskar Meishtovich, the owner of the Rogoznitsa estate near Grodno, who was subsequently killed in a Minsk prison.
Soviet soldiers treated foresters and military settlers with particular cruelty. The command of the Ukrainian Front issued a 24-hour permission to the local Ukrainian population to "crack down on the Poles." The most brutal murder took place in the Grodno region, where not far from Skidel and Zhydomlya there were three garrisons inhabited by Pilsudski's former legionnaires. Several dozen people were brutally killed: their ears, tongues, noses were cut off, and their stomachs were torn open. Some were doused with oil and burned.
Terror and repression also fell upon the clergy. Priests were beaten, taken to camps, and often killed. In Antonovka, Sarny district, a priest was arrested right during the service; in Ternopil, Dominican monks were expelled from the monastery buildings, which were burned before their eyes. In the village of Zelva, Volkovysk district, a Catholic and Orthodox priest was arrested, and then they were brutally dealt with in the nearby forest.
From the first days of the entry of Soviet troops, the prisons of the cities and towns of Eastern Poland began to fill rapidly. The NKVD, which treated the captives with bestial cruelty, began to create their own makeshift prisons. Within just a few weeks, the number of prisoners had increased by at least six to seven times.
On September 28, German troops captured Warsaw, the last armed clashes in Poland were on October 5. Those. despite the assertions of the USSR, the Polish army continued to resist after 17 September.
At the end of September, Soviet and German troops met near Lublin and Bialystok. Two joint formations of Soviet and German troops (sometimes called parades) were held, in Brest the brigade commander S. Krivoshein and General G. Guderian took over the parade, in Grodno - commander V. Chuikov and a German general (last name is not yet known).
As a result of the undeclared war, the Red Army lost 1173 people killed, 2002 wounded, 302 missing, 17 tanks, 6 aircraft, 6 guns and 36 vehicles. The Polish side lost 3,500 people killed, 20,000 missing, 454,700 prisoners and a large number of guns and aircraft.
In the era of the Polish People's Republic, they tried to convince the Poles that on September 17, 1939, there was a "peaceful" entry of Soviet troops to protect the Belarusian and Ukrainian population living on the eastern borders of the Polish Republic. Meanwhile, it was a brutal attack that violated the provisions of the 1921 Riga Treaty and the 1932 Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The Red Army, which entered Poland, did not reckon with international law. It was not only about the capture of the eastern Polish regions as part of the implementation of the provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on August 23, 1939. Having invaded Poland, the USSR began to implement a plan that had been born back in the 1920s to exterminate the Polish elite. The Bolsheviks acted according to their usual scheme.
Indeed, having familiarized myself with a huge number of documents and their analysis, I was able to conclude that 1939 was indeed a turning point for the Red Army. The main part of the repressions has already been left behind, in principle, one can even say that there has been some calm.
The repressed were where it was determined by them (both in this world and in the next), who were lucky, they returned back. In general, the reform of the Red Army and the actual preparation for the upcoming battles began.
The fact that there will be a war, no matter how anyone has any particular doubts, the only question is - with whom and when. Partially, those who, in the event of war, were to bear the main responsibility, also took care of such a mood.
But before I finish my discussion about personnel in the Red Army of that time, I decided to touch on a technical topic, although personnel will also be present here. But I'll start with technology and numbers.
In many materials devoted to the Great Patriotic War, mainly those where some unfortunate historians and unfortunate commanders are trying to whitewash their own flaws, two ideas run like a red thread.
First: Stalin is to blame for everything, who did not take into account, did not prepare, did not understand, and so on.
Second: the Red Army was not ready and fought in 1941-1942 with outright junk.
We will talk about Stalin in due time, but regarding the fact that the Red Army was armed with old rubbish, we will talk in detail today. Let's start with the Air Force.
As many sources say, against 4,000 Luftwaffe aircraft, the Red Army Air Force had about 10,000, but only 1,540 of them were new. The rest was junk. That is, the Luftwaffe had a threefold advantage in the sky, plus a sudden attack on "peacefully sleeping airfields" and so on.
And then the nuances came, and such a crowd ...
We look at the Red Army Air Force. More precisely, on the planes that were this very "aviation junk". Just watching, no comments yet. For quantity and year of commencement of production.
DB-3. 1937 1 528 pcs.
DB-3F/IL-4. 1939 6 785 pcs.
Sat. 1936 6 656 pcs.
I-16. 1934 10 292 pcs.
I-15bis. 1938 2 608 pcs.
I-153. 1939 3 437 pcs.
I deliberately left everything released before 1934 behind the scenes, since it (like TB-1 and TB-3) was really junk.
Now we look at the Germans.
Do-17. 1937 2 139 pcs.
Me-109V. 1937 3 428 pcs.
Me-110. 1939 6 170 pcs.
FW-189. 1938 845 pcs.
Non-111. 1935 7 603 pcs.
Hs-129. 1938 878 pcs.
Ju-87. 1936 6 500 pcs.
Ju-88. 1939 15,001 pcs.
Strange, but from these lists from the Soviet side, only IL-4 reached 1945. As for the German list, only Dornier-17 did not survive. Meanwhile, the planes are mostly of the same age. But the Soviets went down in history at the turn of 41-42, and the Germans, being modified, fought to the end.
Here, of course, we can say about the existing backwardness of our aviation industry. But excuse me, what Hottabych conjured the suddenly appearing, albeit in small numbers, Il, Yak, Pe, MiG, LaGG?
LaGG-1 (1940), Yak-1 (1940), MiG-1 and MiG-3 (1940), Pe-2 and Il-2 (1941). Where?
Conclusions a little later, but for now let's turn to the tanks. Tanks are an equally important component of victory in battle. What did the BTV of the Red Army have in 1939?
Armored cars.
BA-27M. 1930 215 pcs.
FAI. 1933 1,067 pcs.
BA-20. 1936 2 114 pcs.
BA-6. 1936 386 pcs.
BA-10. 1938 3 413 pcs.
The last BA-6s met in early 1942. The rest of the list were lost in the first six months of the war.
T-27. 1931 3 295 pcs. (T-27 - tankette, also used as a tractor for light guns)
T-26. 1931 11 218 pcs.
BT-2. 1932 620 pcs.
BT-5. 1933 1 836 pcs.
BT-7. 1935 5 328 pcs.
T-37A. 1933 2 552 pcs.
T-38. 1936 1 340 pcs.
T-40. 1939 722 pcs.
T-28. 1933 503 pcs.
T-35. 1933 61 pcs.
You can not talk about the fate of thousands of these machines. They ended maximum in 1942.
Let's go to the Germans. Immediately I apologize for the simplification of the designations, T instead of PzKpfw
T-1. 1934 1574 pcs.
T-2. 1935 2068 pcs.
LT-35. 1936 343 pcs.
LT-38. 1939 1406 pcs.
T-3. 1939 5691 pcs.
T-4. 1936 8686 pcs.
Here, by the way, the situation is similar, because light German and Czech tanks also quickly ended. But the T-3 and T-4 were regularly produced until 1943 and 1945, respectively.
Even if you take and discard those T-3s and T-4s that were produced after 1941, strange questions definitely arise.
In artillery, both conventional and self-propelled, the picture is quite similar, and often even more sad.
A logical question arises: how and why? Here you can argue for a long time that German planes and tanks were head and shoulders above ours, but, I beg your pardon, with such a crowd, with a ratio of 4 to 1, it was possible to stumble and not such a mammoth as we are shown by the Luftwaffe or Panzertruppen. Apparently, it was not only a matter of technology.
And it cannot be said that Soviet engineers did everything in isolation from world manufacturers. Yes, not everything could be bought, but the bulk of the novelties that were sold for money were acquired by the USSR. It is enough to read "The Purpose of Life" by designer Yakovlev to conclude that since 1934 representatives of our industry have visited all world exhibitions. And since 1939, purchases and familiarization with German technology began.
"On the line of the airfield, in strict order, as in a parade, a lot of different military equipment was exhibited, the Junkers-88 and Dornier-215 twin-engine bombers, the Heinkel-100 and Messerschmitt-109 single-engine fighters, the Focke reconnaissance -Wulf-187" and "Henschel", twin-engine fighter "Messerschmitt-110", dive bomber "Junkers 87" and other aircraft".
“We returned to Adlon strongly impressed by what we saw. However, our General Gusev was overcome by doubts: the Germans couldn’t show us the actual level of military aviation equipment. “Probably, they consider us fools and showed us junk, not modern aircraft,” he said. "(A. Yakovlev, "The Purpose of Life").
What happened after all, why suddenly began a feverish study of world models of military equipment and the creation of new models of Soviet?
There is an opinion that the arrest, trial and execution of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army Tukhachevsky became a kind of Rubicon for the Red Army. The point in the Tukhachevsky case was put by a bullet on June 11 or 12, 1937, but only by 1939 did Tukhachevsky's heaps begin to be corrected.
Enough has been written about the repressed marshal so as not to be repeated. I support the opinion that Tukhachevsky was a narrow-minded man, but utterly ambitious. In military terms, it was mediocrity, which had to be looked for. But the best thing about Tukhachevsky, in my opinion, was written by Jozef Pilsudski in his book "1920". Yes, Pilsudski did not somehow denigrate Tukhachevsky, there is no great glory in defeating such a "military leader", but it is worth reading to compare Pilsudski's statements in the direction of Tukhachevsky and Budyonny. But the unfortunate historians made a "fool with a saber" out of Budyonny, and the beaten Tukhachevsky later taught his frank nonsense about the use of "ram attacks by infantry masses" at the Frunze Academy. And they listened carefully.
It was not for nothing that Stalin called Tukhachevsky a "red militarist". The global plans of Mikhail Nikolaevich in 1927 to produce 50 thousand tanks a year were not only unrealistic, but also disastrous for the industry and economy of the USSR.
Tukhachevsky, it seems, did not understand well what he proposed. Also, the "red militarist" proposed to produce 40 thousand aircraft per year, which was fraught with no less big problems for the country.
But what to take from a person who simply lived in some kind of his own, rather strange little world, dreaming of "ram strikes" by infantry and tank masses? By the way, I note that Tukhachevsky led his only "ram strike" near Warsaw ... from Minsk! And the fact that on August 16 the Poles launched a counteroffensive and defeated his armies, he learned on the 18th ...
Only one thing is surprising: indeed, where was Stalin looking? And Stalin, oddly enough, respected and trusted this maniac and agreed to all his plans. No matter what. Neither the fact that Tukhachevsky was a protege of Trotsky, nor the fact that the main victories of Tukhachevsky were in suppressing the uprisings of the Tambov peasants with the help of poisonous substances.
And all this disgrace continued until 1937, and then for some time it went along the path knurled by the marshal. Tank corps were created with more than a thousand tanks, the same corps that entered the battle with the Germans in parts, since such a hulk could be quickly deployed only in a cozy office. Armadas of aircraft were ordered, and absolutely without regard to what is happening in the world. Please note that after four years of operation of the I-16, no matter how complex the aircraft was, they continued to stamp the I-15bis and I-153 biplanes.
Tanks were developed that were suitable for parades (T-35), but absolutely not suitable for combat. And thousands of light tanks with bulletproof armor. Also, as practice has shown, they are absolutely incompetent.
And it cannot be said that Tukhachevsky was a lone idiot. No, he had faithful and devoted assistants. For example, artillery marshals Voronov and Govorov, who pushed Tukhachevsky's favorite brainchild wherever possible - the dynamo-reactive monster of Kurchevsky, and sent the real miracle guns F-22 and ZIS-2 to the landfill, which, being pulled out of this dump, said their big word in the Great Patriotic. The head of artillery Yakovlev (not to be confused with the designer) is also there, and Pavlov and Meretskov from the Main Directorate of Armored Forces are also there. Pavlov, however, was shot in 1941, but for completely different things. But fair.
Why do I accuse these people so fiercely, despite the fact that some of them fought through the entire war and even reached certain heights, despite their failures (Meretskov)? But simply because it was they who, supporting Tukhachevsky's stupid and harmful inventions, gave assignments for the development of one or another type of weapon.
This young and budding designer Yakovlev could cut down an aviette at the flying club. And for the Red Army, the equipment was developed in accordance with the tasks that were given by the headquarters. This is how heavy tanks appeared, unable to overcome a slope of 15 degrees, or, like the KV, armed with a 76-mm cannon. And Grabin's 57-mm anti-tank gun was discontinued, as it had "excessive armor penetration."
Many were shot and imprisoned. But many remained where they were. And here it is quite clear that it was simply impossible to clean out everyone. And there were mistakes. For example, the Pole Rokossovsky was first imprisoned and then rehabilitated. And later he became a Marshal of the USSR. But the Pole Bronislaw Kaminsky is not. They did not really prove it and sent him to a settlement in the village of Lokot, Orel Region. And during the war, it was Kaminsky who became so famous for his atrocities in the Russian People's Liberation Army (RONA), which he created, that the Germans first gave him the rank of general, and then shot him. And there are hundreds, if not thousands, of such examples.
Many of those who openly harmed in the pre-war years and betrayed covertly or openly at the beginning of the war (and with Grabin's 57-mm and 107-mm guns, this is precisely a betrayal) after 1943 became such ardent fighters that it's a pleasure to watch. And the list can be continued indefinitely, there will be marshals and admirals. And it is very easy to identify all these unshot ones: according to their memoirs. As soon as you come across stories about how wisely a commander or naval commander acted in the first days of the war, despite frankly stupid orders from above, then you can immediately put such a stigma. And how they began to trample on Stalin after his death ...
But the events of 1941 are still ahead of us. We won't forget anyone.
On the whole, if we put aside the nightmare of Tukhachevsky's militarization plans, then 1939 was the year the Red Army began to rise, both in terms of personnel and in technical terms. Especially in technical. The Main Directorate of the Red Army began to issue tasks for the development and creation of precisely the equipment that made it possible to defeat the Germans. It's a pity we didn't make it a bit.
The purges carried out in 1937-38, of course, did not clean up the Red Army as we would like. And remained in the ranks and cowards, and careerists, and traitors, and fools. But in quantitative terms, they have become smaller.
Image copyright getty Image caption
On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland. After 17 days at 6 am, the Red Army with large forces (21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank and 2 motorized brigades, a total of 618 thousand people and 4733 tanks) crossed the Soviet-Polish border from Polotsk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
In the USSR, the operation was called the "liberation campaign", in modern Russia they are neutrally called the "Polish campaign". Some historians consider September 17 the date of the actual entry of the Soviet Union into World War II.
The birth of the pact
The fate of Poland was decided on August 23 in Moscow, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed.
For "calm confidence in the East" (the expression of Vyacheslav Molotov) and the supply of raw materials and grain, Berlin recognized half of Poland, Estonia, Latvia (Stalin subsequently exchanged Lithuania from Hitler for part of the Polish territory due to the USSR), Finland and Bessarabia as a "zone of Soviet interests".
The opinion of these countries, as well as other world players, was not asked.
Great and not-so-great powers were constantly dividing foreign lands, openly and secretly, on a bilateral basis and at international conferences. For Poland, the German-Russian partition of 1939 was the fourth.
The world has changed quite a lot since then. The geopolitical game continues, but it is impossible to imagine that two powerful states or blocs would so cynically decide the fate of third countries behind their backs.
Has Poland gone bankrupt?
Justifying the violation of the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932 (in 1937 its validity was extended until 1945), the Soviet side argued that the Polish state had in fact ceased to exist.
"The German-Polish war clearly showed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state. Thus, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland ceased to be valid," said the note handed to the Polish Ambassador Vaclav Grzybowski, summoned to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on September 17, by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Potemkin.
"The sovereignty of the state exists as long as the soldiers of the regular army are fighting. Napoleon entered Moscow, but as long as the Kutuzov army existed, they believed that Russia exists. Where did the Slavic solidarity go?" Grzybowski answered.
The Soviet authorities wanted to arrest Grzybowski and his staff. Polish diplomats were saved by the German ambassador Werner von Schulenburg, who reminded the new allies about the Geneva Convention.
The blow of the Wehrmacht was really terrible. However, the Polish army, dissected by tank wedges, imposed on the enemy the battle on the Bzura that lasted from September 9 to 22, which even the Völkischer Beobachter recognized as "fierce".
We are expanding the front of socialist construction, this is favorable for humanity, because Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians consider themselves happy, whom we delivered from the oppression of landowners, capitalists, policemen and all other bastards from the speech of Joseph Stalin at a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) on September 9 1940
An attempt to encircle and cut off from Germany the aggressor troops that had broken through was unsuccessful, but the Polish forces retreated behind the Vistula and began to regroup for a counterattack. In particular, 980 tanks remained at their disposal.
The defense of Westerplatte, Hela and Gdynia was admired by the whole world.
Ridiculing the "military backwardness" and "gentry ambition" of the Poles, Soviet propaganda picked up Goebbels's fiction that the Polish uhlans allegedly rushed at the German tanks on horseback, helplessly stabbing the armor with their sabers.
In fact, the Poles did not engage in such nonsense, and the corresponding film, shot by the German propaganda ministry, was subsequently proven to be a fake. But the Polish cavalry worried the German infantry seriously.
Polish garrison Brest Fortress led by General Konstantin Plisovsky repulsed all attacks, and German artillery got stuck near Warsaw. Soviet heavy guns helped, shelling the citadel for two days. Then a joint parade took place, which was received from the German side by Heinz Guderian, who soon became too well known to the Soviet people, and from the Soviet side by brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein.
Surrounded Warsaw capitulated only on September 26, and finally the resistance ended on October 6.
According to military analysts, Poland was doomed, but could fight for a long time.
Diplomatic games
Image copyright gettyAlready on September 3, Hitler began to urge Moscow to speak out as soon as possible - because the war did not unfold quite the way he wanted, but, most importantly, in order to encourage Britain and France to recognize the USSR as an aggressor and declare war on it along with Germany.
The Kremlin, understanding these calculations, was in no hurry.
On September 10, Schulenburg reported to Berlin: "At yesterday's meeting, I got the impression that Molotov promised a little more than one might expect from the Red Army."
According to historian Igor Bunich, diplomatic correspondence every day more and more resembled conversations in thieves' "raspberries": if you don't go for it, you will be left without a share!
The Red Army began to move two days after Ribbentrop in his next message transparently hinted at the possibility of creating an OUN state in western Ukraine.
If Russian intervention is not launched, the question will inevitably arise as to whether a political vacuum will not be created in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence. In eastern Poland, conditions may arise for the formation of new states from Ribbentrop's telegram to Molotov of September 15, 1939.
"The question of whether the preservation of an independent Polish State is desirable in mutual interests, and what the boundaries of this state will be, can be finally clarified only in the course of further political development," paragraph 2 of the secret protocol read.
At first, Hitler was inclined to the idea of keeping Poland in a truncated form, cutting it off from the west and east. The Nazi Fuhrer hoped that Britain and France would accept such a compromise and end the war.
Moscow did not want to give him a chance to slip out of the trap.
On September 25, Schulenburg reported to Berlin: "Stalin considers it wrong to leave an independent Polish state."
By that time, it was officially announced in London: the only possible condition for peace is the withdrawal of German troops to the positions that they occupied before September 1, no microscopic quasi-states will save the situation.
Divided without a trace
As a result, during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow on September 27-28, Poland was divided without a trace.
In the signed document, it was already about "friendship" between the USSR and Germany.
In a telegram to Hitler in response to congratulations on his own 60th birthday in December 1939, Stalin repeated and strengthened this thesis: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, sealed by blood, has every reason to be long and strong."
New secret protocols were attached to the September 28 agreement, the main one of which stated that the contracting parties would not allow "no Polish agitation" in the territories they controlled. The corresponding map was signed not by Molotov, but by Stalin himself, and his 58-centimeter stroke, starting in Western Belarus, crossed Ukraine and drove into Romania.
At a banquet in the Kremlin, according to Gustav Hilger, an adviser to the German embassy, 22 toasts were raised. Further, Hilger, according to him, lost count, because he drank equally.
Stalin honored all the guests, including the SS man Schulze, who was standing behind Ribbentrop's chair. The adjutant was not supposed to drink in such a society, but the owner personally handed him a glass, proclaimed a toast "to the youngest of those present", said that he probably suits a black uniform with silver stripes, and demanded that Schulze promise to come to Sovetsky again Union, and certainly in uniform. Schulze gave his word, and kept it on June 22, 1941.
Unconvincing arguments
Official Soviet history offered four main explanations, or rather, justifications for the actions of the USSR in August-September 1939:
a) the pact made it possible to delay the war (obviously, it is understood that otherwise, the Germans, having captured Poland, would immediately go to Moscow without stopping);
b) the border moved 150-200 km to the west, which played an important role in repelling future aggression;
c) the USSR took Ukrainians and Belarusians under the protection of half-brothers, saving them from Nazi occupation;
d) the pact prevented "anti-Soviet collusion" between Germany and the West.
The first two points arose retroactively. Until June 22, 1941, Stalin and his entourage did not say anything of the sort. They did not consider the USSR as a weak defending side and were not going to fight on their territory, even if it was "old" or newly acquired.
The hypothesis of a German attack on the USSR in the autumn of 1939 does not look serious.
For aggression against Poland, the Germans were able to assemble 62 divisions, of which about 20 were undertrained and understaffed, 2,000 aircraft and 2,800 tanks, over 80% of which were light tankettes. At the same time, Kliment Voroshilov, in negotiations with the British and French military delegations in May 1939, said that Moscow was capable of deploying 136 divisions, 9-10 thousand tanks, 5 thousand aircraft.
On the former border, we had powerful fortified areas, and then only Poland was the direct enemy, which would not have dared to attack us alone, and in the event of its collusion with Germany, it would not be difficult to establish the exit of German troops to our border. Then we would have had time to mobilize and deploy. Now we are face to face with Germany, which can secretly concentrate its troops for an attack from the speech of the Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Military District Maxim Purkaev at a meeting of the district command staff in October 1939.
The extension of the border to the west in the summer of 1941 did not help the Soviet Union, because the Germans occupied this territory in the first days of the war. Moreover, thanks to the pact, Germany moved east by an average of 300 km, and most importantly, acquired a common border with the USSR, without which an attack, especially a sudden one, would have been impossible at all.
A "crusade against the USSR" might have seemed plausible to Stalin, whose worldview was shaped by the Marxist doctrine of class struggle as the main driving force of history, and also suspicious by nature.
However, not a single attempt by London and Paris to conclude an alliance with Hitler is known. Chamberlain's "appeasement" was intended not to "direct German aggression to the East," but to encourage the Nazi leader to abandon aggression altogether.
The thesis about the protection of Ukrainians and Belarusians was officially presented by the Soviet side in September 1939 as the main reason.
Through Schulenburg, Hitler expressed his strong disagreement with such an "anti-German formulation."
“The Soviet government, unfortunately, does not see any other pretext to justify its current intervention abroad. We ask, taking into account the difficult situation for the Soviet government, not to allow such trifles to stand in our way,” Molotov said in response to the German ambassador
In fact, the argument could be considered irreproachable if the Soviet authorities, in pursuance of the secret order of the NKVD No. 001223 of October 11, 1939, in a territory with a population of 13.4 million, did not arrest 107 thousand and did not deport 391 thousand people administratively. About ten thousand died during the deportation and in the settlement.
High-ranking Chekist Pavel Sudoplatov, who arrived in Lvov immediately after its occupation by the Red Army, wrote in his memoirs: “The atmosphere was strikingly different from the state of affairs in the Soviet part of Ukraine. liquidate".
special accounts
In the first two weeks of the war, the Soviet press devoted short informational messages to her under neutral headings, as if they were talking about distant and insignificant events.
On September 14, in the course of information preparation for the invasion, Pravda published great article, devoted mainly to the oppression of national minorities in Poland (as if the arrival of the Nazis promised them better times), and containing the statement: "That's why no one wants to fight for such a state."
Subsequently, the misfortune that befell Poland was commented on with undisguised gloating.
Speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet on October 31, Molotov rejoiced that "nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Treaty of Versailles."
Both in the open press and in confidential documents, the neighboring country was called either "former Poland" or, in the Nazi style, "governor-general."
Newspapers printed cartoons depicting a border post knocked down by a Red Army boot and a sad teacher announcing to the class: "This, children, is the end of our study of the history of the Polish state."
Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to the world conflagration. On bayonets we will carry happiness and peace to working mankind Mikhail Tukhachevsky, 1920
When the Polish government-in-exile headed by Vladislav Sikorsky was created in Paris on October 14, Pravda responded not with informational or analytical material, but with a feuilleton: “The territory of the new government consists of six rooms, a bathroom and a toilet. In comparison with this territory, Monaco looks boundless empire."
Stalin had special scores with Poland.
During the disastrous Polish war of 1920 for Soviet Russia, he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council (political commissar) of the Southwestern Front.
The neighboring country in the USSR was called nothing more than "pan Poland" and blamed for everything and always.
As follows from the decree signed by Stalin and Molotov on January 22, 1933 on the fight against the migration of peasants to the cities, it turns out that people did this not trying to escape from the Holodomor, but being incited by "Polish agents".
Until the mid-1930s, the Soviet military plans saw Poland as the main adversary. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who also turned out to be among the beaten commanders at one time, according to the recollections of witnesses, simply lost his temper when the conversation turned to Poland.
Repressions against the leadership of the Polish Communist Party living in Moscow in 1937-1938 were a common practice, but the fact that it was declared "wrecking" as such and dissolved by the decision of the Comintern is a unique fact.
The NKVD discovered in the USSR also the "Polish organization of troops", allegedly created back in 1914 by Pilsudski personally. She was accused of what the Bolsheviks themselves took credit for: the decomposition of the Russian army during the First World War.
In the course of the "Polish operation", carried out on Yezhov's secret order No. 00485, 143,810 people were arrested, 139,835 of them were convicted and 111,091 were shot - one in six ethnic Poles living in the USSR.
In terms of the number of victims, even the Katyn massacre fades before these tragedies, although it was she who became known to the whole world.
easy walk
Before the start of the operation, Soviet troops were brought together in two fronts: Ukrainian under the command of the future People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and Belarusian General Mikhail Kovalev.
The 180-degree turn happened so quickly that many Red Army soldiers and commanders thought they were going to fight the Nazis. The Poles also did not immediately understand that this was no help.
Another incident occurred: the political officers explained to the fighters that they had to "beat the lords", but the installation had to be urgently changed: it turned out that in the neighboring country everyone was lords and panis.
The head of the Polish state, Edward Rydz-Smigly, realizing the impossibility of a war on two fronts, ordered the troops not to resist the Red Army, but to be interned in Romania.
Some commanders did not receive the order or ignored it. The fighting took place near Grodno, Shatsk and Oran.
On September 24, near Przemysl, the lancers of General Vladislav Anders defeated two Soviet infantry regiments with a surprise attack. Timoshenko had to advance tanks to prevent the Poles from breaking through into Soviet territory.
But for the most part, the “liberation campaign,” which officially ended on September 30, was a cakewalk for the Red Army.
The territorial acquisitions of 1939–1940 turned out to be a major political loss for the USSR and international isolation. The "bridgeheads" occupied with the consent of Hitler did not strengthen the country's defense capability at all, since Vladimir Beshanov was not intended for this,
historian
The victors captured about 240 thousand prisoners, 300 combat aircraft, a lot of equipment and military equipment. Created at the beginning of the Finnish war, the "armed forces of democratic Finland", without thinking twice, dressed in trophy uniforms from warehouses in Bialystok, disputes with Polish symbols from it.
The declared losses amounted to 737 killed and 1862 wounded (according to updated data from the site "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century" - 1475 dead and 3858 wounded and sick).
In a holiday order on November 7, 1939, People's Commissar of Defense Kliment Voroshilov stated that "the Polish state at the first military clash shattered like an old rotten cart."
"Just think about how many years tsarism fought to annex Lvov, and our troops took this territory in seven days!" - Lazar Kaganovich triumphed at a meeting of the party economic activists of the People's Commissariat of Railways on October 4.
In fairness, it should be noted that in the Soviet leadership there was a person who tried to at least partially cool the euphoria.
“We were terribly damaged by the Polish campaign, it spoiled us. Our army did not immediately understand that the war in Poland was a military walk, not a war,” Joseph Stalin said at a meeting of the highest command staff on April 17, 1940.
However, on the whole, the "liberation campaign" was perceived as a model for any future war that the USSR would start whenever it wanted and end victoriously and easily.
Many participants in the Great Patriotic War noted the enormous harm inflicted by the army and society by the hatred moods.
Historian Mark Solonin called August-September 1939 the finest hour of Stalinist diplomacy. From the point of view of momentary goals, it was so: without officially entering the world war, with little bloodshed, the Kremlin achieved everything it wanted.
However, just two years later, the decisions taken then almost turned into death for the country.
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