Partisans through the eyes of fascists. Why did the Germans hate the partisans more than the soldiers of the red army

Conclusion. What were you fighting for?

The partisan movement has repeatedly proved its effectiveness during the wars. The Germans were afraid of the Soviet partisans. "People's avengers" destroyed communications, blew up bridges, took "tongues" and even made weapons themselves.

History of the concept

Partizan is a word that came into Russian from the Italian language, in which the word partigiano denotes a member of an irregular military detachment enjoying the support of the population and politicians. Guerrillas fight using specific means: war behind enemy lines, sabotage or sabotage. Distinctive feature guerrilla tactics is covert movement on enemy territory and a good knowledge of the terrain features. In Russia and the USSR, this tactic has been practiced from time immemorial. Suffice it to recall the war of 1812.

In the 1930s, in the USSR, the word "partisan" acquired a positive connotation - this was the name given only to partisans fighting for the Red Army. Since then, in Russia, this word is extremely positive and is almost never used in relation to enemy guerrilla groups - they are called terrorists or illegal military formations.

Soviet partisans

Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War were controlled by the authorities and performed tasks similar to those of the army. But if the army fought at the front, then the partisans had to destroy enemy routes of communication and means of communication.

During the war years, 6,200 partisan detachments worked in the occupied lands of the USSR, in which about a million people took part. They were managed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, developing coordinated tactics and directing them towards common goals to the disparate partisan associations.

In 1942, Marshal of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, and they were asked to create a partisan army in the rear of the enemy - German troops. Despite the fact that guerrillas are often thought of as indiscriminately organized units of the local population, “ folk avengers"Behaved in accordance with the rules of strict military discipline and took the oath as real soldiers - otherwise they would not have survived in the cruel conditions of war.

Life of the partisan

The worst of all was for the Soviet partisans, who were forced to hide in the forests and mountains, in winter. Before that, not a single partisan movement in the world had faced the problem of cold - in addition to the difficulties of survival, the problem of camouflage was added. The partisans left footprints in the snow, and the vegetation no longer hid their refuge. Winter dwellings often impaired the mobility of the partisans: in the Crimea, they built mainly terrestrial dwellings like wigwams. In other areas, dugouts prevailed.

Many partisan headquarters had a radio station, with the help of which they communicated with Moscow and transmitted news to the local population in the occupied territories. With the help of the radio, the command gave orders to the partisans, who, in turn, coordinated airstrikes and provided intelligence information.

There were also women among the partisans - if for the Germans, who thought of a woman only in the kitchen, this was unacceptable, then the Soviets in every possible way agitated the weaker sex to participate in the partisan war. Women scouts did not fall under suspicion of enemies, women doctors and radio operators helped in sabotage, and some brave women even took part in hostilities. It is also known about the officer's privileges - if there was a woman in the detachment, she often became the "field wife" of the commanders. Sometimes everything happened the other way around and wives instead of husbands gave orders and intervened in military issues - such a mess the higher authorities tried to suppress.

Partisan tactics

The basis of the "long arm" tactics (as the Soviet leadership called the partisans) was the implementation of reconnaissance and sabotage - they destroyed the railways along which the Germans delivered trains with weapons and food, broke high-voltage lines, poisoned water pipes or wells behind enemy lines.

Thanks to these actions, it was possible to disorganize the enemy's rear and demoralize him. A great advantage of the partisans was also the fact that all of the above did not require large human resources: sometimes even a small detachment could implement subversive plans, and sometimes even one person.
When the Red Army advanced, the partisans attacked from the rear, breaking through the defenses, and unexpectedly thwarted an enemy regrouping or retreat. Prior to this, the forces of partisan detachments were hiding in forests, mountains and swamps - in the steppe regions, the activities of partisans were ineffective.

Partisan warfare was especially successful in Belarus - forests and swamps hid the "second front" and contributed to their success. Therefore, the exploits of the partisans are still remembered in Belarus: it is worth remembering at least the name of the Minsk football club of the same name.
With the help of propaganda in the occupied territories, the "people's avengers" could replenish the fighting ranks. However, partisan detachments were recruited unevenly - part of the population in the occupied territories kept their nose to the wind and waited, while other people familiar with the terror of the German invaders were more willing to join the partisans.

Rail war

The "second front", as the German invaders called the partisans, played a huge role in the destruction of the enemy. In Belarus in 1943 there was a decree "On the destruction of enemy railway communications by the method of rail war" - the partisans had to wage the so-called rail war, undermining trains, bridges and damaging enemy tracks in every possible way.

During the operations "Rail War" and "Concert" in Belarus, train traffic was stopped for 15-30 days, and the army and equipment of the enemy were also destroyed. Undermining enemy trains, even in the absence of explosives, the partisans destroyed more than 70 bridges and killed 30 thousand German soldiers. On the first night of Operation Rail War alone, 42,000 rails were destroyed. It is believed that over the entire period of the war, the partisans destroyed about 18 thousand enemy formations, which is a truly colossal figure.

In many ways, these achievements became a reality thanks to the invention of the partisan craftsman T.E. Shavgulidze - in field conditions, he built a special wedge that would derail trains: the train ran into a wedge, which was attached to the tracks in a few minutes, then the wheel was moved from the inside to the outside of the rail, and the train was completely destroyed, which did not happen even after the mine explosions ...

In addition to repairs, the partisans were also engaged in design work: “A large number of self-made mines, machine guns and partisan grenades have an original solution both for the entire structure as a whole and its individual units. Not limiting themselves to inventions of a “local” nature, the partisans sent a large number of inventions and rationalization proposals to the mainland. "

The most popular handicraft weapons were homemade submachine guns PPSh - the first of them was made in the Razgrom partisan brigade near Minsk in 1942. The partisans also made "surprises" with explosives and unexpected types of mines with a special detonator, the secret of which only their own knew. "People's Avengers" easily repaired even blown up German tanks and even organized artillery battalions from repaired mortars. Partisan engineers even made grenade launchers.

07.07.43: The Hitlerite newspaper "Deyche Zeitung in Kroatien" published the second article by the German Major Schaefer, in which the author complains about the enormous difficulties that the Hitlerite command has to experience in the fight against the Soviet partisan detachments. He writes that the partisans have machine guns, machine guns and artillery at their disposal. Individual partisan detachments skillfully maintain communication with each other.

The author's particular "indignation" is caused by the "wrong tactics" of the partisans, the "cunning methods" with which they deceive Hitler's punitive detachments. The guerrillas, writes Schaefer, faced with difficulties, quickly and imperceptibly dispersed in the forests, and then reunite at the appointed place. "They," he writes, "fight stubbornly, bravely and brutally." “It’s not an easy job,” the author laments, “to fight against partisans on forest roads and paths in the thick of the forest. You have to cross the forest in all directions, through thickets and swamps. When crossing swampy places, German soldiers are forced to take each other's hands in order not to drown. Clothes are dried directly on the soldier's body. You have to sleep on damp ground. But good nights are rare, for partisans attack at night. The supply of foodstuffs, weapons and ammunition to the German troops is carried out with great difficulties, for the partisans mine roads. "

All this, declares the Hitlerite officer, forces the German command to use in the fight against the partisans not only SS and police units, but also aviation and even German soldiers who arrived from the front for treatment. The tactics of the German command, according to Schaefer, boils down to "surround the partisans with superior forces, not to push them back, but to destroy them." “However,” laments the Hitlerite major, “it is easier to achieve this in words than in deeds. With the support of the population, the guerrillas have an excellent information network. They know in advance about every movement of the German units, as a result of which the operations undertaken by the German troops often turn out to be meaningless. " ("Red Star", USSR) *

04.07.43: According to the Berlin correspondent for the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, Berlin circles admit that Soviet partisans are causing the German command a lot of worries. “The Russian partisan war,” the correspondent writes, “especially in forest and swampy areas, puts German soldiers in difficult trials. The fight against the partisans demanded many casualties from the German side. "

According to the correspondent, the German command is forced to use special SS troops and large police detachments to fight the Soviet partisans. The Germans had to build special strongholds and fortified positions, as well as a large number of towers, from which they are monitored around the clock. The Soviet partisans, the correspondent writes, direct their attacks primarily against the German lines of communication in the rear, which, according to German circles, causes them. ("Red Star", USSR)

27.05.43: The Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet reports that the Germans are frightened by the growing partisan war in Belarus. The operations of the Soviet partisans took on such a scale that the Germans were forced to introduce ever larger forces to fight them. According to the newspaper, some time ago large units of the SS and numerous detachments of the Nazi police surrounded Minsk, completely isolating it from the outside world. After that, a massive raid began in the city, which continued for a week. None of the residents of Minsk escaped the search.

The Svenska Dagbladet newspaper writes that, according to the Germans, “Soviet partisan detachments in the surrounding forests were supported from Minsk. Their actions interfered with the supply of the front and made the work of the German authorities extremely difficult. " In Minsk, the newspaper writes, weapons and secret supplies were discovered. (Izvestia, USSR)

JANUARY 1943 :

14.01.43: The German fascist occupiers are alarmed by the growth of the partisan movement in the occupied Soviet regions. Hitler's newspaper "Hamburger Fremdenblat" complains about the "cunning" of the Soviet partisans, who, according to her, are especially successful in forest areas. The newspaper writes that the German troops have to carry out a thorough reconnaissance of the area. To fight the partisans, the Germans were forced to create a special "security police".

The Hitler newspaper admits that there are a lot of excellent snipers among the partisans, therefore, the fight against them, in her words, "requires experienced people." The newspaper indicates that the partisan detachments are connected with each other via radio.

The newspaper complains that German soldiers are often the victims of partisans and that the latter are destroying bridges and blowing up trains.

Another Nazi newspaper, National Zeitung, accuses the civilian population of the occupied regions of helping the partisans. According to the newspaper, the Soviet partisans "are conducting real military operations against the German troops, and especially against their rear communications." The newspaper complains about the difficulties of the struggle against the partisans, who, in its words, “find a refuge in”. ("Red Star", USSR)

14.10.42: A war correspondent for the Hitlerite newspaper Minsker Zeitung writes: “The fight against Soviet partisans is going on among forests and swamps around separate railway lines. The guerrillas are constantly trying to blow up tracks, plant mines under rails and bridges, cut telegraph wires, attack trains, destroy alarms, and raid stations and bridges. In the fight against the partisans, SS troops and aviation are involved. Forests on both sides of the track have been cleared so that German railway personnel can observe the area. Despite this, the guerrillas often manage to damage the railways. Steam locomotives go off the rails, shots are heard from ambushes, German railroad workers are killed, steam locomotives are blown into the air. At night, trains are forced to go without lighting and signal lights. The guerrilla war is being waged mercilessly. "

And here is how the Nazi newspaper Vilnaer Zeitung describes the entry of Nazi troops into the captured Soviet city: “The city is busy. The army is followed by the police. All around, the ground shudders, and a giant concrete building is blown into the air. This hellish machine did its job. The police start cleaning up the city. All under the "driving paths to it are blocked, no one is allowed in or out of the city. All suspicious persons are arrested. Here in the city they seem to be only" harmless "pedestrians, and outside the city they form whole detachments. The reprisals against them are merciless. All men should be Those who cannot prove that they permanently reside in the city are expelled. At night, someone blows up all the bridges. The temporary bridge is constantly guarded from saboteurs by the police. The main task of the police is to clear the rear areas, and often have to conduct fierce battles. with partisans for every street, for every square, for. ”(Krasnaya Zvezda, USSR)

AUGUST 1942 :

25.08.42: More and more often in Hitler's newspapers there are reports of war correspondents about the difficult difficulties created for the German troops by the Soviet partisans. War correspondents point out that in many places all roads have become dangerous for the Germans. Here is a picture drawn by the correspondent of the newspaper "Velkischer Beobachter":

“A small seaside town in Crimea. On the road, when leaving this city, we notice a post with the inscription: "Keep weapons in combat readiness, there is a danger of attack by partisans!" We are driving along the road, to the right is a slope, densely overgrown with bushes. Suddenly, a shot rings out. The truck's sight glass is broken. The second bullet hits the wheel. The car stops. We jump out of the trucks, looking for cover. The shots follow one after the other, but we do not see anyone. The partisans run from one place to another and conduct continuous fire. "

The newspaper "National Zeitung" publishes the story of the commander of an SS company sent to take part in an operation against a partisan detachment.

“How many hardships and fear we have experienced,” writes the author, “during these months of fighting the partisans, we have not yet been able to find the detachment. While attacking railways, bridges, carts, military columns and police detachments, the guerrillas remain elusive, hiding in the forest. Yesterday evening they came to the village, linking up with other companies on its outskirts. Suddenly, a skirmish with partisans begins on the streets of the village. The population of the village takes their side. We, of course, answered later to the population, as it should be. A similar fate befell in the following days all the villages that hospitably received the partisans. In the morning we go deep into the forest for two and a half kilometers. Suddenly, a fierce fire starts from everywhere. Many of our soldiers are falling killed and wounded. A fierce battle begins. All the advantages are on the side of the enemy, since he is almost invisible and has good weapons. We have to call the planes, however, the partisans make their way through our lines. "

"Who would have thought," the Hitlerite punisher exclaims plaintively in conclusion, "that we have to solve such combat tasks in such a way." ("Red Star", USSR)

06.08.42: The correspondent of the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nycheter, who visited the occupied Soviet regions, sent a correspondence in which he writes: “In Belarus, where great battles took place in 1941, the fighting is still going on. Soviet partisans in groups of 200-300 people undertake unexpected sorties against the occupying detachments and attack the camps of the German troops. With frenzied attacks, they inflict heavy losses on the Germans. When the Germans send significantly superior forces against them, the partisans instantly disappear. A good-natured long-bearded peasant works with a plow from morning to evening. When the sun goes down, he returns home. At nightfall, he takes a hidden machine gun, and the peaceful peasant becomes a dangerous partisan.

The actions of the partisans often take such a turn that the Germans have to deploy bombers. But for the German pilots, this is associated with a risk, since the Russians open a hurricane of fire from machine guns. In the winter, fighting the partisans represented a terrible stage in the war in Russia for the Germans. There are women and even children among the partisans. A German officer said that in the winter a 12-year-old boy was captured, who had crossed the front line many times. The boy did not give any information. His specialty was setting fire to houses where German soldiers slept. He courageously accepted the message of the death sentence, and before the execution he exclaimed: "Long live the motherland!" Those who help the Germans also live in fear of the partisans' revenge. "

Regarding the situation of the population of the occupied regions, the correspondent writes that they have no housing, no food, and they are deprived of the opportunity to get it. ("Red Star", USSR)

The Nazis are seriously alarmed by the difficult situation that has created for them in Belarus. At every step, the German fascist enslavers run up against the fiercest resistance of the entire population, which frustrates all measures of the occupation authorities. “A mysterious and terrible curse hangs over us in Belarus,” exclaims the Hitlerite newspaper “Neyes Wiener Tageblat”. - German officials do not find anything here that could facilitate their activities. They have to deal with insurmountable difficulties here. The peasants do not want to put up with the new conditions of property. The artisans did not respond to our call. ”

To break the resistance of the Belarusian people, the Nazis brutally dealt with the disobedient, they kill men and women, old people and children. At the same time, they launched vile propaganda among the population, trying to prove that "the Belarusians have nothing in common with the Russians" and that "the fate of Belarus, as the Nazi newspaper Krakauer Zeitung puts it, is inseparable from the fate of Germany." The citizens of Soviet Belarus respond with a bullet and a grenade to all the invaders' calls for obedience. No wonder the same Hitlerite newspaper admitted that "the most urgent task of the Germans in Belarus is to suppress the partisan movement." The scope of this movement is evidenced by the report of Hitler's newspapers that one of these days a special order of the occupation authorities will be published "on the organization of German self-defense" c. ("Red Star", USSR)

01.07.42: The German fascist newspaper "Hamburger Fremdenblatt" in its June 25 issue published an article by Lieutenant General Tischowitz. The Hitlerite general, who tested the strength and might of the Red Army on his back, is forced to admit that, unlike Belgium, Holland, France and other European countries on the Soviet-German front, the German invaders “encountered unusually stubborn resistance already in border battles. Soviet soldiers are fighting with unparalleled courage. When the situation is hopeless, they prefer to blow themselves up along with the fortification than to surrender. The highest Soviet commanding staff also stood up to the tasks assigned to them throughout the campaign. "

The Hitlerite general recalls with horror the winter operations of the Red Army, which cost the Hitlerite bandits huge losses in manpower and equipment, “in the winter,” he writes, “our regiment was stationed on the Donets, south of Kharkov. Our difficulties went to extremes. I, says the author, fought at Verdun, on the Somme, in Flanders. All this is zero compared to what was required of each of us in the east. "

Further, the Hitlerite general is forced to admit the courage of the Soviet partisans. “The partisans,” he writes, “know that if they are caught, they are threatened with execution, but they are indifferent to this. When German soldiers were preparing to shoot one young woman, the general narrates with cynical frankness about the atrocities committed by the Nazis over Soviet people, she did not lose her composure and put her hand to her heart, showing where. " ("Red Star", USSR)

JUNE 1942 :

27.06.42: Hitler's officials complain about the "exceptional difficulties of work" in the occupied Soviet regions. During Rosenberg's stay in Ukraine, Hitler’s Commissioner Koch made a speech, who was forced to note that “all German leaders working in Ukraine, as well as district commissars and agricultural leaders are often completely alone in their posts.” Rosenberg himself spoke even more openly, sharing his "impressions" of his trip to the occupied Soviet regions. According to Ostdeicher Beobachter, after returning from the occupied regions of Ukraine, Rosenberg said that the German authorities “failed to establish cooperation with the local population. Armed detachments are operating everywhere, killing. " ("Red Star", USSR)

11.06.42: In an editorial, the Swedish newspaper Gothenburgs Posten writes that after the attack of Hitler's armies on the USSR, the Russians, with their heroic resistance to the enemy, aroused respect throughout the world. “Today,” the newspaper writes, “everyone speaks with admiration about the fearlessness and excellent fighting qualities of Soviet soldiers. Soviet weapons also amazed the world with their quantity and quality. Even the Germans do not hide this. They met a people who were fully armed, a people who neither ask nor give for mercy, but fight to the end. The most characteristic phenomenon for the struggle waged by the Soviet people is the partisan movement behind enemy lines. Russian partisans do not give the Germans a moment's rest, although they know very well that if they are captured, they will be immediately shot. The Russian soldier, the defender of the homeland in the war with Germany, won fame and will be spoken of with admiration. He fights with fearlessness for protection sacred Russia and the social order that he built and that he believes. " ("Red Star", USSR)

07.06.42: The newspaper "Kölnische Zeitung" wrote last fall: "The gallows for the Russian partisans and partisans are the trees of German freedom." A good fugasca hit the editorial board. ("Red Star", USSR)

02.06.42: Soviet partisans inflict a lot of anxiety and losses on the Germans. According to the German press itself, the scale of the struggle of the people's avengers is difficult to imagine. “The Soviet partisan,” writes the Frankfurter Zeitung in its issue of May 24, “has an incomprehensible ability for us to live in forests and offer stubborn resistance to our troops. In winter, in addition to fierce defensive battles on the front lines, an equally fierce struggle broke out, one might say a war in the rear of our front. At the same time, partisan units could be based on well-prepared strong points in the forests with depots of weapons and food.

German transport units, police battalions and field gendarmerie had to defend themselves against the enemy all the time. Whoever survived the winter in the East knows the difficulties that befell the units in the rear, as well as the fact that many fell in the fight against the partisans. At home, they have no idea about this unusual struggle for us. An enemy like lightning appears and disappears, attacks, cuts communications, blows up railway tracks. He knows all the paths. Whoever has experienced this struggle on two fronts will understand what our troops have gone through. " ("Red Star", USSR)

MAY 1942 :

16.05.42: The Italian newspaper Corriera della Sera published an article about the partisan war in the temporarily occupied Soviet regions. The entire article reflects the animal fear of the fascists before the sacred hatred of the Soviet people. The author of the article writes that the German command has finally “realized what a danger a partisan war poses. It is not easy to fight against guerrillas. The guerrilla war turned out to be completely unknown to the soldiers. They did not know how to deal with this enemy, whose activities border on fanaticism! "

The author is clearly amazed at the elusiveness of the partisans. “To successfully fight the partisans,” he writes, “we still need to find them, and this is much more difficult than the fight against them itself. Many partisans, dressed in civilian clothes, mingle with the population during the day and accept the most. " ("Red Star", USSR)

07.05.42: The glorious deeds of the Soviet partisans haunt the German invaders. The newspaper "Deyche Zeitung in Ostland" in the article "Guerrilla War in Donbass" declares: "The Bolsheviks are waging a guerrilla war here. No soldiers or civilians are visible between the lines. The enemy appears in one place or another. The supply of food and ammunition to the German troops is associated with exceptional difficulties. Convoys cannot be sent unsecured. Small enemy detachments have settled in each village and are attacking us. "

The newspaper "Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung" writes: "Our tank detachment has been given a very serious task - to protect one sector from the partisans. The partisans have settled in a wooded swampy area where we dare not enter. The bridge over the swamp has been blown up, and all approaches to the forest have been mined. Partisans often attack our shock troops. "

War correspondent Janssen writes in Danziger Outpost that "in the mountains of the southern part of Crimea there are Soviet partisan detachments with large stocks of weapons, ammunition and food."

In Das Reich, one SS officer states: “Partisans attack roads and railway lines in broad daylight. They took with them two German sappers last night. They use all kinds of tactical methods. Partisans are constantly moving from place to place. If you meet a group of forest workers, you never know if they are hiding short rifles of partisans under their clothes. Recently, the activity of partisans has become even more active "...

The last issue of the Swedish magazine "Nu" publishes great article about the struggle of Soviet partisans.

"The struggle of the partisans showed," writes the magazine, "that the war even more about" united the Russian people. The defense of Russia against the army, which won so many victories on the continent, amazed the whole world. " damage to German troops. ”Already soon after the start of the war, the magazine writes, alarming reports began to appear in the reports of the German command that“ battles continued and flared up again behind the German lines. ”

“The partisans,” the magazine writes further, “are well armed and enjoy the boundless sympathy of the population and its active support. Guerrilla warfare is going on in all the occupied regions of the USSR. Partisans blow up bridges, ferries, military echelons, freight trains. They appeared on the roads, where they captured or killed messengers, destroyed vehicles, set fire to fuel depots, fired at tank trucks, attacked armored vehicles, tanks and aircraft, and destroyed them with hand grenades. German tanks and armored vehicles often fell into traps. More than once it was reported about attacks on German headquarters. Many German generals were killed by the partisans. The villages occupied by the Germans were often raided at night. "

In conclusion, the magazine writes: “The partisans support the will to resist the occupation authorities and destroy the traitors who enter the service of the invaders.

The partisans publish hectographed newspapers and leaflets, organize secret meetings, and post appeals to the population. The influx of new people into the partisan detachments. " ("Red Star", USSR)

04.03.42: The Krakauer Zeitung newspaper published an article by the SS war correspondent, Schneider, who admits that Soviet partisans are active everywhere behind German lines. "They," says the correspondent, "are trying to destroy the German military columns and, in general, everything that could benefit the Germans." The correspondent cites the following episode: once from a village located north of S., the German headquarters was informed that partisans daily attack the soldiers stationed in this village, kill them and threaten to hang the village headman appointed by the German command. When this village was producing food for the German soldiers, the partisans flew into the village and killed two German soldiers and a non-commissioned officer. To eliminate the partisans, an SS detachment was sent, which tried to encircle the forest where the partisans had settled. The SS-sheep broke in. to the forester's hut, in which, according to their information, the headquarters of the partisan detachment was located. However, they failed to capture anyone.

21.02.42: The German newspaper "Hamburger Fremdenblatt" published an article by one of the leaders of the "SS" detachments, Fritz Carstens, who admits that the Soviet partisans do not give life to the invaders. “Our bitter experience,” complains Carstens, “shows that illegal groups were formed in all the occupied regions after the retreat of Soviet troops. Partisans often destroy German food depots, raw materials, as well. " ("Red Star", USSR)

DECEMBER 1941 :

04.12.41: The German command tried to explain the retreat of Hitler's troops from Rostov by the fact that they had to turn back specifically to punish the civilian population attacking the rear of the German army. it turned out to be something about 6 German divisions. ”This ridiculously stupid" clarification "was intended to hide the major defeat suffered by the Germans near Rostov. It goes without saying that the Germans failed to hide this fact, and the imprudent statement about the "reasons" for leaving Rostov, drawn up in a hurry, played a bad joke on them ...

The American "Washington Post" writes in this regard: "If you believe the claims of the Nazis that they evacuated Rostov because of the actions of the partisans, it turns out that they are so weak that they cannot cope with the partisans" ... London Times writes that the version of the partisans "as an explanation of the retreat is, of course, a lie", but in itself it represents "a more terrible and murderous sentence from its own lips than anything previously exposed against the Germans."

It so happened that the German fascist invaders, against their will, told the whole world about that carefully concealed and silent war that was raging on the captured Soviet lands, c. (Izvestia, USSR)

21.11.41: The German newspaper Brusseler Zeitung, published in Belgium, published an article reflecting the Nazis' fear of Soviet partisans.

The newspaper is outraged that "legal methods of war" are not to the liking of the Bolsheviks, who are fighting fiercely, and that "the entire civilian population has taken up the fight." We will have to, the newspaper says, step up the fight against the partisans.

The Nazi leaflet also complains about the stubbornness of the soldiers of the Red Army. "The enemy in the East cannot be compared with other soldiers with whom the German army had to fight," says the newspaper, lamenting the "fury of Russian soldiers in battle."

The Nazi newspaper especially dislikes the prospects of a winter war in the context of continuous active partisan activity. “The enemy wants,” the newspaper laments, “so that the Germans do not sit idle in the winter. It will not be difficult for the Soviets, which are accustomed to glorify the exploits of the partisans during the civil war. " ("Pravda", USSR)

07.10.41: The Swiss newspaper National Zeitung, commenting on the situation on the Eastern Front, notes the firmness and organization of the resistance of the Soviet troops. This firmness of the Soviet army, the newspaper writes, is emphasized even in the stories of many Germans, participants in this war. It is therefore quite understandable that "motorized fortresses", as the Germans call tanks in their messages, can only advance at the cost of enormous efforts and heavy losses. German newspapers are filled with long lists of dead tankmen and soldiers of the motorized forces.

The newspaper calls the struggle of the Soviet units behind enemy lines and the struggle of the partisans a kind of small war, in which not only small partisan detachments take part, but also entire military units.

The Soviet army showed its firm and irrevocable determination to deprive the advancing enemy of absolutely everything. The main role, however, is played by the readiness of the Soviet army not to yield to the enemy, no matter what position the Soviet troops find themselves in. Every district, every house, every wall is used in the organization of defense. As a result, the Germans suffer huge losses. The stories of the Germans themselves about individual episodes of the war only confirm the fearlessness of Soviet soldiers and the stubbornness of Soviet resistance. The lessons of the war on the Eastern Front are instructive. They show how important such a factor as the "soldier's psychology" is.

14.09.41: The German newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" published an article "The Face of War in the East", in which it admits that the German army ran into unexpected difficulties on the Eastern Front.

“Here,” the newspaper writes, “in reality, everything turns out to be different than we imagined. In this campaign, the German soldier is, as it were, transported to another part of the world, to another planet, and this should be understood not only in a geographical sense. The reason for this is the people living in this country. "

The newspaper bitterly complains that during the battle on the battlefield “Bolshevik fighters continue to fight even when they are in the most difficult situation. This is not only the behavior of the peasants in uniform, but also of the commanders. "

The course of action of this enemy cannot be foreseen. German soldiers have long been accustomed to the fact that there may be a front 100 kilometers in the rear. Every columnist should have a gun or automatic pistol on hand. Even the highest headquarters located far from the front at night set up sentries as in the front lines. A special chapter is made up of a description of what hardships the German soldier had to endure and what tasks to solve. It is not surprising, the newspaper says, if a soldier scolds "home-grown strategists" who are not happy with the progress of operations with strong words. ("Pravda", USSR)

09.08.41: The Times of India, in its weekly review of the hostilities, notes that the German fascists met with great difficulties that they did not foresee. Guerrilla warfare, the destruction of all materials by Soviet troops during the retreat, effective counterattacks by Soviet tanks - all this creates such difficulties that cause concern for the German command.

The Tribune newspaper also notes in a detailed article that the Germans are in a very difficult situation. The Red Army, the newspaper writes, showed not only valor, but also good training.

In addition, the Russians launched a guerrilla war. Disorganized and disadvantaged Germans curse the Russians. They call the tactics of the Russians devilish. When the devil begins to call another's policy devilish, it is easy to imagine to what a disastrous situation he has been brought.

To support their very battered troops on the eastern front, the Germans even recalled several divisions from Libya. German air force serious losses were also inflicted. To reinforce them, planes were deployed from the western front. The German army is stuck. Winter is coming with its terrible whip to. ("Pravda", USSR)

JULY 1941 :

30.07.41: Among the staff documents seized during the defeat of one enemy unit, there were field newspapers, the content of which sheds light on what is happening in the fascist rear. From the materials in these newspapers, one can clearly imagine how frightened the fascists are by the growth of the partisan movement.

The field newspaper "Blucher" (No. 6), published for one of the tank formations, reports in detail about the partisan methods of struggle used by the Red Army and the population. One officer, by the way, writes: “During the campaign we had to pass through 20 villages. In every village we were fired upon by red snipers who had settled in peasant huts. They also shot at us when we moved from one village to another ”.

Each issue of this newspaper contains reports on attacks by partisans on regular German units. In No. 9 of July 4, it is reported that partisans attacked a group of German signalmen in the forest and killed an officer. The next issue of the newspaper describes in detail the battle between the partisan group and the German quartermaster unit.

Judging by the materials published in the field newspapers, the fascist command is also very concerned about the partisan actions of the civilian population. The same newspaper "Blucher" in its July 9 issue cites a number of cases of damage to railway lines, burning of warehouses, destruction of crops, etc.

Another fascist newspaper, Gubener Zeitung, published a large amount of correspondence about the partisan actions of the population of the city of D., which began after the occupation of it by the fascists.

A fascist war correspondent writes: “Night street battles with snipers are becoming common and everyday. But that's not all. In broad daylight, shots are thundering here from around the corner, from attics, from windows. Every inhabitant we meet on the street, every woman who seems to bow to us - all of them can disappear at any moment into the maze of narrow alleys and small houses, take up weapons and start shooting at us from an ambush. And they do it! They are doing it even now, although the city has been in our hands for several days already.

The war correspondent goes on to describe how, while riding a motorcycle through the streets of the city, he was constantly bombarded from all directions. From all that has been said, the newspaper draws the following conclusion: “New for us is the medieval method of waging war used by the enemy from around the corner, in the courtyard and on the street. This war is being waged by men and women who do not wear military uniforms, so the fight is peaceful. " ("Red Star", USSR)

13.07.41: The newspaper "Dagens Nycheter" published an article by the famous Swedish military publicist Colonel Bratt, dedicated to the guerrilla war behind German lines. The author writes: “Everyone says that the Russians are waging a guerrilla war with devilish skill. There is no formal objection here: the guerrilla war waged by uniformed soldiers does not contradict the "law of war." The Russian soldier proved to be capable of guerrilla warfare requiring individual action. The Germans emphasize that the "small war" waged behind the line of the main front is heavy, brutal, and brings huge losses. From the articles published in the Russian press, it is clear that the Russian partisans use grain fields as a shelter. One can imagine what efforts the Germans have to make to clear the Russian fields and forests from the partisans armed with rifles and machine guns. "
(Special archive)
(Special archive)
(Special archive)
(Special archive)
(Special archive)
(Special archive)
("Red Star", USSR)
(Izvestia, USSR)

It was easier for the Germans to fight the partisans if they united in large groups. To this end, German special agencies even distributed fake leaflets on behalf of the Soviet command. Corresponding refutations appeared in the partisan press. So, the bulletin of the "Selyanskaya Gazeta" on May 7, 1943 warned:

“Recently, the Nazis concocted a leaflet and scattered it in some regions of Ukraine and Belarus. In this leaflet, allegedly on behalf of the Soviet military authorities, the partisans are invited to stop acting alone and in small detachments, to unite in large detachments and to carry out the order on joint action with regular units of the Red Army. This order, according to Hitler's fake, will follow as soon as the crops are in the barns and the rivers and lakes are covered with ice again. The purpose of this provocation is obvious. The Germans are trying on the eve of the decisive spring-summer battles to delay the actions of the partisans. The Nazis want the partisans to stop fighting and take a wait and see attitude. "

During the first two years of the war, the Germans and police officers, as a rule, shot prisoners of partisans on the spot after a short interrogation. Only on October 5, 1943 was a special order “Treatment of captured bandits” issued, according to which the captured partisans and defectors should henceforth be considered not only as a source of intelligence information and labor for Germany, but also as a possible replenishment of increasingly thinning collaborationist formations. In July 1943, the Western headquarters of the partisan movement was forced to admit that the partisans captured during military operations were spared, more or less tolerable conditions of existence were created:

“The command of the fascist army allocates horses to the families of the partisans to cultivate the estates. At the same time, these partisan families are given the obligation to ensure that their father, son or brother, etc., return to the house, leave the partisan detachment ... This tactic of the German fascist invaders has some influence on the unstable partisans. There are cases of a single transition of partisans to the side of the enemy. "

“Instead of the usual executions on the spot, they (the Nazis. - BS) enroll a partisan who has been captured or went over to their side, they are enlisted in the police, they give rations for a family, even for 2-3 families they give a cow. Those newly captured or transferred are placed separately. They are not even allowed to communicate with the police officers who went over to the service of the Nazis in the winter. Of these, separate groups are created and sent to hunt out small groups of partisans. The Nazis specially send partisan wives to the forests to persuade their husbands and bring them to the Germans, promising them good rations. This fascist propaganda and the method of their struggle had some influence on the morally unstable cowards, who, due to their isolation from the command of the detachments, weak educational work, being in small groups and alone, went over to the side of the enemy. until the end of the month were in a triangle (Vitebsk - Nevel - Polotsk. - BS) and were subjected to continuous round-ups by fascists and police, up to 60 people went over to the side of the enemy, mainly from the former Zelenovites ("green", or "wild partisans" , previously not subordinate to Moscow. - BS) and deserters from the Red Army ...

In the description of German actions, which was given by the command of the Okhotin brigade, one can feel respect for the formidable enemy that the Wehrmacht was:

“German tactics in a surprise attack on partisans always boiled down to one thing: shelling from all types of available weapons, followed by an attack. But the enemy never used the tactics of relentless pursuit. Having achieved success from the first attack, he stopped there. This was one of the weaknesses of German tactics. During the defense in cases of attack by partisans, the enemy turned around quickly and, having turned around, taking up the battle formation, fought very stubbornly, always almost to the point of complete depletion of his forces (loss of people and the expenditure of ammunition). This was one of the strengths of the enemy, but this led him to great losses in people. There was not a single case when the enemy did not accept the battle imposed on him. Even having run into a partisan ambush, he never fled in panic, but, retreating in battle, took away his dead, wounded and weapons. In such cases, the enemy did not consider losses, but did not leave his killed or wounded.

The weak side of German tactics was that the Fritzes were afraid of the forest. They set up ambushes on partisans only in settlements. There was not a single case that the Germans ambushed partisans in the forest.

The strength of German tactics was defense tactics. Wherever the Germans went, and if they had to stop even for a short time, they always dug in, which the partisans never used against themselves. "

The enemy began to use partisan methods of struggle (a hidden concentration of forces in the forest at night in order to attack partisans by surprise at dawn, ambushes, mining of partisan roads, etc.) only recently.

In addition, in August 1943, continuous bombing of the partisan zone by aviation began. “Almost not a single village remained in the Ushachsky and Lepelsky districts, occupied by partisans, that had not been raided by fascist vultures. German schoolchildren (pupils-pilots. - BS) also had their practice in this business. "

Indeed, according to German sources, the last year and a half of the war, the Luftwaffe used the Eastern Front as a kind of training ground for graduates of flight schools. Freshly baked pilots had to get comfortable in the air and gain experience in the fight against a weaker enemy in the face of the Soviet Air Force, before engaging in mortal combat with a much more formidable enemy - the Anglo-American "flying fortresses". The guerrilla zones, on the other hand, were ideal targets for training. The partisans, of course, did not have either fighters or anti-aircraft guns, and it was possible to shoot down the plane with a rifle or machine gun only at a very low altitude. Young German pilots were hardly worried about the fact that their bombs fall primarily on the heads of peaceful inhabitants of villages and towns, who, by the will of fate, ended up on the territory of the partisan region. However, the pilots of the "flying fortresses" also did not think about the life and death of German burghers, dropping their bomb load on the cities of Germany ...

In the struggle in the occupied territory, all sides widely used traditional methods of guerrilla warfare, including disguise as the enemy. So, on June 16, 1944, in the order for the 889th German security battalion, it was noted: “Recently, the partisans have been trying to capture more prisoners (a few days remained before the start of the general Soviet offensive in Belarus - Operation Bagration. - BS). To this end, they drive in German uniforms in trucks along the main highways and, picking up German soldiers who ask for a lift, take them to their camp. A similar case took place on 2.6.44 on the Bobruisk - Starye Dorogi highway. All soldiers are advised of the danger of driving in unfamiliar vehicles. Drivers are not allowed to take unfamiliar soldiers with them. "

The Germans also resorted to a masquerade, in particular, they created false partisan detachments from policemen or Vlasovites, dressed in Red Army uniforms or civilian clothes. They made contact with small groups or single guerrillas, encouraged them to join the detachment, and then, after waiting for an opportune moment, destroyed or taken prisoner. The Germans even introduced special distinctive headgear for their partisans. Such false detachments often robbed the population in order to later shift the blame on the real partisans. However, the latter also sometimes robbed the population thoroughly, donning German or police uniforms.

But it happened that the false partisan detachments turned into real ones. This happened, for example, with a detachment of 96 people, led by officers of the ROA, Captain Tsimailo and Senior Lieutenant Golokoz. The latter, instead of fighting the partisans, established contact with Zakharov's brigade operating on the territory of the Vitebsk region and revealed the truth to him. As a result, on July 17, 1943, 55 false partisans led by Golokoz joined the real ones, having previously killed the Germans who were with them - two radio operators and a captain. The rest of the detachment, together with Tsimailo, managed to escape.

Sometimes false underground centers were created, with the help of which the secret field police caught out the real underground fighters. According to this scheme, a "military council" operated in Minsk, consisting of German agents - the former commanders of the Red Army Rogov and Belov (he was eventually killed by partisans) and the former secretary of the Zaslavl district party committee Kovalev, who "concurrently" was also a member of the genuine Minsk underground committee ... At first, the "military council" was a real underground organization headed by the commanders and commissars of the Red Army, unfortunately not familiar with the rules of conspiracy. The organization had grown too big, almost half of Minsk knew about its activities. It got to the point that at the house where the headquarters of the "military council" was located, sentries were openly posted, who checked the documents of the ordinary underground fighters who came there. Very quickly they found out about the organization in the Minsk State Fund of Entrepreneurship. The leaders of the "war council" were arrested and bought their lives at the cost of betrayal. Now, under the control of the Gestapo, they sent the underground, supposedly to a partisan detachment, the police stopped trucks on the way, and their passengers ended up in a concentration camp. As a result, hundreds of underground fighters were arrested and shot, and several partisan detachments were defeated.

Sometimes pseudo-partisan detachments were created by the local residents themselves - after their liberation by the Red Army. The goal here was one and rather mundane - to get an indulgence for being under occupation, and at the same time "legally" to profit from the good of the former German accomplices. The story of one such detachment, discovered by the Special Department of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps in the Konyshevsky District of the Kursk Region, was told by the head of the Special Department of the Central Front L.F. the village of Bolshoye Gorodkovo, Konyshevsky district Ryzhkov Vasily Ivanovich, born in 1915, native and resident of B. Gorodkovo, non-partisan, with a secondary education, the former junior commander of the 38th separate battery of the headquarters of the 21st Army, in October 1941 voluntarily surrendered to captured by the Germans. The "commissar" of this detachment was a resident of the village of Maloye Gorodkovo, Summin Tikhon Grigorievich, a former soldier of the Red Army, who returned to the village after its occupation by the Germans. Ryzhkov V.I. March 2 Osobkor (Special department of the corps. - BS) was arrested. TG Summin went into hiding, is currently wanted.

The investigation in the Ryzhkov case and the activities of the detachment established the following. Parts of the Red Army B. Gorodkovo and M. Gorodkovo were liberated from the Germans on February 8, 1943; Ryzhkov and Summin organized a pseudo-partisan detachment on February 12, 1943. This detachment, under the guise of fighting German accomplices, carried out raids and searches in the adjacent settlements, took property and livestock from some former elders and police officers. Part of what was selected was distributed to passing military units, and part was assigned.

Hiding behind the name of the commander of the partisan detachment, Ryzhkov contacted the advancing units, misleading them with the fictitious actions of the “partisan detachment”.

On 20-11-43 Ryzhkov and Summin gathered members of the detachment and, threatening with weapons, offered to go to the regional center - Konyshevka, with the aim of ostensibly organizing Soviet power there and heading an organ of Soviet power in the region ... There are signals about the existence of several more such detachments. " ...

I do not know if the Chekists managed to find Summin and what was Ryzhkov's further fate - execution, penal battalion, or the Gulag.

Often the Germans defeated the partisans using their own methods of struggle. Thus, the commander of the Osipovichi partisan formation, which included several partisan brigades, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Nikolai Filippovich Korolyov, testified in the final report: “In Bobruisk, Mogilev, Minsk and other cities,“ volunteer ”battalions“ Berezina ”,“ Dnepr ”began to form, "Pripyat" and others, which were designed to fight the partisans. To replenish these battalions and to train command personnel in Bobruisk, an "Eastern Reserve Regiment" was created.

I must say that some of these "volunteers", who sold themselves completely to the Germans, actively fought against the partisans. Applying guerrilla tactics, they penetrated into woodlands in small groups and organized ambushes on partisan roads. So, in March 1943, one of the battalions organized an ambush on the site of partisan days in the Zolotkovo forest, which was run into by the headquarters group of the partisan brigade For the Motherland. During the battle, the commander of this brigade, Major Aleksey Kandievich Flegontov, was killed (I note that Flegontov was not a simple major, but a major of state security, which was equated to an army general rank. - BS) ...

Later, with the liberation of a significant part of the Soviet territory occupied by the enemy by the Soviet Army, police and treasonous garrisons were transferred to our region from the areas liberated by the Soviet Army. In October 1943, a regiment under the command of the former Dorogobuzh landowner and White émigré Bishler arrived in the village of Vyaz'e (was it not this Bishler who wrote the text of the leaflet about partisan cannibalism, which will be discussed below? - B. S). This regiment then took an active part in blocking the partisans of the Pukhovichi, Cherven and Osipovichi districts at the end of May 1944.

Korolyov also wrote about the "traitorous battalion" of Major Buglai, who arrived in the Osipovichi region to fight the partisans and "settled in villages located in the immediate vicinity of the partisan zone. Its personnel were well trained in the methods of fighting the partisans and skillfully used the tactical blunders of individual units. He waged an active struggle through ambushes in woodlands, on partisan roads and on river crossings, through a surprise attack on partisan outposts in villages ... "

The paradox was that as the Red Army moved westward, the position of the partisans did not improve, but, on the contrary, worsened. The partisan lands now fell into the operational zone, and later into the front line of the Wehrmacht. The partisans more and more often had to engage in battle with regular army units, which surpassed them both in armament and in combat training. Collaboration groups fleeing from the regions liberated by Soviet troops moved to all the diminishing occupied territories. In these formations now there are people who, as a rule, vehemently hated the communists, who did not count on mercy for the Red Army and partisans, and who had extensive experience in fighting the latter. At the same time, many other collaborators, hoping to earn forgiveness, joined the partisans in hundreds and thousands. It is no coincidence that at the time of joining with Soviet troops in the partisan brigades of Belarus, from a third to a quarter of the fighters were former policemen, Vlasovites and "volunteers" of the Wehrmacht. However, in practice, the sharp increase in numbers did not strengthen, but weakened the partisan detachments and formations. After all, they did not begin to deliver more ammunition, and the overgrown detachments became, as mentioned, less maneuverable and more vulnerable to attacks from the air and on the ground.

Complicated the situation and one more circumstance. As stated in the report of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (late 1942), "using the remnants of anti-Soviet formations and persons whose interests are infringed upon by the Soviet regime, the German command is trying to impose on us the Civil War, forming combat military units from the scum of human society ..." Indeed, on the occupied territories in 1941-1944 there was a real civil war, complicated by acute interethnic conflicts. Russians killed Russians, Ukrainians killed Ukrainians, Belarusians killed Belarusians. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians fought with Russians and Belarusians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians - with Poles, Chechens and Ingush, Karachais and Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Kalmyks - with Russians, etc. fewer own troops and police to fight various guerrillas.

How many people participated in the Soviet partisan movement? After the war, more than a million people often figured in the writings of historians. However, familiarity with the documents of wartime makes it necessary to reduce it by at least half.

Ponomarenko and his headquarters kept statistics, but the received data were far from always accurate. The commanders of partisan brigades and formations sometimes did not have information about the number of individual detachments, and sometimes, we repeat, they deliberately overestimated it, hoping to get more weapons and ammunition. True, very soon they realized that the supply from the center was limited by such objective factors as the weather, the availability of landing sites that were convenient and inaccessible to enemy fire weapons, and the number of transport aircraft. Therefore, they often began to underestimate the number of detachments in order to accordingly underestimate the losses incurred and more freely report on the successes achieved.

In 1944, after the liberation of the republic, the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement drew up a final report, according to which there were 373,942 people in the ranks of the partisans. Of these, 282,458 people were in combat formations (brigades and individual partisan detachments), and also

79,984 people were used as scouts, messengers, or were employed in the protection of partisan zones. In addition, about 12 thousand people were included in the underground anti-fascist committees, especially in the western regions of the republic. In total, the underground in Belarus, as it turned out after the war, was more than 70 thousand people, of which over 30 thousand were considered messengers and intelligence agents of the partisans.

In Ukraine, the scope of the partisan movement was much smaller. Although after the war Khrushchev claimed that by the beginning of 1944 more than 220 thousand Soviet partisans were active here, this figure looks absolutely fantastic. Indeed, by that time the entire left bank of the Dnieper, where the most numerous partisan formations operated, had been liberated from the Germans. And on March 5, 1943, Po-nomarenko, in his report to Stalin, estimated the total number of 74 partisan detachments in Ukraine at 12,631 people. Almost all of these detachments belonged to large formations of Kovpak, Fedorov, Naumov, etc. In addition, as the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement pointed out, there were partisan reserves and detachments with which communication was lost on the Right Bank and in the regions of the Left Bank Ukraine that were not yet liberated. numbering over 50 thousand people. In subsequent raids, the formations of Kovpak, Saburov and others increased by two to three times due to local reinforcements, but in any case, the number of Soviet partisans on the Right Bank was three to four times lower than the figure named by Khrushchev. As noted in the certificate prepared on February 15, 1976 by the Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, there. unlike other republics and regions, there were no registration cards at all, either for 220 thousand or for any smaller number of partisans.

The relatively weak development of the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine in comparison with Belarus and the occupied regions of the RSFSR is explained by a number of factors. Historically, Ukrainian lands have always been richer than Belarusian ones, which means that the population is more prosperous. For this reason, it suffered more severely during the revolution, and later - from collectivization and the resulting famine. Hunger in Ukraine turned out to be stronger than in Belarus, also because agriculture was undermined here by the creation of collective farms. But by the beginning of World War II, it partially recovered and, thanks to better climatic conditions, still exceeded the productivity of the agriculture of Belarus. The latter, during the course of the war, had to supply Army Group Center, the largest of all German army groups in the East. Therefore, food supplies for the occupiers caused especially strong discontent here. In addition, the natural conditions of Belarus, covered with forests and swamps, were ideal for guerrilla warfare.

Thanks to this, much more encircled Red Army soldiers settled in the Belarusian forests than in the Ukrainian steppes, which also created a massive base for the pro-Soviet partisan movement.

It should be borne in mind that in Western Ukraine the most influential among the local residents was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Nationalist organizations in Belarus have never been so popular, although here, as in Ukraine, an acute confrontation with the Polish population continued. If in Galicia and Volyn the Ukrainians relied on the OUN and the UPA in this confrontation, then in Belarus Orthodox Belarusians (as opposed to Catholic Belarusians) saw the Soviet partisans as their comrades-in-arms in the fight against the Poles.

In other occupied union republics, the scope of the partisan movement was even smaller than in Ukraine. By April 1, 1943, there were 110889 partisans throughout the German-occupied territory, located mainly in Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea, as well as in the Smolensk and Oryol regions. In Estonia at that time there were three sabotage groups of 46 people, in Latvia - 13 groups with a total number of 200 people and in Lithuania - 29 groups, numbering 199 people. The overwhelming majority of the population of the Baltic states did not have any sympathy for the Soviet system and viewed the German occupation as the lesser evil. And in Moldova, out of 2892 ethnic Moldovan partisans, there were only seven, and the bulk were Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. The song about “a dark-skinned Moldavian woman gathering a Moldovan partisan detachment” is nothing more than a poetic fantasy. The Moldovans clearly preferred to return to Romania after a year of Soviet rule.

The total number of participants in the Soviet partisan movement, assuming that about the same number of partisans acted on the rest of the lands as on the Belarusian one, can be estimated at about half a million people (only in combat units).

I note that there were much more collaborators among prisoners of war and residents of the occupied territories than partisans and underground fighters. Only in the Wehrmacht, in the military and police formations of the SS and SD, according to various estimates, from one to one and a half million former Soviet citizens served. In addition, several hundred thousand people each were in the local auxiliary police and peasant self-defense detachments, on the one hand, and served as headmen, burgomasters and members of local governments, as well as doctors and teachers in schools and hospitals opened by the Germans, on the other hand. True, it is difficult to say how much of those who had to work in the occupation institutions in order not to die of hunger can be considered as collaborators.

Now about the irrecoverable losses. By January 1, 1944, they were for individual republics and regions (excluding Ukraine and Moldova): Karelo-Finnish SSR - 752 killed and 548 missing, and only 1300 (of this number, only 1086 had the names and addresses of relatives); Leningrad Region - 2954,1372.4326 (1439); Estonia - 19, 8, 27; Latvia -56, 50.106 (12); Lithuania - 101.4.115 (14); Kalinin region - 742,141, 883 (681); Belarus - 7814, 513, 8327 (389); Smolensk region - 2618, 1822, 4400 (2646); Oryol region - 3677, 3361, 7038 (1497); Krasnodar Territory - 1077, 335, 1412 (538); Crimean ASSR - 1076, 526, 1602 (176); in total - 20 886, 8680, 29 566 (8487). These figures are probably incomplete, but they illustrate quite well the comparative intensity of the combat activities of partisans in different regions.

To this it must be added that in the seven months remaining until the end of the partisan movement, the Soviet partisans suffered the greatest casualties caused by large-scale punitive operations undertaken against them with the participation of army formations. In Belarus alone, the partisans then lost 30,181 people killed, missing and captured, that is, almost four times more than in the preceding two and a half years of war. The total irrecoverable losses of Soviet partisans until the end of the war can be estimated at at least 100 thousand people.

We are accustomed to thinking that the "rail war" waged by the partisans almost paralyzed the German rear. According to the reports of the partisans, in April-June 1943 alone, at its height, they derailed over 1,400 enemy echelons. In total, over the war years, they caused the wreck of more than 21 thousand trains. But is the given data really so reliable? A number of archival documents raise doubts about this.

The most interesting thing is that in Moscow a plan was set for how many partisans should commit sabotage on the railway or attacks on enemy garrisons. For example, in 1943, during Operation Concert, partisans in Belarus alone had to blow up 140,000 rails. Many brigades reported a significant overfulfillment of targets. Ponomarenko happily reported to Stalin: the Dubrovsky brigade completed the task by 345 percent, the Markov brigade - by 315 percent, the Zaslonov brigade - by 260 percent, the Romanov brigade - by 173 percent, the Belousov brigade - by 144 percent, the Voronyansky people's avengers brigade - by 135 percent, the Filipskys brigade - by 122 percent ... The figures were pleasing to the commanding eye, but the German echelons kept going and going to the front. During the war, not a single operational transport of the Wehrmacht in the East was disrupted and not a single major offensive operation of the German troops began late due to the actions of the partisans.

Sometimes it got to the point that social competition was organized between the partisan detachments. So, on December 30, 1943, the commander of the Flegontov partisan brigade Zhokhov issued an order: “In commemoration of the 26th anniversary of the Red Army and its glorious victories achieved in the struggle against the German invaders, I order ... detachments, platoons, squads and partisans. The basis of socialist commitments is to put the fulfillment of monthly plans for combat and political work. " A scale for evaluating various combat operations was even invented. For example, the elimination of a garrison or a railway echelon with the capture of trophies was rated above all - at 75 points. The same thing, but without trophies it was only 50 points, and the destroyed gun - for 10,100 rounds captured from the enemy, was estimated at a point. The same amount was given for one slain enemy. A trophy rifle earned a competitor two points, and a blown up road bridge earned three. In addition to certificates of honor and challenge banners, the winners were awarded with weapons.

Ponomarenko's order of August 3, 1942, which established a kind of "norms" of exploits for rewarding the partisans with the "Golden Star" of the Hero, also greatly contributed to the credits in the partisan reports. She relied on "the crash of a military train of at least 20 cars, tanks or platforms with manpower, equipment, fuel or ammunition with the destruction of a train with a steam locomotive ... for the destruction of warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food, ammunition ... for an attack on an airfield with destruction materiel ... for the attack or destruction of the enemy's headquarters or military establishment, as well as radio stations and other outstanding services. "

I strongly suspect that the figures from the reports of the partisan commanders about derailed trains, blown up bridges and rails were several times overstated. This is also proved by some data from German sources, which were at the disposal of the Soviet command. So, according to the dispatch bureau of the Minsk station, in July 1943, partisans blew up 34 trains on the Minsk-Borisov railway section. According to the data of only four partisan brigades operating in this area (1st Minsk, "Flame", "Razgrom" and "For Soviet Belarus"), they undermined more than 70 trains in the same sector. “If we add to this the echelons of the Shchors, Death to Fascism, Flegontov brigades,” said a letter from one of the Minsk partisan leaders sent to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, “the increase will reach 5, if not 6 times. This is because the work of subversive groups is not sufficiently controlled, and the party and Komsomol organizations have not yet taken up the fight against fraud. "

Probably the same was the case with the ill-fated rails, the planned tasks for which Comrade Ponomarenko lowered his subordinates. In June 1943, in his report on the state of the partisan movement, he himself had to emphasize “the unreliability of the information of some detachments. Exaggeration of enemy losses, false eyewash, attributing to oneself the results of the actions of other detachments. "

After the war, Ponomarenko admitted:

“As a rule, the partisans did not expect the results of mining. The results for the most part were clarified according to the information of local residents, through agents reporting to the command of the partisan formations about the results of mining in one place or another, or according to captured enemy documents and the testimony of prisoners. "

Often, the partisans relied only on rumors, and several partisan formations were credited to the same echelon undermined.

During interrogation on September 24, 1943, a former officer for special assignments of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, Captain Alexander Dmitrievich Rusakov, spoke about the facts of fraud and other unseemly acts:

“Alexander Saburov. Before the war, he was the political instructor of the NKVD fire department in Kiev. His entire guerrilla career was built on deceiving people, on extraordinary deceit. In Moscow, an opinion was created about him as a man who worked miracles ... He was awarded the rank of Major General and Hero of the Soviet Union. Only later everything was revealed, it became known that Saburov was a deceiver and a liar. But they decided to keep silent about it. "
Alexander Dmitrievich gave a very unattractive characterization to another partisan commander:

“Lieutenant Colonel Emlyutin, former head of the NKVD regional department in the Kursk region. The population of the Kursk and Oryol regions knows Emlyutin's partisans well. This is a gang of rapists, robbers, marauders who terrorize local residents, Emlyutin himself is a sadist who lives only by murder. "

Of course, Rusakov wanted to buy himself a life and tried to tell what was pleasant to hear to the investigator - the colonel of the Vlasov army. However, it is striking that, having listed more than a dozen leaders of the partisan movement, the captain characterized only Emlyutin and Saburov so negatively. He gave the surname and position of the first secretary of the Chernigov underground regional committee A.V. Fedorov without any comments at all, and speaking of the legendary S.A. ... No, probably Emlyutin and Saburov stood out in some way for the worse, since Rusakov named them.

The captain also testified that “to my question about what to do with the ROA fighters and prisoners of war who had defected to the partisans, General Strokach (chief of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. - BS) said:“ Who needs to be shot, and let the rest fight; because now is the war, and then the NKVD will deal with them. " And it really sorted it out, sending many partisans from among the former Vlasovites to the camps.

Rusakov explained the suspicious attitude of the NKVD towards all residents of the occupied territories, including the partisans, as follows: “Frankly speaking, those who have visited this (German. - BS) side do not believe at all. Also to the partisans. They know what they would not need to know ... The partisans stayed in the German rear, read enemy literature, learned criticism of Stalin and Bolshevism. " The veracity of this part of his testimony is beyond doubt.

Despite all the exaggerations contained in the partisan reports, it is obvious that sabotage seriously complicated the transport of the Germans. They were especially frequent in Belarus. For example, on August 29, 1942, the head of the military communications of Army Group Center reported with alarm: “The general situation of the railway communication in the rear of Army Group Center between Brest and the front inspires more and more fears in view of the attacks of the partisans ...

If until now all the important summer transportation for Army Group Center from Smolensk to the front could be carried out in a timely manner, then in recent weeks, when the transfer of new large formations was carried out, we had to face the fact of the presence of partisans between Brest and Smolensk. This had a very negative effect on transportation, exactly as we expected back in early May.

However, it was possible to temporarily concentrate all forces on the implementation of this movement of troops, and this kind of consequences of the actions of the partisans remained within the permissible limits ... Night raids by partisans on trains cause more damage than the refusal to move at night in general, as is now the case. However, such an event reduces the carrying capacity, and during daytime hours it is possible to only partially fill the gap. "

Very often, the numbers of enemy losses cited in partisan reports seem absolutely fantastic. So, on September 11, 1943, by order of the underground Mogilev regional committee, 10 German garrisons in the Belynichi region were simultaneously attacked. Here is what the partisan commanders reported about the battle with the largest garrison located in the regional center: “In Belynichi, after a 3.5-hour fierce battle, which reached hand-to-hand combat, the enemy garrison, which consisted of a ROA battalion and 60 policemen, was defeated. The main brunt of the battle was borne by the battalions of the 208th regiment, 600 and 760 partisan detachments and the detachment of Major Shestakov took part in cooperation with them. As a result of the battle, over 200 enemy soldiers and officers were killed and up to 200 were wounded. Trophies were taken: 2 light machine guns, 2 50 mm mortars, 68 rifles, 4 assault rifles, 8 revolvers and pistols, 25 hand grenades ... Documentation of the Belynichsk commandant's office was taken. Their losses: 3 killed, 30 wounded. "

It is your will, but something is wrong here. Even if the partisans caught the enemy by surprise, obviously, the Vlasovites and the police still managed to organize a defense, since the fierce battle lasted three and a half hours. But then it is absolutely incredible that for every partisan killed there would be 70 enemy soldiers and officers. It is also unclear how the partisans counted the number of wounded policemen and Vlasovites. And why in the partisan ranks there were ten times more wounded than killed, if usually there are no more than three or four wounded for one killed. Most likely, the partisan losses are several times underestimated, while the losses of the pro-German formations, on the contrary, are several times overestimated.

The situation was no better considering the German losses in military equipment. After the war, Ponomarenko argued:

“Based on the reports of the partisans and the documents of the enemy, it can be concluded that during the war throughout the occupied territory, the partisans destroyed 790 aircraft by shelling, sabotage and attacks on enemy airfields. The number of planes destroyed by partisans and underground organizations as a result of sabotage on railway transport and those killed in crashes is close to 350 planes. Thus, in total 1140 enemy aircraft were destroyed by partisans and underground organizations. "

This figure is also highly questionable. During the period from September 1, 1939 to the end of 1944, the Luftwaffe lost 71,965 aircraft destroyed and damaged, of which about 30,000 were on the Eastern Front. To this must be added some not exactly known, but significantly smaller number of downed non-combat aircraft - communications and transport. It turns out that almost every thirtieth aircraft lost by the Germans in the East was destroyed by partisans who did not have fighters or anti-aircraft guns.

Some descriptions of the exploits of the partisan heroes, found in combat reports, are completely legendary, mythological in nature. For example, in the final report on the activities of the 37th Parkhomenko Partisan Brigade, operating in the Bobruisk and Glussky districts of the Mogilev and Polesie regions, it was stated:

“On December 20, 1943, the commander of the Kirov detachment, Vasily Yemelyanovich Golodov, in the village of Kachai Boloto, Parichsky district, when the Nazis approached the dugout where Com. Golodov, they began to throw grenades at him, the communist Golodov picked up enemy grenades on the fly and threw them back. So he threw out 9 grenades and killed more than 20 fascists. But with the tenth grenade, the fearless commander was seriously wounded and died a hero's death. "
Well what can I say!

Here are German reports on losses in battles with partisans, especially if they were drawn up at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, and not by the SD or the security police, look more reliable than the Soviet ones. The number of wounded partisans is almost never found there, while in partisan reports, on the contrary, the imagination of the commanders indicated an amazingly accurate number of wounded Germans and their accomplices.

The Germans indicated the killed partisans only when they had corpses at their disposal. If the battlefield remained behind the partisans or those who died at the scene of the collision were not found, then the German reports reported that the partisans had taken the killed with them and that their number could not be established. Often, German reports directly admit that the losses of the partisans were significantly lower than those of the Germans and their allies.

However, German reports do not always inspire confidence. For example, the headquarters of Army Group Center reported that in January 1943 the total number of partisans killed outside the army's rear areas was determined at 5,762 people, but at the same time only 960 rifles, 56 machine guns, 12 mortars, five guns and three anti-tank guns. It turns out that three-quarters of the partisans fought without weapons, or the Germans simply disdained to take them as trophies. Most likely, the majority of those killed are those who were only suspected of aiding the partisans. It was in the front-line rear that German police formations, gendarmerie and SD detachments operated, which often enlisted civilians killed during punitive expeditions as partisans.

Sometimes German army reports on enemy losses in the course of large anti-partisan operations find full agreement in Soviet data. So, in the final report of the 2nd German Tank Army on June 9, 1943 about the operation "Gypsy Baron", which was carried out in May - June against the main partisan bases in the southern part of the Bryansk forests, the losses of the partisans were determined at 3,152 killed and 869 defectors. According to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, the number of partisans in the Oryol region from May 1 to July 1, 1943 decreased from 14,323 to 9623 people, that is, by 4,700 people. The difference of 699 people is easily explained by the losses of the partisans after June 9 and some of their underestimation by the Germans.

Thanks to Operation Gypsy Baron, the Wehrmacht managed to open the main communications in the region of the Bryansk forests and get rid of the partisan threat in the combat area of ​​Army Group Center until the end of the Battle of Kursk and the evacuation of the Oryol bridgehead.

Likewise, the Germans managed to defeat the main forces of the partisans in the front-line zone of Army Group Center in April-June 1944, on the eve of Operation Bagration, which put an end to German domination in Belarus. The success of the Germans was greatly facilitated by the fact that 16-17 partisan brigades with a total strength of 16 to 20 thousand people were concentrated in the Polotsk-Le-Pel partisan zone since the fall of 1943. The Soviet command intended to seize Polotsk with their help. Then it was planned to transfer the airborne corps supplied by air, which, together with the partisans, was to hold the city until the main forces of the Red Army arrived.

However, in a strange way, both the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, and the command of the 1st Baltic Front, and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command completely forgot that in December-January there is predominantly non-flying weather here, and scheduled the beginning of the operation in mid-December 1943. But at the last moment it was canceled due to unfavorable weather conditions. As if such an outcome could not have been foreseen, and the experience of Stalingrad, where the supply of Paulus's grouping was disrupted largely due to the non-flying winter weather, did not teach the Soviet command anything! The partisans were ordered to winter in the area in order to try to capture Polotsk later. There was no way to provide such an army with the necessary amount of ammunition. As a result, the Germans, taking advantage of the lull at the front, in April 1944 embarked on a large-scale punitive operation and in early June practically eliminated the Polotsk-Lepel partisan zone. According to German data, more than 14 thousand partisans were killed or taken prisoner. According to the partisans' reports, the losses of the brigades of the Polotsk-Lepel zone were half as much - 7,000 killed and missing.

The Germans also undertook large punitive operations against the partisans operating in the Minsk region. They were led by the head of the SS and police in Belarus, Brigadeführer Kurt von Gottberg. During one of these operations, "Cottbus", according to the report of Gottberg on June 26, 1943, 6084 partisans were killed in battle, and another 3709 were shot after being captured. Gottberg also boasted of a new method of overcoming minefields: "After the artillery-anti-aircraft preparation, penetration into the marshland became possible only because local residents suspected of having links with partisans were driven ahead of the troops through heavily mined areas of the territory."

In fairness, it must be said that the same method was used by Soviet military leaders, only they drove not civilians into minefields, but Red Army soldiers. Soon after the war, Marshal Zhukov popularly explained to the American General Dwight Eisenhower that he, Zhukov, if he knew that there was a minefield ahead, sent his soldiers to attack, as if there were no mines in front of them. The soldiers, at the cost of their lives, blew up only anti-personnel mines. Then sappers went into the formed passages and removed anti-tank mines so that armored vehicles could be launched, because they cost more than people. Eisenhower was shocked and doubted that the American army was unlikely to find officers capable of giving such an order, and soldiers willing to carry it out. Gottberg also knew that the Germans would never go to mines for no reason, and used “subhuman” Slavs for “live demining”, who were guilty only of being caught on the path of a punitive expedition.

Under the leadership of Gottberg, from July 3 to August 30, 1943, another major operation, codenamed "Herman", was carried out, this time against the Soviet and Polish partisans of the Baranovichi region. Secretary of the Baranovichi Regional Party Committee V.E. Chernyshev reported: "In the first days of the fighting with the punitive operation, the partisans killed the executioner known to the population of Belarus from the beginning of the war, SS lieutenant colonel Dirlewanger, and captured the entire plan of the operation."

SS Oberfuehrer Oskar Dirlewanger really participated in the operation with his brigade of "general SS", which, unlike conventional SS troops, performed exclusively punitive functions. Dirlewanger's brigade was considered a "penalty" and consisted of German criminals and Russian "volunteers" who, in their criminal inclinations, were not much inferior to their German comrades in arms. The brigade commander himself, before the war, “dragged out a sentence” for molestation of minors and poaching. There is no doubt that Dirlewanger, as having committed crimes against humanity, fully deserved death. But Chernyshev hurried to bury him. Dirlewanger lived for two more years and died in a French prisoner of war camp at Althausen (Upper Swabia) on 7 July 1945.

The secretary of the Baranovichi regional committee generously destroyed the enemy on paper. In the report, he said that the partisans had killed and wounded more than 3,000 Germans and policemen during Operation German and took 29 German soldiers prisoner. Gottberg, on the other hand, estimated the total losses of the Germans and their allies at 205 killed, wounded and missing. Really wrong 15 times? And there were only three missing Germans - 10 times less than the number of prisoners allegedly captured by Chernyshev's partisans. How such large numbers of enemy losses appeared will become clear if you read the following passage from Chernyshev's report: “37 echelons have been derailed. At the Lida-Yurotishki section, 300 corpses of German soldiers and officers were removed from the rubble. " I wonder who could count them? Really guerrilla scouts?

There are also other partisan reports, drawn up according to the principle "all is well, beautiful marquise." For example, when in August - November 1942 the Germans, as a result of a successful offensive, closed the so-called "Vitebsk Gate" - a corridor in the Usvyaty area, through which Belarusian partisans received material supplies and reinforcements from behind the front line, the report of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement cheerfully asserted : “The partisan brigades of the Vitebsk region by continuous battles with the enemy showed their ability to act not only in small groups, but also to inflict serious defeat on the enemy in battles with his large units.

The successful exit of the enemy to the right bank of the Usvyata River and the closure of the "gates" by them until a detailed description of the battles is received can be explained by the inconsistency of actions between the command of the Red Army units and partisan detachments. "

Yes, from such a report Napoleon would never have known that he had lost the battle of Waterloo.

During the Great Patriotic War, the partisans forced the German occupiers to be on their guard all the time, not giving the Germans peace, day or night, creating unbearable conditions for them. The eternal fear of a surprise attack by partisans pursued the Germans throughout the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR. The German command was forced to post guards and develop plans for punitive operations against the partisans. According to German sources, in 1941, 78 specially assigned battalions acted against the Soviet partisans. In 1942 there were already 140 of them. In the first half of 1943 there were already 270, and by the end of the year there were over 500 of them.

In January-February 1942, the Germans tried to strangle the partisan movement in the bud by throwing large forces against it. Partisan detachments and formations carried out heavy battles with punishers in Ukraine, Belarus and in the western regions of the Russian Federation. At the same time, many partisan detachments were scattered and left to continue the struggle underground, some of the detachments died, and some retreated behind the front line. So on the night of March 26, 1942, the security police and parts of the SS and SD attacked the Minsk underground. 28 leaders of the underground were hanged, 251 were shot. By the spring of 1942, the partisans began to pose a serious threat to the communications of the German army. Therefore, for a decisive struggle against the partisans, the German command had to draw large forces into the already occupied regions of the country. And for large-scale operations in areas where the partisan movement has become widespread, as in Belarus, the Bryansk region and some other areas, the German command was forced to withdraw individual military units from the front. According to the German command, the partisan war in Russia drew over 12 German divisions, one mountain rifle corps and 11 infantry and cavalry brigades.
On August 18, 1942, Hitler, realizing that the partisan movement had gone far beyond an insignificant local factor in the combat situation, issued a decisive order, which became known as the Fuhrer Directive No. 46. The order began with the following statement: unacceptable for us, because it threatens to become a serious threat to the logistics and exploitation of the occupied territories. " Hitler demanded an end to the partisans before the onset of winter in order to "prevent serious obstacles to the Wehrmacht's operations in winter time". He appointed Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler in charge of collecting and evaluating information on the course of anti-guerrilla warfare; in addition, Himmler was transferred all the authority to organize operations against partisans in all territories under the civil administration. Hitler appointed the chief of staff of the OKH, responsible for conducting anti-guerrilla operations. in the front-line areas, and also ordered that reserve units transferred to the East, as combat training, be used to carry out such operations.
Aware that the partisan movement cannot be curbed by military means alone, Hitler admitted for the first time that in order to successfully fight the partisans, it was necessary to enlist the support of the population in the respective territories. For this, it was necessary, firstly, to provide him with a sufficient standard of living so that people would not go to the partisans, and, secondly, to create an incentive for active cooperation with the occupation authorities, assigning significant awards for such cooperation. In addition, Hitler for the first time gave permission for the formation of units in the occupied territories to fight the partisans, and the use of the local population from among the prisoners of war in them. In addition to the combat formations located directly on the front line, security divisions, units of the field gendarmerie and the secret field police, as well as police units from the nationalist and anti-Soviet population of the USSR, were allocated to the location of the German military command.
In the fall of 1942, Russian volunteers took the oath of allegiance to the Fuhrer. This was the text of the oath to the Weise regiment of Russian volunteers: "I swear before God by this holy oath that in the fight against the Bolshevik enemies of my homeland I will unquestioningly obey the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces Adolf Hitler and as a brave soldier at any time I am ready to give my life for this oath. " The number of police formations by the beginning of January 1942 was more than 60 thousand people, which was twice the composition of the German police of order used in the occupied territory.
To destroy the partisans, the so-called yagdkommandas (extermination teams) were also created. Their structure made it possible to fight against the partisans with very limited forces. They were used most often for reconnaissance in force. Their number varied from platoon to company. The main thing in their tactics is covert movement, which allows you to approach the partisans as close as possible, suddenly attack them and try to destroy them. The Germans began to form "fighter teams" or "hunting" (jagdkommando, zerstorungskommando) in the fall of 1941. act in any environment. In yagdkamandy served mainly penalty box. These people were not required to have good military training. In such a case, instinct, skills of a person close to nature were needed, therefore preference was given to military personnel who worked as rangers and foresters before the war.
Yagdkomandy used their own tactics against the partisans. They secretly tracked down Soviet patriots and suddenly attacked them from close range, shot or captured prisoners (tongues) - in a word, they acted the way hunters act. The team could go to the starting line in the area of ​​the upcoming combat operation on its own or it was delivered in the bodies of cars, tightly covered with a tarpaulin. The landing was usually carried out on the move, on a section of the road closed from distant observation by dense vegetation, folds of terrain, dilapidated buildings, etc. The battle groups of the team, as a rule, moved at night, and during the day the personnel rested, carefully disguising their parking place ... To exclude a surprise attack by the enemy, outposts and observers were posted.
The "hunters" also attacked large partisan columns. The intent of such attacks was to disrupt the operation for which the column had moved to the starting line. An unexpected fire raid from an ambush (lasting 10-15 seconds) knocked out the commanders and machine gunners, forcing the partisans to drag the wounded back to the camp. In addition, the factor of surprise disappeared, as a result they had to abandon the planned operation. One of the fighters of the yagdkommando recalled after the war: “The hunt for the partisans lasted two or three days. We combed the area and everyone we met in the forest, whether he was armed or unarmed, was usually killed without investigation or trial. "
The Yagdkommando were in constant contact with army units, which made it possible to quickly and timely organize operations against the people's avengers. The most successful "hunters" acted in the spring and summer of 1944, during the large anti-partisan actions ("Drizzling rain", "Rain", "Spring Festival", "Baklan", etc.) in Belarus, as a result of which the partisans suffered the most great losses throughout the war. Nevertheless, despite professional training, the "hunting teams" of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi special services could not radically change the situation on the front of the fight against the Soviet partisan movement.
To strengthen the fight against the partisan movement and Soviet intelligence in the occupied regions of our country, along with the departments of the security police and SD in March 1942, a special body Sonderstab "R" (Special headquarters for Russia) was created. Its tasks included identifying the location of partisan formations, their leadership, strength, party stratum and the commission of terrorist acts against the command and political personnel. For a long time the mobilization department of the OKH tried to inform the command that Germany did not have sufficient human resources to conduct an effective fight against partisans only on its own.
However, regardless of what was said in the Fuehrer Directive No. 46, Hitler did not abandon his plans to reduce the Russian population to the position of slaves and subject them to the most ruthless exploitation. As a consequence, he refused to provide sufficient incentives to secure real support from the German authorities. In addition, as the year drew to a close, the Russian people began to realize more and more that Germany's chances of winning were falling rapidly. Far from idealizing the German army and their comrades from the SS and SD, the Gestapo warned: “A necessary prerequisite for fighting the partisans is the suppression of all acts of arbitrariness and senseless cruelty towards the Russian population. opportunity, has become something self-evident ... The confidence of the Russian population in the German army, which is a prerequisite for pacifying the country, can only be strengthened as a result of fair treatment, energetic economic activities, purposeful and life-like propaganda and an effective fight against banditry ... " But at the same time, torture and repression against the partisans or those who were only suspected of belonging to them or to underground pro-Soviet organizations were by no means rejected.
German intelligence and the Gestapo paid great attention to work within the partisan movement. The head of the rear area of ​​the Northern Front in September 1941 demanded "the creation of a wide network of secret agents, well instructed and knowing the nearest points of appearance. The creation of this organization is the joint task of the divisions of the rear protection and the secret police." In the partisan detachments were sent agents from among the traitors to the Motherland with the task of disintegrating them from within, carrying out terrorist and sabotage activities. Often, groups of agents disguised as partisans or scouts of the Red Army, supplied with authentic documents and radio equipment, were thrown into partisan formations to identify their locations. Combat operations against the guerrillas depended on intelligence, in most cases obtained by intelligence. In special instructions for the fight against partisans, and several of them were issued by the German command at different times, on November 11, 1942, February 10, 1943 and April 1, 1944, it was said that "roundups against partisans without agents and guides will always be ineffectual, so they should only be undertaken with the use of agents. "
As soon as the number of partisans in the partisan region reached 5,000 - 10,000 or more, they became invulnerable to operations conducted against them by the local police. And since the Germans could rarely afford to allocate large forces of the regular army for large-scale anti-partisan operations, the partisans could feel relatively safe. The punitive operations of the Germans against the partisans were particularly brutal. The Germans treated the participants in the partisan movement as ordinary bandits, so the prisoners of the partisans were waiting for only death - execution or the gallows. In turn, this provoked a response from the partisans. The Germans, together with the "policemen", and sometimes with regular troops, organized large anti-partisan operations, in which many civilians were killed. Large forces of Germans and collaborators combed the forest and destroyed all living things. Only a few were left to be hijacked to work in the Reich. It was believed that a person who went into the forest or found himself in a village or even an area controlled by the partisans, even without weapons, automatically became an enemy of the Reich, for which there were corresponding orders. Like, a "good man" will not go into the forest, he is either a partisan himself, or from a family of partisans. In addition, the Nazis formed pseudo-partisan detachments from the traitors to their homeland, which were engaged in all kinds of discrediting of the Soviet partisans.
In the first week of February 1943, after the creation of a system of defensive strongholds, the command of the 3rd Panzer Army began to eliminate the partisan threat. With the onset of winter, guerrilla warfare broke out across the entire belt of Army Groups North and Center. As in the previous year, the Soviet side used the partisans as an auxiliary force in the offensive. And again the most favorable conditions have developed for this. Experiencing an acute shortage of personnel at the front, the German command could afford to have only second-rate troops in the rear areas. Morale in partisan units has grown considerably after the recent Soviet victories; increased support for the partisan movement and the underground and among the civilian population.
Hitler, as at the beginning of the war, called for tougher measures to combat the partisans. In January 1943, he issued an order according to which military personnel were not brought to trial for cruel acts committed in the fight against partisans. He proclaimed that the Geneva Convention and the rules of chivalry had no place in such a war. The atrocities of the Germans, and even more of the Latvian and Estonian formations in "pacifying" the population of the partisan territories, are well known. At the same time, the German generals were fully aware that they did not have enough strength to put an end to the partisans, and draconian measures, if applied, would only turn the entire civilian population in the occupied territories against the Germans.
At the end of February 1943, the 3rd Panzer Army carried out Operation Ball Lightning against partisans in the Surazh region, northeast of Vitebsk. Despite the fact that this operation had little impact on the course of the war as a whole, it is worth considering more closely for two reasons. Firstly, it is able to give an idea of ​​a dozen of similar anti-partisan operations carried out by the German command at different times and in different areas in the period from 1942 to 1944, and, secondly, it extremely clearly reflects the nature of partisan and anti-partisan warfare. The Surazh region was located directly behind the sector of the front, which was defended by the German 3rd Panzer Army. The guerrillas have been active in this area for over a year; thanks to their activity, this territory received from the Russians the unofficial name of the Vitebsk corridor. In late 1941 - early 1942, partisans and units of the Red Army, through gaps in the front line, maintained communication with this area using horse-drawn and even cargo road transport, ensuring the supply of partisan formations operating there.
By February 1943, the situation at the front had not undergone significant changes. The section of the front north of Surazh, which was a thin line of strongholds, was held by the forces of German airfield divisions. In places where the front line was broken, as well as in wooded and swampy areas, the Germans, due to a lack of troops, were forced to give the partisans complete freedom of action. The partisans, which numbered about 4-5 thousand people, were organizationally organized into brigades. They built permanent field fortifications and equipped their own airfields.
To carry out the anti-partisan operation, G. Reinhardt involved two security divisions. At the first stage, which ended on February 21, it was necessary to determine the outlines of the territory in which the partisans operated, which included almost the entire Surazh region. When this task was completed, the troops began to advance inside this territory, gradually tightening the ring and forcing the partisans to retreat to its center. At the same time, it was very difficult to ensure contact between divisions; the troops had to advance off-road, through forests in deep snow, so the soldiers soon got tired. In turn, the partisans tried to avoid open clashes with German troops; where possible, they tried to slip out through the gaps in the encirclement without a fight. After the end of the operation on March 8, the army command announced the destruction of about 3,700 partisans, but there was no way to determine which of the killed was really a partisan, and who belonged to the civilian population. As soon as the Germans withdrew their troops from this area, the partisans returned there and soon almost recovered their numbers.
In the spring of 1943, the Germans began widespread military operations against the Bryansk partisans. In May alone, an army of 40,000 acted against them, including the 292nd motorized infantry division, 2 regiments of the 492nd infantry division, the 102nd Hungarian infantry division, about 120 tanks of the 18th tank division, 3 artillery divisions, 7 special battalions to combat partisans with the support of aviation. Up to 30 thousand enemy soldiers acted against a large group of Belarusian partisans in the Minsk region with the support of tanks, artillery and aviation. In 1944, the Germans, anticipating the advance of our troops, launched their attacks against the Belarusian partisans. In April, the Germans managed to encircle a 17,000-strong group of partisans, who fought back for 25 days from a 60,000-strong group of punishers, which had 137 tanks and 235 guns. Aviation also supported her actions. But the partisans broke through the encirclement and went into the rear of the punishers.
In the spring of 1944, the Germans carried out three large-scale anti-partisan operations (as it turned out, the last ones during the war). The attacks were directed against partisan bases. Ever since the winter battles of 1941-1942. the rear areas of the German 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army on the left flank of Army Group Center became a sector of the Eastern Front where partisan detachments and groups were actively operating. In 1944, the command of the 1st Baltic Front hatched plans to turn this partisan region into a second front, with the help of which one day it would be possible to defeat two German armies. The most powerful partisan base was the so-called partisan republic in the area of ​​the Ushacha River, which controlled the territory in the 60 km strip between Lepel and Polotsk. It was headed by an experienced brigade commander and former commissar, Colonel Vladimir Lobanok. Other partisan centers, almost as powerful, controlled areas east of Lepel to Senno and further south, between Lepel and Borisov. In the spring of 1944, they were ordered to equip defensive positions and keep the area from attempts by German forces to seize it.
Beginning on April 11, 20,000 troops from the German 3rd Panzer Army were recruited to participate in two related operations against a partisan base in the Ushachi area. The partisans offered fierce resistance, which, however, did not last long. Despite the support of the Soviet aviation, the presence of a large number of minefields and defensive positions, equipped to great depths, they did not manage to prevent the advance of the German units. Many of the partisans, sometimes entire brigades, were newcomers who had never been under enemy fire before. In addition, the degree of combat capability of the partisan units was not the same, the partisan brigades often could not cooperate in defense or carry out an organized withdrawal. By mid-May, the Ushachi partisan center was destroyed. The losses of the partisans amounted to 7 thousand killed and about the same number taken prisoners. On May 22, the troops of the 3rd Panzer Army launched another anti-partisan operation. This time, the strikes were carried out on partisan bases in the area bounded by the settlements of Lepel, Senno, Borisov, Minsk and Molodechno. And again, the defense of the partisans turned out to be fragmented and uncoordinated. Exercising pressure from all sides, the Germans pushed the partisans back into narrow bags, where they then destroyed them in parts. The Germans stopped the operation in connection with the beginning of the Soviet summer offensive, but before that time, according to German data, more than 13 thousand partisans had been destroyed. In July and August 1944, after the retreat of German troops from Soviet territory, the partisan movement gradually ceased to exist.

Operation "Gypsy Baron"

According to the headquarters of, for example, the Bryansk Front, on October 1, 1942, Soviet patriots put out of action an average of 8-10 steam locomotives and 150-200 carriages per month. Between September and December 1942, 226 trains were derailed. The partisans, thus, did everything possible to destabilize the situation in the rear of the 2nd German Panzer Army, whose logistical authorities were responsible for maintaining the "new order" on the territory of the Oryol region.
And by the spring of 1943, the situation in the occupied regions of the USSR began to get out of the control of the German authorities responsible for maintaining "order and security." The development of counter-guerrilla operations began to be carried out by the operational departments of the army headquarters. For the corps and divisional headquarters, Abwehr officers with special powers were allocated, and in the regiments and battalions - the so-called. "Defense officers" responsible for organizing anti-guerrilla warfare. Direct responsibility for conducting operations lay with the commanders of the armies and army groups. When carrying out large-scale actions by the joint efforts of the army formations and the auxiliary police, it was first of all considered necessary to deprive the partisan brigades of freedom of movement and to impose on them military operations in extremely unfavorable conditions for them.
The command of the 2nd German tank army in order to destroy the centers of "bandit resistance" more than once carried out punitive operations with the involvement of front-line formations. In particular, in the second half of 1942, major operational events were carried out: "Bird song" (Vogelsand), "Triangle" (Dreieck), "Quadrangle" (Viereck), "Polar bear" (Eisbar), etc., but the desired results they didn't. Army formations in May-June 1943 were again involved in the operations "Free shooter" (Freischutz), "Help for a neighbor" (Nachbarhilfe), "Spruce houses" (Tannenhauser) and "Vostok" (Osterei).
In parallel with these operations, the Germans carried out the largest and most famous action, codenamed "Gypsy Baron" (Zigeunerbaron). The total number of the German collaborationist group was over 50 thousand people, it was supported from the air by aviation. The headquarters of the united partisan brigades of Emlyutin D.V. had much smaller forces - 12 partisan formations (about 10 thousand people).
In the fight against the punishers, the people's avengers were going, on the one hand, to use independently acting detachments, whose maneuverable tactics were supposed to allow them to constantly go into the rear of the enemy and deliver unexpected blows to him. On the other hand, since many local residents lived with the partisans, who fled to the forest from the invaders, it was decided to create a fortified area. Bunkers and dugouts, firing positions for artillery, machine-gun nests, trenches for grenade launchers and riflemen, which were connected by trenches and communication trenches, were built along its perimeter. Outside the fortified area, in the direction of the most likely appearance of the enemy, separate trenches were dug for 7-10 people, carefully camouflaged underground communication passages.
The punitive operation "Gypsy Baron" got its name due to the fact that the Germans saw in the partisans a combined image of inveterate "bandits" and "gypsies", it began on May 16. Although the partisans stubbornly resisted, by May 20, German troops and collaborationists managed to penetrate deeply into the base area of ​​the partisan formations. They were surrounded and isolated from the rest of the units of the brigade of the people's avengers. Shchorsa (731 people), them. Kravtsov (over 600 people), 1st named after Voroshilov (about 550 people).
D.V. Emlyutin's headquarters and the units of the brigade "Death to the German occupiers" (about 1000 people) directly attached to him also ended up in the cauldron, communication and command of the detachments were lost. On May 21, the Germans captured the Khutor Mikhailovsky - Unecha railway, thanks to which they resumed the transfer of motorized divisions to the front in this sector. The position of the partisans, due to the significant superiority of the Germans, became critical. For 10 days, from May 20 to May 29, they fought off continuous attacks by German units supported by aviation, which, in addition to bombs, dropped leaflets urging the partisans to surrender. By May 29, the partisans had almost run out of ammunition and food supplies. The general situation was saved only by the fact that at night the besieged brigades were delivered food products, cartridges and explosives by air.
The bomber aviation of the Central Front bombed the battle formations and dispositions of German troops operating against the partisans in the areas: Suzemka, Kokorevka, Ostrye Luki, Altukhovo, Glinnoe, Krasnaya Sloboda. But despite this support, the situation was still difficult…. However, on May 31, after 12 days of bloody battles, the Germans seized a partisan airfield near the village of Smelizh and drove the main forces of the people's avengers to the Desna, as a result the area of ​​the defended "Soviet region" narrowed to 6 square kilometers. At this critical moment, the headquarters of the partisan movement at the Central Front took urgent measures to provide assistance to the partisans. Along with the delivery of ammunition, medicine and food, a group of officers headed by Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Gorshkov was sent to the Bryansk forests, which headed the leadership of the brigades.
The new command of the united partisan brigades decided to break out of the cauldron. An operational plan was developed as soon as possible. On the night of July 2, 1943, at the Pionersky farm, the remnants of the partisan formations went to break through. In the course of fierce battles and at the cost of huge losses, they managed to break out of the encirclement. Over the next days, the partisans tried, as far as the conditions allowed, to restore their combat effectiveness, while continuing to wage heavy battles against the punishers. After July 6, the intensity of the fighting began to decline, and by the 10th, the fighting had almost ceased.
In the report of the 2nd German Panzer Army on the conduct of Operation Gypsy Baron, it was said that the partisans suffered significant losses: 1584 were killed, 1558 were taken prisoner, 869 - deserted. 15 812 people were forcibly evacuated from the combat zone, more than 2400 people. were brought to trial as "bandit accomplices", which entailed punitive measures. In addition, 207 camps, 2,930 dugouts and firing points were destroyed, 21 heavy guns, 3 tanks, 60,000 cartridges, 5,000 hand grenades, dozens of machine guns, hundreds of small arms were captured. However, the report expressed concern that since the “bandit” command and the “core of the gangs” were not completely destroyed, a gradual build-up of power by the guerrillas could be expected if new operations were not carried out against them. However, as subsequent events showed, there could be no question of any major actions, since the German offensive near Kursk required all combat-ready units and formations to take part in it.
Thus, the invaders were unable to achieve their goals. The results of Operation Gypsy Baron turned out to be transitory, not comparable to the expended forces and means. The partisans managed, albeit with significant losses, to get out of the encirclement. At the same time, the people's avengers killed, wounded and captured 3,852 people, 888 soldiers from the eastern battalions and the auxiliary police went over to the side of the forest soldiers. On July 8, 1943, the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht summed up the preliminary results of the efforts to "pacify" the occupied Soviet regions. They said that since the command did not have to count on a further significant build-up of forces allocated to fight the partisans, it was necessary to clearly understand that the pacification of the eastern regions as a result of subsequent measures could not be achieved. Therefore, in the future it will be necessary to be satisfied only with measures that are vital to ensure combat operations. In fact, this was an acknowledgment of the failure of the German occupation policy.