Causes of the Tsushima disaster. Reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle

13.10.2019

The Battle of Tsushima took place on May 14-15, 1905 in the Tsushima Strait between the East China and Japan Seas. In this grandiose naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated by the Japanese squadron. Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky Zinovy Petrovich (1848-1909) commanded the Russian ships. The Japanese naval forces were led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934). As a result of the battle, most of the ships of the Russian squadron were sunk, others capitulated, some broke into neutral ports, and only 3 ships managed to complete their combat mission. They got to Vladivostok.

Campaign of the Russian squadron to Vladivostok

The battle was preceded by an unprecedented transition of the Russian squadron from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan. This path was equal to 33 thousand km. But why did such a feat be performed by a large number of a wide variety of ships? The idea of creating the 2nd Pacific Squadron arose in April 1904. It was decided to form it to strengthen the 1st Pacific squadron, based in Port Arthur.

On January 27, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began.. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, without declaring hostilities, attacked Port Arthur and opened fire on warships standing on the outer roadstead. The exit to the open sea was blocked. Twice the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron tried to break into the operational space, but these attempts ended in failure. Thus, Japan gained complete naval superiority. In Port Arthur, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and gunboats were locked up. There are 44 warships in total.

In Vladivostok at that time there were 3 cruisers and 6 old-style destroyers. 2 cruisers were blown up by mines, and destroyers were suitable only for short-term naval operations. In addition, the Japanese blocked the port of Vladivostok, which led to the complete neutralization of naval forces. Russian Empire in the Far East.

That is why in the Baltic they began to form a new squadron. If Russia intercepted the championship at sea, then the course of the entire Russo-Japanese war could change dramatically. By October 1904, a new powerful sea formation was formed, and on October 2, 1904, the great sea campaign began.

The squadron, headed by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, included 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 cruiser battleship, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 6 transport ships and 2 hospital ships. The squadron was armed with 228 guns. Of these, 54 guns had a caliber of 305 mm. There were a total of 16,170 personnel, but this is along with those ships that joined the squadron already during the voyage.

Campaign of the Russian squadron

The ships reached Cape Skagen (Denmark), and then divided into 6 detachments, which were supposed to join in Madagascar. Part of the ships moved through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. And the other part was forced to go around Africa, since these ships had a deep landing and they could not pass through the canal. It should be noted right away that during the voyage, tactical exercises and live firing were carried out very rarely. Neither the officers nor the sailors believed in the success of the event. Hence the low morale, which is crucial in any company.

December 20, 1904 Port Arthur fell, and the naval forces going to the Far East were clearly not enough. Therefore, it was decided to create the 3rd Pacific squadron. And before that, on November 3, a detachment of ships under the command of Captain 1st Rank Dobrotvorsky Leonid Fedorovich (1856-1915) was poisoned in pursuit of the Rozhdestvensky squadron. Under his command were 4 cruisers and 5 destroyers. This detachment arrived in Madagascar on 1 February. But 4 destroyers were sent back due to systematic breakdowns.

In February, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific squadron left Libava under the command of Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849-1922). The detachment included 4 battleships, 1 battleship cruiser and several auxiliary vessels. On February 26, Rozhdestvensky's squadron was overtaken by the Irtysh transport with large coal reserves. At the beginning of the journey, the legendary lieutenant Schmidt was the senior assistant on it. But in the Mediterranean, he began to have renal colic, and the future hero of the revolutionary uprising was sent to Sevastopol on the cruiser Ochakov.

In March, the squadron crossed Indian Ocean. Warships were replenished with coal with the help of longboats, which transported it from transport ships. On March 31, the squadron arrived in Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). Here she waited for Nebogatov's detachment, which joined the main forces on April 26.

On May 1, the last tragic stage of the campaign began. Russian ships left the coast of Indochina and headed towards Vladivostok. It should be noted that Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky accomplished a real feat. Under his command, the most difficult 220-day transition of a huge squadron was carried out. She overcame the waters of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. We must also pay tribute to the courage of officers and sailors. They withstood this transition, and yet there was not a single naval base on the route of the ships.

Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Heihachiro Togo

On the night of May 13-14, 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Tsushima Strait. The ships were darkened and could easily pass a dangerous place unnoticed. But the patrol Japanese cruiser "Izumi" discovered the hospital ship "Eagle", which was at the end of the squadron. All the lights were burning on it in accordance with the maritime rules. The Japanese ship approached and spotted other ships. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was immediately notified of this.

The Japanese naval forces included 4 battleships, 8 battleship cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 42 destroyers and 21 destroyers. The squadron consisted of 910 guns, of which 60 had a caliber of 305 mm. The entire squadron was divided into 7 combat detachments.

Russian ships sailed along the Tsushima Strait, leaving the island of Tsushima on the left side. Japanese cruisers began to follow a parallel course, hiding in the fog. At about 7 o'clock in the morning the enemy was discovered. Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the squadron to reorganize into 2 wake columns. In the rear guard were transport ships, covered by cruisers.

At 13:20, at the exit from the Tsushima Strait, Russian sailors saw the main forces of the Japanese. These were battleships and battleships-cruisers. They went perpendicular to the course of the Russian squadron. The enemy cruisers began to lag behind in order to attach themselves to the rear of the Russian ships.

The defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait

Rozhdestvensky rebuilt the squadron into one wake column. After the rebuilding was over, the distance between the opponents was 38 cables (slightly more than 7 km). The Vice Admiral ordered to open fire. The Japanese responded with return fire a couple of minutes later. They concentrated it on the lead ships. Thus began the Battle of Tsushima.

Here you need to know that the squadron speed of the Japanese fleet was 16-18 knots. And for the Russian fleet, this value was 13-15 knots. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Japanese to stay ahead of the Russian ships. At the same time, they gradually reduced the distance. At 14 o'clock it became equal to 28 cables. This is approximately 5.2 km.

Artillery on Japanese ships had a high rate of fire (360 rounds per minute). And Russian ships fired only 134 shots per minute. In terms of their high-explosive capabilities, Japanese shells were 12 times superior to Russian ones. As for armor, it covered 61% of the area of Japanese ships, while for Russians this figure was 41%. All this already predetermined the outcome of the battle from the very beginning.

At 14:25, the flagship Knyaz Suvorov was put out of action. Zinoviy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, who was on it, was wounded. At 14:50, having received numerous holes in the bow, the battleship "Oslyabya" sank. The Russian squadron, having lost its overall leadership, continued to move north. She tried to maneuver in order to increase the distance between herself and the enemy ships.

At 18:00, Rear Admiral Nebogatov took command of the squadron, and Emperor Nicholas I became the flagship. By this time, 4 battleships had been destroyed. All ships were damaged. The Japanese also suffered damage, but none of their ships were sunk. Russian cruisers marched in a separate column. They also repelled enemy attacks.

The battle didn't stop at dusk. Japanese destroyers systematically fired torpedoes at the ships of the Russian squadron. As a result of this shelling, the battleship Navarin sank and 3 battleship cruisers lost control. The teams were forced to sink these ships. During the same time, the Japanese lost 3 destroyers. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at night the Russian ships lost contact with each other, so they had to act independently. Under the leadership of Nebogatov, 4 battleships and 1 cruiser remained.

From the early morning of May 15, the main part of the Russian squadron tried to break through to the north to Vladivostok. 3 cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist turned south. Among them was the cruiser "Aurora". They managed to break through the Japanese defenses and escape to Manila, but in doing so they left the transport ships unprotected.

The main detachment, led by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, was surrounded by the main Japanese forces. Nikolai Ivanovich was forced to give the order to stop resistance and surrender. It happened at 10:34 am. The destroyer Bedovy, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky was also surrendered, also surrendered. Only the cruiser "Emerald" managed to break through the encirclement and went towards Vladivostok. It ran aground near the shore and was blown up by the crew. Thus, he did not go to the enemy.

The losses for May 15 were as follows: the Japanese sank 2 battleships, which were fighting on their own, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer. 3 destroyers were sunk by their crews, and one managed to break through and escape to Shanghai. Only the Almaz cruiser and 2 destroyers managed to reach Vladivostok.

Russian and Japanese losses

The second Pacific squadron of the Russian fleet lost 5045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were taken prisoner, including 2 admirals. They went to foreign ports and then 2110 people were interned. 910 people managed to break into Vladivostok.

Of the ships, 7 battleships, 1 battleship cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 vehicles. The enemy got 4 battleships, 1 destroyer and 2 hospital ships. 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 2 transport ships were interned. Of the entire squadron of 38 ships, only the Almaz cruiser and 2 destroyers, Grozny and Bravy, remained. They managed to break through to Vladivostok. From this it can be seen that the defeat was complete and final.

The Japanese losses were much less. 116 people were killed and 538 wounded. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. The rest of the ships escaped with only damage.

Reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron

For the Russian squadron, the Tsushima battle would be more correctly called the Tsushima disaster. Experts see the main reason for the total defeat in the movement of ships in a wake column at low speed. The Japanese simply shot the head battleships in turn and thereby predetermined the death of the entire squadron.

Here, of course, the main blame falls on the shoulders of the Russian admirals. They didn't even draw up a battle plan. Maneuvers were carried out indecisively, the battle formation was inflexible, and control of the ships was lost during the battle. And the combat training of the personnel was at a low level, since during the campaign there were practically no tactical exercises with people.

But the Japanese were not like that. They seized the initiative from the first minutes of the battle. Their actions were distinguished by decisiveness, courage, and the commanders of the ships showed initiative and independence. The personnel had extensive combat experience behind them. We must also not forget the technical superiority of the Japanese ships. All this together and brought them victory.

It is impossible not to say about the low morale of Russian sailors. He was also affected by fatigue after a long transition, and the capitulation of Port Arthur, and revolutionary unrest in Russia. People felt the complete senselessness of this whole grandiose expedition. As a result, the Russian squadron lost the battle even before it began.

The end of the whole epic was the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on August 23, 1905. But the main thing was that Japan felt its strength and began to dream of great conquests. Her ambitious dreams continued until 1945, until Soviet troops did not put an end to them, utterly defeating the Kwantung Army.

Alexander Arsentiev

Photos from open sources

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. "Tsushima" has become a household name for the fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

1 Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, the Rozhdestvensky squadron was assigned the very vague task of independently gaining dominance at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was far enough away from the theater of operations and had too little infrastructure for a huge squadron. The campaign, as you know, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of Japan without losses in the ship composition and serious accidents.

The command of the squadron and the commanders of the ships had to solve a lot of problems, ranging from the most difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for the crews, who quickly lost discipline during long monotonous stops. All this, of course, was done to the detriment of the combat state, and the ongoing exercises did not and could not give good results. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long hard trip away from bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

2 Artillery: pyroxylin against shimose

Often in the literature on the Tsushima battle, the terrible high-explosive action of Japanese shells, which burst even from hitting the water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. The Japanese in the Tsushima battle fired shells with a powerful high-explosive action that caused great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

So, under Tsushima, the Nissin cruiser lost three of its four main battery guns. Russian armor-piercing shells loaded with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without bursting. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the daytime battle, the flagship of Admiral Kammamura, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoya the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overload of Russian ships with a large amount of coal, water and various cargoes also played into the hands of the Japanese, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Tsushima battle was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in terms of their scale, falling into the skin of ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The start of the battle, unsuccessful for the Russian squadron, allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship Knyaz Suvorov and inflict fatal damage on the battleship Oslyabya. The main result of the decisive daytime battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships "Emperor Alexander III", "Prince Suvorov" and "Borodino", as well as the high-speed "Oslyabya". The fourth battleship of the "Borodino" type - "Eagle" received a large number of hits, but retained combat capability.

It must be taken into account that out of 360 hits of large shells, about 265 fell on the aforementioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentrated fire, and although the battleship Mikasa was the main target, due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

3 Low speed

The advantage of Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor in the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much larger speed.

So, four of the latest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

Having tied himself up with low-speed transports, which still turned out to be impossible to protect from the attacks of light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the hands of the enemy. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The daytime battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance to break through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the fact that the enemy overtook the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov, the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

4 Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhdestvensky himself and the junior flagships. There were no specific instructions before the battle. In the event of a failure of the flagship, the squadron was supposed to be led by the next battleship in the ranks, keeping the set course. This automatically negated the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the failure of the flagship?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" died with the entire crew, and who really led the ships, replacing the retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhdestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening Nebogatov took command of the squadron - more precisely, with what he could gather around him. In the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful rebuilding. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could seize the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, actually doubling the formation and passing the turning point. The hypotheses are different .... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment, nor later, decisive actions were taken by Rozhdestvensky.

5 Night battle, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the completion of the daytime battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. So the battleship Navarin died with almost the entire crew, and the Sisoy Veliky, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which received hits from torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers at night, but then, observing the disguise, successfully disengaged from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of the Japanese destroyers.

In the Tsushima battle, mine attacks, as well as during the battle in the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with the Akatsuki-2 (former Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chifu).

Tsushima battle

TVD	Pacific Ocean
Place	Tsushima Island, East China Sea
Period	Russo-Japanese War
The nature of the battle	pitched battle

Opponents

Side force commanders

Side forces

Tsushima battle(Japanese 対馬海戦) - the largest battle in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet, which took place on May 27-28, 1905. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky by the forces of the United Japanese Fleet under the command of Admiral H. Togo . The results of the battle finally predetermined Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and also significantly influenced the development of world military shipbuilding.

general information

The sudden start of the Russo-Japanese War with a night attack by the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron gave the Japanese the opportunity to gain strategic initiative and superiority over Russian naval and land forces. In order to strengthen the Russian fleet and then gain dominance at sea, the command decided to form the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.

The preparation of the 2nd TOE dragged on from April to September 1904 due to various complexities related to the supply, repair, completion and commissioning of new ships of the 1898 program. By the end of September, the completed squadron concentrated in the Libava region, refueling with coal, water and provisions, after which on October 2 it began to move to Vladivostok. Having made an unprecedented transition of 18 thousand miles, which required many efforts, Rozhdestvensky's squadron entered the Korea Strait on the night of May 14.

Characteristics of the parties involved

Russian side

Compound

Naval Action Plan

Z. P. Rozhdestvensky set the squadron the task of reaching Vladivostok by breaking through at least part of the squadron (this was contrary to the directive of Nicholas II, which demanded to “take possession of the Sea of Japan”), which is why he chose the shortest route that ran through the Korea Strait. The Vice Admiral could not count on any significant assistance from the Vladivostok squadron, and also refused to conduct reconnaissance. At the same time, the Russian commander did not develop a detailed battle plan, giving only a few general instructions to individual ships. That is, the squadron was supposed to bypass Japan and not engage in battle until it arrived in Vladivostok. did not comply and doomed the squadron to death. You can say he sabotaged the transition and simply presented the squadron to the enemy.

The commander of the Russian fleet, Vice-Admiral Zinoviy Rozhestvensky, is criticized by historians for the fact that he adhered to defensive tactics in the battle against the Japanese. Since leaving the Baltic, he spent very little time preparing the crew, in particular the gunners, and the only serious maneuver was made only on the eve of the battle. A strong impression is created that he did not trust his subordinates and did not inform them of his battle plans, and during the battle he himself was going to lead the ships from his flagship Suvorov.

Japanese side

Compound

Naval Action Plan

The main goal of Admiral H. Togo is to destroy the Russian squadron. He, knowing about the passive tactics of the Russians following in the wake columns, decided to act in small maneuverable formations (4-6 ships), which, using their speed, would attack the Russian wake column from favorable heading angles. The primary goals of these formations are the head and end ships of the column. Intelligence data added confidence to the Japanese admiral, thanks to which he knew where, in what composition and how the Russian squadron was moving.

The course of the battle

Time	Event
On the night of May 14 (27), 1905, the Russian squadron approached the Tsushima Strait. She moved at a 5-knot speed in three columns, observing blackout. A reconnaissance detachment marched ahead in the formation of a wedge. The main forces marched in two wake columns: on the left the 3rd armored detachment and in its wake a detachment of cruisers, on the right - the 1st and 2nd armored detachments.
04 h 45 min.	Admiral Togo on board IJN Mikasa, receives a radiogram from the scout of the auxiliary cruiser IJN Shinano Maru, containing information about the location and approximate course of the Russian squadron.
06 h 15 min.	Admiral Togo, at the head of the United Fleet, leaves Mozampo to meet the squadron of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, which entered the eastern part of the Tsushima Strait
07:14	The Russian squadron notices the Japanese class 3 cruiser IJN Izumi. It becomes clear that the Russian connection has been detected, but Rozhdestvensky does not cancel his order and maintains radio silence.
OK. 11 o'clock	A detachment of Japanese cruisers ( IJN Kasagi, IJN Chitose, IJN Otowa, IJN Niitaka), were fired upon by "Oslyabey", "Prince Suvorov" and battleships of the III detachment and hastily retreated. By order of Rozhdestvensky "do not throw shells", the inconclusive firing was stopped.
12:00 pm - 12 hours 20 minutes	The 2nd TOE changes its course to Vladivostok and maintains a 9-knot speed. Japanese reconnaissance cruisers are again discovered, which forces Rozhdestvensky to cancel the maneuver he had begun to build a front of 12 battleships.
13 hours 15 minutes	"Sisoi the Great" by signal reports the discovery of the main forces of the Japanese fleet, crossing the course of the squadron from right to left.
13h 40 min.	The Japanese ships crossed the course of the Russian squadron and began to turn to a course parallel to it, so as not to diverge on counter courses (and to avoid a short-term battle).
Daytime battle May 14
13 h 49 min.	"Prince Suvorov" fired the first shots at IJN Mikasa from a distance of 32 kb. Behind him, Alexander III, Borodino, Oryol, Oslyabya, and possibly Navarin opened fire on the Japanese flagship. Shisoy the Great and all three coastal defense battleships are firing at Nissin and Kasuga, after 5-10 minutes. opened fire and "Nicholas I" and "Admiral Nakhimov".
13 hours 51 minutes	First shot from IJN Mikasa, after which the rest of the Japanese ships begin firing: IJN Mikasa, IJN Asahi, IJN Azuma- according to "Suvorov"; IJN Fuji, IJN Shikishima and most armored cruisers - according to "Oslyaba"; IJN Iwate and IJN Asama- according to "Nicholas I".
OK. 14 o'clock	Flagship Togo IJN Mikasa comes out from under the fire of "Borodino", "Eagle" and "Oslyabya", having received in the first 17 minutes. battle 19 hits (five of them - 12-inch shells). From 2 p.m. no more than twelve large-caliber guns fired at it. Despite the flooding of the coal pit as a result of breaking through casemate No. 1, it was not possible to disable the ship.
14h09 min.	As a result of Russian artillery fire, only IJN Asama, which is 40 min. got out of the fight.
OK. 14h 25 min.	"Oslyabya", which received serious damage from the first minutes of the battle (the bow turret was destroyed, the 178-mm armor plate of the main belt came off, a hole formed in the bow of the left side along the waterline, which caused flooding), and the Prince Suvorov, enveloped in fires, went out of order. This led to the loss of combat control of the main forces of the squadron.
14 hours 48 minutes	The Japanese ships, turning "all of a sudden," rebuilt and began to fire on the Borodino.
OK. 14 h 50 min.	"Oslyabya" rolled over and began to go under water.
15:00 min.	Sisoi the Great and Navarin received holes near the waterline, the commander was mortally wounded on the last ship.
15h 40min	The beginning of the battle between Russian forces led by "Borodino" and the Japanese at distances of 30-35 kb, which lasted about 35 minutes. As a result, all the towers of the "Prince Suvorov" were put out of action, the commander of the "Borodino" was seriously injured, a fire started on the "Sisoy the Great", due to which the ship was temporarily out of action. "Alexander III" was heavily damaged. From the firing of Russian ships, heavy damage was received IJN Mikasa and IJN Nisshin.
5:30 p.m.	The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the completely out of action "Suvorov" the surviving officers of the headquarters and the wounded in the head Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky.
5:40 p.m.	The Russian squadron led by the Borodino was fired upon by a detachment of Admiral Togo that had overtaken it, which led to the stretching of the Russian system and lagging behind the Alexander III column.
18 h 50 min.	"Alexander III", being fired upon by H. Kamimura's cruisers from a distance of about 45 kb, lost stability, rolled over to starboard and soon sank.
19h00 min.	The wounded Rozhdestvensky formally handed over the command of the squadron to N.I. Nebogatov with the order to go to Vladivostok.
19 hours 10 minutes	"Borodino", possibly as a result of hits by 12-inch shells from IJN Fuji, which led to the explosion of ammunition, rolled over to starboard and sank.
19 hours 29 minutes	"Prince Suvorov" was finally sunk as a result of four torpedo hits fired point-blank by Japanese destroyers.
OK. 20 o'clock	N. I. Nebogatov, following the last order of the commander, headed for Vladivostok, increasing the speed to 12 knots.
As a result of the daytime battle, four of the five best Russian battleships were sunk; "Eagle", "Sisoy the Great", "Admiral Ushakov" received serious damage, which affected their combat capability. The Japanese won this battle largely due to their tactics: general and use of artillery (concentration of fire on the lead ships of the Russian squadron, high firing accuracy).
Fight on the night of May 14-15
At night, Nebogatov's squadron was attacked by Japanese destroyers, from which the already damaged ships mostly suffered. In general, Russian ships successfully repelled mine attacks (perhaps due to the lack of searchlights and distinctive lights). From the fire of Russian ships, two Japanese destroyers (Nos. 34, 35) were killed, and 4 more ships were seriously damaged.
OK. 21 o'clock	The cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", having found itself after turning on the combat lighting, received a mine hole in the bow coal pit.
OK. 22 o'clock	Whitehead's mine, fired from a Japanese destroyer, hit the Navarin's stern, causing it to sink to the stern turret. The "Vladimir Monomakh" also received a mine hit in the bow.
23h 15 min.	As a result of the mine explosion, the Sisoy Veliky lost steering control.
OK. 02 o'clock	The damaged Navarin was discovered by Japanese destroyers, who fired 24 Whitehead mines at it. The battleship, which received hits, soon sank.
Separate fights on May 15
On the afternoon of May 15, almost all Russian ships trying to reach Vladivostok on their own south of Evenlet Island were attacked by the superior forces of the Japanese fleet.
OK. 05 o'clock	The destroyer "Brilliant" was flooded by her crew south of about. Tsushima.
05 h 23 min.	As a result of an unequal battle with a cruiser IJN Chitose and fighter IJN Ariake, which lasted more than an hour, the destroyer "Imperfect" was sunk.
08 h 00 min.	The battleship "Admiral Nakhimov" was flooded north of about. Tsushima.
10 h 05 min.	"Sisoi the Great" sank as a result of being hit by a Japanese mine.
10 hours 15 minutes	A detachment of Admiral Nebogatov's ships (battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" (flagship), "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin") ended up in a half-ring of five Japanese combat detachments and surrendered. Only the rank II cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.
OK. 11 o'clock	After an unequal battle with 2 Japanese cruisers and 1 destroyer, the crew of the cruiser Svetlana was sunk.
14h00 min.	The crew scuttled "Vladimir Monomakh".
5:05 p.m.	The commander of the 2nd TOE, Vice-Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, who was on the destroyer Bedovy, surrendered.
18 hours 10 minutes	The Russian battleship Admiral Ushakov was sunk by the Japanese cruisers Yakumo and Iwate.

Chronology on maps
red - Russians
white - Japanese

Losses and results

Russian side

The Russian squadron lost 209 officers, 75 conductors, 4761 lower ranks, killed and drowned, a total of 5045 people. 172 officers, 13 conductors and 178 lower ranks were wounded. 7282 people were taken prisoner, including two admirals. 2110 people remained on the captured ships. The total personnel of the squadron before the battle was 16,170 people, of which 870 broke through to Vladivostok. Of the 38 ships and vessels participating from the Russian side, they sank as a result of the enemy’s combat action, flooded or blown up by their crews - 21 (including 7 battleships, 3 armored cruisers, 2 armored cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 transport) , surrendered or were captured 7 (4 battleships, 1 destroyer, 2 hospital ships). Thus, the Almaz cruiser, the Bravy and Grozny destroyers, and the Anadyr transport could be used to continue hostilities.

Japanese side

According to the report of Admiral Togo, a total of 116 people died on the Japanese squadron, 538 were wounded. According to other sources, 88 people were killed on the spot, 22 died on ships, 7 in hospitals. 50 invalids turned out to be unfit for further service and were fired. 396 of the wounded recovered on their ships and 136 in hospitals. The Japanese fleet, as a result of fire, lost only two small destroyers - No. 34, 35 and the third No. 69 - as a result of a collision with another Japanese destroyer. Of the ships that participated in the battle, shells and fragments did not hit the cruisers Itsukushima, Suma, Tatsuta and Yaema. Of the 21 destroyers and 24 destroyers hit by fire, 13 destroyers and 10 destroyers were hit by shells or shrapnel, and several were damaged due to collisions.

Main Consequences

The tragedy that occurred in the waters of the Korea Strait had a serious impact on Russia's internal political situation. The defeat led to the rise of the socio-political movement in the country, including the revolutionary-separatist nature. One of the most severe consequences for the Russian Empire was the fall of its prestige, as well as its transformation into a minor maritime power.

The Battle of Tsushima finally tipped the scales in favor of Japan's victory, soon Russia was forced to conclude the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. The final dominance of the sea also remained with Japan.

From the point of view of military-technical influence on the development of shipbuilding, the experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Medium-caliber artillery, due to the increase in combat distance, did not justify itself. This led to the development of the so-called "big guns only" concept. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of the ship's side and reinforcement of horizontal armor.

Tsushima naval battle (1905)

Battle of Tsushima - took place on May 14 (27) - May 15 (28), 1905 in the area of \u200b\u200babout. Tsushima, in which the Russian 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky suffered a crushing defeat from the Japanese squadron under the command of Admiral Heihachiro Togo.

balance of power

The final stage of the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima, which took place on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By that time, the Russian squadron had 8 squadron battleships (of which 3 were old), 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers, 5 auxiliary cruisers and 9 destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, which consisted of 12 armored ships, were divided into 3 detachments of 4 ships each. The cruisers were consolidated into 2 detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov.

The Japanese fleet, under the command of Admiral Togo, consisted of 4 squadron battleships, 6 coastal defense battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into 8 combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The commander of the first detachment was Admiral Togo, the second - Admiral Kamimura.

Weapon quality

The Russian fleet in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers) was not inferior to the enemy, but in terms of quality, the superiority was on the side of the Japanese. The main forces of the Japanese squadron had significantly more large and medium caliber guns; Japanese artillery was almost three times superior to Russian in rate of fire, and Japanese shells had 5 times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese squadron had higher tactical and technical data than the Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this it should be added that the Japanese had multiple superiority in cruisers, especially in destroyers.

combat experience

The great advantage of the Japanese squadron was that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, having no such, after a long and difficult transition, had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had a lot of experience in carrying out live firing at long distances, which was gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in the conduct of concentrated fire with several ships at a single target at long distances. Russian gunners, on the other hand, did not have experience-tested rules for firing at long distances and did not have the practice of conducting this kind of firing. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky and Admiral Togo

Side tactics

At the time of the arrival of the Russian squadron in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese in the 1st and 2nd combat detachments were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers - about. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto Kvelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, whose task was to timely detect the Russian squadron when approaching the Korea Strait and ensure the deployment of their main forces on its movements.

Thus, the initial position of the Japanese before the battle was so favorable that any possibility of the passage of the Russian squadron through the Korea Strait without a fight was excluded. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korea Strait. Considering that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to act depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active operations, giving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing was repeated as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

balance of power

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and was built into a night marching order. Ahead, cruisers were deployed along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron at a distance of one mile were 2 hospital ships. When moving through the Rozhdestvensky Strait, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, he refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese to detect the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its way.

First at 2:25. noticed the Russian squadron by fire and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, which was on patrol between the islands of Goto-Kvelpart. Soon, due to the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempt to interfere with the Japanese negotiations.

Having received a report about the discovery of the Russians, the commander of the Japanese fleet left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet in the path of the Russian movement. The tactical plan of Admiral Togo was to cover the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and with concentrated fire on the flagships to disable them than to deprive the squadron of control, and then develop the success of the daytime battle with night attacks of destroyers and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

On the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron, first into the formation of a wake, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following in the ranks of two wake columns by the Korea Strait, the Russian squadron at 13 h 30 min. to the right of the bow, she discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were going to cross her course.

The Japanese admiral, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cab. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese wanted to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, having gone to the port side, began a sequential turn of 16 points in order to cover the head of the Russian squadron.

This turn, which was made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships in an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn on the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation in almost one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. But this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire was ineffective, because due to improper control it was not focused on the Japanese ships, which were turning around on the spot. As the enemy ships turned, they opened fire, concentrating it on the flagships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired from 4 to 6 Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve a positive result.

The superiority of the Japanese fleet in artillery and the weakness of armoring their ships had an immediate effect. At 14:23 battleship "Oslyabya", was seriously damaged and out of order and soon sank. Around 2:30 p.m. the battleship "Surov" went out of order. Having been seriously damaged and completely engulfed in flames, for another 5 hours he repelled the continuous attacks of enemy cruisers and destroyers, but at 19:30. also sank.

After the battleships "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" went out of action, the order of the Russian squadron was disrupted, and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going into the head of the Russian squadron, increased their fire. At the head of the Russian squadron was the battleship "Alexander III", and after his death - "Borodino".

In an effort to break through to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron was on a general course of 23 degrees. The Japanese, having a great advantage in speed, covered the head of the Russian squadron and concentrated fire on almost all of their battleships on the leading ship. Russian sailors and officers, finding themselves in a difficult situation, did not leave their combat posts and, with their characteristic courage and stamina, repulsed enemy attacks to the last.

At 15:05 fog began, and visibility decreased to such an extent that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. Around 3:40 p.m. the Japanese again discovered the Russian ships heading to the northeast, and resumed the battle with them. At about 4 p.m., the Russian squadron, evading envelopment, turned south. Soon the battle was again stopped due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and, finally, was forced to use his main forces to search for it.

daytime fight

Having organized reconnaissance well before the battle, Togo neglected it during the Tsushima battle, as a result of which he lost sight of the Russian squadron twice. In the daytime phase of the battle, the Japanese destroyers, who were keeping close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against the Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (4 ships per group) from different directions. The shells were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cab. Of the 30 torpedoes, only 5 hit the target, while three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 5:52 p.m. the main forces of the Japanese fleet, discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting with Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. Admiral Togo, this time, was distracted from the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the daytime battle, which lasted until 19:12, the Japanese were able to sink 2 more Russian battleships - Alexander III and Borodino. With the onset of darkness, the Japanese commander stopped the artillery battle and headed with the main forces to about. Ollyndo, and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

Night fight

Around 20:00, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small units, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45. simultaneously from three directions and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance of 1 to 3 cabs, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors were able to destroy 2 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

Morning May 15

The crews of the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov under the command of Captain 1st rank Miklukho-Maclay and the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy under the command of Captain 2nd rank Lebedev fought heroically against the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags in front of the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

Losses

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian squadron lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. 4 armored ships and a destroyer, together with Rozhdestvensky (due to the wound, he was unconscious) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the Almaz cruiser and 2 destroyers were able to break through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

Reasons for the defeat

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in forces and the unpreparedness of the Russian squadron for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian fleet lies with Rozhestvensky, who, as a commander, made a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, abandoned reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active operations and did not organize command and control of forces during the battle.

Actions of the Japanese squadron

The Japanese squadron, having sufficient time and action; in favorable conditions, well prepared for a meeting with the Russian fleet. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they were able to timely detect the Russian squadron and concentrated their main forces along its route.

But Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he could not cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron, Togo exposed his ships to its attack, and only the inept actions of Rozhdestvensky saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this wrong maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used the cruisers in the battle, resorting to the search for the Russian squadron by the main forces.

findings

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again showed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Artillery of medium caliber with increasing combat distance did not justify itself. It became necessary to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to build on the success achieved in artillery combat.

An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of the ship's side and reinforcement of horizontal armor. The battle formation of the fleet - a single-keel column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, as it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces at a distance of up to 100 miles.

Valery Shilyaev. Triptych Tsushima. Left side. 2005
Illustration from the artist's website http://www.shilaev.ru/

Tsushima naval battle (May 14-15, 1905). Fight at about. Tsushima warships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, consisting of 30 warships with the Japanese fleet (120 ships). The main goal of the Russian fleet (commanders of the squadrons, Admirals Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov) was a breakthrough to Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet (commander - Admiral Togo) had the task of completely defeating the Russian fleet. The high concentration of forces of the Japanese fleet, its better equipment and maneuverability led to military success. Despite the courage and heroism of the Russian officers and sailors, who had previously traveled 33 thousand kilometers from Kronstadt to Tsushima and entered the battle on the move, the losses for them were catastrophic: 19 ships were sunk, 3 cruisers broke into neutral ports and were interned, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok. Of the 14 thousand people of the squadron personnel, more than 5 thousand died.

Chronicle of the battle

1905.05.27 (May 14 O.S.) Japanese Sea. The Russian 2nd Pacific squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky (11 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 1 auxiliary cruiser) met with the Japanese fleet adm. H. Togo (4 battleships, 24 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 42 destroyers, 24 auxiliary cruisers) in the Tsushima Strait.

7 .fourteen. A Japanese cruiser was spotted from the Russian squadron.

9 .40. Found a detachment of Japanese cruisers.

13 .fifteen. The Russian squadron met with the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

13 .49. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of 38 cables (over 7 km).

13 .52. The Japanese fleet responded with concentrated fire on the battleships Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya.

14 .00 The Japanese cruiser Asama was damaged and withdrawn from the battle by the Russians.

14 .25. Having received heavy damage and lost control, the battleship "Oslyabya" went out of order.

14 .thirty. The battleship Knyaz Suvorov was put out of action and lost control.

14 .40. Russian battleship "Oslyabya" turned over and sank.

15 .40. The squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" received heavy damage.

16 .20. On the battleship Suvorov, only a 75-mm gun in the aft casemate survived from the artillery, which continues to fire at the enemy. The ship is a solid fire from bow to stern.

17 .20. The Russian auxiliary cruiser Ural was sunk.

17 .thirty. The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the battleship "Suvorov" the surviving staff officers and the wounded in the head Adm. Z. Rozhdestvensky.

18 .fifty. The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was sunk.

2 .15 the battleship Navarin was sunk, the Russians sank 3 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12.

5 .00 To the south of Tsushima Island, their crew scuttled the Russian destroyer "Brilliant".

5 .23. Japanese cruiser sunk Russian destroyer "Imperfect".

8 .00 To the north of Tsushima Island, the battleship "Admiral Nakhimov" was sunk.

10 .05. A Japanese torpedo sank the battleship Shisoy Veliky.

10 .38. Adm. Nebogatov's detachment of ships (battleships "Emperor Nikolai I", "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin"), surrounded by the Japanese squadron, capitulated. Only the cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.

11 .00 After a battle with 2 Japanese auxiliary cruisers and 1 destroyer, the cruiser "Svetlana" was scuttled by the crew.

11 .thirty. The destroyer "Buyny" was sunk.

11 .fifty. The destroyer "Fast" was sunk. 12 .43. Off the coast of Korea, met by 3 Japanese destroyers, the destroyer Gromkiy was flooded by her crew.

14 .00 The team scuttled the battleship "Vladimir Monomakh"

17 .05. The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice-Adm. Z. Rozhestvensky, surrendered to Japanese captivity on the destroyer "Trouble."

18 .ten. The Japanese cruisers "Yakumo" and "Iwate" sank the Russian battleship "Admiral Ushakov" (commander cap. 1r. Miklukho-Maclay). In the Battle of Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905, the Russians lost 10 thousand people, the losses of Japan - 3 destroyers and 1 thousand people. Of the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron, only a few ships managed to escape. The cruisers "Aurora", "Oleg" and "Zhemchug" broke into the city of Manila (Philippines; USA), the destroyer "Bodry", the transports "Svir" and "Korea" in Shanghai ( China) where they were interned, the transport "Anadyr" went to the island of Madagascar (fr). Only the cruisers "Almaz", "Izumrud" and the destroyers "Brave" and "Grozny" broke into Vladivostok.

Analysis of the course of the battle

The final stage of the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By this time, the Russian squadron included eight squadron battleships (of which three were old), three coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, eight cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers and nine destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, consisting of 12 armored ships, were divided into three detachments of four ships each. The cruisers were consolidated into two detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov. The Japanese fleet, commanded by Admiral Togo, consisted of four squadron battleships, six coastal defense battleships, eight armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into eight combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The first detachment was commanded by Admiral Togo, the second - by Admiral Kamimura.

The Russian squadron in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers) was not inferior to the Japanese, but in qualitative terms, the superiority was on the side of the enemy. The main forces of the Japanese fleet had significantly more guns of large and medium caliber; Japanese artillery was almost three times faster than Russian artillery, and Japanese shells had five times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese fleet had higher tactical and technical data than Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this we must add that the Japanese had multiple superiority in cruisers and especially in destroyers.

The great advantage of the Japanese fleet was that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, having no such, after a long and difficult transition, had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had a lot of experience in carrying out live firing at long distances, gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in the conduct of concentrated fire with several ships at a single target at long distances. The Russian gunners, on the other hand, did not have the rules of firing at long distances tested by experience and did not have the practice of conducting such firing. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

By the time the Russian squadron arrived in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese fleet as part of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers - at about. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto - Kvelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, which was supposed to timely detect the Russian squadron when approaching the Korea Strait and ensure the deployment of their main forces on the way of its movement. Thus, the initial position of the Japanese fleet before the battle was so favorable that it excluded any possibility of the passage of the Russian squadron through the Korea Strait without a fight. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korea Strait. Considering that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to conduct it depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active operations, leaving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing was repeated as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and formed up in a night marching order. Ahead, cruisers were deployed along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron, two hospital ships followed at a distance of one mile. While moving through the Rozhdestvensky Strait, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, he refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese to detect the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its way. The first at 2 hours 25 minutes noticed the Russian squadron by fire and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, which was on patrol between the islands of Goto-Kvelpart. Soon, due to the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempt to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

Having received a report about the discovery of the Russians, Admiral Togo left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet in the path of the Russian squadron. The tactical plan of the commander of the Japanese fleet was to cover the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and with concentrated fire on the flagships to disable them and thereby deprive the squadron of control, and then develop the success of the daytime battle with night attacks of destroyers and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

With the onset of the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron, first in the formation of a wake, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following in the ranks of two wake columns along the Korea Strait, the Russian squadron at 1330 hours on the right of the bow discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were going to cross its course.

Admiral Togo, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cab. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese were trying to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, having gone to the port side, began a sequential turn of 16 points in order to cover the head of the Russian squadron. This turn, made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships in an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn on the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation in almost one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. However, this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire turned out to be ineffective, because, due to improper control, it was not focused on those Japanese ships that carried out a U-turn on the spot. As they turned, the enemy ships opened fire, concentrating it on the flagships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired on by four to six Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve positive results.

The superiority of the Japanese in artillery and the weakness of the reservation of Russian ships had an immediate effect. At 14:23, the battleship Oslyabya, having received serious damage, went out of action and soon sank. At about 2:30 p.m., the battleship Suvorov broke down. Having been seriously damaged and completely engulfed in flames, for another five hours it repelled the continuous attacks of enemy cruisers and destroyers, but at 1930 hours it also sank.

After the failure of the battleships "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov", the order of battle of the Russian squadron was broken, and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going into the head of the Russian squadron, increased their fire. At the head of the Russian squadron was the battleship "Alexander III", and after its death - "Borodino".

At 1505 hours fog began, and visibility decreased so much that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. At about 3:40 p.m., the Japanese again discovered the Russian ships heading to the northeast, and resumed the battle with them. At about 4 p.m., the Russian squadron, evading envelopment, turned south. Soon the fight stopped again due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and was eventually forced to use his main forces to search for it.

Well organized reconnaissance before the battle. During the battle, Togo neglected her, as a result of which he twice lost sight of the Russian squadron. In the daytime phase of the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese destroyers, keeping close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (four ships per group) from different directions. Torpedoes were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cab. Of the 30 torpedoes, only five hit the target, and three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 1751 hours, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, having discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. The Japanese commander this time abandoned the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the daytime battle, which lasted until 19 hours 12 minutes, the Japanese sank two more Russian battleships - "Alexander III" and "Borodino". With the onset of darkness, Admiral Togo stopped the artillery battle and headed with the main forces to about. Ollyndo (Dazhelet), and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

Around 20:00, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small detachments, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45 simultaneously from three directions and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance of 1 to 3 cabs, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors destroyed two Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

By the morning of May 15, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized force. As a result of frequent evasions from attacks by Japanese destroyers, Russian ships dispersed throughout the Korea Strait. Only individual ships tried to break through to Vladivostok on their own. Encountering superior Japanese forces on their way, they boldly entered into a decisive battle with them and fought it to the last shell. The crews of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" under the command of Captain 1st Rank Miklukho-Maclay and the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev fought heroically against the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags in front of the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted completely differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian fleet lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. Four armored ships and a destroyer, together with Rozhdestvensky (due to the wound, he was unconscious) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the Almaz cruiser and two destroyers broke through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in forces and the unpreparedness of the Russian fleet for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian squadron lies with Rozhestvensky, who, as a commander, made a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, abandoned reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active operations and did not organize command and control in battle.

The Japanese fleet, having sufficient time and operating under favorable conditions, was well prepared for a meeting with the Russian squadron. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they discovered the Russian squadron in a timely manner and concentrated their main forces on its route. However, Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he could not cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron. Togo exposed his ships to her attack, and only the inept actions of Rozhdestvensky saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this wrong maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result of which he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used the cruisers in the battle, resorting to the search for the Russian squadron by the main forces.

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Medium-caliber artillery, due to the increase in combat distance, did not justify itself. It became necessary to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to build on the success achieved in artillery combat. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of the ship's side and strengthening the horizontal armor. The battle order of the fleet - a single-keel column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, as it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces at a distance of up to 100 miles.

Used materials from the book: "One Hundred Great Battles", M. "Veche", 2002

Literature

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2. History of naval art / Ed. ed. ON THE. Petersburg. - M., 1953. - T.Z. - S. 66-67.

3. History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. / Ed. I.I. Rostunov. - M., 1977. S. 324-348.

4. Kilichenkov A. Togo's mistake and Admiral Rozhdestvensky's last chance. [On the tactics of the naval battle at Tsushima, 1905]. // Marine collection. - 1990. -№ 3.-S. 80-84.

5. Marine atlas. Descriptions for cards. - M., 1959. - T.Z, part 1. - S. 698-704.

6. Marine Atlas / Ed. ed. G.I. Levchenko. - M., 1958. - T.Z, part 1. - L. 34.

7. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the Russo-Japanese war. -T.I-9. -SPb., 1910.

8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Marine Gen. Headquarters. - KN.1-4, 6, 7. - St. Petersburg-Pg., 1912-1917.

Read further:

War in the context of world politics.

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905(chronological table).

Defense of Port Arthur(detailed chronicle of the battle and its analysis).