The economy of the Russian Empire and the USSR comparison. The Russian economy at the beginning of the 20th century: the reasons for the collapse

Paul Gregory's research proves the failure of attempts to justify the revolution of 1917 on economic grounds.

The government and financial circles of the West, who scrupulously assessed the pace of economic growth of tsarist Russia, did their best to remove the dynamically developing competitor.

Paul Gregory answers a number of questions:

• What motivated foreign investors to invest billions in the Russian economy?
• What could Russia have achieved on the world stage without the 1917 revolution?
• How was the Russian economy protected from the influence of foreign investors?
• How did the economy of the USSR pay for its economic growth, and what experience could it not take from tsarist Russia?
• Why did Nicholas II introduce the gold standard in Russia? What results did this lead Russia to on the world stage?
• Why is there more data on the economy of the Russian Empire in foreign libraries than on any other country?

In 2003, a monograph by a well-known American economist was published in Russian. Paul Gregory titled "Economic growth of the Russian Empire. New calculations and estimates».

Paul Gregory is a professor at the University of Houston, a researcher at the Hoover Institution, a researcher at the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, and a specialist in the economic history of Russia and the USSR.

Gregory's view of the economy of the Russian Empire is interesting for several reasons: firstly, it is the view of a specialist and scientist, secondly, Gregory is politically neutral, and thirdly, his research is based on very rich statistical material taken from high-quality pre-revolutionary sources that have a greater degree of reliability than, for example, some Soviet sources compiled to please a political order.

In this article, we will talk about the results and conclusions that Paul Gregory received in the course of a long-term study of the economy of the Russian Empire.

Already in the introduction, Paul Gregory writes the following:

“The prevailing notion was that the economy of tsarist Russia was a chain of failures, which was the cause of the revolution of 1917. My research, the results of which are presented in this book, proves otherwise.

All calculations were made on the basis of materials stored in the libraries of Western Europe and the USA. I had an extra opportunity to make sure that specialists in the history of pre-revolutionary Russia have at their disposal much more complete statistical materials in comparison with similar materials for this period in other countries. In many ways, this was facilitated by the developed bureaucratic management system that existed in the Russian Empire, where many departments were involved in the collection of statistical information.

What assessment of the position of the Russian Empire before the First World War does Paul Gregory give? The American economist states the following:

“Russia on the eve of the First World War was one of the main economic powers. It was ranked fourth among the five largest industrialized countries. The Russian Empire produced almost the same volume of industrial output as Austria-Hungary, and was the largest producer of agricultural goods in Europe.

In the Russian translation of the monograph, there is no exact indication of which indicator this statement was made on the basis of. However, further in his study, the author, when assessing the rate of economic growth, uses such an indicator as the total national product, or in other words, the gross national product (GNP), which reflects the total value of goods created only by residents of a particular country, regardless of their geographical location. It can be assumed that Gregory uses this indicator in his assessments.

GNP is very close in its value to GDP. For a better understanding, we present the following illustration.

“In 1861, the volume of production [GNP - approx. ed.] in Russia was about half the American, 80% of the volume of production in the UK and Germany and only slightly behind the French. In 1913, according to this indicator, Russia almost caught up with England, significantly surpassed France, twice overtook Austria-Hungary and reached 80% of Germany's production volume.

In other words, in the period from 1861 to 1913, the rate of economic growth in the Russian Empire was higher than in Great Britain, France and Austria-Hungary and was approximately equal to the German one.

Is it a lot or a little? In his study, the author gives the following indicators of economic growth calculated by him for different countries (only correlated figures are taken). GNP growth (%/year):

Russia (1883-1887 - 1909-1913) - 3.25%;

Germany (1886-1895 - 1911-1913) - 2.9%;

USA (1880-1890 - 1910-1914) - 3.5%.

One can see some difference in time frames, but the general trend is obvious: in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia was among the leaders in terms of economic growth.

One more clarification should be made: at present, economic growth of 3 percent or more is not considered unique against the backdrop of the fast-growing economies of China and India, where growth at times reaches 10 percent or more per year. But it must be taken into account that at present the speed of all processes, including economic ones, has increased significantly. At the beginning of the 20th century, the main engine of economic growth in most countries was industry, now it is the service sector, which is developing faster than real production. Therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, an increase of 3.25% is a very good indicator.

The figures obtained by P. Gregory are confirmed in the research of the Groningen Center for Growth and Development under the leadership of Angus Maddison, the results of which the American economist cites in his monograph.

The Groningen Center study gives us GDP values ​​for different countries of the world for 1900 and 1913, calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP). Let's take a look at some of these numbers.

In 1900, the GDP of the German Empire was 162,335 million international Geary-Khamis dollars, for the Russian Empire this figure was 154,049 million dollars, and in 1913, the GDP values ​​for Germany and Russia, respectively, amounted to 237,332 million dollars and $232,351 million.

A simple mathematical calculation shows that Germany's GDP grew by 1.46 times over 13 years, and the Russian Empire's by 1.51 times. That is, if these figures are correct, the Russian GDP in 1900-1913. grew faster than Germany.

Studying the economy of the Russian Empire, Paul Gregory talks about the steps that were necessary for successful development:

Russia in the 1870s. had a sufficiently balanced economy to participate in the industrial revolution. The steps that needed to be taken were fairly obvious: reform of land relations, construction of railways, and improvements in education.”

It should be said that it was in these areas that truly revolutionary changes took place during the reign of Nicholas II. By 1913, the Russian Empire took 2nd place in the world in terms of the length of railways. Peasants in 1916 sowed (on their own and rented land) 89.3% of arable land and owned 94% of the livestock.

A real boom took place in Russian education: according to open sources, in the period from 1896 to 1910, 57 thousand primary schools were opened. The number of primary schools has doubled compared to the previous time period. 1,500 lower vocational schools, 600 city schools, 1323 secondary educational institutions have been created, 20 male higher educational institutions and 28 women's universities are being opened.

Thus, the necessary conditions for industrialization in Russia were created. However, there was one more necessary component - capital. An important place in this issue is given by the American economist to the introduction in Russia in 1897 of the so-called "gold standard" - the free conversion of the credit ruble into gold.

Gregory writes:

“The financial and tax policy of Russia since the 1870s. was aimed at joining the world gold standard.

By 1895, the Russian credit ruble was exchanged at a fixed rate for gold rubles. Russia officially introduced the gold standard in 1897, which increased Russia's credibility in the eyes of Western investors.

A distinctive feature of Russian policy in the last quarter of the 19th century was its deliberate pursuit of financial stability in order to attract foreign capital.

Unlike other countries that pursued a policy of financial stability and accumulated gold reserves in order to achieve a stable exchange rate, Russia did this in order to attract capital from abroad.

The financial stability provided by the gold standard was an important asset of Russian business policy. In addition to improving its position in the global financial community, Russia has relied on attracting large amounts of foreign capital. As a result, by 1917 Russia was the world's largest borrower, accounting for about 11% of the world's international debt.

The average annual inflow of foreign investment before the introduction of the gold standard (1885-1897) was 43 million rubles, and during the period of the gold standard (1897-1913) it reached 191 million rubles, an increase of almost 4.4 times . Prior to the introduction of the gold standard, the ratio of foreign investment to national income was just over 0.5% (or 5.5% of all net investment); after the introduction of the gold standard, this ratio was about 1.5% (11% of all net investment in Russia).

These facts require some explanation. There is a point of view that large loans in the foreign market were a huge mistake of the tsarist government, since they made the country dependent on foreign creditors. But, as Paul Gregory states:

“Russia began industrialization with surprisingly high levels of domestic savings. This meant that foreign finance had to play only a supporting role in raising the level of domestic capital accumulation. Pre-revolutionary Russia, unlike the Soviet leadership in the 1930s, was not forced to adopt a radical program of capital formation with the goal of “catching up” with the West in a few years. For tsarist Russia, this was not so necessary.

In other words, the Russian Empire, with the help of its high business reputation and financial stability, was able to attract huge foreign investments into its economy and, among other things, achieved high rates of economic growth due to them. Without loans, these rates would be somewhat lower. It is important to understand that the well-being of the Russian people was built on these funds. The Soviet Union also managed to achieve high rates of economic growth, but millions of lives, sweat and blood of the peoples of the country paid for them.

In conclusion, let us give Paul Gregory's assessment of the prospects for Russia's economic development.

“My book presents the success story of the economy of the Russian Empire: Russian agriculture, despite serious institutional problems, grew as fast as in Europe as a whole, and in general, the growth rates of output in the country exceeded those in Europe. Even if we project this growth very carefully into a hypothetical future, we will see that Russia is only a few decades away from becoming an all-round prosperous economy.

From my point of view, if Russia after the war had kept on the path of a market model of development, the growth rates of its economy would have been no less than before the war. In this case, the pace of its development would be ahead of the average European. However, there is every reason to believe that by overcoming many institutional obstacles (by completing the agrarian reform, improving the system of legislation in the field of business regulation), post-war Russia's growth rates would exceed pre-war figures. Any of the proposed scenarios theoretically determines the position of that hypothetical Russia as one of the most developed national economies - not as rich as, say, Germany or France, but close to them.

For decades, Soviet economists and historians have been talking about backward pre-revolutionary Russia, which would not have expected anything good if there had not been a revolution. After the collapse of the USSR, liberal historians, economists, and political scientists took over the baton, repeating the words about “free market” and “democracy” like a mantra, in which only a market economy is possible. And again, they talk about the revolution of 1917 as a necessary step for the modernization of the country.

Paul Gregory's research proves the failure of attempts to justify the revolution of 1917 on economic grounds. No coups were required to turn Russia into an industrial power. All the necessary steps by 1917 had already been taken.

The only "economic" reason for the catastrophe of 1917 lies in the minds of people who associated material well-being with the democratic social structure of Western countries and did not understand that they already had everything necessary to build this well-being with their own hands.

And the power and financial circles of the West, which very scrupulously and objectively assessed the pace of economic growth of tsarist Russia, strongly contributed to removing the dynamically developing competitor.

Boo rlaki on the Volga, I.E. Repin, 1873

Over the past 30 years, mankind has created as much information as in the previous three millennia.

On the one hand, the Internet is a blessing. If it had been widespread in 1991 as it is today, it would not have been possible to carry out perestroika and destroy the USSR.
Let me remind you that the main goal of perestroika - hidden from public consciousness - was the destruction of the USSR. Society was told about the renewal of socialism, acceleration,
publicity, etc.

On the other hand, the Internet is an information dump, which mixes tons of garbage and several kilograms of useful "food for thought", which is very difficult to find. But, as they say, the path will be mastered by the walking one. The main thing is to set yourself the task of finding useful information.

For example, you need to answer yourself the question: did tsarist Russia develop rapidly or not rapidly at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries?

Since in post-Soviet Russia the "de-Sovietization machine" worked at full capacity, one of its "products" was the exaltation of everything connected with Tsarist Russia. It couldn't be otherwise. The shifters who scolded the monarchy in the Soviet era began to glorify it in post-Soviet Russia.

In the TV show "Court of Time", such shifters as Svanidze, Mlechin and Co. showed all their "tricks". But not all people from their camp lost face.

From the program about Nicholas II:

Mlechin:
"Sergey Vladimirovich, please tell me how would you describe the state of Russia at the beginning of the century, before the outbreak of the First World War?
How do you rate: it was a prosperous state, a lagging state"?

Sergei Mironenko, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Director of the State Archives of the Russian Federation:

Of course, it was a backward state. The state, which in the 60s realized that it was necessary ... Unfortunately, you know, I am a witness for the defense, but I cannot prevaricate against the truth.

To a direct question about what kind of tsarist Russia was - prosperous or lagging behind - before the outbreak of the First World War, a direct answer was received: "Of course, it was a backward state."

Let me remind you again, Mlechin took a position in defense of Nicholas II and Mironenko acted as his witness for the defense.

Now about the numbers.

1. What place in the world did Russia occupy in terms of GDP?

Shares in world industrial production ()

In the period 1881-1885. Russia is lagging behind:

1. From USA and UK 8 times.
1. From Germany 4 times.
2. From France 2 times.

In the period 1896-1900. Russia increased its share by 1.6%, backlog:

1. From USA 6 times
2. From the UK 4 times
3. From Germany 3 times
4. From France 1.4 times

Already in 1900-1913. a stop occurs. Lag:

1. From USA 7 times
2. From the UK 2.6 times
3. From Germany 3 times
4. From France 1.2 times

During the specified time, we see rapid growth only in the United States - from 28.6% to 35.8%.
Russia is 7 times behind the USA!

2. What place in the world did Russia occupy in terms of finance?

On the eve of the First World War, Russia's financial capital was 11.5 billion rubles.

Shares of world financial capital:

The share of Russia in the world financial capital is inferior to:

4.5 times US
- 4.5 times the British Empire
- 4 times France
- 3 times Germany

At the same time, 7.5 billion rubles. (out of 11.5 billion rubles) or 2/3 - foreign investment. So the beneficiaries are foreigners. As they say in such cases: whose music is the one who dances it.

If we take only the actual Russian national financial capital, excluding foreign investment, then the absolute and relative indicators will decrease by at least 3 times. ()

The share of Russia (excluding foreign investments) in the world financial capital is inferior to:

13.5 times US
- 13.5 times the British Empire
- 12 times France
- 9 times Germany

State debt of tsarist Russia:

In 1913 - 8.8 billion rubles.
- in 1917 - 50 billion rubles. (the debt grew 5.6 times!)

3. What is Russia's place in the world in terms of per capita income?

Sources: Experience in calculating national income in 50 provinces of European Russia in 1900-1913. (M., 1918); Rubakin N.A. Russia in numbers. The country. People. Estates. Classes. The experience of statistical characteristics of the estate-class composition of the population of the Russian state (St. Petersburg, 1912).

Thus, we can conclude that there was indeed growth in Tsarist Russia before the First World War. You can't just call it fast. We significantly lagged behind other countries of the world both in terms of GDP and finances. The public debt from 1913 to 1917 increased by 5.6 times! In terms of per capita income - read in terms of living standards - we had a huge lag (from England by 4.58 times, from France by 3.51 times, from the USA by 3.18 times, etc.)

So, all those who talk about rapid growth are deceitful?

Or did they fail to sort out the heaps of garbage in search of "useful food for thought"?

P.S. The reason for writing the note was the program "The Meaning of the Game - 101", to the question of useful food for the mind.

In the 20th century, Russia experienced a revolution, a civil war, two world wars, and changes in political regimes. It is 1913 that is a kind of standard mark, the last year on the eve of the First World War.

What was our country like and how much has it changed in 100 years? To answer this question, let's compare a number of the most important indicators of the life of the country and its inhabitants.

One hundred years ago, the last large-scale industrial census was conducted in the Russian Empire. That is why, throughout almost the entire Soviet era, the achievements of socialism were aligned with 1913. In such and such a year, the level of 1913 was surpassed in iron smelting, in such and such - in the production of locomotives ... The Gosplan, Soviet economists and statisticians were guided by the coordinates-1913, they were crammed by students and schoolchildren.

Itogi decided to revive the tradition and compare the current Russian economy with that of a century ago. It turned out that for the absolute majority of positions, comparisons are not only appropriate, but also lead to a paradoxical conclusion: “The Russia that we lost” was ahead of the current one in almost all respects.

If it fell in the Empire to be born

A hundred years ago, about 94 million people lived within the current borders of the Russian Federation. That is, almost one and a half times less than in 2013. The entire empire, including Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, numbered about 174 million people. Moreover, such as now, the concentration of the population around Moscow was not observed: the most numerous were the Kiev, Volyn and Podolsk provinces, and only then, among others, were Moscow and Petrograd. At the same time, the majority were non-urban residents: 85 percent, of which 90 percent were peasants.

Accordingly, the main export commodities then were not oil and gas, but agricultural products. But the empire did not sit on the "agrarian needle": 57.4 percent of exports were in agriculture, 37 percent in the raw materials sector, and 5.6 percent in the factory industry. Today, in the structure of Russian exports, 70 percent is occupied by mineral resources (oil, gas and other raw materials).

Now the question for filling: how much has the standard of living of the average Russian increased in a hundred years? Answer: not grown that much! History made a century-old circle with two world wars, three revolutions, the collapse of the Soviet empire - and returned to its own circles. As a result, today the income of the average Russian is about the same as in 1913.

But first things first. The average salary in the Russian Empire as of 1913 was 37.5 golden "Nikolaev" rubles per month. It could buy 5 times less flour than now, 4 times less salt, 6 times less sugar, 4.5 times less eggs, 2.5 times less vodka and 1.2 times less beef. But do not rush to be happy for yourself and worry about your ancestors. For example, a modern Russian can buy 1.2-2 times less milk and potatoes for an average salary than in 1913. As for food prices, it is worth considering: the cost of food production has fallen very much during this time due to the development of the food industry, chemistry and transport logistics.

Cars were noticeably more expensive in 1913, which is quite excusable for the very beginning of the automobile era. But the sphere of services and cultural leisure, as well as the cost of housing, is not like ours. So, a ticket to the gallery in the Bolshoi Theater could be bought for 30 kopecks, while now a ticket to the balcony in the new hall for The Nutcracker will cost 3,500 rubles (if you are lucky enough to do without speculators), which, according to purchasing power parity, calculated based on the price loaf of bread in 1913 and 2013, 15 times more expensive. A trip to the Moscow cinematograph cost 20 kopecks instead of 300-400 rubles today, or three times cheaper.

Renting inexpensive housing in 1913 cost 17-20 kopecks per square meter. Not the most qualified worker with a salary of 27.7 rubles a month (the most sought-after professionals received up to 50 rubles) could rent a living space of 138 square meters, if, of course, it occurred to him to spend his entire salary on it. But in any case, the current Moscow tenants can complain about their fate: their average monthly income would be enough for the unfortunate 37 square meters.

Weep, poor modern students! Education in the capital's university a century ago cost an average of 7-8 rubles a month. Today, at paid branches - about 20 thousand rubles, or 5-6 times more expensive at parity. It is better not to talk about the quality of education, so as not to offend the university leadership.

However, as now, in terms of salaries in 1913, Russia lagged behind the leading countries. So, the British worker was then paid 6.5 pounds per month (61 rubles at gold parity), the German - 123 marks (57 rubles), the French - 108 francs (41 rubles), and the American - 57 dollars (110 rubles). That is, 1.5-4 times more. Although the prices for the same foodstuffs in the Russian Empire were three times lower than in America.

In absolute terms, the ratio of current Russian and American salaries has remained the same: we are still three to four times behind today. But prices for consumer goods across the ocean have dropped dramatically over the past hundred years (albeit mainly due to Chinese consumer goods).

So, how much did they receive in the Russian Empire in terms of our money? It is possible to convert "Nikolaev" rubles into gold, for which they were freely exchanged, and multiply by its current market price, which will turn 37.5 rubles of a hundred years ago into 48.3 thousand modern ones. However, gold has long been the subject of speculation and it is difficult to trust the amounts received. There is another way - at the rate of the US dollar, which in 1913 cost 1.94 rubles. Given this and the rate of depreciation of the dollar, the average royal salary today is 26,126 rubles a month. By the way, according to Rosstat, in October 2012 real wages in Russia averaged 26,803 rubles. Here is the age of progress with its steady growth of material well-being! The standard of living in our country has just returned to the level of 1913.

Even if you do not rely on volatile exchange rates, the numbers are still close.

Most graciously deigned to grow

The most painful place in modern Russia is industry. In 1913, in this regard, our country looked incomparably better. It is terrible to say, but even more oil was produced. In relative terms, of course: in absolute terms, modern Russia leads by a huge margin. A hundred years ago, 9 million tons of black gold were brought to the surface, and in January-November 2012 - 454.3 million tons. But at the same time, the Russian Empire produced about half of all world oil, now our share is much lower.

The same with coal or, for example, steel. It seems that the increase in production is ten or more times, but consumption has grown even more over a hundred years. And it turns out that even in terms of raw materials we are inferior to the former Russia.

Engineering in general is a problem. In 1913, the Russian Empire produced 654 steam locomotives, and the Russian Federation for 11 months of 2012 - only 107 diesel and electric locomotives. Passenger cars in 1913 left the factories in 1507 pieces, in 2012 - 770. From 1875 to 1917, about 30 thousand kilometers of railways were built, that is, 714 kilometers were built per year. By 1916, the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway with a total length of more than 9 thousand kilometers was completed (it took 25 years), into which 1.5 billion gold rubles were pumped, or about a trillion rubles today. For comparison: over the past ten years, only a thousand kilometers of railways have been built in Russia, that is, the pace has decreased by 7 times.

The domestic aircraft industry also does not look the best, which, as many believe, did not exist at all in tsarist Russia. Even in the USSR in the mid-1980s, up to 200 aircraft per year were produced, half of which were civilian, while Boeing was already rolling out 1,000 aircraft annually from hangars. But that's nothing. For all zero years, Russia was able to produce only 102 liners (an average of 10 pieces per year). In the Russian Empire in 1914-1917, only one firm, Anatra, built 1,100 aircraft. By the beginning of the First World War, the tsarist army had the largest air force in Europe - 263 units! And by 1917 it increased to 1500 units. In addition to the Anatra, aircraft were produced at the Shchetinin, Lebedev and Slyusarenko plants in St. Petersburg, as well as the Duks plant in Moscow and the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in Riga, which is best known for producing cars. At this plant, by the way, the famous aircraft designer Igor Sikorsky designed aircraft, whose Ilya Muromets aircraft was considered at that time the largest in the world (the start of production was 1913).

By the way, about competition. For example, over 200 private companies were engaged in oil production in the Russian Empire, while now there are no more than a dozen of them, and de facto only one or two of them are truly private.

On the whole, Russia's share in world industry in 1913 was 5.3 percent, and France had a little more, 6.4 percent. Top three: USA - 35.8, Germany - 15.7 and the UK - 14 percent. Today, Russia's share in the world economy is less than three percent.

The only thing in which the Russian Empire is inferior to modern Russia is in the production of cars. By 1913, 90 percent of Russian cars were assembled in Riga, where Russo-Balts were produced. Production expected to increase to 300 pieces per year. This was in line with the then performance of similar plants in Europe. In 2012, 1.8 million cars were produced in Russia. But the share in world production again declined.

Highly tasting

For many, it is still a mystery whether Russia once fed half of Europe, as Dmitry Medvedev once put it, and whether it is worth rejoicing at the increased export of Russian grain in recent years. It's time to dispel some myths here.

In 1913, the Russian Empire was the world's largest net exporter of grain, sending abroad 8.115 million tons of wheat, rye, barley and corn, accounting for 30 percent of world exports, according to the Collection of statistical and economic data on agriculture in Russia and foreign countries, published in 1917. It is curious that exactly the same share in the world market is occupied by Russian oil today. Argentina was breathing in our back a hundred years ago, exporting 7.8 million tons of grain out of the country, followed by the USA (5.3 million tons), Canada (2.8 million tons), Romania (2.5 million tons) and Australia (1.4 million tons).

Most of our grain, says the Statistical Yearbook for 1914, went to Germany and Italy, as well as France, Belgium, Romania, Spain, Portugal and other countries where the share of Russian grain in local imports did not exceed 8 percent. A special client is the Netherlands, which accounted for 23 percent of domestic grain exports (about two million tons). This is due to the fact that the Netherlands was (and remains) the largest trade intermediary. In terms of gross grain harvest, Russia was second to the United States - 67 against 88 million tons. Following by a wide margin were Germany (20.5 million tons), Austria-Hungary (18 million tons), Argentina and France. The fact is that Russians in 1913 consumed two and a half times less grain than Americans.

According to Rosstat, for the first time Russia exceeded the 1913 figures for grain exports only in 2002-2003 (11-13 million tons), followed by a failure in 2004 (up to 5 million tons), and starting from 2005 they were sold abroad 12-20 million tons each, depending on the weather and harvest. However, in vain Russian politicians write down these figures for themselves as an achievement.

After 1917, grain exports continued by inertia. Its maximum values ​​before the Great Patriotic War were noted in 1930 and 1931 (5 million tons each), despite the massive famine in certain regions of the country. Close to the indicators of 1913, the USSR was able to approach only in 1962 and 1968-1970, after which there was a sharp decline in exports and, conversely, an increase in grain imports. This was due to the fact that in the mid-1950s, the Soviet leadership wanted to raise meat consumption in the USSR to the level of Western Europe. And Soviet Russia had no choice but to feed grain to livestock, thanks to which its consumption began to exceed all conceivable and unthinkable possibilities of domestic fields. Without imports, any severe drought would lead to a sharp drop in the production of meat, milk and other products.

As a result, according to the USSR State Statistics Committee, by 1990 the number of cattle had grown to 118 million from 52 million in 1913, surpassing even the United States (96 million). The gross grain harvest increased to 218 million tons (in America - more than 300 million tons). And then the most interesting began.

From 1990 to 2011, due to the decline of agriculture in Russia, the number of livestock of all types decreased by 60 percent (from 150 to 60 million heads), meat production - by 25 percent (from 10 to 7 million tons in carcass weight), milk - by 44 percent (from 55.7 to 31.8 million tons). And the production of grain, which for the most part is suitable only for livestock feed, fell by only 10 percent (from 104 to 94 million tons). As a result, a huge surplus was formed, which began to be delivered abroad. We get the necessary rate of consumption of livestock products through imports, which account for up to 30 percent of the total meat consumption, Rosstat records.

So is it worth being proud of the fact that, at the cost of falling meat production below the level of 1913, Russia still returned to tsarist times in terms of grain exports?

His Majesty the ruble

There are several other fundamental differences between the domestic economy of a hundred years ago and the current one. They are qualitative in nature and largely explain the quantitative indicators. For example, in 1913, we, not the States, had the largest gold reserves in the world. The ruble was 100% backed by the precious metal. European banknotes - on average half. This made the "Nikolaev" ruble the most reliable currency in Europe during the First World War, its use in settlements was a sign of stability.

In Russia, there was no income tax, which was more than covered by excises on alcohol (the tsarist government had a monopoly on its production and sale), property taxes, income from the operation of railways and other indirect payments. That is, in fact, Russia for Europe was a real offshore.

In 1913, the country had a budget surplus with very large military spending. At the beginning of the 20th century there was a net inflow of investment, now there is a net outflow.

But there is more than numbers. The achievements of the economy of the Russian Empire can be seen today. We go to a Moscow art gallery set up by entrepreneur Pavel Tretyakov. We go to Siberia and the Far East along the only railway in this direction - the Trans-Siberian Railway, and to St. Petersburg - along the Nikolaevskaya. And the famous "Russo-Balt" has not gone away. The plant, which moved from Riga to Moscow Fili with the outbreak of the First World War, today bears the name of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Center. Now they make rockets there.

The economic policy of the Russian Empire - diving into the abyss

Before analyzing in detail the economic policy of the early 20th century, it is necessary to briefly outline how the situation developed until the accession to the throne of Nicholas II.

A distinctive feature of Russia as an empire was the endless wars that it waged, which inevitably led to huge budget deficits, because the economy always needed additional issuance of banknotes. One of the most costly was the Crimean War, which forced the printing of paper money in large quantities.

In the era of military campaigns and reforms of Alexander II, the total amount of budget deficits amounted to astronomical for those times, 1 billion rubles. and half of this billion falls on 1855-1856. Such huge costs had to be covered by foreign borrowing. The colossal growth of the national debt led to the fact that in the budget of 1857 out of 268 million rubles. income, 100 million rubles were intended for debt service. As a result of the reign of Alexander II, the public debt increased three times.

During the reign of Alexander III, Russia collects huge crops of grain during a crop failure in Europe, which makes it possible to develop grain exports to enormous sizes. Since 1888, a new significant item of income appeared in the budget - income from state-owned railways. In combination with a policy of economy, this made it possible to achieve a deficit-free budget and even an excess of state revenues over expenditures. At the same time, a policy of customs protectionism is being introduced, which makes it possible not only to pay interest on the external state debt in gold and silver, but also to accumulate the state gold reserve. This policy, however, comes to ruin due to the bad harvest of 1891. The government was forced to ban the export of bread this year and allocate 161 million rubles. to buy food for the hungry. These expenditures had a noticeable effect on the state treasury, forced them to print paper money again and resort to new loans.

By the time of accession to the throne of Nicholas II, payments on the public debt accounted for 20% of government spending. With a total treasury income of 1.7 billion rubles. 346 million rubles are spent on servicing the debt. In 1897, the "financial genius", a representative of a new wave of monetarist economists, Finance Minister S. Yu. Witte, concerned about Russia's successful entry into the world economy, proposes to the Emperor a monetary reform aimed at strengthening investment activity and increasing the inflow of foreign capital into the country. The Emperor agrees. And in 1897, a reform takes place that pegs the ruble to gold, and as we will see later, this becomes the beginning of the collapse of the Russian Empire and the loss of its economic sovereignty.

After the reform, foreign capital poured into the country, which began the construction of new enterprises. As a result, the rate of industrial growth increased sharply. However, the West had nothing to be afraid of Russia "rushing" forward. The more efficiently the Russian economy worked, the more income the banks of Western countries received. It is very significant that after the reform the amount of external debt continued to grow. The Russo-Japanese War forced an even greater increase in the amount of borrowing. The public debt increased from 6.6 billion rubles. up to 8.7 billion rubles The place of the main creditor of the Russian Empire (about 60% of loans) belonged to France.

In 1887-1913. The West has invested 1,783 million gold rubles in Russia. During the same period, net income was exported from Russia - 2326 million gold rubles (an excess of income over investments for 26 years - by 513 million gold rubles). Annually, up to 500 million gold rubles were transferred abroad on interest and loan repayments (in modern prices, this is 15 billion dollars).

For the period from 1888-1908. Russia had a positive trade balance with other countries in the amount of 6.6 billion gold rubles. This amount was 1.6 times higher than the value of all Russian industrial enterprises and their working capital. In other words, having built 2 enterprises in Russia, the West built 3 enterprises at home with the money of Russia. Therefore, the average per capita income in Tsarist Russia grew much more slowly than the average per capita income of those countries that plundered Russia with their “investments and loans”.

Moreover, all these enterprises did not belong to Russia at all. Take, for example, the book "Securities of the Russian State", published in Moscow in 1995. In it, the authors provide photographs of samples of securities. Having carefully examined these photographs, we see that the industry of Russia was practically divided among Western states.

So, for example, shares of enterprises, banks and railways of the Russian Empire had inscriptions in Russian, German, English and French, in addition to distribution addresses in St. Petersburg and Moscow, they had distribution addresses in Europe and the United States.

In other words, at least 2/3 of Russia's industry did not belong to it and worked not for the welfare of the country, but to support the growth of foreign economies. Isn't it a very familiar picture?

First of all, Russia, even in terms of industrial production, lagged behind the USA, England, Germany and France. Its share in the total industrial production of the five above powers was only 4.2%.

In global production in 1913, the share of Russia was 1.72%, the share of the USA - 20%, England - 18%, Germany - 9%, France - 7.2% (these are all countries with a population 2-3 times less than Russia).

And this despite the fact that in Russia in 1913 there was a record (80 million tons) grain harvest.

The average yield in Russia is 8 centners per hectare. The figures are very low. Despite this, Russia annually exported approximately 10 million tons of grain abroad. As a result, in terms of bread consumption, Russia consumed 345 kilograms of bread per person per year. USA 992 kilograms, Denmark 912 kilograms, France 544, Germany 432 kilograms. At one time, about this situation in Germany, V.I. Lenin said a very interesting phrase: “In Germany, not just famine reigned, but a brilliantly organized famine”

In terms of gross national product per capita, Russia was 9.5 times behind the United States, England - 4.5 times, Canada - 4 times, Germany - 3.5 times, France, Belgium, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, Spain - 3 times, Austria-Hungary - 2 times.

Russia continued to lag behind - in 1913 its GNP correlated with that of Germany as 3.3 to 10, while in 1850 the ratio was 4 to 10.

Volumes of industrial production in 1913:

General, million rubles

Per capita, rub.

Great Britain

Germany

When they talk about economic growth, they somehow leave aside one very interesting thing - despite economic growth, per capita income in Russia almost halved from 1885 to 1913, and the gap with developed countries almost doubled. That is, Russia did not develop, Russia regressed.

By 1913 Russia had lost its economic sovereignty. This is only the property in Russia that belonged to foreign capital. Not to mention even those loans that were taken.

The First World War, which the Russian Empire entered in 1914, revealed with particular clarity the depravity of the economic model adopted. The economy, which entered the world economic system, was unable to provide for the vital problems of the country and the army waging war. As a result: the gold reserve, which at the beginning of the war amounted to 1.7 billion rubles. in 1914, in 1915, already a year later, it decreased to 1.3 billion rubles. and by January 1917 it amounted to 1.1 billion rubles. External debt for the first year of the war grew from 8.8 billion rubles. in 1914, up to 10.5 billion rubles. in 1915, and by January 1917 it had totaled 33.6 billion rubles.

For the army there were not enough weapons, for the country there was not enough food. The issue of money not backed by gold began. Inflation reached 13,000%. The peasants refused to sell food, and at the end of 1916 the state was forced to introduce a surplus appraisal.

It turned out that at state-owned factories 122 mm shrapnel costs 15 rubles per pound, and at a private factory 35, since the main defense plants in Petrograd and the Urals belonged to foreign capital.

And here is a conversation between Nicholas II and the head of the main artillery department, Manyakovsky:

Nicholas II: They complain about you that you constrain the initiative of society in supplying the army.

Manyakovsky: Your Majesty, they already profit from supplies to the army by 300%, and sometimes even by 1000.

Nicholas II: Well, let them profit, as long as they don't steal.

Manyakovsky: Your Majesty, but this is not even theft, but pure robbery.

Nicholas II: Still, there is no need to irritate public opinion.

(N. Yakovlev, Decree, p. 196)

What state goals did Russia pursue in World War I? We all know the talk that Russia fought for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. But why do Russia need them as a state? If we carefully look at the map, we will see that in fact, no state problems were solved by the acquisition of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Only trade problems were solved. Here we go back to the map. You can see the French enclave. The richest, most fertile lands, latifundia, which were under French influence through obtaining loans, through French-owned railways. The export of grain through Odessa in the direction of Constantinople was necessary for private capital so that there was no courier barrier on the straits in order to calmly export their grain to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. That is why, in order to fulfill the economic tasks that England and France, members of the Entente, set themselves, Russia was drawn into the war.

As a result, the Russian Empire collapsed, unable to withstand the test of the world war. The Provisional Government that replaced it not only did not correct the state of affairs in the economy, but, on the contrary, aggravated them even more. The already huge public debt grew by July 1917 to 44 billion rubles. and by October it was 60 billion rubles. Inflation continued in the country - an excess of money in circulation. Its inevitable companion was the depreciation of money and the rise in prices. By February 1917, the purchasing power of the ruble was 27 kopecks. By October 1917, the purchasing power of the ruble had fallen to 6-7 kopecks of the pre-war level.

We can give such a curious example: the only normally working industrial enterprise in Russia in March-October 1917 was the Expedition for Procurement of State Papers in Petrograd on the Fontanka (the current Goznak, which celebrated its 190th anniversary in 2008). This factory under the Provisional Government worked continuously, in 4 shifts, and threw more and more paper money into the market, which cost less and less. problems. An analysis of the economic state of the Russian Empire at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and up to October 17 clearly shows that the transfer of the Russian Empire to the rails of liberal monetarism ended in collapse and disaster for it. Unfortunately, since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has been led the same way. Doesn't this mean that modern capitalism has not abandoned its cherished desires for economic enslavement and the division of our country into zones of economic expansion?..

So, the light industry of the Russian Empire can be characterized as follows: world-class high-class products, extremely dynamically developing. After the Bolshevik occupation, the entire light industry was, in fact, destroyed and eked out a miserable existence.

Food industry and agriculture

The agriculture of the Russian Empire provided a significant income from exports, especially wheat. The structure of exports can be presented on this graph, for more details on the harvest for 1883–1914, see the detailed report

Russia occupied the first place in grain harvesting, trade in grain, eggs (50% of the world market) and butter brought most of the export earnings. And here, as we see, the role of private forces was again the most important. The state was poorly represented in agriculture, although it owned 154 million acres of land, while 213 million acres belonged to peasant communities and private individuals. Only 6 million acres of the state were sown, the rest was occupied mainly by forests. In other words, enterprising peasants provided the backbone of the country's economy by producing goods whose sale allowed them to buy needed foreign goods.

Yields for 1883–1914

Animal husbandry was relatively developed. “Number of horses per 100 inhabitants: Russia - 19.7, Britain - 3.7, Austria-Hungary - 7.5, Germany - 4.9. France - 5.8, Italy - 2.8. The only European country competing with Russia - Denmark. There were 20.5 horses per 100 people. In general, the supply of horses was at the level of America, but inferior to Argentina, Canada and Australia.
In terms of cattle, Russia was not a leader - rather, a strong middle peasant. On average, there were 29.3 heads of cattle per 100 inhabitants of the Russian Empire. In Austria-Hungary -  30, in Britain -  26.1, in Germany -  30, in Italy -  18, in France -  32.1, in the USA -  62.2. That is, pre-revolutionary Russia was quite adequately provided with cattle - in fact, every third owned a cow.
In terms of sheep, Russia is also a strong middle peasant: the indicators are not the best, but far from the worst. On average - 44.9 sheep and rams per 100 people. In Austria-Hungary this number was less than 30, in Britain - 60.7, in Germany - 7.5, in Italy - 32.3, in France - 30.5, in America - 40.8 sheep per hundred people. The only industry in which Russia was inferior to some of the leading powers was pig breeding, it was not very widespread. On average, there were 9.5 pigs per 100 people. In Austria-Hungary - about 30, in Britain - 8.1, in Germany - 25.5, in Italy - 7.3, in France - 11.2. However, even here the average level is not inferior to the French or British”. Data from here.

The mechanization of agriculture from 1905 to 1913 can be represented in the following figures:

Steam plows were imported in 1905, 97 units, in 1912, 73 thousand units.

In 1905, 30.5 thousand seeders were imported, in 1913 about 500 thousand.

In 1905, 489.6 thousand locomobiles were imported, in 1913 more than 1 million units.

In 1905, 2.6 million poods of Thomas slag were imported, in 1913 - 11.2 million.

Phosphorites in 1905 were imported 770 thousand pounds, in 1913 3.2 million.

1.7 million poods of superphosphates were imported in 1905, and 12 million in 1913.

Nikolay Vasilievich Vereshchagin. "Merry milkman" of a healthy person.

The production of butter developed. The export of butter in 1897 amounted to 529,000 poods worth 5 million rubles, although before that there was almost no export. In 1900 - 1189 thousand poods worth 13 million rubles, in 1905 exports increased to 2.5 million poods worth 30 million rubles, and a year later 3 million poods worth 44 million rubles were exported. At the same time, the Empire owed the development of the industry to Nikolai Vasilyevich Vereshchagin. “Transportation by rail, as shown by statistics, is over 20,000,000 poods a year, and since up to 3,000,000 poods of oil from this amount is exported abroad and is estimated at approximately 30,000,000 rubles, the rest of the amount, over 17,000,000 poods, in any case, it represents a value of at least 30,000,000 rubles, and, consequently, we already produce dairy products for about 60,000,000 rubles a year. The value of more productive cattle and more fruitful land has undoubtedly risen considerably wherever improved dairy farming has taken root.

Sugar production increased from 1887 to 1913 from 25.9 million poods to 75.4 million poods. Its consumption also grew (see table):

Population

It is no secret that the population of the Russian Empire grew at a very rapid pace. The population of the European part of Russia from 1897 to 1914 grew from 94 million to 128 million, Siberia from 5.7 million to 10 million. In total, in the Empire, including Finland, from 129 million to 178 million people (according to other sources, in 1913 the population without Finland was 166 million). The urban population, according to the data of 1913, was 14.2%, i.e. more than 24.6 million people. In 1916, about 181.5 million people already lived in the Empire. In essence, this human asset laid the foundations for future victory in the Second World War - this is the numerical advantage of people who grew up in relatively well-fed imperial years, who received good immunity and physical data, provided Russia with labor and an army for many years to come (as well as those who was born to them in the early 1920s).

Education

The number of students in lower, secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as literacy, grew steadily in the last decades of the Empire. This can be estimated from the following data:

The budget for education of the Ministry of Public Education for the period from 1894 to 1914: 25.2 million rubles and 161.2 million rubles. An increase of 628%. According to other sources, the budget of the MNP was 142 million rubles in 1914. The total expenditure of the ministries on education was 280-300 million + the expenditures of cities and zemstvos were about 360 million rubles. In total, the total expenditure on education in the Republic of Ingushetia in 1914 amounted to 640 million rubles, or 3.7 rubles per person. For comparison, in England this figure was 2.8 rubles.

The intention to achieve full literacy as a long-term goal of the government was obvious. If in 1889 the ability to read in men and women aged 9 to 20 was 31% and 13%, respectively, then in 1913 this ratio was already 54% and 26%. Russia, of course, lagged behind in this respect all developed European countries, where from 75% to 99% of the population could read and write.

The number of primary educational institutions by 1914 was 123,745 units.

The number of secondary educational institutions by 1914: about 1800 units.

The number of universities by 1914: 63 state, public and private units. The number of students - 123,532 students in 1914 and 135,065 students in 1917.

Urban literacy increased by an average of 20% between 1897 and 1913

The increase in literacy among recruits speaks for itself.

In 1914, there were 53 teachers' institutes in Russia, 208 teachers' seminaries, and 280,000 teachers worked. More than 14,000 students studied at pedagogical universities and seminaries of the MNP; in addition, in 1913 alone, 15.3 thousand students graduated from additional pedagogical classes in women's gymnasiums. The number of professionally trained teachers in elementary schools also steadily increased, including in the remaining parochial schools (despite the lower pay in them): if by 1906 82.8% (in one-class) and 92.4% (in two-class) professionally trained teachers, then by 1914 - already 96 and 98.7%, respectively.

In general, according to the expectations of that time, the problems with the literacy of the population and the creation of a system of universal education should have been resolved by 1921-1925. And somehow I have no doubt that it would be so.

Results

Thus, we see that absolutely in all parameters of the development of the economy of the Russian Empire from the late 1880s to 1917, the country made significant progress. Undoubtedly, Russia was still lagging behind France, Germany, England, the USA, and even in some respects Italy and Denmark. But the trend of continuous development is obvious - this allows us to conclude that after 1917 the country would have made progress in the economy. As for the relatively low standard of living of the majority of the population in the 1900s, Russia, in principle, almost always lagged behind the rest of Europe, as it lagged behind under the USSR and today. But in the Republic of Ingushetia, we see how the incomes of the population grew continuously and at a rapid pace, which cannot be said about the life of the Soviet people and our current long-term stagnation.

One of the factors hindering the development of the economy was the increase in duties and protectionism. You may already be familiar with the notion that the tariffs allegedly contributed to the development of domestic industry. But this is not so, because it was precisely those industries where there was no competition with foreign products (raw materials, processing, agriculture, handicrafts, textiles) that developed faster. Duties hampered the development of engine building, automotive, aircraft manufacturing, largely because only the emerging industry in these industries lacked foreign components, which were so necessary at the initial stage, making business in these industries unprofitable. The Tariff of 1868, for example, imposed duties on cars. In the same way, duties on cars were raised in 1891. As a result, it is precisely in mechanical engineering since then that the growth has been the least significant and the share of imported machines is high. When, as adherents of protectionism, they always point us to an impressive growth in the raw materials industry and agriculture, where, in general, nothing could threaten Russia with all the will.