Jum is a treatise on human nature. David Hume

HUME, David (1711-1776). A Treatise of Human Nature: being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Of the Understanding; Of the Passions; Of Morals. London: John Noon and Thomas Longman, 1739-1740. 3 volumes, 8 ° (197-206x126mm). Four pages of publisher "s advertisements at end of volume II. (Without the final blank in vol. III, occasional scattered marginal spotting.) Contemporary near uniform calf, spines with raised bands, numbered directly in gilt, compartments with gilt double rules, sides with gilt double-rule border, volumes 1 and 2 also with an inner blind roll-tooled border with crowns and sprays, edges sprinkled red (vol. I rebacked preserving the original spine, vols. II-III with spine ends repaired and joints split, corners repaired, extremities rubbed); modern blue cloth slipcase with Kennet arms in gilt. Provenance: Lord Kennet of the Dene (bookplate). PMM 194.

Nursing: £ 62,500. Christie "s. Valuable Books and Manuscripts Including Cartography. 15 July 2015. London, King Street. Item # 177.

FIRST EDITION. THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT OF 18TH-CENTURY ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY, and a work which Hume intended to ‘produce an almost total alteration in philosophy’ (letter to Henry Home, 13 February 1739). It "sums up a century of speculation on knowledge and of theological discussion", and represents' the first attempt to apply Locke "s empirical psychology to build a theory of knowledge, and from it to provide a critique of metaphysical ideas" (PMM) ... The clarity of Hume's writing also makes his Treatise one of the finest examples of 18th-century prose. Brunet III, 376; Jessop p. 13; Lowndes III, 1140; PMM 194; Rothschild 1171.

Hume began his philosophical career in 1739, publishing the first two parts of the Treatise on Human Nature, where he tried to define the basic principles of human knowledge. Hume considers questions about determining the reliability of any knowledge and belief in it. Hume believed that knowledge is based on experience, which consists of perceptions (impressions, that is, human sensations, affects, emotions). Ideas mean faint images of these impressions in thinking and reasoning. A year later, the third part of the treatise came out. The first part was devoted to human cognition. Then he finalized these ideas and published in a separate work "Research on Human Cognition."

Structurally starting the presentation of his philosophy with the theory of knowledge, Hume, in his first major work, "A Treatise on Human Nature" (1739-1740), nevertheless points to the preparatory nature of epistemological constructions in the context of more important, in his opinion, philosophical tasks, and namely - the problems of morality and ethics, as well as social interaction of people in modern society.

According to Hume, the subject of philosophy should be human nature. In one of his major works, A Study of Human Cognition, Hume wrote that "Philosophers should make human nature an object of speculation and study it carefully and accurately in order to discover the principles that govern our knowledge, excite our feelings and make us approve or condemn this or that particular object, deed or course of action." He is convinced that "the science of human nature" is more important than physics, mathematics and other sciences, because all these sciences "depend to varying degrees on human nature." If philosophy could fully explain "the greatness and power of the human mind," then people would be able to achieve tremendous progress in all other areas of knowledge. Hume believed that the subject of philosophical knowledge is human nature. What does this subject include? According to Hume, this is a study, firstly, of the cognitive abilities and capabilities of a person, secondly, the ability to perceive and evaluate beauty (aesthetic problems) and, thirdly, the principles of morality. Thus, Hume's main work is called "A Treatise on Human Nature" and consists of three books:

1. "On knowledge";

2. "About affects";

3. "On morality."

David Hume on cognition

In exploring the process of cognition, Hume adhered to the main thesis of the empiricists that experience is the only source of our knowledge. However, Hume offered his own understanding of the experience. Experience, the philosopher believes, describes only that which directly belongs to consciousness. In other words, experience does not say anything about relationships in the external world, but refers only to the development of perceptions in our consciousness, since, in his opinion, the reasons that give rise to perceptions are unknowable. Thus, Hume excluded the entire external world from experience and connected experience with perceptions. According to Hume, cognition is based precisely on perceptions. He called perception "everything that can be represented by the mind, whether we use our senses, or manifest our thought and reflection." He divides perceptions into two types - impressions and ideas. Impressions are "those perceptions that enter consciousness with the greatest strength." These include "images of external objects communicated to the mind by our senses, as well as affects and emotions." Ideas, on the other hand, are weak and dull perceptions, since they are formed from thinking about some feeling or object that is not present. Also, Hume notes that "all our ideas, or weak perceptions, are deduced from our impressions, or strong perceptions, and that we can never think of any thing that we have never seen or felt in our own mind." ... The next step in the study of the process of cognition by Hume is the analysis of "the principle of combining various thoughts, ideas of our mind." He calls this principle the principle of association.

“If ideas were completely scattered, only chance would connect them, the same simple ideas could not regularly be combined into common ones (as is usually the case), if there was no connecting principle between them, some associating quality, with the help of which one idea naturally evokes another. "

Hume identifies three laws of association of ideas - similarity, contiguity in time or space, and causality. At the same time, he noted that the laws of similarity and proximity are quite definite and can be fixed by feelings. While the law of causality is not perceived by the senses, therefore it must be subjected to a rigorous test by empiricism.

David Hume and the problem of causality

One of the central places in Hume's philosophy belongs to the problem of causality. What is the essence of this problem? Scientific knowledge pursues the goal of explaining the world and everything that exists in it. This explanation is achieved through the study of cause and effect; to explain - this means to know the reasons for the existence of things. Already Aristotle in the "doctrine of four reasons" (material, formal, effective and target) fixed the conditions necessary for the existence of any thing. The belief in the universality of the connection between causes and effects has become one of the foundations of the scientific worldview. Hume was well aware of this, noting that all our reasoning about reality is based on the "idea of ​​causality." Only with the help of it can we go beyond the limits of our memory and feelings. However, Hume believed that "if we want to satisfactorily solve the question of the nature of evidence, which certifies to us the existence of facts, we need to investigate how we go to the knowledge of causes and actions." Let's suppose, wrote Hume, that we came into the world unexpectedly: in this case, based on the fluidity and transparency of water, we cannot conclude that it is possible to drown in it. Therefore, he concludes:

"Not a single object manifests in its qualities accessible to the senses neither the reasons that gave rise to it, nor the actions that it will perform."

The next question that Hume poses is - what lies at the basis of all conclusions about the existence of cause-and-effect relationships between things? Experience with regard to causality testifies only to the connection of phenomena in time (one precedes the other) and their spatio-temporal contiguity, but says nothing and cannot say anything in favor of the actual generation of one phenomenon by another. Cause and effect cannot be found either in a single object or in many simultaneously perceived objects, and therefore we have no "impression of a causal relationship." But if the connection between causes and effects is not perceived by the senses, then, according to Hume, it cannot be proven theoretically. Therefore, the idea of ​​causality has an exclusively subjective and not objective meaning and denotes a habit of the mind. So, the causal relationship, in the understanding of Hume, is just ideas about such objects, which in experience always turn out to be connected together in space and in time. The repeated repetition of their connection is fixed by habit, and all our judgments about cause and effect are based solely on it. And the belief that the same order will continue to be maintained in nature is the only basis for recognizing a causal relationship.

Hume's social views

According to Hume, in the very nature of man lies a gravitation towards social life, loneliness is painful and unbearable.

"People cannot live without society, and they cannot enter into a state of association apart from political rule."

Hume opposed the theory of the "contractual" origin of the state and the doctrine of the natural state of people during their pre-social life. Hume contrasted the doctrine of Hobbes and Locke on the state of nature with the concept according to which elements of a social state, and, above all, a family, are organically inherent in people. In one of the sections of the Treatise on Human Nature, entitled On the Origin of Justice and Property, Hume wrote that the transition to the political organization of human society was caused by the need to form a family, which “can be considered precisely as the first and primary principle of human society. This need is nothing more than a natural mutual desire that unites the different sexes and maintains their union until new bonds appear associated with their relationship to their offspring. The new relationship thus becomes the principle of communication between parents and offspring and form a larger society in which parents rule, relying on their superiority in strength and intelligence, but at the same time restrain themselves from exercising their authority by the natural affect of parental care. So, from the point of view of Hume, parental, kinship relations between people lead to the emergence of social ties.

David Hume on the origin of the state

Hume linked the origin of the state, first, with the need to defend or attack in an organized manner in conditions of military clashes with other societies. Secondly, with the awareness of the benefits of having stronger and more orderly social ties. Hume offers this understanding of social development. At its first stage, a family-social state is formed, in which certain moral norms operate, but there are no coercive organs, there is no state. Its second stage is the state of society. It arises as a result of the "increase in wealth and possessions", which caused clashes and wars with neighbors, which in turn gave military leaders a particularly important role and importance. Government power arises from the institution of military leaders and from the very beginning takes on monarchical features. Government, according to Hume, appears as an instrument of social justice, an organ of order and civil discipline. It guarantees the inviolability of property, the orderly transfer of it on the basis of mutual consent and the fulfillment of its obligations. Hume considered the best form of government to be a constitutional monarchy. Under an absolute monarchy, he argues, tyranny and impoverishment of the nation are inevitable, and the republic leads to constant instability of society. The combination of hereditary royal power with narrow prerogatives and bourgeois-noble representation is, in Hume's views, the best form of political governance, which he defines as the middle between the extremes (monarchy and republic) and as a combination of despotism and liberalism, but with a "predominance of liberalism."

Specificity of Hume's empiricism. The meaning of his philosophy

Hume in his philosophy showed that knowledge based on experience remains only probabilistic and can never claim to be necessary and universally valid. Empirical knowledge is true only within the boundaries of previous experience, and there is no guarantee that future experience will not refute it. Any knowledge, according to Hume, can only be probabilistic, but not reliable, and the appearance of its objectivity and necessity is a consequence of habit and belief in the immutability of experience.

“It is necessary to confess, - wrote Hume, - that nature keeps us at a respectful distance from its secrets and provides us with only knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects, hiding from us those forces and principles on which the actions of these objects entirely depend. "

The general result of Hume's philosophy can be defined as skepticism regarding the possibility of objective knowledge of the world, the disclosure of its laws. Hume's philosophy had a great influence on the further development of European philosophy. The eminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant took many of Hume's conclusions seriously. For example, that we receive all the material of knowledge from experience and that the methods of empirical knowledge are not able to ensure its objectivity and necessity, and thereby substantiate the possibility of theoretical sciences and philosophy. Kant set himself the goal of answering the questions: why does science exist at all? how can she produce such powerful and effective knowledge? how is universal and necessary knowledge possible? On Hume's skepticism, Auguste Comte's ideas about the tasks of science, which are associated only with the description of phenomena, and not their explanation, as well as a number of other positivist conclusions, were based. On the other hand, the further development of science and philosophy confirmed Hume's fears regarding the absolutization of any philosophical conclusions. And, if we go beyond the absolutizations of Hume himself, then it is clear how important reasonable skepticism and reasonable doubt are for the attainment of truth.

David Hume is a renowned Scottish philosopher who represented empiricist and agnocyst movements during the Enlightenment. He was born on April 26, 1711 in Scotland (Edinburgh). My father was a lawyer and owned a small estate. David received a good education at a local university, worked in diplomatic missions, wrote many philosophical treatises.

Main work

The Treatise on Human Nature is today considered Hume's main work. It consists of three sections (books) - "On Cognition", "On Affects", "On Morality". The book was written during the period when Hume was living in France (1734-1737). In 1739, the first two volumes were published, the last book saw the world a year later, in 1740. At that time, Hume was still very young, he was not even thirty years old, moreover, he was not well-known in scientific circles, and the conclusions that he made in the book "A Treatise on Human Nature" all existing schools should have been considered unacceptable. Therefore, David prepared in advance arguments in defense of his position and began to expect fierce attacks from the scientific community of that time. But it all ended unpredictably - no one noticed his work.

The author of the "Treatise on Human Nature" then said that he came out of print "stillborn." In his book, Hume proposed to systematize (or, as he put it, to anatomize) human nature and draw conclusions based on the data that are justified by experience.

His philosophy

Historians of philosophy say that David Hume's ideas are radical skepticism, although the ideas of naturalism still play an important role in his teaching.

The development and formation of Hume's philosophical thought was greatly influenced by the works of the empiricists J. Berkeley and J. Locke, as well as the ideas of P. Bayle, I. Newton, S. Clark, F. Hutcheson and J. Butler. In A Treatise on Human Nature, Hume writes that human knowledge is not something innate, but depends solely on experience. Therefore, a person is unable to identify the source of his experience and go beyond it. Experience is always limited to the past and consists of perceptions, which can be roughly divided into ideas and impressions.

Human Science

The "Treatise on Human Nature" is based on philosophical thoughts about man. And since other sciences of that time relied on philosophy, this concept is of fundamental importance for them. In the book, David Hume writes that all sciences are somehow related to man and his nature. Even mathematics depends on the human sciences, because it is the subject of human knowledge.

Hume's doctrine of man is interesting in its structure. "A treatise on human nature" begins with a theoretical and cognitive section. If the science of man is based on experience and observation, then first you need to turn to a detailed study of knowledge. Try to explain, and knowledge, gradually moving to affects and only then to moral aspects.

If we assume that the theory of knowledge is the basis of the concept of human nature, then thinking about morality is its goal and end result.

Human signs

In A Treatise on Human Nature, David Hume describes the main features of human nature:

1. Man is who finds food in science.
2. Man is not only intelligent, but also a social being.
3. Among other things, man is an active being. Due to this inclination, as well as under the influence of various kinds of needs, he must do something and do something.

Summarizing these criteria, Hume says that nature has provided people with a mixed lifestyle that suits them best. Also, nature warns a person not to be very keen on any one inclination, otherwise he will lose the ability to engage in other activities and entertainment. For example, if you read only scientific literature, with complex terminology, then the individual will eventually cease to enjoy reading other printed publications. They will seem unbearably stupid to him.

Retelling the author

To understand the main ideas of the author, you need to refer to the abbreviated presentation of the "Treatise on Human Nature". It begins with a preface, where the philosopher writes that he would like to make understanding of his conjectures easier for readers. He also shares his unfulfilled hopes. The philosopher believed that his work would be original and new, so he simply could not be ignored. But apparently, humanity still needed to grow up to his thoughts.

Hume begins his Treatise on Human Nature with a historical bias. He writes that the bulk of ancient philosophers looked at human nature through the prism of the refinement of sensuality. They focused on morality and the greatness of the soul, leaving aside the depth of thought and prudence. They did not develop chains of reasoning or transform individual truths into a systematic science. But it is worth finding out whether the science of man can have a high degree of accuracy.

Hume despises any hypothesis if it cannot be confirmed in practice. Human nature needs to be investigated only through practical experience. The sole purpose of logic should be to explain the principles and operations of the human ability to reason and know.

About cognition

In A Treatise on Human Nature, D. Hume devotes an entire book to the study of the process of cognition. In short, cognition is a real experience that gives a person real practical knowledge. However, here the philosopher offers his understanding of experience. He believes that experience can only describe what belongs to consciousness. Simply put, experience does not provide any information about the external world, but only helps to master the perception of human consciousness. D. Hume in his "Treatise on Human Nature" more than once notes that it is impossible to study the reasons that give rise to perception. Thus, Hume excluded from experience everything that concerned the external world and made it a part of perception.

Hume was convinced that knowledge exists only through perception. In turn, he referred to this concept everything that the mind can imagine, sense the senses or manifest itself in thought and reflection. Perceptions can come in two forms - ideas or impressions.

The philosopher calls impressions those perceptions that most of all cut into consciousness. He refers to them affects, emotions and outlines of physical objects. Ideas are weak perceptions, as they appear when a person begins to think about something. All ideas come from impressions, and a person is not able to think about what he did not see, did not feel and did not know before.

Further in "A Treatise on Human Nature" David Hume tries to analyze the principle of combining human thoughts and ideas. He named this process "the principle of association". If there was nothing that would connect ideas, then they could never be embodied in something large and common. An association is a process in which one idea evokes another.

Causal relationships

In a short summary of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, one should also consider the problem of causality, to which the philosopher assigns a central role. If scientific knowledge pursues the goal of understanding the world and everything that exists in it, then this can only be explained by examining cause-and-effect relationships. That is, you need to know the reasons due to which things exist. Even Aristotle in his work "The Doctrine of Four Causes" recorded the conditions necessary for the existence of objects. One of the foundations of the emergence of a scientific worldview was the belief in the universality of the connection between causes and effects. It was believed that thanks to this connection, a person can go beyond the limits of his memory and feelings.

But the philosopher did not think so. In A Treatise on Human Nature, David Hume writes that in order to explore the nature of an apparent relationship, you first need to understand how a person comes to understand causes and actions. Every thing that exists in the physical world, by itself, cannot manifest either the reasons that it was created, or the effects that it will bring.

Human experience makes it possible to understand how one phenomenon precedes another, but does not say whether they generate each other or not. In a single object, it is impossible to determine the cause and effect. Their connection is not subject to perception, therefore it is impossible to prove it theoretically. Thus, causality is a subjective constant. That is, in Hume's treatise on human nature, causality is nothing more than an idea of ​​objects that, in practice, turn out to be interconnected at the same time and in one place. If the connection is repeated many times, then its perception is fixed by the habit on which all human judgments are based. And the causal relationship is nothing more than the belief that this state of affairs will continue to persist in nature.

Striving for the social

David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature does not exclude the influence of social relationships on a person. The philosopher believes that in human nature itself lies the desire for social, interpersonal relationships, and loneliness seems to people to be something painful and unbearable. Hume writes that man is incapable of living without society.

He refutes the theory of the creation of a "contractual" state and all the teachings about the natural human condition in the pre-social period of life. Hume ignores the ideas of Hobbes and Locke about the natural state without a twinge of conscience, saying that elements of the social state are organically inherent in people. First of all, the desire to create a family.

The philosopher writes that the transition to the political structure of society was associated precisely with the need to create a family. This innate need should be considered as the basic principle of the formation of society. The emergence of social ties is greatly influenced by family, parental relationships between people.

The emergence of the state

D. Hume and his "Treatise on Human Nature" give an open answer to the question of how the state came into being. First, people had a need to defend themselves or attack in the face of aggressive clashes with other communities. Second, strong and orderly social bonds were found to be more beneficial than solitary existence.

According to Hume, social development proceeds as follows. First, family and social relations are laid, where there are certain norms of morality and rules of behavior, but there are no bodies forcing the performance of certain duties. At the second stage, a public-state state appears, which arises from an increase in livelihoods and territories. Wealth and possessions become the cause of conflicts with stronger neighbors who want to increase their resources. This, in turn, shows how important military leaders are.

The government emerges precisely from the formation of military leaders and acquires the features of a monarchy. Hume is convinced that government is an instrument of social justice, the main organ of order and social discipline. Only it can guarantee the inviolability of property and the fulfillment by a person of the obligation imposed on him.

According to Hume, the best form of government is a constitutional monarchy. He is sure that if an absolute monarchy is formed, it will certainly lead to tyranny and impoverishment of the nation. Under the republic, society will constantly be in an unstable state and will not have confidence in the future. The best form of political government is to combine hereditary royalty with representatives of the bourgeoisie and nobility.

The value of work

So what is a Treatise on Human Nature? These are reflections on knowledge that can be refuted, skeptical assumptions that a person is not able to reveal the laws of the universe and the basis on which the ideas of philosophy were formed in the future.

David Hume was able to show that knowledge gained from experience cannot be universally valid. It is true only within the framework of previous experience and no one guarantees that future experience will confirm it. Any knowledge is possible, but it is difficult to consider it 100% reliable. Its necessity and objectivity is determined only by habit and the belief that future experience will not change.

As regrettable as it is to admit it, nature keeps a person at a respectful distance from its secrets and makes it possible to learn only the superficial qualities of objects, and not the principles on which their actions depend. The author is very skeptical that a person is able to fully cognize the world around him.

And yet the philosophy of D. Hume had a great influence on the further development of philosophical thought. Immanuel Kant took seriously the statement that a person receives knowledge from his experience and empirical methods of knowledge cannot guarantee their reliability, objectivity and necessity.

Hume's skepticism found a response in the works of Auguste Comte, who believed that the main task of science is to describe phenomena, and not to explain them. Simply put, in order to know the truth, you need to have reasonable doubt and a little skepticism. Do not take any statement at face value, but test and double-check it in different conditions of human experience. This is the only way to understand how this world works, although this method of cognition will take years, if not an eternity.

David (David) Hume (May 7 (April 26, old style), 1711 Edinburgh - August 25, 1776, ibid.) - Scottish philosopher, representative of empiricism and agnosticism, predecessor of the second positivism (empirio-criticism, Machism), economist and historian, publicist, one of the greatest figures of the Scottish Enlightenment.

David Hume was born in 1711 into the family of a poor nobleman who practiced law and the owner of a small estate. Hume attended the University of Edinburgh, where he received a good legal education. He worked in the diplomatic missions of England in Europe. Already in his youth, he showed a special interest in philosophy and literature. After visiting Bristol for a commercial purpose, feeling a failure, he went to France in 1734.

Hume began his philosophical career in 1738, publishing the first two parts of the Treatise on Human Nature, where he tried to define the basic principles of human knowledge.

A year later, the third part of the treatise came out. The first part was devoted to human cognition. Then he finalized these ideas and published in a separate work "Research on Human Cognition."

In 1763, after the end of the war between England and France, Hume, as secretary of the British Embassy at the Court of Versailles, was invited to the capital of France, where he was recognized for his work on the history of England. Hume's criticism of religious fanatics was approved by Voltaire and Helvetius. However, praise from other philosophers was due to their intense correspondence with Hume, for their interests and views converged in many ways. A special impression on Helvetius, Turgot and other enlighteners was made by "The Natural History of Religion", published in 1757 in the collection "Four Theses".

In 1769, Hume created the Philosophical Society in Edinburgh, where he acted as secretary. This circle included: Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, Alexander Monroe, William Cullen, Joseph Black, Hugh Blair and others.

Shortly before his death, Hume wrote his Autobiography. In it, he described himself as a meek, open, sociable and cheerful person who had a weakness for literary fame, which, however, "never hardened my character, despite all the frequent setbacks."

Hume died in August 1776 at the age of 65.

Books (3)

Research on Human Understanding

But, seeing the failure of the named work, the author realized his mistake, which consisted in a premature publication in print, reworked everything anew in the following works, where, he hopes, some negligence in his previous reasoning or, rather, expressions were corrected.

However, some writers who honored the author's philosophy by analysis tried to direct the fire of all their batteries against this youthful work, which was never recognized by the author, and made a claim to the victory, which, as they imagined, they managed to win over him.

This is a mode of action that is very contrary to all the rules of frankness and straightforwardness in actions and is a striking example of the polemical contrivances that fanatics consider themselves entitled to resort to in their zeal. From now on, the author wishes that only the following works should be considered as a statement of his philosophical views and principles.

Works in two volumes. Volume 1

The first volume contains Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature, or an Attempt to Apply an Experiential Method of Reasoning to Moral Subjects, and is supplemented by the first Russian translation of A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh.

The volume is equipped with a scientific apparatus, including a new introductory article by A.F. Gryaznova.

Works in two volumes. Volume 2

Most of the principles and reasoning contained in this volume were made public in a three-volume work entitled A Treatise on Human Nature, a work conceived by the author before leaving college and written and published shortly thereafter.

But, seeing the failure of this work, the author realized his mistake, which consisted in a premature appearance in print, reworked everything anew in the following works, where, he hopes, some negligence in his previous reasoning, or rather, expressions, have been corrected.

However, some writers who honored the author's philosophy by analysis tried to direct the fire of all their batteries against this youthful work, which was never recognized by the author, and made a claim to the victory, which, as they imagined, they managed to win over him. This is a mode of action that is very contrary to all the rules of frankness and straightforwardness in actions and is a striking example of the polemical tricks to which the zeal of fanatics considers themselves entitled to resort. From now on, the author wishes that only the following works should be considered as a statement of his philosophical views and principles.

FOREWORD

<...>The work, an abbreviated presentation of which I present here to the reader, has evoked criticism as dark and difficult to understand, and I am inclined to think that this happened both because of the lengths and because of the abstractness of the reasoning. If I have corrected this deficiency to some extent, then I have achieved my goal. It seemed to me that this book has such originality and novelty that it can claim the attention of the public, especially when you consider that, as the author seems to be hinting, if his philosophy were accepted, we would have to change the foundations of most of the sciences. Such bold attempts always benefit the literary world, for they shake the yoke of authority, teach people to think about themselves, throw new hints that gifted people can develop, and by the very opposition [of views] shed light on points in which no one had previously did not suspect any difficulties.<...>

I have chosen one simple reasoning, which I carefully trace from start to finish. This is the only way I care to finish [the presentation]. The rest are just hints at certain passages [of the book], which seemed interesting and significant to me.

ABBREVIATED STATEMENT

This book appears to have been written with the same intentions as many other works that have gained such popularity in England in recent years. The philosophical spirit, which has perfected so much over the past eighty years throughout all of Europe, has become as widespread in our kingdom as in other countries. Our writers seem to have even begun a new type of philosophy that promises more, both for the benefit and for the amusement of humanity, than any other philosophy with which the world was previously familiar. Most of the philosophers of antiquity, who considered human nature, showed more sophistication of feelings, a genuine sense of morality or greatness of the soul than the depth of judgment and reflection. They limited themselves to providing excellent examples of human common sense along with an excellent form of thought and expression, without consistently developing chains of reasoning and not transforming individual truths into a single systematic science. Meanwhile, at the very least, it is worth finding out if the science of man to achieve the same precision that is found to be possible in some parts of natural philosophy. There seems to be every reason to believe that this science can be brought to the greatest degree of accuracy. If, by examining several phenomena, we find that they can be reduced to one general principle, and this principle can be reduced to another, we eventually arrive at several simple principles on which everything else depends. Although we will never reach the ultimate principles, we get the satisfaction of making progress as far as our ability allows us.

This, it seems, is the goal of the philosophers of modern times, and among the rest - and the author of this work. He proposes to systematically anatomize human nature and promises not to draw any conclusions other than those that are justified by experience. He speaks with insight about hypotheses and inspires us with the idea that those of our compatriots who expelled them from moral philosophy did the world a more significant service than Lord Bacon, whom our author considers the father of experimental physics. He points in this connection to Mr. Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchison, Dr. Butler, who, although very different from each other, seem to all agree that base their precise studies of human nature entirely on experience.

[In the study of man] it is not a matter of the satisfaction of knowing what is most closely related to us; it is safe to say that almost all sciences are covered by the science of human nature and depend on it. The only goal logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning ability and the nature of our ideas; morality and criticism touch our tastes and feelings, and politics views people as united in society and dependent on each other. Therefore, this treatise on human nature, apparently, should create a system of sciences. The author has completed what concerns logic, and in his consideration of the passions laid the foundations of other parts [of systematic knowledge].

The famous Mr. Leibniz saw the drawback of conventional systems of logic in the fact that they are very lengthy when they explain the actions of reason in obtaining evidence, but too laconic when they consider probabilities and those other measures of evidence, on which our life and activity entirely depend and which are our guiding principles even in most of our philosophical speculations. He extends this censure to The Experience of the Human Mind. The author of the "Treatise on Human Nature", apparently, felt such a deficiency among these philosophers and sought, as far as he could, to correct it.

Since the book contains a huge amount of new and noteworthy reflections, it is impossible to give the reader a proper understanding of the entire book as a whole. Therefore, we will confine ourselves primarily to considering the analysis of people's reasoning about cause and action. If we can make this analysis understandable to the reader, then it can serve as a model for the whole.

Our author starts with some definitions. He calls perception everything that can be represented by the mind, whether we use our senses, or are inspired by passion, or manifest our thought and reflection. He divides our perceptions into two kinds, namely impressions and ideas. When we experience an affect or emotion of some kind, or have images of external objects communicated by our senses, then the perception of the mind is what it calls impression- the word that he uses in a new meaning. When we think about some affect or object that is not available, then this perception is idea. Impressions, therefore they represent vivid and powerful perceptions. Ideas the same - dimmer and weaker. The difference is obvious. It is as obvious as the difference between feeling and thinking.

The first statement that the author makes is that all our ideas, or weak perceptions, are derived from our impressions, or strong perceptions, and that we can never think about any thing that we have never seen or felt before. in our own mind. This position seems to be identical with that which Mr. no innate ideas. The inaccuracy of this famous philosopher can only be seen in the fact that he is the term idea encompasses all of our perceptions. In this sense, it is not true that we do not have innate ideas, for it is obvious that our stronger perceptions, i.e. impressions are innate and that natural attachments, love of virtue, resentment and all other passions arise directly from nature. I am convinced that whoever views this issue in this light will easily reconcile all parties. Father Malebranche would find it difficult to indicate any thought in his mind that would not be the image of something previously perceived by him, either internally, or through external feelings, and would have to admit that, no matter how we combine, combine, strengthen or weakened our ideas, they all come from the sources indicated. Mr. Locke, on the other hand, would easily admit that all our affects are a kind of natural instinct, derived from nothing more than the original make-up of the human spirit.

Our author believes that “no discovery could be more favorable for resolving all disputes about ideas than that impressions always take precedence over the latter, and that every idea that imagines first appears in the form of a corresponding impression. These later perceptions are so clear and obvious that they do not allow for any controversy, although many of our ideas are so dark that it is almost impossible to accurately characterize their nature and composition, even for the mind that forms them. Accordingly, whenever an idea is unclear, he reduces it to an impression that should make it clear and accurate. And when he believes that any philosophical term has no idea associated with it (which is all too common), he always asks: from what impression is this idea derived? And if no impression can be found, he concludes that the term is completely devoid of meaning. In this way he explores our ideas. substances and essences, and it would be desirable that this rigorous method be practiced more frequently in all philosophical controversies.

Obviously, all reasoning regarding facts based on the relationship of cause and effect and that we can never deduce the existence of one object from another, if they are not interrelated, indirectly or directly. Therefore, to understand the above reasoning, we must be perfectly familiar with the idea of ​​cause; and for this we must look around in order to find something that is the cause of the other.

There is a billiard ball on the table, and another ball is moving towards it at a known speed. They hit each other, and the ball, which was previously at rest, now acquires movement. This is the most perfect example of the relationship of cause and effect that we only know from feeling or from thinking. Let us therefore examine it. Obviously, before the movement was transmitted, the two balls touched each other and that there was no time gap between the impact and the movement. Spatio-temporal adjacency is, therefore, a necessary condition for the action of all causes. Likewise, it is evident that the movement that was the cause is primary in relation to the movement that was the effect. Primacy in time there is, therefore, a second necessary condition for the action of each cause. But that's not all. If we take any other balls in a similar situation, we will always find that the push of one causes movement in the other. Hence, here we have third condition, namely persistent connection causes and actions. Every object like a cause always produces some object like an action. Apart from these three conditions of contiguity, primacy and permanent connection, I cannot discover anything in this reason. The first ball is in motion; he touches the second; the second ball starts to move directly; By repeating the experiment with the same or similar balls under the same or similar circumstances, I find that the movement and contact of one ball is always followed by the movement of the other. Whatever form I give to this question and however I investigate it, I can find nothing great.

This is the case when both cause and effect are given to sensations. Let us now see what our conclusion is based on when we deduce from the presence of one that the other exists or will exist. Suppose I see a ball moving in a straight line towards another; I immediately conclude that they will collide and that the second ball will move. This is inference from cause to action. And this is the nature of all our reasoning in everyday practice. All our knowledge in history is based on this. All philosophy is derived from this, with the exception of geometry and arithmetic. If we can explain how the inference is obtained from the collision of two balls, we will be able to explain this operation of the mind in all cases.

Let some person, such as Adam, created to have the full power of reason, have no experience. Then he will never be able to take the movement of the second ball out of the movement and thrust of the first. Deduce the effect compels us not to any thing that the mind sees in the cause. Such a conclusion, if it were possible, would be tantamount to deductive proof, for it is entirely based on the comparison of ideas. But inference from cause to action is not tantamount to proof, as is evident from the following obvious reasoning. The mind can always introduce, that any action follows from some cause, and even that some arbitrary event follows some other. Whatever we are imagined perhaps at least in a metaphysical sense; but whenever deductive proof takes place, the opposite is impossible and entails a contradiction. Hence, there is no deductive proof of any combination of cause and effect. And this is a principle that philosophers recognize everywhere.

Therefore, for Adam (if he was not inspired from the outside) it would be necessary to have experience, indicating that the action follows the collision of the two balls. He must observe from several examples that when one ball collides with another, the second always acquires motion. If he observed a sufficient number of examples of this kind, then whenever he saw one ball moving towards another, he would conclude without hesitation that the second would acquire motion. His mind would anticipate his gaze and carry out an inference consistent with his past experience.

It follows that all reasoning about cause and effect is based on experience and that all reasoning from experience is based on the assumption that the same order will invariably be maintained in nature. We conclude that similar causes under similar circumstances will always produce similar actions. Now it might be worth considering what motivates us to form inferences with such an infinite number of consequences.

Obviously, Adam, with all his knowledge, would never have been able to prove, that the same order must always be maintained in nature; and that the future must correspond to the past. You can never prove that the possible is false. Or it is possible that the order of nature can change, for we are able to imagine such a change.

Moreover, I will go further and argue that Adam could not prove even with the help of any probable inferences that the future must correspond to the past. All plausible inferences are based on the assumption that there is a correspondence between the future and the past, and therefore no one can ever prove that such a correspondence exists. This correspondence is a question of fact; and if it were to be proved, it would not admit of any evidence other than that gleaned from experience. But our past experience cannot prove anything about the future, unless we assume that there is a similarity between the past and the future. It is, therefore, a point that cannot admit of proof at all and which we take for granted without any proof.

To assume that the future corresponds to the past motivates us only habit. When I see a billiard ball moving towards another, the habit immediately draws my mind to the usual action and anticipates what I will see next, [making me] imagine the second ball in motion. There is nothing in these objects, abstractly considered and independent of experience, that would compel me to make such an inference. And even after I have experienced many repetitive actions of this kind in the [process of] experience, there is no argument compelling me to assume that the action will correspond to the past experience. The forces that act on bodies are completely unknown. We perceive only the properties of those forces that are accessible to sensations. And on what the basis should we think that the same forces will always be combined with the same perceived qualities?

Therefore, the guide in life is not reason, but habit. It alone compels the mind in all cases to assume that the future corresponds to the past. As easy as this step may seem, the mind would never have been able to complete it for all eternity.

This is a very curious discovery, but it leads us to others who are even more curious. When I see a billiard ball moving towards another, habit immediately drives my mind to normal action, and my mind anticipates what I will see by imagining the second ball in motion. But is that all? Am I only I imagine what will it move? What then is this faith? And how does it differ from a simple representation of any thing? Here is a new question that philosophers have not pondered.

Whenever some deductive proof convinces me of the truth of a statement, it makes me not only present the statement, but also feel that it is incredible to present the opposite. What is false by deductive proof contains a contradiction, and what contains a contradiction cannot be imagined. But when it comes to anything factual, no matter how strong the evidence from experience, I can always imagine the opposite, although I can not always believe it. Faith, therefore, makes some distinction between a view with which we agree and a view with which we disagree.

There are only two hypotheses trying to explain this. We can say that faith connects some new idea with those that we can imagine, not agreeing with them. But this is a false hypothesis. For, Firstly, you cannot get such an idea. When we just imagine an object, we imagine it in all its parts. We represent him as he could exist, although we do not believe that he exists. Our faith in him would not reveal any new qualities. We can draw an entire object in our imagination without believing in its existence. We can place it in a certain sense before our eyes with all its space-time circumstances. At the same time, the same object appears to us as it could exist, and, believing that it exists, we do not add anything more.

Secondly, the mind has the ability to connect all ideas between which there is no contradiction, and therefore if faith lies in some idea that we add to a simple idea, then it is in the power of a person, adding this idea to him, to believe in any thing that we can imagine.

Since, therefore, faith presupposes the presence of a representation and, besides, something more, and since it does not add a new idea to the representation, it follows that it is different. way object representation, something like that which differs in feeling and does not depend on our will in the same way as all our ideas depend. Out of habit, my mind shifts from the visible image of one ball moving towards another, to an ordinary action, i.e. the movement of the second ball. He not only imagines this movement, but feels that there is something different from the mere dreams of the imagination in his vision. The presence of such a visible object and the constant connection with it of a given concrete action makes the said idea for the senses different from those vague ideas that come to mind without anything prior. This conclusion seems somewhat surprising, but we got to it through a chain of statements that are beyond doubt. In order not to force the reader to strain his memory, I will briefly reproduce them. Nothing actually given can be proven otherwise than from its cause or from its action. Nothing can become known as the cause of another except through experience. We cannot justify the extension to the future of our experience in the past, but we are entirely guided by habit when we imagine that a certain action follows from its usual cause. But we not only imagine that this action will come, but we are sure of it. This belief does not add a new idea to the performance. It only changes the way of presentation and leads to a difference in experience or feeling. Consequently, belief in all factual data arises only from habit and is an idea comprehended by a specific way.

Our author is going to explain the way, or feeling, that makes faith different from vague notion. He seems to feel that it is impossible to describe in words this feeling that everyone should experience in their own chest. He calls him sometimes more strong, and sometimes more alive, bright, stable or intense representation. Indeed, whatever name we give to this feeling that constitutes faith, our author considers it obvious that it has a stronger effect on the mind than fiction or mere notion. He proves this by his influence on passions and imaginations, which are set in motion only by truth or by what is considered to be such.

Poetry, for all its artfulness, can never evoke a passion like passion in real life. Its insufficiency in the initial representations of its objects, which we can never feel just like the objects that dominate our faith and opinion.

Our author, believing that he has sufficiently proved that the ideas with which we agree must differ in their accompanying feeling from other ideas and that this feeling is more stable and vivid than our usual ideas, tries to further explain the reason for such a vivid feeling by analogy with other actions of the mind. His reasoning seems curious, but it can hardly be made intelligible, or at least plausible to the reader, without going into details that would go beyond the limits I have set for myself.

I have also omitted many of the arguments the author adds to argue that faith is only about a specific feeling or experience. I will only point out one: our past experiences are not always uniform. Sometimes the cause leads to one action, sometimes another. In this case, we always believe that the most frequent action will appear. I look at a billiard ball moving towards the other. I cannot distinguish whether it is moving, rotating on its axis, or whether it was sent so that it slides on the table. I know that in the first case, after the impact, it will not stop. In the second, he can stop. The first is the most common, and therefore I expect this action. But I also imagine the second action and imagine it as possible in relation to the given cause. If one idea did not differ in experience or feeling from another, then there would be no difference between them.

We have confined ourselves in all this reasoning to the relation of cause and action in the form as it is found in the movements and actions of matter. But the same reasoning applies to the actions of the spirit. Whether we consider the influence of the will on the movement of our body or on the control of our thought, it is safe to say that we could never foresee an action from only considering the cause, without referring to experience. And even after we have perceived these actions, it is only habit, not reason, that prompts us to make this a model for our future judgments. When a cause is given, the mind, through habit, immediately shifts to the idea of ​​ordinary action and the belief that it will come. This faith is something different from the given representation. However, she does not add any new idea to it. It only makes us feel differently and makes him more alive and strong.

Having coped with this important point regarding the nature of inference from cause and effect, our author returns to its basis and re-examines the nature of this relationship. Considering the movement transmitted from one sphere to another, we could find nothing but contiguity, primacy of cause and permanent connection. But it is usually assumed that, in addition to these circumstances, there is a necessary connection between cause and effect, and that the cause has something that we call strength, power or energy. The question is what ideas are associated with these terms. If all our ideas or thoughts are derived from our impressions, this power must be revealed either in our sensations or in our inner feeling. But in the actions of matter, so little is revealed to the senses. power, that the Cartesians did not hesitate to assert that matter is completely devoid of energy and all its actions are performed only thanks to the energy of a higher being. But then another question arises: what is this idea of ​​energy or power that we possess even in relation to a higher being? All our ideas about deity (according to those who deny innate ideas) are nothing more than a combination of ideas that we acquire through reflection on the actions of our own mind. But our own mind does not give us an idea of ​​energy any more than matter does. When we consider our own will or a priori desire, distracting ourselves from experience, we are never able to deduce any action from them. And when we resort to the help of experience, it only shows us objects that are adjacent, follow each other and are constantly connected to each other. In general, either we do not possess the idea of ​​force and energy at all, and these words do not matter at all, or they cannot mean anything other than the compulsion of thought through habit to the transition from a cause to its usual action. But anyone who wants to fully understand these thoughts should turn to the author himself. It will be enough if I can make the scientific world understand that in this case there is a certain difficulty and that everyone who struggles with this difficulty must say something unusual and new, as new as the difficulty itself.

From all that has been said, the reader will easily understand that the philosophy contained in this book is very skeptical and seeks to give us an idea of ​​the imperfections and narrow limits of human knowledge. Almost all reasoning boils down to experience, and the belief that accompanies experience is explained only through a specific feeling or vivid idea generated by habit. But that's not all. When we believe in external existence of a thing or suppose that an object exists after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a feeling of the same kind. Our author insists on several other skeptical theses and generally concludes that we agree with what our abilities give and use our reason only because we cannot do otherwise. Philosophy would make us entirely supporters of Pyrrhonism, if nature were not too strong to admit it.

I will conclude my consideration of the reasoning of this author by setting out two opinions, which, apparently, are characteristic of him alone, as, in fact, are most of his opinions. He argues that the soul, insofar as we can comprehend it, is nothing but a system or a series of different perceptions, such as warmth and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; moreover, they are all connected, but devoid of any perfect simplicity or identity. Descartes argued that thought is the essence of spirit. He did not mean this or that thought, but thinking in general. This seems completely incomprehensible, since every thing that exists is concrete and singular, and, therefore, there must be different singular perceptions that make up the spirit. I say: constituents spirit but not owned by him. Spirit is not a substance in which perceptions reside. This concept is as incomprehensible as cartesian the concept according to which thought, or perception, in general is the essence of spirit. We have no idea of ​​a substance of any kind, since we have no ideas other than those derived from some impression, while we have no impression of any substance, material or spiritual. We do not know anything except certain particular qualities and perceptions. Just as our idea of ​​a body, for example a peach, is only the idea of ​​a certain taste, color, shape, size, density, etc., so our idea of ​​a mind is only an idea that is formed from certain perceptions without representation about anything that we call a substance, simple or complex. The second principle that I intend to dwell on relates to geometry. Denying the infinite divisibility of extension, our author is forced to reject the mathematical arguments that were presented in its favor. And they, in fact, are the only reasonably weighty arguments. He does this by denying that geometry is a sufficiently precise science to allow himself to draw conclusions as subtle as those concerning infinite divisibility. His reasoning can be explained in this way. All geometry is based on the concepts of equality and inequality, and, therefore, according to whether or not we have an exact measure of these relations, science itself will or will not allow significant accuracy. But an exact measure of equality exists if we assume that quantity consists of indivisible points. Two lines are equal when the numbers of points composing them are equal and when there is a point on one line corresponding to a point on the other. But although this measure is accurate, it is useless, since we can never calculate the number of points in any line. Moreover, it is based on the assumption of infinite divisibility and, therefore, can never lead to a conclusion directed against this assumption. If we reject the indicated measure of equality, we do not possess any measure that would have a claim to accuracy.

I find two yardsticks that are commonly used. Two lines larger than a yard, for example, are said to be equal when they contain any quantity of the lowest order, such as an inch, an equal number of times. But this results in a circle, since the amount we call inch in one case is assumed equal what we call an inch is in another. And then the question arises as to what yardstick we use when we judge them as equals, or, in other words, what do we mean when we say that they are equal. If we take quantities of a lower order, then we leave in infinitum. Therefore, this is not a measure of equality.

Most philosophers, when asked what they mean by equality, say that the word does not admit definition and that it is enough to place two equal bodies in front of us, such as two circles of equal diameter, to make us understand this term. Thus, as a measure of the indicated ratio, we take general form objects, and our imagination and our senses become its final judges. But such a yardstick does not admit of precision and can never deliver any conclusion contrary to imagination and feeling. Whether or not such a formulation of the question has a basis should be left to the judgment of the scientific world. Undoubtedly it would be desirable that some ruse be applied to reconcile philosophy and common sense, which, in connection with the question of infinite divisibility, waged the most brutal war against each other. We must now turn to an evaluation of the second volume of this work, which deals with affects. It is easier to understand than the first, but it contains views that are also completely new and distinctive. The author begins by considering pride and humiliation. He notes that the objects that arouse these feelings are very numerous and very different from each other in appearance. Pride, or self-esteem, can arise from qualities of the spirit, such as wit, common sense, learning, courage, honesty, or from qualities of the body, such as beauty, strength, agility, agility in dancing, riding, swordsmanship, and also by external advantages such as [home] country, family, children, kinship, wealth, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, dress. Then the author proceeds to find that general circumstance in which all these objects converge and which makes them act on affects. His theory also extends to love, hate, and other feelings. Since these questions, while curious, cannot be made intelligible without much deliberation, we will omit them here.

It may be more desirable for the reader that we inform him about what our author says about free will. He formulated the foundations of his doctrine by speaking about cause and effect as explained above. "The fact that the actions of external bodies have the necessary character and that when their movement is transferred to other bodies in their attraction and mutual cohesion, there is not the slightest trace of indifference, or freedom, has received universal recognition." “Therefore, everything that is in the same position with matter must be recognized as necessary. In order for us to know whether this is also true in relation to the actions of the mind, we can examine matter and consider what the idea of ​​the necessity of its actions is based on and why we conclude that one body or action is the inevitable cause of another.

“It has already been found that in no single example is the necessary connection of any object revealed by our senses or reason, and that we are never able to penetrate so deeply into the essence and structure of bodies as to perceive the principle on which their mutual influence. We are only familiar with their permanent connection. From this constant connection, a necessity arises, due to which the spirit is forced to pass from one object to another, usually accompanying it, and to deduce the existence of one from the existence of another. Here, therefore, there are two features that should be considered as essential for need, namely the permanent connection and outlet connection(inference) in the mind, and whenever we find it, we must admit that there is a need. " However, there is nothing more obvious than the constant combination of certain actions with certain motives. And if not all actions are constantly connected with their true motives, then this uncertainty is no more than that which can be observed on a daily basis in the actions of matter, where, due to confusion and uncertainty of reasons, the action is often changeable and indefinite. Thirty grains of opium will kill anyone not accustomed to it, although thirty grains of rhubarb won't always weaken him. Likewise, the fear of death will always cause a person to go twenty steps out of his way, although it will not always cause him to commit a bad deed.

And just as there is often a constant combination of volitional acts with their motives, so the inference about motives from acts is often as reliable as any reasoning about bodies. And this conclusion is always proportional to the constancy of the specified connection.

Our belief in testimony, our respect for history and, in fact, all kinds of moral evidence, as well as almost all our behavior in the course of life, are based on this.

Our author claims that this reasoning sheds new light on the whole dispute, for he puts forward a new definition of necessity. Indeed, even the most ardent defenders of free will must recognize such a combination and such inference regarding human action. They will only deny that this is due to the need in general. But then they must show that in the actions of matter we have the idea of ​​something else, and this, according to the previous reasoning, is impossible.

From the beginning to the end of this whole book there are very significant claims for new discoveries in philosophy; but if anything can give the author the right to a glorious name inventor, it is that he applies the principle of association of ideas, which permeates almost all of his philosophy. Our imagination has tremendous power over our ideas. And there are no ideas that would be different from each other, but which could not be separated, connected and combined in the imagination in any version of fictions. But, despite the dominance of imagination, there is a secret connection between individual ideas, which makes the spirit more often connect them together and, when one appears, to introduce the other. Hence arises what we call a propos in conversation; hence coherence in writing arises; from here comes that chain of thoughts that usually arises in people even with the most incoherent daydreaming. These principles of association boil down to three, namely: similarities- the picture naturally makes us think about the person who is depicted on it; spatial contiguity - when Saint Denis is mentioned, the idea of ​​Paris naturally comes to mind; causality - when we think of our son, we tend to direct our attention to the father. It is easy to imagine what broad implications these principles must have in the science of human nature, once we consider that, as far as the mind is concerned, they are the only connections that connect parts of the universe or connect us to something. or a person or object external to us. For since only through thought can any thing act on our affects, and since the latter are the only connecting [links] of our thoughts, then in reality they are for us that which holds the Universe together, and all actions of the mind must to a great extent depend on them.

Hume D. Abridged presentation (Treatise on human nature) // Anthology of world philosophy. - M., 1970. - S. 574-593.

“Is the world cognizable?” Is a traditional question that arose in ancient times, when philosophy was making its first steps.

This issue in epistemology is considered as a set of other resulting issues. For example, how do our thoughts about the world around us relate to this world itself? Is our thinking able to cognize the real world? Can we, in our ideas and concepts of the real world, constitute a true reflection of reality? The answers to these questions presuppose the complexity of cognition of objects, processes, situations, the presence of not only their external side, but also their internal one. Therefore, the question is not, but whether it is possible to reliably cognize objects, their essences and manifestations of essence.

In the history of philosophy, two positions have developed: cognitive-realistic and agnostic.

So, agnosticism (from the Greek agnostos - inaccessible to knowledge) is a philosophical doctrine that denies the possibility of knowing the objective world and the attainability of truth;

The presence of agnosticism in philosophy testifies to the fact that knowledge is a complex phenomenon, that there is something to think about, that it deserves special philosophical thinking.

All knowledge, according to agnostics, is acquired only through the senses, through the knowledge of phenomena. Consequently, the subject of human cognition can only be that which is accessible to these feelings, i.e. one sensual world. The moral principles and ideas created by man about a higher being, about God, are nothing more than the result of the same experience and activity of the soul and its natural desire to find an omnipresent and all-pervading force that determines and preserves the world order.

Initially, agnosticism referred exclusively to the possibility of knowing God, but soon it was extended to the possibility of knowing the objective world in principle, which immediately opposed many natural scientists and philosophers to itself.

D. Hume drew attention to causality, to its interpretation by scientists. According to the understanding then accepted, in causal relationships, the quality of the effect should be equal to the quality of the cause. He pointed out that there is a lot in the investigation that is not in the cause. Hume concluded: there is no objective reason, but only our habit, our expectation of the connection of a given phenomenon with others and the fixation of this connection in sensations. In principle, we do not know and cannot know whether he believed whether the essence of objects exists or does not exist as an external source of sensations. He argued: "Nature keeps us at a respectful distance from her secrets and only presents us with the knowledge of a few superficial qualities."

In his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume presented the problem in the following way

No amount of observation of white swans can lead to the conclusion that all swans are white, but observation of a single black swan is sufficient to refute this conclusion.

Hume was irritated by the fact that the science of his day experienced a shift from scholasticism based entirely on deductive reasoning (no emphasis on observing the real world) to an overuse of naive and unstructured empiricism, thanks to Francis Bacon. Bacon argued against "spinning the web of learning" with no practical result. Science shifted, emphasis on empirical observation. The problem is that, without proper method, empirical observation can be misleading. Hume began to warn against such knowledge and to emphasize the need for some rigor in the collection and interpretation of knowledge.

Hume believed that our knowledge begins with experience and ends with experience, without innate knowledge. Therefore, we do not know the reason for our experience. Since experience is always limited to the past, we cannot comprehend the future. For such judgments, Hume was considered a great skeptic in the possibility of knowing the world through experience.

Experience consists of perceptions, perceptions are divided into impressions (sensations and emotions) and ideas (memories and imaginations). After perceiving the material, the knower begins to process these representations. Decomposition by similarity and difference, far apart or near (space), and by causality. Everything is made up of impressions. And what is the source of the sensation of perception? Hume replies that there are at least three hypotheses:

• 1. There are images of objective objects (the theory of reflection, materialism).
• 2. The world is a complex of sensations of perception (subjective idealism).
• 3. The sensation of perception is evoked in our mind by God, the higher spirit (objective idealism).

Hume poses the question which of these hypotheses is correct. For this it is necessary to compare these types of perceptions. But we are shackled within the line of our perception and will never know what is behind it. So the question of what is the source of sensation is a fundamentally insoluble question. Anything is possible, but we can never verify it. There is no evidence of the existence of the world. You can neither prove nor disprove.

Sometimes the false impression is created that Hume asserts the absolute impossibility of knowledge, but this is not entirely true. We know the content of consciousness, so the world in consciousness is known. That is, we know the world that appears in our consciousness, but we will never know the essence of the world, we can only know the phenomena. Causal relationships in Hume's theory are the result of our habit. A man is a bundle of perceptions. agnosticism philosophical teaching hume

Hume saw the basis of morality in moral sense, but he denied free will, believing that all our actions are conditioned by affects. agnostic philosophy fetishization perception

There is, however, subjective causality - our habit, our expectation of a connection between one phenomenon and another (often by analogy with an already known connection) and the fixation of this connection in sensations. We cannot penetrate beyond these psychic connections. "Nature," asserted Hume, "keeps us at a respectful distance from its secrets and provides us with only knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects, hiding from us those forces and principles on which the actions of these objects entirely depend."

Let's see how Hume himself defined the essence of his philosophical position. It is known that he called her skeptical.

In the "Abridged presentation ..." "Treatise ..." Hume calls his teaching "very skeptical. Convinced of the weakness of the human spirit and the narrowness of its cognitive capabilities, Hume could not agree that there is no Therefore, in the Addendum to the first book of the Treatise ... where Hume once again returns to the problem of space, he tries to find a more flexible label for his skepticism and calls it just "mitigated."

Agnosticism is the most accurate definition of the basic content of Hume's philosophy. The deviation from agnosticism in the Treatise on Human Nature, expressed in the construction of a dogmatic scheme of the spiritual life of man, was undertaken by Hume not with the aim of shaking agnosticism, but, on the contrary, with the aim of implementing the recommendations arising from it. And they consisted in the rejection of attempts to penetrate into objective reality and in the cognitive sliding on the surface of phenomena, that is, in phenomenalism. In fact, this is just another name for Hume's agnosticism, but viewed as a method

Bourgeois historians of philosophy most often prefer to characterize Hume's method as "empirical (experimental, empirical)", that is, they do not go beyond the characterization given to him by Hume himself, and fix it without further analysis, often inappropriately identifying his method with the method Newton, about whom he wrote, for example, in the third book of Optics. Meanwhile, the empirical method differs from the empirical method. Hume did not conduct any experiments, including psychological ones, and his "empirical" (literally: experimental) method consisted in the requirement only to describe what directly belongs to consciousness. "... We will never be able," he wrote, "to penetrate far into the essence and structure of bodies so that we can perceive the principle on which their mutual influence depends."

Not understanding the dialectic of the relationship between relative and absolute truths, Hume eventually arrives at disbelief in scientific knowledge. A.I. Herzen aptly noted that | Hume's skepticism is capable of "killing all science with its irony, its negation, because it is not all science."

• 1. See, for example, D. G. G. M a c N a b b. David Hume. His theory of Knowledge and Morality. London, 1951, pp. 18 - 19. McNabb believes that Hume also used the "challenge method" to convince readers, explaining to them that wanting more than just orientation in phenomena, they themselves do not know what they really want ... (Cf. J. A. Passmore. Op. Cit., Where on page 67 an analogy of this method is drawn with thesis 6.53 in Wittgenstein's "Logical-Philosophical Treatise").
• 3. A.I. Hertsen. Fav. Philos. manuf. vol. I, p. 197.

Hume's favorite example is with bread, regarding which scientists seem to never know why people can eat it, although they can describe in different ways how people eat it. There is no need to specifically prove that this phenomenalist Hume's prohibition turned out to be as untenable as the later prediction of the positivist O. Comte that people will never be able to know the chemical composition of cosmic bodies!

Hume's phenomenalism expressed one of the characteristic features of the bourgeois worldview - the fetishization of the immediately given. Today in bourgeois philosophy there is a peculiar phenomenon that has a direct connection with this trait - this is the desire to lower philosophy as much as possible to the level of everyday consciousness, to adapt it to the outlook of the average bourgeois, to his intuitive reactions to the environment and those situations that arise in his daily life. In this endeavor, most of the bourgeois philosophers of the 20th century. - the heirs of David Hume (although not all of them are inclined to openly admit this). No wonder in the "Conclusion" to the first book of the "Treatise ..." Hume wrote that a skeptical mood is best expressed in the subordination of a person to the usual course of things.

Literature

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• 3. Frolov I.T. Introduction to philosophy. Textbook for universities. At 2 o'clock, Part 1.M.,
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